


THE HELLENISTIC PELOPONNESE: INTERSTATE RELATIONS

A NARRATIVE AND ANALYTIC HISTORY,
FROM THE FOURTH CENTURY TO 146BC



Ioanna Kralli

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The Classical Press of Wales, an independent venture, was founded in 1993, initially to support the work of classicists and ancient historians in Wales and their collaborators from further afield. More recently it has published work initiated by scholars internationally. While retaining a special loyalty to Wales and the Celtic countries, the Press welcomes scholarly contributions from all parts of the world.

The symbol of the Press is the Red Kite. This bird, once widespread in Britain, was reduced by 1905 to some five individuals confined to a small area known as ‘The Desert of Wales’ – the upper Tywi valley. Geneticists report that the stock was saved from terminal inbreeding by the arrival of one stray female bird from Germany. After much careful protection, the Red Kite now thrives – in Wales and beyond.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of ancient sources follow the forms used in *OCD*³; abbreviations of modern periodicals those in *L'Année Philologique*. In addition, the following abbreviations should be noted:

<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> .
<i>CID II</i>	J. Bousquet (ed.), <i>Corpus des Inscriptions de Delphes. Tome II: Les comptes du quatrième et du troisième siècle</i> , Paris 1989.
<i>CID IV</i>	F. Lefèvre (ed.), <i>Documents amphictioniques</i> (avec une note d'architecture par D. Laroche et des notes d'onomastique par O. Masson), Paris 2002.
<i>Corinth VIII.1</i>	B. D. Meritt (ed.), <i>Corinth, Greek Inscriptions</i> (1896–1927), VIII.1, Cambridge, Mass. 1931.
<i>Corinth VIII.3</i>	J. H. Kent (ed.), <i>Corinth, The Inscriptions</i> (1926–1950), VIII.3, Princeton 1966.
<i>CPCActs</i>	<i>Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre</i> .
<i>CPCPapers</i>	<i>Papers of the Copenhagen Polis Centre</i> .
<i>Curtius</i>	E. Curtius, <i>Peloponnesos. Eine historisch-geographische Beschreibung der Halbinsel I</i> , Gotha 1851.
<i>FD III</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes III. Epigraphie</i> , Paris 1909–.
<i>Halikarnassos</i>	D. F. McCabe, <i>Halikarnassos Inscriptions</i> . Text and List ‘The Princeton Project on the Inscriptions of Anatolia’, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1991.
<i>LAEpid</i>	W. Peek, <i>Inschriften aus dem Asklepieion von Epidauros</i> , Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philologisch-historische Klasse 60, 2, Berlin 1969.
<i>Inscr. Cret.</i>	M. Guarducci, <i>Inscriptiones Creticae : Opera et consilio Friderici Halbherr collectae</i> , vols I–V, Rome 1950.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Berlin 1873–.
<i>I. Magnesia</i>	O. Kern (ed.), <i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander</i> , Berlin 1900.
<i>I.Orop.</i>	B. C. Petrakos, <i>Οί ἐπιγραφές τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ</i> , Βιβλιοθήκη τῆς ἐν Ἀθῆναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας 170, Athens 1997.
<i>IPArk</i>	G. Thür and H. Taeuber (eds), <i>Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien</i> , Vienna 1994.

Abbreviations

<i>I.Rhamn.</i>	B. C. Petrakos, Ὁ Δῆμος τοῦ Ραμνοῦντος. Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρευνῶν (1813–1998), τ. II. Οἱ ἐπιγραφές, Βιβλιοθήκη τῆς ἐν Ἀθῆναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας 181, Athens 1999.
<i>ISE</i>	L. Moretti (ed.), <i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche. Testo critico, traduzione e commento</i> , I–II, Florence 1967, 1976.
<i>IvO</i>	W. Dittenberger and K. Purgold (eds), <i>Olympia: die Ergebnisse der von dem deutschen Reich veranstalteten Ausgrabung. V. Die Inschriften</i> , Berlin 1896.
<i>NIEpi</i>	W. Peek (ed.), <i>Neue Inschriften aus Epidauros</i> , Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philologisch-historische Klasse 63, 5, Berlin 1972.
<i>OCD</i> ³	S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , Oxford 1996, 3 rd ed.
<i>OGIS</i>	W. Dittenberger (ed.), <i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> , 2 vols, Leipzig 1903–1905.
<i>Olympiabericht VII</i>	E. Kunze (ed.), <i>Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia, VII</i> , Berlin 1961.
<i>Olympiabericht XI</i>	Mallwitz, A. et al. (eds), <i>Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia, XI</i> , Berlin 1999.
<i>P Oxy</i>	<i>Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i> , 1898–.
<i>RC</i>	C. B. Welles, <i>Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period. A Study in Greek Epigraphy</i> , London 1934.
<i>RE</i>	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (eds), <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , Munich 1893–.
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> , Leiden 1923–.
<i>SGDI</i>	H. Collitz et al. (eds) <i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften</i> , Göttingen 1884–1915.
<i>Syll.</i> ³	W. Dittenberger, F. Hiller von Gaertringen, J. Kirchner, H. R. Pomtow and E. Ziebarth (eds) <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> ³ , 4 vols, Leipzig 1914–1924.
<i>SVa II</i>	H. Bengtson (ed.), <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums II. Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.</i> , Munich 1975, 2 nd ed.
<i>SVa III</i>	H. Schmitt (ed.), <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums III. Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.</i> , Munich 1969.

Note on literary passages and inscriptions

For the literary passages the Loeb texts and translations have been employed, with occasional adjustments. These are noted when they lead to significant differences in the interpretation of a given passage. Proper names are usually hellenized.

As to inscriptions, the asterisk indicates the edition used by the author. The slash sign signals alternative places where an inscription may be read. Where no asterisk is employed, it is indicated that there is no or hardly any difference between the texts. Variations between different editions are noted where necessary.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this book is to provide a thorough examination of interstate relations in the Hellenistic Peloponnese, hoping to solve the ‘Peloponnesian tangle’ (Gruen’s phrase: 1984, 120), or at least to clarify it. Individual subjects and periods, such as the Achaian Confederacy or Hellenistic Sparta, have been studied by others extensively though to some extent in isolation; here we attempt to provide a framework that embraces the general political history of Peloponnesian states over a long period, from the battle of Leuktra in 371 down to 146.¹

The study consciously concentrates on presenting overall patterns of action rather than motives and psychology because the former are less speculative, given the nature of our sources. As Aristotle puts it, one should expect ‘that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits’ (*Eth. Nic.* 1094b.4). There is not much scope for explanation of motives behind the policies of the various states. Our sources do not provide us with discussions in assemblies or in councils or with information on the particular circumstances of most Peloponnesian *poleis*. Literary sources in particular are largely interested in the psychology and the (alleged) motives of individual leaders and they are in different ways superficial or unreliable: Polybius is malevolent towards Sparta, Plutarch and Pausanias are also biased while Diodorus is superficial.

Strabo (8.1.3) calls the Peloponnese ‘almost the akropolis of the whole of Greece’. Similarly Pausanias is interested in the Peloponnese because this region was, in his view, the heart of resistance first to Macedon and later to Rome (Bearzot 1992, 18–20). But in fact, the Peloponnese was no such thing. To understand its limited success as the akropolis of Greece we have to see the internal divisions.

In order to comprehend a large part of political interstate relations in the Hellenistic Peloponnese we have to go some years before Alexander’s death in 323 – the conventional beginning of the Hellenistic period – and explore the long-term consequences of two monumental developments in the history of the Peloponnese, both involving Sparta. From the wider viewpoint of the eastern

Mediterranean and the creation of kingdoms ruled by Macedonians, Alexander's death and the beginning of the creation of the Hellenistic kingdoms in 323 is undoubtedly *the* turning point. But from the more narrow perspective of the Peloponnese, the battle of Leuktra in 371 and the battle of Chaironeia in 338 were much more of turning points than 323. The year 371 was no less important than 338 because in its aftermath the geo-political map in the Peloponnese, as it had been for three centuries, changed dramatically, for the first time and at the expense of Sparta (Cartledge 2002b, 5). The Theban victory over the Spartans in 371, at the battle of Leuktra (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.7–16), signalled the end of Spartan dominance over the Peloponnese or the end of the 'Pax Spartana' (David 1981, 81). The subsequent foundation of the Messenian state in 369 deprived Sparta of almost half its territory.² The second major development was the re-arrangement of borders in the aftermath of the battle of Chaironeia in 338, following the intervention of Philip II of Macedon, which further diminished Spartan territory to the benefit of its rivals.

Cartledge's observation (2002b, 16) with regard to Sparta can be applied to the entire Peloponnese: its history 'cannot be slotted conveniently into the conventional "Classical" to "Hellenistic" transition'. However, if we have to choose a date closer to Alexander's era and one in which a king was involved as the starting point of Peloponnesian Hellenistic history, then this has to be 338 and its aftermath.

An essential part of our inquiry into interstate relations – both friendly and hostile – will concern continuities, the extent to which the origin of certain conflicts or liaisons, and political attitudes as a whole in the Hellenistic period, can be traced back to the situation created because of the decline of Sparta and its loss of grip over most of the Peloponnese. I intend to examine how far we are entitled to talk about a 'long 4th century' in the case of the Peloponnese as in the case of Asia Minor (Ma 2000, 353). Or, to be bolder, I would like to argue for a 'longer' Hellenistic period than customarily thought, although the term will be used in the conventional way, i.e. for the period after 323. Philip II would thus appear to be more of a Hellenistic king, from the perspective of his sweeping influence on Greek affairs. To this end, it is expedient to present interstate relations in the Peloponnese for the period between 371 and 338, focusing on events that remained influential in the next two centuries.

This study goes down to 146 and the subjection of mainland Greece to Rome, and follows a chronological arrangement. Thus the history of the Hellenistic Peloponnese starts and ends with Sparta. It starts with a decrease of its territorial possessions through the intervention of Philip II after the battle of Chaironeia, and ends with the so-called Achaian War, which was conducted by the Romans, (allegedly) because of the Achaian treatment of Sparta. Of interest are the ways in which Sparta, in decline or especially in resurgence, continues to shape policies and attitudes of Peloponnesian *poleis*, by provoking either interstate conflict or coalitions. There is explored the extent to which Peloponnesian *poleis* change over time or hold firmly onto their attitudes towards Sparta – be they hostile or friendly.

Chapter 1 discusses the consequences of the battle of Leuktra: the various and – occasionally – changing attitudes towards Sparta and the consequent shifting alignment of powers; the attempts at peace as well as the attempt at unity of the Arkadians via the creation of the Arkadian Confederacy,³ the dismemberment of the latter and the subsequent signs of occasional revival in a rather loose form. Of particular interest are the changes in intra-Arkadian relations observed after the battle of Mantinea in 362. Finally, there will be discussed the formation of the new political entities in the Peloponnese, Messene and Megalopolis. This discussion will form the background for the discussion of Messene's and Megalopolis' relations with Sparta in the 3rd and the 2nd centuries.

Chapter 2 examines the influence exercised on intra-Peloponnesian relations by Macedon from the mid-4th century and until the aftermath of the battle of Chaironeia: first, the alignment of powers and the increasingly pronounced tendency of Peloponnesian states to keep clear of military engagements. The main themes of the chapter are the re-arrangement of the geopolitical map of the Peloponnese by Philip II, the new great powers in terms of territory and the emergence of the practice of treating Peloponnesian territories as gifts, as well as the artificial unity achieved by the League of Corinth. Finally, we examine the brief military revival of Sparta under Agis III and the reaction of Peloponnesian states. In this context, the alignment of Arkadian *poleis* (apart from Megalopolis) with the Spartans holds a prominent position.

Chapter 3 presents the impact of the wars of the *Diadochoi* on intra-Peloponnesian relations. Our information is hardly satisfactory but what

stands out is the unanimous political stance of the Peloponnesian *poleis*, especially the Arkadian ones (again with the exception of Megalopolis), against Kassandros. This unanimity may have taken the form of a revival of both the Arkadian Confederacy and of a 'Peloponnesian' League of Corinth, by the Macedonian regent Polyperchon. This and the short-lived revival of the League of Corinth by Demetrios Poliorketes represent attempts at unification by various agents and for various reasons. On the other hand, emphasis is also laid on the disruptive influence of the *Diadochoi* wars, e.g. on the Achaian Confederacy.

Chapter 4 discusses the least documented period under examination, the one from 280 to the mid-3rd century. The focal point of interest is the re-emergence of Sparta in the role of champion of Greek freedom against Macedonian rule, first in 280 and even more so in the 260s, and the concomitant attitudes of Peloponnesian *poleis* towards Sparta. Arkadian support for Sparta is again a noteworthy fact, while, due to the invasion of king Pyrrhos of Epeiros, there are also observed important, temporary changes in the relations of Sparta with its traditional enemies, i.e. the Argives and the Messenians.

From the mid-3rd century onwards, the history of the Peloponnese is dominated by the Achaian Confederacy. From the early 220s down to 146, intra-Peloponnesian relations essentially mean relations between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta, and the attitudes of Peloponnesian *poleis* towards the one and the other. Notably, the political history of Peloponnesian states is presented by literary sources as the life and times of prominent individuals and their often conflicting ambitions, in keeping with an era in which powerful monarchs shaped history. There is very little information as to what prompted the citizens of each *polis* to take sides with one or the other power or with one or the other statesman. Occasionally, we have sweeping comments by our literary sources but there is hardly any description of a discussion in an assembly or a council of an individual *polis*.

Chapter 5 analyzes the forms of expansion of the Achaian Confederacy, at the expense of Macedonian control over a large part of the Peloponnese, and the achievement of (temporary) unity in north-eastern and central Peloponnese (from the mid-3rd century to 229). In the north-eastern Peloponnese, in particular, one aspect of unity involves the settlement of a dispute between Corinth and Epidaurus, to the benefit of the latter, via arbitration arranged by the Achaian

Confederacy. The main subject of the chapter, however, is the extent to which unity was the result of coercion of certain member states. Our information largely concerns Argos, the eastern Arkadian *poleis* and Megalopolis. Apart from Megalopolis, the other *poleis* were not particularly enthusiastic members. Thus, the viability of the new federal state was undermined and the way was prepared for the challenge by the Spartan king Kleomenes III.

Chapter 6 examines the clash between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta under Kleomenes III, over supremacy in the Peloponnese (228–222) – the first officially declared war among Peloponnesian states after 362 and the last war fought by the Peloponnesians without external interference until the intervention of the Macedonian king Antigonos Doson on the Achaian side (in 224). We shall examine the nature of Kleomenes' ambitions and how far these represented either continuity or departure from past Spartan history. An interwoven subject is the unattractiveness of the Achaian Confederacy on the one hand, and the allure of Sparta on the other, particularly for the eastern Arkadian *poleis*, the Corinthians, and for some at least of the Argives. The last theme of the chapter concerns the re-arrangement of the geo-political map of the Peloponnese and the re-emergence of the royal practice of treating Peloponnesian states as gifts.

Chapter 7 discusses the Peloponnesian part in the so-called Social War (220–217), between the Aitolian Confederacy on the one hand, the Hellenic Alliance (previously founded by Antigonos Doson), under Philip V, on the other. Sparta plays a role of secondary importance while the Eleans come to the forefront of events, under the Aitolian aegis. The chapter focuses on abandonment of Messenian neutrality and, especially, on Elean hostility towards Achaian *poleis*, the nature of Elean expansionism and its curtailment by Philip V. Emphasis is laid on the culmination of Achaian military weakness, resulting among other things in the alienation of the original Achaian Confederacy (the Achaian *poleis*) and the corresponding establishment of the Macedonian king as donor of Arkadian states to the Achaian Confederacy.

Chapter 8 examines two interwoven subjects: unification of the Peloponnese and the protracted, intermittent war between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta, from the end of the Social War down to 146. The clash is viewed essentially as the culmination of the ancestral hostility between Sparta and Megalopolis, going back to the latter's

foundation in c.370. By 191 the Achaian Confederacy had come to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese but emphasis is laid on unity being partly the result of Roman territorial gifts to the Achaian Confederacy and partly the result of coercion exercised by individual leaders, mainly Megalopolitans, on Sparta and Messene. Of particular interest is the case of Argos which came under the control of the Spartan Nabis between 197 and 195; here the question is whether this brief period signalled a major (albeit brief) departure from traditional hostility between Argos and Sparta. The highly problematic and much discussed relations of the Achaian Confederacy with Sparta and Messene after their incorporation will also be presented, focusing on the hardened attitude of Megalopolitan statesmen. For the period extending from the 180s onwards, epigraphic evidence provides us with information on the integration of Sparta (and other members) and especially on the regulation of relations between Megalopolis and its neighbours. The long-standing territorial conflict between Sparta and (probably) Megalopolis is viewed as at least partly responsible for the outbreak of the so-called Achaian War of 148–6, that led to the dismemberment of the Achaian Confederacy and the incorporation of mainland Greece by Rome (taking into account the tendency of our defective sources to ascribe everything to foolishly passionate or corrupt leaders).

The final chapter (9) deals with peaceful co-existence and amicable relations between Peloponnesian states, big and small, via the attribution of honours such as the *proxenia* and the *theōrodoikia*, as well as the participation in major festivals. As a whole, our surviving evidence is mainly epigraphic and it largely involves Epidauros, Argos and Arkadian *poleis*. Additionally, literary evidence informs us about participation in the Olympic Games conducted by Elis. We have chosen to deal with epigraphic evidence separately because most of our inscriptions cannot be securely dated and therefore cannot be ascribed to a specific historical context, although associations will be made whenever evidence allows. And this brings us to the general subject of the evidence at our disposal.

* * *

The dearth of literary sources for the Hellenistic period is a well-known, lamentable fact which, nevertheless, has to be stated once again with regard to the Peloponnese. For the late 4th century (after the battle of Chaironeia in 338) we largely draw on the world history of Diodorus and on Plutarch's *Lives* (mainly *Demetrios*), both of them late sources (1st century BC and 2nd AD respectively) and interested primarily in the *Diadochoi*. Furthermore, Diodorus' books covering the period after 301 have only survived in an extremely fragmentary state.

The first decades of the 3rd century in the Peloponnese remain largely obscure. The picture changes, drastically, when we get to the second half of the 3rd century. Political and military developments, from one end of the Mediterranean to the other, form the background against which Polybius, a Peloponnesian from Megalopolis and our most helpful surviving historiographical source for the entire Hellenistic period, sets out to describe the expansion of Rome, from 220 to 146, after having covered in summary the period between 264 and 220. With regard to the Peloponnese in particular, Polybius describes the rise and expansion of the Achaian Confederacy, its alliance with Macedon and its clash with Sparta; the so-called Social War conducted by the Achaian Confederacy and Macedon against the Aitolian Confederacy and certain Peloponnesian states – all these constitute the background to the three Macedonian Wars between Rome and Macedon. In these wars the Greek world was divided between the two powers; the Aitolian and the Achaian Confederacies were almost constantly in opposite camps. The Achaian Confederacy went over to the Romans in 198, while the Aitolians were on Rome's side and against Macedon in the first two wars but parted company with the Romans in 196. Set against the background of Roman expansion in the East is the conflict between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy, which was ended with the Achaian War in 146 and the subjugation of the Greek mainland.

There are certain serious impediments to our study. Out of Polybius' 40 books only 5 have survived complete. His main subject, the expansion of Rome eastward and its role in Greek affairs, is preserved in the later history of Livy (late 1st century).

For our purposes, two problems with Polybius' work are potentially serious. Firstly, he was an eye-witness and an active politician but as such he was heavily prejudiced against the enemies of the Achaian Confederacy, most notably Sparta. Secondly, Polybius organizes his

work around major wars and the major powers and leaders of his time. Consequently, he is interested in interstate relations in the Peloponnese only so far as these form part of these major wars and is heavily inclined to see everything from the perspective of individuals.⁴ He is not particularly helpful for someone who wishes to inquire into relations between Peloponnesian *poleis* independently of their military-political relations with lesser or greater powers operating in the Peloponnese – the Achaian Confederacy, Sparta, Macedon and Rome – or relations between Peloponnesian *poleis* and other parts of the Greek world, be they political, economic or cultural. In this context, it is lesser *poleis* (and there were many in the Peloponnese) which suffer especially from lack of attention.

The aforementioned features of Polybius' work are to a certain extent transmitted to the much later works of Plutarch and Pausanias. Plutarch's *Lives* – *Pyrrhos* and, especially, *Aratos*, *Agis and Kleomenes* and *Philopoimen* – are a valuable source of information for Sparta, the Achaian Confederacy and their clash from the mid-3rd to the early 2nd centuries. Being biographies, these works are not primarily concerned with historical accuracy and they are prone to either excessive praise or excessive disapproval of the individuals concerned. Plutarch does not fabricate stories but he tends to be less critical when he deals with an individual's psychology (Pelling 2002, 146–51, 153).

Seven out of the ten Books of Pausanias' *Periegesis* concern Peloponnesian regions (Lafond 1994, 170–1). The Hellenistic element in his work is certainly not negligible (Ameling 1994, 123, 135–7) but Pausanias did not set out to write history. What he chooses to narrate 'springs from a site or monument' (Habicht 1998a, 95). Nowhere does he mention Polybius explicitly. However, it is clear that he has used his work (perhaps through an intermediate source), especially in book VII on Achaia.⁵ Book VII is particularly useful because Pausanias covers here the period extending from after the Third Macedonian War until the sack of Corinth (167–146), focusing on the Spartan and Achaian leaders who played a decisive role in relations with Rome. In fact, Pausanias is our only source for the years 149–147.⁶ Book IV on Messenia is also important, referring mainly to events of the late 3rd – early 2nd centuries (from the age of Kleomenes III to the age of Nabis). As in the case of Polybius, we have to work our way through Pausanias' prejudice against the Spartans. The latter are presented as a factor of

upheaval, obstructing the Panhellenic cause promoted by Aratos and the Achaian Confederacy (Bearzot 1992, 136–45, 150–63) while there is a ‘love story’ between Pausanias and the Messenians (Auberger 1992).

Our main literary sources – Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Pausanias – preserve layers of information from historians whose work has survived only in fragments, such as the 3rd-century historians Hieronymos of Kardia and Phylarchos (of Athens or Naukratis). Hieronymos wrote the history of the wars of the *Diadochoi* until 272 (death of Pyrrhos, king of Epeiros) and is not particularly interested in mainland Greece. Phylarchos takes up from where Hieronymos stops but is much more interested in mainland Greek affairs from the perspective of the Greeks.⁷ He is particularly valuable since he offers a favourable view of Sparta and Kleomenes III, diametrically opposite to that of Polybius. The irony is that Polybius himself, a declared enemy of the kind of ‘tragic’ history represented by Phylarchos, preserves most interesting Phylarchan passages. Plutarch’s *Lives of Agis and Kleomenes* are also seriously indebted to Phylarchos. Pausanias also draws on Phylarchos but does not share his pro-Spartan sympathies (Bearzot 1992, 136). Another important source surviving mainly in the works of Polybius and Plutarch is the *Hypomnemata* of the Achaian statesman Aratos (originally consisting of some 30 books and going down to 220: Meadows 2013). His work has the advantage of being the product of an eye-witness and active agent of history but is also biased and often turns into *apologia* (Haegemans and Kosmetatou 2005, 123–9).

* * *

A history of interstate relations in the Peloponnese must also draw on epigraphic evidence, because inscriptions provide different or even contrasting information, necessary for constructing as complete a picture as possible. Literary evidence focuses mainly on wars and on individuals, whereas public inscriptions – fragmentary though they are in most of our cases – focus on collective action and to a large extent constitute testimony for attempts at peaceful co-existence between *poleis*, via attribution of honours and privileges, regulation of problems such as boundaries or exploitation of territory. It is no coincidence that Polybius, writing the history of wars, does not refer to arbitration, a widespread institution in the Hellenistic period.⁸ Had only literary

evidence survived, we would never know about the attempts at peaceful solutions to problems between member-states of the Achaian Confederacy.

Only a limited number of the c.130 Peloponnesian *poleis*⁹ figure on the epigraphic record; most only rarely.¹⁰ Of the Peloponnesian *poleis* present some are (much) more prolific than others. As Shipley (2005, 325) has observed, the peak of epigraphic evidence for Argos is from the late 4th to the mid-3rd century, while a sharp increase is observed in Arkadia and Messenia in the 3rd century. This is also the case for Lakonia, Achaia and Messenia in the 2nd century. Shipley (2005, 327–8) also calls attention to what he calls ‘epigraphic centralism’, i.e., ‘to what extent the finds are concentrated in one or two central places in a region’. He observes that in the 4th and 3rd centuries, most inscriptions come from only one site each in Korinthia, Lakonia, and Messenia and from two sites in the Argolid. By contrast, Arkadian inscriptions are distributed over 10 sites. As for the 2nd century: ‘centralization increases sharply in Korinthia, western Arkadia, and western Achaia but decreases in eastern Arkadia, Messenia, and Laconia’.

The usual limitations affect informed examination of the inscriptions, the first one being that they are often broken or mutilated. While some inscriptions allude to interesting liaisons between certain Peloponnesian *poleis*, and also with other parts of the Greek world, a substantial number of them are only very roughly dated.

Epigraphic evidence regarding relations with the Macedonian kings is largely confined to a limited number of inscriptions on statue bases, mainly for Antigonos III Doson, ruler of Macedon from 229 to 221.¹¹ The surviving evidence shows that only Messene recorded on stone its treaties with Hellenistic rulers: Lysimachos and most probably Polyperchon (see pp.96, 102–3). Of course, one cannot tell whether this constitutes evidence of absence of similar treaties made by or recorded by other Peloponnesian *poleis*. On the other hand, there has survived from Epidauros a copy of the foundation charter of the Hellenic League of 302 – a creation of Demetrios Poliorketes (see pp.101–2).

The rarity of decrees for royal officials is so striking, especially in comparison with contemporary Athens, that it cannot be accidental. Either Peloponnesian *poleis* did not cultivate friendly relations with royal officials, or they did not feel compelled to advertise on stone such connections.

The Peloponnese has produced mainly honorific decrees, admittedly far from detailed, and inscriptions recording the settlement of disputes (usually territorial) between two *poleis* by either Peloponnesian or foreign judges. The number of Hellenistic Peloponnesian inscriptions gets nowhere near the volume or the detail of Athenian or Asia Minor inscriptions. Part of the explanation lies in the perishable material used in certain regions, such as Argos, Arkadia or Elis which used to inscribe on bronze.¹² However, there are other parameters we should also take into account. Firstly, until as late as the end of the 4th century the culture of the written word had been an almost exclusively Athenian phenomenon, associated with the acme of the democracy and the empire, while it had been in an embryonic stage in the rest of the Greek world, the Peloponnese included. In general, the practice of inscribing decisions on stone started spreading at the end of the 4th century and became established in the 3rd century. It should be noted that drafting and recording of decrees is not necessarily directly related to the political importance or the size of the *polis*.¹³

Certain of the Peloponnesian *poleis* only emerged as *poleis* in the political (or even in the urban) sense in the 4th century – the most spectacular examples being Messene and Megalopolis – and therefore they could hardly have had any tradition of recording collective decisions on stone.

Based on the Athenian example, it appears that the recording of decisions on stone was the expression of a powerful *dēmos*. Most Peloponnesian *poleis* in the Classical period were either oligarchic or constitutionally unstable or, in any case, they had not enjoyed the experience of a robust democracy.¹⁴ Division within a society and the consequent lack of social and political stability can account for the lack of decrees. It is usually assumed, and not without good reason, that restricted oligarchies did not favour recording decisions on stone. It is useful to bear in mind that Argos, which presents the most prolific record of inscriptions in the Hellenistic Peloponnese, had been democratic for the best part of the Classical period. On the other hand, at least in the Peloponnese after 338, the recording of decisions on stone is not necessarily the product of democratic regimes.

Spartan dominance is a related factor. In the Classical period Sparta had no literary tradition and had largely kept the Peloponnese backward in this respect, whether consciously or not. For one thing, it would not

have been much in the interest of the Spartans to lay down with precision the terms of their relations with their (subordinate) allies. Furthermore, since Sparta was the major foreign policy maker in the Peloponnese, there was not much room for decisions to be taken and recorded by the individual *poleis*—members of the Peloponnesian League – at least not with regard to foreign policy.

However, Peloponnesian inscriptions from the 330s onwards become numerous enough – in comparison with the output of the Classical period – to allow Shipley (2005, 327) to speak of an ‘epigraphic habit’¹⁵ emerging and establishing itself in the Peloponnese in the Hellenistic period. Slightly modifying Shipley’s term, I would rather speak of an ‘epigraphic mood’, in the sense that Peloponnesian *poleis* neither present us with a picture of regularity in their epigraphic practices over time, with respect to the number of inscriptions they produce, nor do these inscriptions have an even distribution geographically.

Peloponnesian epigraphy is a series of outbursts. Flowerings of inscriptions, from different states and at different periods, arise and disappear often without for us any obvious explanation. The outbursts in the epigraphic output correspond to extraordinary inconsistencies in the history of the Peloponnese. Certain *poleis* forge bonds with other Peloponnesian *poleis* as well as the outside world, by awarding honours to citizens of both Peloponnesian and non-Peloponnesian origins, while others remain apparently introvert.

Despite these limitations, epigraphic evidence makes it possible to add or highlight significant aspects of the history of traditionally important *poleis*, as well as to acquire information on the history of the less important *poleis*. Combined with literary sources, inscriptions can help us present patterns of relations between Peloponnesian *poleis*.

Notes

¹ All dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

² Cartledge 2002b, 6; Shipley 2000a, 388–9, Table I and Map.

³ I follow the distinction applied by Larsen 1968, xiv–xv: the term ‘League’ is taken to apply to organizations such as alliances or amphictyonies, while ‘Confederacy’ applies to federal states; Greek language uses *koinon*, *sympoliteia* or even *ethnos* to denote a federal state. However, Beck and Funke (2015, 13–14) rightly stress the difficulties in applying rigid categories, due both to ancient fluid practices as well as to the different semantics in modern languages. See also Dmitriev (2011, 28–9) who labels

‘confederacies’, ‘leagues’ and ‘federations’ as military alliances and points out that these terms are modern creations and that therefore it is futile to engage in debates about their meaning. These terms are indeed modern inventions but a distinction is appropriate for the sake of clarity.

⁴ See Pédech (1964, 206–10, 254) on the supreme role ascribed to personalities by Polybius.

⁵ Musti 1994, 18, 32; Errington 1969, 238–40.

⁶ Lafond 1994, 171–6; Ameling 1994, 140–1.

⁷ Hornblower, J. 1981, 18–75 on Hieronymos as a source for Diodorus’ Books 18–20; Landucci Gattinoni 2008, x–xxiv, against the assumption that Hieronymos was Diodorus’ sole source for the above-mentioned books (but cf. the review by Meeus 2009); see Gabba 1957, Marasco (1981, 31–43) and Pédech (1989, 400–7, 428–9, 439–46, 449, 455–93), on Phylarchos as a source for Plutarch’s *Pyrrhos*, and *Agis and Kleomenes*; Bearzot 1992, 133–5, on Pausanias’ use of Hieronymos and Phylarchos; Meadows (1995, 100–2, 113), on Pausanias’ use of Aratos’ *Memoirs*, and in general his preference for historians contemporary with events; for an overall evaluation see Habicht 1998a, 95–116.

⁸ I exclude here the reference to the re-arrangement of Peloponnesian boundaries by Philip II in 338/7 (Polyb. 9.28.7, 33.11–12).

⁹ Shipley 2005, 315, for the number of Peloponnesian *poleis*.

¹⁰ Shipley (2005, 325) provides an illuminating table of epigraphic activity by region, from the 4th to the 2nd century.

¹¹ *Megalopolis* for Philip II: ed. pr. Lauter and Spyropoulos 1998, 445–7 (= *SEG* 48.521); *Argos* for Pyrrhos: *ISE* 37a; *Epidauros* for Antigonos III Doson: *IG* IV².1.589+590a+frgs / Dow and Edson 1937, 130, no.4 [*IG* IV².1.589]/*ISE* 46 / **LAEpid* 250/ Kotsidu 2000, no.56 [E] [*LAEpid* 250]; *Mantineia/Antigoneia* for Doson: *IG* V.2.299 / Dow and Edson, 1937, 131, no.6 (= *SEG* 11.1089); *Geronthrai* for Doson: *IG* V.1.1122 / Dow and Edson 1937, 132, no.8; *Epidauros* for Philip V: *IG* IV².1.590b / Dow and Edson 1937, 131, no.5 [*IG* IV².1.590a+590b]/ **ISE* 47/ Kotsidu 2000, no.57 [E] [*IG* IV².1.590b]; *Sikyön* for Philip V: *IG* IV 427 / Dow and Edson 1937, 131–2, no.7. See also *Elis* for Philip II, Alexander, Seleukos, Antigonos Monophthalmos: Paus. 6.11.1/ Kotsidu 2000, no.64. It is uncertain whether the statues of Antigonos Doson and Philip V, crowned by Hellas, were dedicated by the Eleans (Paus. 16.2–3).

¹² Plassart and Blum 1914, 450; Moretti, *ISE*, I, p.136; Perlman 2000, 153 and n.240; Kritzas 2006, 404–5.

¹³ N.B.: all observations presented here are based on the surviving record. I am fully aware that absence of evidence might be more or less accidental.

¹⁴ The term ‘oligarchy’ covers a variety of regimes. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1279b17–19) explicitly connects oligarchy with constitutional authority in the hands of those in possession of property, especially landed property. Furthermore, Aristotle (*Pol.* 1293a12–34) classifies four varieties of oligarchy, depending on the size of the estates (from small to large) and of the power group (from broad-based to narrow): see Ostwald 2000, 391–3. Gehrke (1985, 315–20) distinguishes between narrow and broad oligarchies.

¹⁵ The term is employed by MacMullen 1982 for the Roman Empire.

FROM LEUKTRA TO MANTINEIA (371–362)

Attitudes to Sparta and attempts at peace

The early 4th century in the Peloponnese was a period of constant warfare but also of repeated attempts at peace, which were largely the result of external pressure (of the Persian king) or threat (from Thebes). They were not so much the result of an acknowledgement of the merits of peace in itself (the peace of 362 is not part of this pattern: see p.18). Ryder (1965, 37–8) draws a fine distinction between ‘selfish pacifism’ and ‘pacifist idealism’ pointing out that the ‘incentives to selfish pacifism – wealth, trade and war-weariness in its many forms – were growing more pressing on the Greeks in general...but there is less certainty about the growth of pacifist idealism’. However, the first multilateral peace was the so-called King’s Peace, in the spring of 386, which signalled the end of the Corinthian War between Boiotia, Corinth, Argos, and Athens on the one hand, Sparta and its allies on the other.¹ Ultimately the Persian king took the Spartan side and enforced peace. It was declared that ‘all *poleis*, great and small, will be autonomous (= independent)’ (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31).² It was made clear then that peace could only be maintained by force of arms, as Sordi acutely observed (1985, 5–6: ‘pace armata’; also Errington 1990, 87). Neither then nor later did all parties involved see eye to eye on the issue of *autonomia*, that is, independence – at the time. The earlier slogan of *autonomia* and the later one of *eleutheria* became open to different interpretations.³ For Sparta in this period, independence of Greek *poleis* was translated into obstructing unity among its neighbours and attacking military alliances.⁴ For a great *polis*, i.e. one aspiring to hegemony, the perfect degree of freedom was perceived as domination over smaller, i.e. less powerful, *poleis* (Gauthier 1987–89, 190–1). In our case, in the second half of the 3rd and the first half of the 2nd centuries freedom for the Peloponnesians was translated into struggle for dominance of the Achaian Confederacy over Sparta.

After 386, attempts at a Common Peace were made again in 375; in 372/1, shortly before the battle of Leuktra; another shortly after the battle, and the last one ten years later, in 362. The very repetition of these agreements suggests failure but Cawkwell’s rather positive view (1961, 86)

about their nature should be endorsed: ‘the series of Congresses were a series of diplomatic negotiations in which concessions were made by various parties in recognition of the changing balance of power’.

The short-lived peace of 375 (Diod. Sic. 15.38.4; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1) between Athens and Sparta was brought about by the fear caused by the Theban rise to power and it amounted to acknowledging Athens’ and Sparta’s respective spheres of hegemony.⁵

By 372/1, the Theban threat⁶ once again forced the two traditional hegemonic powers to agree upon peace.⁷ The initiative belonged to the Athenians who invited both the Thebans and the Spartans. This time, the issue of the small *poleis*’ autonomy came powerfully to the fore. The Thebans asked to take the oath in the name of all Boiotians; king Agesilaos bluntly refused and excluded Thebes from the peace.⁸ From the perspective of the development in the notion of peace, Ryder (1965, 68) has underlined the importance of a particular clause: those who did not wish to fight to defend the peace were not obliged by oath to do so (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18). For Ryder, this represents ‘the first step towards the creation of a system to guarantee the peace because it involved no extra surrender of sovereignty on the part of the signatory city’.

However, the insistence of the Thebans on taking the oath in the name of all Boiotians gave the Spartans the excuse to invade Boiotia (under the leadership of king Kleombrotos) allegedly to secure the autonomy of the Boiotians. For the Spartans, autonomy for the Greek *poleis* had come to be translated into domination over Thebes, but the Thebans were not innocent either. In any case, this most unsuccessful attempt at peace led to the battle of Leuktra⁹ and to the downfall of Sparta.

With hindsight, we may say that 371 marked a turning point, but the Peloponnesian states would not have automatically assumed that there was no possibility of Spartan resurgence. First of all, the *polis* of Sparta itself remained inviolate. Certain Peloponnesian states – Tegea, Mantinea, Corinth, Phleious, Sikyon, Achaia – continued to follow the Spartans for a while, much to the surprise of the Athenians: the Spartans had not been reduced to the sad condition of the Athenians in 404 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1, 4.19–20). The experience of the Peloponnesian War would have taught all parties involved not to underestimate Spartan ability for a comeback. They would have remembered, some more vividly than others, that they had written the Spartans off in 421 (the year of the Peace of Nikias) and then the Spartans emphatically returned to power at the battle of Mantinea in 418 (Thuc. 5.66–73). The Spartans did not accept their defeat at Leuktra as final (the ephors issued a call to arms) and attempted to regain ground by forming an alliance with Athens in the early summer of 369¹⁰

(Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.17–18, 5.33–49; 7.1.12–14). They even won a victory (admittedly not significant in the long run) over the joint forces of the Arkadians, the Argives and the Messenians in the so-called ‘Tearless Battle’ (allegedly, no Spartan was slain) in 368/7.¹¹

In terms of territory, even after the liberation of Messenia in 369 there was no balance of power in the Peloponnese since Sparta continued to retain control of extensive territory, more than any other *polis* in the Peloponnese, and was still capable of inspiring fear. Simply, three centuries of dominance could not be forgotten. This in itself was a motivation as good as any to lead to a unification of states, i.e. the Arkadian Confederacy.

Reactions of the Peloponnesian states after Leuktra and until the battle of Mantinea in 362 were determined by a number of factors. Past relations, either hostile or amicable, with Sparta certainly played a part. Another factor was how far Sparta represented a threat or protection against one’s neighbours (e.g. for the *poleis* in the Argolid against Argos or for Orchomenos against Mantinea) or an obstacle to one’s territorial ambitions (the case of Elis for instance).

Attitudes of the Peloponnesians towards Sparta were also determined by the pressure or coercion exercised by the Theban army and the extent to which certain Peloponnesians (especially certain members of the Arkadian Confederacy), at some point, saw the Thebans as a threat equally serious to the Spartans or the Spartans as preferable allies or protectors or overlords, e.g. the helots of Lakonia or the *perioikoi* south of Sparta, especially Gytheion.¹²

The victory of the Thebans provided a catalyst, unleashing the full force of ‘centrifugal impulses’ operating in the Peloponnese already before 371, but the Theban role has been overstressed, as Funke argues.¹³ It was diplomatic initiative undertaken by the Peloponnesian rivals of Sparta that provided the Thebans with the opportunity to take action in the area (Roy 1994, 187–8). On the other hand, the enemies of Sparta dared not take the military initiative. Very much to the point Diodorus (15.62.3) writes about the Arkadians that they ‘felt a prudent respect for the strength of Sparta’: εὐλαβοῦντο τὸ βάρος τῆς Σπάρτης. The Spartans, crippled though they were, were still capable of generating fear.

The Thebans avoided invading the Peloponnese immediately after their victory (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.20–3). They did invade in the winter of 370/69, under the leadership of Epameinondas (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.24–5). It was the Eleans, the Arkadians and the Argives who took the initiative, offered alliance to the Thebans and urged them to invade Lakonia. Following the advice of the Eleans, the allies, without the Thebans, declined battle against

Agésilao when he attacked Mantinea.¹⁴ To make up for their own lack of military initiative, the Eleans offered 10 talents to cover the expenses of the campaign.¹⁵ It is noteworthy that although the allies took pride in their large numbers, these were not enough to risk taking the field on their own.¹⁶

Apparently, the Thebans had their own views on how to contain Sparta. It was during this campaign that Epameinondas detached Messenia from Sparta and founded Messene.

The second Theban invasion took place in the summer of 369, again at the instigation of the Argives, the Arkadians and the Eleans (Diod. Sic. 15.68; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.16–22). Again, the Peloponnesians did not wish to, or dared not, assume action on their own. Presumably, memory of past defeats lingered on. Furthermore, since they had to turn to the Thebans for help, they inevitably had to acknowledge Epameinondas as their *hēgemōn*, even if unofficially, thus implicitly accepting their inferiority in terms of leadership. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.32) notes that the Eleans had been the object of contempt by practically everybody, the Arkadians, the Argives, the Achaïans and the Athenians, for their non-existent skill in warfare (until the day they fought for possession of the Olympian sanctuary; see p.15). This deficit would reach its nadir in the 3rd century when they had to ask for Aitolian commanders for their army (see pp.288–95).

To return to the Theban invasion: this time, the Thebans aimed at the states of the north-eastern Peloponnese which had offered active support to Sparta in 370, but the results were rather unimpressive (Buckler 1980, 92–102). The Thebans kept clear of the Peloponnese in 368 and 367¹⁷ and returned in 366. This time the objective was the *poleis* of Achaia (Buckler 1980, 185–201).

When examining attitudes of the Peloponnesian states, we have to distinguish between the periods before and after 367/6. It was in 367 that the Thebans, thanks to the famous embassy of Pelopidas to Sousa, obtained from king Artaxerxes a renewal of the King's Peace of 386 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31). In the course of this mission, both Messenian independence and Elean claims to Triphylia were acknowledged by the Persian king.¹⁸ As a result of Persian recognition of Elean claims, the Arkadians, under the leadership of the Mantinean Lykomedes, and already feeling uncomfortable with Theban claims of hegemony, refused to discuss the matter at Thebes because this would be tantamount to formal acknowledgement of Theban leadership (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39).¹⁹ Claiming superiority for itself, the Arkadian Confederacy chose to forge an alliance with Athens, which was essentially directed against Thebes, following the third Theban invasion of the Peloponnese in the spring of 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.3–5).²⁰

Certain Peloponnesian states remained firm in their anti-Spartan policy whereas others moved from one camp to the other, sooner or later, willingly or not so willingly. Argos and Messenia remained firmly against Sparta throughout the decade till 362. Of the Arkadian *poleis*, Mantinea made a most spectacular 180-degree turn, from ardently anti-Spartan to Spartan ally; the attitude of Elis also changed over time. Corinth and the *poleis* of the peninsula known as the Argolic Akte²¹ (Epidauros, Troizen, Hermione, Methana, Halieis) notably switched from pro-Spartan to neutral.

To take a closer look at attitudes to Sparta: in the aftermath of Leuktra, Argos and Elis sided with the Thebans; predictably so, given their past consistently hostile relations with Sparta.²² Notably, both states entertained ambitions of control over certain of their neighbours. After the initial shock of Leuktra, most if not all Arkadians eventually turned against Sparta, under the leadership of Mantinea and also Tegea. On the other hand, a fair number of north-eastern Peloponnesian *poleis* remained, at least for a while, on the Spartan side, whether out of loyalty, as Xenophon wants us to believe, or out of habit.²³ These were: the Corinthians, the Epidaurians, the Troizenians, the Hermioneis, the Halieis, the Phleisians, the Sikyonians, and the Achaians – the latter as part of a Confederacy.²⁴ In fact, Corinth, Sikyon, Pellene and the *poleis* of the so called Akte – Epidauros, Troizen, Methana, Hermione and Halieis – sent help to Sparta in 370 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.29).²⁵

Unfortunately for the *poleis* of north-eastern Peloponnese, it was especially after 371 that it was demonstrated that anyone intending to control both southern and central Greece should control the *poleis* on and around the Isthmos. Their strategic location – especially that of Corinth – would become *the* most decisive factor in their history in the next two centuries. If a garrison was established on the Isthmos, the Peloponnese would be turned into an island, i.e. not approachable by land, something that every single ruler bore in mind.²⁶

Pressure escalated, then, on the *poleis* of the north-eastern Peloponnese, which found themselves squeezed between Argos and the Arkadians on the one hand, the Thebans on the other. It was exhaustion caused by prolonged plundering and inability to face superior powers that generated a widespread wish for peace with the Thebans in the spring of 365 – Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.10) names the Corinthians, the Phleisians, and those with the Phleisians; among the others we should include the Epidaurians (Isokrates, *Archidamos* 91).

Corinth deserves special attention because its policy essentially signalled the end of the Peloponnesian League. Corinth had steadily weakened from

the days of the Peloponnesian War. Its weakness was translated into bloody civic strife in 392 when, after a massacre of pro-Spartan citizens, it was politically united with Argos. Initially, the two parties shared citizenship but eventually the Argives campaigned against Corinth (in full force: πανδημεῖ) and took complete control of the city, possibly in 390.²⁷ After Leuktra, Corinthian territory was plundered by the Argives and the Kleonaians (Plut. *Tim.* 4.1), and the Corinthians had to seek protection from the Athenians.²⁸ They even had to repulse a Theban attack in 369 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18–19). A few years later, the Corinthians were ready for peace. In 367, following king Artaxerxes' letter demanding a renewal of the King's Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39), the Corinthians refused to take an oath or commit themselves in any way with the Persian king (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.40; Diod. Sic. 15.81). They did stand by the Spartans until 366 when the Arkadians concluded an alliance with the Athenians (Salmon 1984, 374–6). Thus hard pressed, in fact fearful of their existence according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.8), the Corinthians chose neutrality.²⁹ This is indeed strong language for the once mighty Corinth. Being exposed to Argive aggression and fearful of an Athenian assault, the Corinthians took the monumental decision to ask the Spartans permission to conclude peace with the Thebans independently. Permission was granted and this effectively signalled the end of the Peloponnesian League (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6–10; Cartledge 2002a, 257). On the other hand, it was on the same occasion that the Spartans vowed not to let go what had been theirs for three centuries, i.e. Messenia.³⁰ How far they kept their oath will be examined below.

The Corinthians also established peace with the Thebans but refused to agree to an alliance, for such an alliance would not bring about peace but, instead, a different war: οἱ δὲ ἀπεκρίναντο ὅτι ἡ μὲν συμμαχία οὐκ εἰρήνη, ἀλλὰ πόλεμον μεταλλαγὴ εἶη (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.10). Immediately afterwards Xenophon presents the Thebans praising the Corinthians for their refusal to turn against the Spartans, 'their benefactors', but we should pay more attention to the weakness to which this passage bears testimony, a weakness which became a factor of peace-orientated policy.³¹

The Corinthians were not alone in their quest for peace. In fact, they set a pattern of political behaviour for smaller *poleis* (Salmon 1984, 379–80). Alongside them, there were Phleiasian envoys as well as others – not specified by Xenophon – who also concluded peace with Thebes (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.10).³² Isokrates (*Archidamos* 91) adds the Epidaurians.³³

It was mainly Argive aggression that led north-eastern Peloponnesian *poleis* to peace with Thebes. The Argives did not attempt, or rather were not in a position, to step into Sparta's shoes as the leaders of the Peloponnese.

Their ambitions appear limited to the Argolid region and even there they did not act alone; instead they appeared progressively weaker (Piérart and Touchais 1996, 60). Escalating civic strife, of which we know very little, must have had a large share in the causation of Argive inadequacy. What we do know is that the Argive *dēmos* had remained practically headless after the *skytalismos* of 370 in which the democratic populace clubbed to death more than 1,200 of the most illustrious citizens who had attempted to overthrow the democracy. This situation should be at least part of the explanation for Argive underperformance.³⁴ Another ‘decapitation’ occurred in 315 (see pp.93–4).

For the *poleis* of the Argolid, siding with Sparta was understandable given that Sparta represented protection against the Argives.³⁵ Epidauros, being nearest to the Isthmos, and also Phleious, being the ‘chief holding base against Argos’ (Tomlinson 1972, 142), had suffered greatly from Argive expansionism during the Peloponnesian War.³⁶ Similarly, both had to sustain Argive aggression after 371. It is in this context that we should ascribe the efforts of the Phleiasian Prokles to cement the treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta in 369 in which these two *poleis* would share leadership (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1–11). Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.2.1–15) has a long digression on the stout pro-Spartan attitude of the Phleiasians and their resisting the repeated attempts of the Argives (in spring 369 – in full force – and in summer 368) and the Arkadians to bring them over to their side.³⁷ Phleiasian attitudes must be associated with the fact that after protracted and bloody civic strife (starting in 384) pro-Spartan leaders had taken over control of Phleious (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10, 12–14). Eventually the Phleiasians, hard-pressed by the Argives and the Thebans,³⁸ followed the example of Corinth and concluded peace with the Thebans in 365. Pro-Spartan sympathies had subsided after all or rather they came second to the need for a peaceful life, relieved at least from the Theban threat.

During the second Theban invasion of the Peloponnese, Epameinondas had attempted to coerce Epidauros but failed; he was also faced with failure at Troizen.³⁹ Possibly he was luckier with Hermione and Halieis.⁴⁰ In 365 the Epidaurians, squeezed between Thebes and Argos, were forced to change sides and conclude peace with the Thebans.⁴¹ It is possible that one reason leading the Epidaurians to this decision was the need to promote the festival of Asklepios – a building programme had already been under way in the 370s.⁴²

As to subsequent relations between Epidaurians and Argives, there is only one additional piece of evidence for hostility. The honorific decree for the Phleiasian Menekles could be taken to indicate that the Argives had established a cleruchy in Epidauros at some point in the 4th century,

perhaps in the 360s perhaps after 338 (see pp.426–7). It seems, however, that after the two *poleis* had ceased to be in opposite camps because of Sparta, relations between them changed. Epidaurios set out to enhance its prestige via the Asklepieia festival and the latter was turned into a means of forging bonds. Argive entrepreneurs and stonemasons participated in the building of the Asklepieion.⁴³ Not long after 365, the Epidaurians appointed Drymos, son of Epikrates, *proxenos* and *theōrodokos* at Argos (ed. pr. Mitsos 1976 [1977], 83–6, no.2 = *SEG* 26.445 / Perlman 2000, 177–9, E 12). The lists of *proxenoi* and *theōrodokoi* for the Asklepieia show that relations between the two *poleis* improved impressively, with numerous Argives being appointed *theōrodokoi* or *proxenoi* in the 3rd century (see pp.419–28).

To return to 365, the Argives, although they too were exhausted by protracted warfare and had sworn to the peace, at least in theory would not relinquish their ambition of conquering Phleious: they refused the Phleisian request to submit to arbitration (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.11).⁴⁴ There is hardly any information on subsequent Argive-Phleisian relations but at least we do not hear of any more hostilities. In 352 both Phleious and Argos provided support to Megalopolis as it faced a Spartan attack (Diod. Sic. 16.39.1–3; see pp.19–20). Much later, external factors brought Argos and Phleious together, as part of a larger entity. In 302, both *poleis* were part of the Hellenic League established by the Macedonian Demetrios Poliorketes. In 229, the tyrant of Phleious imitated the tyrant of Argos by abdicating and having Phleious enrolled in the Achaian Confederacy (see p.175).

Thus, in 365 we observe two tendencies in the Peloponnese: a tendency towards neutrality as well as a disposition towards restricted warfare accompanied by (limited) ambitions of expansion.

The Achaian *poleis* – in keeping with their traditional policy – had preferred to remain neutral during the second Theban campaign in the Peloponnese,⁴⁵ but neutrality was not really an option in view of their strategic position. The first Achaian *polis* to bear the brunt of Theban attack was Pellene, the only Achaian *polis* that had always shown a distinctly pro-Spartan attitude.⁴⁶ The Achaian *poleis* were won over by Epameinondas, but only briefly (Anderson 1954, 90–1). Achaian garrisons were expelled from Dyme, Naupaktos and Kalydon (Diod. Sic. 15.75.2).⁴⁷ Democratic regimes and what Xenophon calls harmosts, a distinctively Spartan term, were established (despite Epameinondas' objections). Soon oligarchies were re-established and the Achaians returned to the Spartan side.⁴⁸ Thus, the Thebans gained nothing in the north-eastern Peloponnese; instead, they increased the ill feeling of the Arkadians who accused Epameinondas of arranging Achaian affairs in the interest of the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.43).⁴⁹

The case of Sikyon is rather idiosyncratic. It offers an example of how a *polis* caught in the clutches of greater powers, could (try to) play the one off against the other through the initiative of an individual. The ruling oligarchy went over to Thebes, willingly, probably in 369/8; a Theban garrison and a harmost were installed. Soon, things became complicated. Euphron (a former member of the ruling oligarchy) installed first a democratic regime with Argive and Arkadian help but then, shortly afterwards, a tyrannical regime; the Arkadians deposed him in early 366, and *stasis* ensued. Euphron offered the harbour to the Spartans and regained control of the *asty* with mercenary and Athenian help. In the end he was assassinated by Sikyonian exiles at Thebes where he had gone to ask for the removal of the garrison. After his death, the Sikyonians maintained alliances with both the Arkadian Confederacy and Thebes. They maintained an anti-Spartan profile by participating in the battle of Mantinea in 362 and by helping defend Megalopolis in 352.⁵⁰ We should keep in mind the political instability in Sikyon which culminated in a succession of tyrannical regimes from the late 4th to the mid-3rd century. This instability ended when in the mid-3rd century Aratos had Sikyon admitted into the then very modest Achaian Confederacy (see pp.157–60).

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The Arkadian *Koinon*:⁵¹ precarious unity, expansion and dismemberment

The most far-reaching developments after Leuktra took place in Arkadia⁵² and in Messenia. Shortly after Leuktra and certainly by 370, liberation from Spartan dominance but also fear of Spartan resurgence⁵³ led the Arkadians to unite into a democratically orientated *Koinon* (Confederacy).⁵⁴ We know little about its organization.⁵⁵ It had a primary assembly called the *myrioi* (literally the Ten Thousand but the term most likely means ‘multitude’), probably open to all Arkadians,⁵⁶ a *boulē* in which member-states were possibly represented in proportion to their population, a board of *damiorgoi*, an annually elected *strategos*, and a standing army, the *eparittoi* of uncertain composition but possibly numbering a few hundred.⁵⁷

The Arkadian Confederacy represented, among other things, opposition to the already existing Achaian Confederacy, which was of oligarchic and pro-Spartan tendency but did not, in the event, exercise any significant political-military role in the 4th century.⁵⁸ In the second half of the 3rd century the Arkadian and the Achaian states were to merge into the Achaian Confederacy (see pp.177–88).

The Arkadian Confederacy was a rare interaction of ‘democratic politics

and a national ethnic sense' (Robinson 2009, 136).⁵⁹ This political unification can be described as the 4th-century peak of a 'pronounced tendency' in the Peloponnese for sympolities (political unions),⁶⁰ which 'may in many ways have been determined by foreign policy, especially insofar as it worked in opposition to Sparta' (Funke 2009, 11).⁶¹ On the other hand, Spartan loss of power eventually helped to cause other 'centrifugal impulses'. In the end, as we shall see, centrifugal tendencies prevailed. On the positive side, however, as Nielsen (1999, 59) has put it, 'Arkadia never became a Spartan puppet again'. But nor could it step into Sparta's shoes as a leader of the Peloponnese. Only much later, in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries, did an Arkadian *polis* – Megalopolis – via its leading men seriously aspire to leadership of the Peloponnesians, through its membership in the re-born Achaian Confederacy (see pp.221–2, 340–53). And we can also add that important Arkadian *poleis* such as Mantinea, Orchomenos and Tegea showed a markedly pro-Spartan tendency later on (see pp.215–20).

Mantineia, in particular, and Tegea – the latter to a somewhat lesser degree – had a leading role in the establishment of the Arkadian Confederacy.⁶² It was the Mantinean Lykomedes (later also an *oikistēs* of Megalopolis) who inspired the Arkadians to seek supremacy in the Peloponnese, and later on tried to push the Thebans aside, employing as arguments the autochthony of the Arkadians – allegedly unique in the Peloponnese, their military prowess and their helping others to power.⁶³

Mantineia was the first Peloponnesian *polis* to benefit from Spartan defeat. Its fortifications had earlier been demolished by the Spartans and its constitution had been changed into an aristocracy; most important, the Mantineans had suffered a *dioikismos* by the Spartans in 385 (the inhabitants had been forced to disperse either to villages or to other *poleis*).⁶⁴ Therefore, it is not surprising that the Mantineans would have grasped the opportunity to contain Sparta. Nielsen (1996, 93 and 2002, 390) labels the *dioikismos* as a 'grave violation of *autonomia*' while Funke (2009, 7) notes the brutality of the Spartan measures against Mantinea in the overall context of the general hardening of Spartan behaviour after 418, particularly so after the Corinthian War.⁶⁵ This brutality was a legacy of the Peloponnesian War⁶⁶ and we shall observe it again in the 3rd and 2nd centuries, this time exercised by the Achaian Confederacy on more than one occasion; notably, Mantinea was again a victim (in 223; see pp.246–7).

However, in 370, immediately before if not simultaneously with the formation of the Arkadian Confederacy (Dušanić 1970, 291), the Mantineans deliberated concerning a new *synoikismos* and the building of a new wall, apparently with the consent of the aristocracy and without the Spartans'

attempting to oppose it.⁶⁷ In fact, king Agesilaos suggested that he would arrange for the defensive walls to be built with Spartans' consent, without cost to the Mantineans, which is indicative of the Spartan will to keep Mantinea on their side as well as of their inability to exercise force.⁶⁸ The Mantineans refused his offer and the Eleans contributed 3 talents of silver for the walls.⁶⁹ However, this ambivalent relationship with the Spartans took a new turn less than ten years later, when the Mantineans returned to the Spartan side. By the end of the 4th century (in 331/0) and in the 3rd century they demonstrated a markedly pro-Spartan attitude (see pp.70–3).⁷⁰

Both Tegea and Mantinea had been members of the Peloponnesian League, both had in the past broken away from Sparta.⁷¹ For Tegea it took the exiling of no less than 800 oligarchs and supporters of Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6–10), as well as help from the Mantineans, to make adhesion to the Confederacy possible.⁷² For Mantinea itself, joining appears to have been a smooth process.⁷³

The Arkadian Confederacy turned out to be a very sanguine, even unrealistic, project, despite the existence of a common Arkadian identity consisting mainly of hostility against Sparta.⁷⁴ The fact that the Arkadians had been politically united as members of the Peloponnesian League equipped them with the experience necessary to operate politically as a unit,⁷⁵ but this unity had been imposed from the outside. No Arkadian *polis* had managed or attempted to unite all the Arkadians in the past, although the most important Arkadian *poleis* had tried their hand with their neighbours. Thus, the Arkadians were faced with the challenge of making their own, unanimous decisions and in this they failed, less than ten years after the establishment of their Confederacy. However, as we shall see below, in the long run the Macedonian factor did produce nearly unanimous Arkadian political behaviour in the 4th century and, on one occasion (the so-called War of Agis), even military reaction. Notably, the newly-founded Megalopolis (and perhaps certain other Arkadians) did not share the policies of its fellow-Arkadians.

The very composition of the Arkadian Confederacy showed that its survival would be problematic. First of all, not all Arkadians were enthusiastic about it. Heraia and Orchomenos, for instance, had to be coerced.⁷⁶ The Orchomenians welcomed a mercenary force in the service of Sparta while the Heraians participated in the Spartan invasion of Arkadia.⁷⁷ Orchomenos, in eastern Arkadia, strategically commanding one of the main entrances into the Peloponnesian plains and thus being essential to anyone wishing to dominate the Peloponnese (Jost 1985, 113), could not be left to its own devices. However, by 369, 'most, if not all [Arkadians], joined, willingly or not' (Roy 1971, 571).⁷⁸

At its peak the Confederacy comprised, among others, *poleis* which had entertained micro-imperialistic ambitions: Tegea and Mantinea, Orchomenos and Kleitor (northern Arkadia). As Lewis (1992, 104) has put it: ‘these centralized Peloponnesian states were regularly found indulging in minor imperialisms of their own’. Tegea and Mantinea had both been heads of local hegemonies, but we know more about Mantinea. In the 5th century, Tegea had exercised control probably over the southern Mainalian communities (Oresthasion, Asea, Eutaia, Pallantion; see Map 1) while Mantinea came to control the Parrhasians⁷⁹ and certain northern Mainalian communities in the second half of the 5th century.⁸⁰ Probably before the *διοικισμος* of 385/4, Mantinea and Helisson⁸¹ concluded a treaty (*synthesis*), which is commonly referred to as *sympoliteia* (*IPArk* 9).⁸² All citizens of Helisson became citizens of Mantinea but Helisson continued to be a *polis* whether in the urban sense or as a dependent community of Mantinea.⁸³ Later on, Helisson was included in the communities to be incorporated in Megalopolis but it is quite uncertain whether this actually happened (see p.28).

The co-operation in both the formation of the Arkadian Confederacy and in the foundation of Megalopolis implied peaceful co-existence of Mantinea with smaller communities and the abandonment of its ambition of control over its neighbours (Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 289). Both Tegea and Mantinea would have renounced claims of expansion – the former over the southern Mainalians, the latter over the Parrhasians and the northern Mainalians.⁸⁴ On the other hand, both *poleis* might have foregone their micro-empires for something bigger: instead of a local, limited hegemony, both might very well have aspired to hegemony of all Arkadia, all the more so since both of them had demonstrated Pan-Arkadian aspirations in the past.⁸⁵ And at least the Tegeans seem to have continued to exercise influence or control over certain southern Mainalians in 363 (Roy 2005, 264–5). Furthermore, the Tegeans and other Arkadians (but not the Mantineans) even turned their attention to the Olympic funds of Elis (see below).

For both Tegea and Mantinea, aspirations to leadership of the Arkadians were associated with anti-Spartan policy. No such policy existed in the case of Orchomenos. In the first half of the 4th century, Orchomenos had also created a modest hegemonic league. Between c.400 and 368 it had come to dominate Methydrion, Thisoa and Teuthis (to its west).⁸⁶ The earliest enactment by Orchomenos (*IPArk* 15),⁸⁷ possibly dating before the dismemberment of the Arkadian Confederacy in 363/2, refers to *συνφοκία* (*synoikismos*)⁸⁸ of Orchomenos with Euaimon (location unknown) providing for the inclusion of the latter’s inhabitants in the civic body of Orchomenos. This is the only epigraphically-attested *synoikismos* before 338

(Moggi 1976, 275, 285–6 and nn.1–3). Regardless of the date,⁸⁹ what is of interest here is a provision for arbitration by the Heraians in case of conflicts over property rights (ll. 15–22).⁹⁰ The clause shows that the Orchomenians and the Heraians shared more than pro-Spartan sympathies. And it is possible that the Spartan factor contributed to the forging of bonds between the two *poleis*.⁹¹ Towards the end of the 4th century, in 324, the Tegeans similarly provided for the regulation of property problems by a Mantinean court (see pp.71–2).

Kleitōr, whose territory was exceptionally large (more than 500 km²), may also have been the leader of a small hegemonic league, in the late Archaic and Classical periods, or at least aggressive towards its neighbours.⁹² However, through an unknown process, by 219/8 its area had reached the river Ladon (Polyb. 4.70.2; Roy 1972b, 79). Unlike Orchomenos, Kleitōr was probably all too eager to abandon the Peloponnesian League of Sparta (Nielsen 2002, 387–8). The anti-Spartan stance of Kleitōr was firmly maintained in the 3rd century (see p.215).

The above had been political unions in which a single *polis* had a leading role, not entities in which all participants enjoyed equal rights. Therefore, it would not be surprising if leading citizens of such *poleis* sought supremacy on a larger scale, not equality, or at least to try to outdo former rivals. In other words, tension was inherent in the Arkadian Confederacy, if for no other reason, because its leading members had been accustomed to rule over others, even if only on a limited scale.

Furthermore, these very same *poleis* were not on the best of terms with each other. Tegea and Mantinea, both situated in the plain of eastern Arkadia, had often quarrelled in the past over the water flowing in the plain between their territories which could damage their cultivable land (Thuc. 5.65.4),⁹³ while their most serious clash had taken place in 423/2. As it turned out, hostility was not buried in the past, not even for the sake of the common good of the Arkadians.

It was hostility towards Mantinea that prevailed in Orchomenos after 371, and, in fact, the Orchomenians had to suffer an attack on their territory by the Mantineans.⁹⁴ Generally speaking, the Orchomenians did not share the strong anti-Spartan sentiments of Tegea and Mantinea.⁹⁵ The pro-Spartan disposition of the Orchomenians is marked by its longevity. As we shall see below, they retained their friendly disposition towards Sparta until the 230s when they joined the Achaian Confederacy and they were again on the Spartan side some ten years later, in the reign of Kleomenes III (see pp.130, 220).

Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.36) reports war between Kleitōr and Orchomenos a few years before Leuktra, in 378/7 (Nielsen 1996, 92 and 2004a, 515,

524). The war may have been caused by the expansion of Orchomenos in the early 4th century, as Roy (1972b, 79) has argued.⁹⁶ Roy (1972b, 79 and 2005, 265–6) also argues that if Thisoa, Methydriion and Teuthis were later probably detached from Orchomenos⁹⁷ to become part of Megalopolis, this might have been due to Kleitorian influence within the Arkadian Confederacy. Whether or not the Kleitorians were responsible, and whether or not these *poleis* were indeed detached as planned, the Orchomenians would not have been very pleased with the Confederacy's plan. This state of affairs, as it turned out, cast a long shadow over relations between Orchomenos and Megalopolis in the future (see pp.186–8).

Fear of possible Spartan resurgence was not enough to keep members of the Arkadian Confederacy together. In fact, Sparta's loss of power soon led to the opposite result: instead of unity, old hostilities resurfaced and new ones broke out.⁹⁸ Notably, however, in the late 4th and in the 3rd centuries, it was pro-Spartan sympathies that brought certain Arkadians together.

Ambitions of certain Arkadians to expand beyond Arkadia proper, on territory that belonged to Elis until the late 5th century, provided a new cause of conflict and, eventually, caused rupture of the Confederacy. In 370, the Eleans had formed an anti-Spartan alliance with the Arkadians, the Athenians and the Argives, which proved to be short-lived (Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; Roy 1994, 190). Like the leading Arkadian *poleis*, Elis also entertained territorial ambitions to which the Spartans first and later the Arkadians were an obstacle.⁹⁹ The bone of contention with the Arkadians was Lasion (north-eastern Elis) and Triphylia (south of the river Alpheios, between Elis proper and Messenia). Lasion had been a perioikic¹⁰⁰ *polis* of Elis before c.400 but after this date it had become independent and some Arkadians claimed it as Arkadian, most probably from the viewpoint of ethnicity, rather than as part of a certain *polis*.¹⁰¹ Triphylia had also been part of Elis until c.400 but the Spartans had removed it from Elean control. However, the whole of Triphylia (either as a single member or as separate *poleis*) joined the Arkadian Confederacy probably in 369 or by 367 at the latest; Lasion had joined by 365.¹⁰² Both Lasion and Triphylia chose to present themselves as Arkadians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26), under the threat of Elean ambitions; opportunism was part of the process.¹⁰³ Needless to say, this projected identity suited the Arkadian Confederacy very well. In fact the confederates advertised this on a monumental dedication at Delphi commemorating their victory over the Spartans during the invasion of Lakonia: the monument consisted of nine statues representing Arkadian ancestors (associated with different districts), among which Triphylos was included as son of Arkas, the eponymous ancestor of the Arkadians

(*FD* III.1.3; Paus. 10.9.5).¹⁰⁴ The location of the monument was also significant: at the entrance of the sanctuary amongst Argive and Spartan dedications (Pretzler 2009, 89–90). In other words, the Arkadians placed themselves among the greats of the Peloponnese; more than that, they proclaimed that *they* were now the new great power in the Peloponnese.

The Arkadians had become the most powerful enemy for the Eleans and the major obstacle to their ambitions (Roy 1971, 575). In 365, the Eleans being under oligarchic control (despite an Arkadian attempt to overthrow the regime) and having failed to regain Triphylia, attacked Lasion.¹⁰⁵ Thus, war broke out between Elis and the Arkadians.¹⁰⁶ The Eleans allied themselves with the Achaians – Pellene was most active – and the Spartans, early in the war or even before that.¹⁰⁷ It is indicative of the dire straits experienced by the Eleans but also of extreme opportunism on their part that they decided to ally with the Spartans who had deprived them of Triphylia. This should stand as a reminder that, no matter how old or strong a feud is, sympathies and alliances can change rapidly when a new, more powerful, enemy appears. What remains is the object of ambition: Elis never renounced its expansionist ambitions on Triphylia and in the mid-3rd century re-acquired it for a while (see pp.291–2). The ‘unattractiveness’ of Elis (Roy 2009, 43) will be important later. As we shall see below, in the mid to late 3rd century the Triphylians did not particularly wish to be Eleans (see pp.296–7).

The Arkadians acquired control of Pisatis (the district around Olympia) and of Olympia in 364 after a notorious battle at the Altis (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–30), during the Olympic Games. Control of the games was either transferred jointly to Pisa and the Arkadians or to the Arkadians alone (Roy 2009, 37). Pisatis was turned into an independent but puppet state. Presumably, it returned to Elis after the battle of Mantinea in 362.¹⁰⁸ This association of Panhellenic games with warfare will be observed again in the 3rd century, in that case involving the Nemeia (see pp.174–5).

Control of the Olympian sanctuary and the accompanying prestige turned out to be incompatible with political unity. This acquisition eventually brought about rupture within the Arkadian Confederacy, although there had probably been dissatisfaction already brewing among members (Roy 1971, 585). Between 364 and 363, the Mantineans challenged the authority of the federal officials, by objecting to the use of Olympic funds by the latter to pay the *eparittoi* (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33).¹⁰⁹ We do not have information on the origins of the officials but probably they were in agreement with at least part of the Tegeans. Whether they were sincere or whether they were putting up a façade, the Mantineans handed in their own share of the payment of the army.

The federal officials and the assembly of the Ten Thousand pursued conflicting policies.¹¹⁰ After the refusal of the Mantinean leaders to obey the order of the officials to stand trial before the assembly, they were condemned *in absentia* and shut the gates before the *eparittoi* who had come to arrest them. The assembly, in accordance with the Mantinean decision, eventually decreed that no sacred funds should be used (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34). Thus, well-off Arkadians replaced the *eparittoi* who could no longer be part of the army while the federal officials, fearing that they would be held accountable for misappropriation of sacred funds, sent for help to the Thebans arguing that there was danger of Arkadia turning to Sparta (λακωνίσαι). Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.35) underlines, doubtless with pro-Spartan prejudice but also with good reason, that the group which prevailed in the subsequent assembly and had an embassy sent to the Thebans asking them not to intervene in arms, had the best interests of the Peloponnese in mind, aiming at keeping away an external power with its own agenda. This group is identified with those who wanted to dispense with the war altogether and thought that they could forego control of the temple of Zeus, i.e. without expansion to Elis:

... ἅμα δὲ ἐλογίζοντο ὅτι πολέμου οὐδὲν δέοιντο. τοῦ τε γὰρ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Διὸς προεστάναι οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλ' ἀποδιδόντες ἂν καὶ δικαιότερα καὶ ὁσιώτερα ποιεῖν...

...at the same time they reasoned that they had no desire for war. For they held that they had no desire for the presidency of the shrine of Zeus, but that they would be acting more justly as well as more righteously if they gave it back.

This is a remarkable attitude. It shows, at least *prima facie*, part of the Arkadians setting a limit to their own expansion (Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 289). Nevertheless, we need not take this attitude as applying to (all) leaders and common people alike. All sorts of reasons could account for this attitude, from genuine piety and exhaustion to jealousy, fear among members of the Confederacy, and political calculation. For instance, one could argue that those objecting to the use of Olympic funds were afraid that whoever got control of them would also control the army, thus becoming dominant in the Confederacy and with unpredictable ambitions.

In any case, the Eleans were also willing to end the war, understandably so given their record in it, and thus a truce was concluded. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.36) stresses that everybody took the oath, including the Tegeans and the Theban commander. The fact that the Tegeans are singled out shows that they, in particular, had previously favoured war against the Eleans.¹¹¹ On the other hand, the rejoicing of the Arkadians from all the *poleis* is

testimony to a widespread yearning for peace, which, however, was not going to happen.

While the Arkadians were still gathered in Tegea to celebrate, a Theban commander who ‘happened to be there with 300 Boiotian hoplites’ (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.36), certain federal officials and part of the *eparitai* shut the gates and went on to arrest the aristocrats (βέλτιστοι) of each *polis*, aiming especially at the Mantineans who had for the most part already left. The fact that we do not hear of a Tegean counter-reaction strongly suggests that local Tegean officials had been involved. Given Mantinea’s subsequent alliance with Sparta, a plan for a Spartan attack on Tegea could very well have been orchestrated by the Mantineans.

Following this incident the Thebans invaded Arkadia, and the Arkadian Confederacy was eventually dismembered in 363.¹¹² Two power groups were formed, one under Mantinea and another under Tegea. It is not much of a surprise that these two former enemies and local hegemonies would eventually clash again. Whether the Tegeans or the Thebans were the primary enemy of the Mantineans, this intra-Arkadian rivalry prevailed over old feuds with Sparta. The Arkadian Confederacy had not had the time to develop into a solid political union, going beyond its *raison d’être*. It had been formed much too fast, taking advantage of the *kairos* (the opportunity), without its individual members having solved their differences and without having a common stance towards Sparta.¹¹³

At the battle of Mantinea in 362 between Sparta and Thebes the Arkadians were divided into two opposite camps. Mantinea, remaining allied with Athens, concluded an alliance with Elis, Achaia, Phleious and, taking a 180-degree turn in policy, Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.1–5; Diod. Sic. 15.82.3–4). Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus identifies any Arkadian followers of Mantinea. Roy (1971, 587–9) underlines the oligarchic nature of the regimes of Mantinea’s allies, arguing that the Mantinean oligarchs or pro-Spartans had taken the upper hand at the time in Mantinea, without this necessarily implying a constitutional change. But even if the oligarchs or pro-Spartans had taken over in Mantinea, there is no sign in Xenophon (or Diodorus) that there was disagreement between oligarchs and democrats in Mantinea as to the foreign policy to be pursued. In the end, we should pay more attention to the anti-Theban sentiments of the Mantineans expressed earlier on by Lykomedes who had impeccable democratic credentials.¹¹⁴ As Roy has also pointed out, rivalry between Mantinea and Tegea was an essential factor, but this could operate irrespectively of constitutional differences. The rivalry would have been accentuated by the fact that the Tegeans appear to have exercised influence upon the southern Mainalians while the northern Mainalians and the

Parrhasians – under Mantinean control in the late 5th century – had been incorporated into Megalopolis, admittedly with Mantinean consent.

The rival group consisted of Tegea, Megalopolis, Argos, Messene, Asea and Pallantion¹¹⁵ (the latter two had been under Tegean control in the 5th century) which remained loyal to Thebes.¹¹⁶ Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.5.5–6) notes that those small *poleis* lying between the bigger ones were forced to follow their lead. Of this alliance, Megalopolis, Argos and Messene would continue to act in concord in the next two decades. Corinth does not figure among the combatants, and it is highly unlikely that Xenophon would have omitted to include such an important *polis* (Salmon 1984, 381). The Corinthians simply adhered to their policy of neutrality.

This final Theban invasion of the Peloponnese ended with the indecisive battle of Mantinea in 362 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.24–7; Diod. Sic. 15.85–7), which in Xenophon's pessimistic, pro-Spartan perspective left things in an even greater disorder than in 371. Surely, the Peloponnese remained divided and Sparta remained weak (Cartledge 2002b, 9). The attempt at pan-Arkadian unity had failed but in the next couple of decades the Macedonian factor, i.e. Philip II, would outweigh old rivalries, bringing most of the Arkadians together, most notably Tegea and Mantinea, but not Megalopolis.

The rival parties, exhausted (καταπονούμενοι) as Diodorus (15.89.1) underlines, concluded peace (*SVF* II, 292).¹¹⁷ This is the first occasion in which a peace treaty is called *Koinē Eirēnē* and it was also carried out without either the involvement of the Persian king or even the initiative of Athens or Sparta.¹¹⁸ Mosley (1971, 322 and 326), who views the notion of the *Koinē Eirēnē* as a form of international law, rather hesitantly observes that the above-mentioned repeated attempts at peace perhaps denote an 'increasing recognition that peace rather than war was a normal state'. Shortly after the battle of Mantinea, the Athenians and certain Peloponnesian states, most probably including Argos, refused to support the so-called Satraps' Revolt, which bears testimony to an eagerness of at least certain Greeks to abstain from unnecessary warfare. Furthermore, they indirectly put the blame for intestine conflict on the Persian king's interference by calling the king not to dissolve the established peace by any means.¹¹⁹ Thus, if we are to believe the authors of the document, at least part of the Greeks, from that moment on, intended to make peace their own business. This is not what happened. Instead, an external agent, Philip II, presented himself as the guarantor of peace some years later.

With regard to the immediate future, prospects for a Common Peace were not particularly good since the Spartans refused to acknowledge Messenian independence and, therefore, were not included in the peace of 362. Nor were the Spartans happy with the existence of Megalopolis.

No restoration of the Arkadian Confederacy, at least not in its original form, is known. Among contemporary sources, the term *Koinon* appears only in an inscription of the late 4th century (*IG IV 616*), which records a κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων. Much later, ps.-Plutarch (*Mor.* 846c–d) also refers to τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, in the context of the Lamian War. Hypereides (*Against Demosthenes* 18) mentions κοινοὺς συλλόγους of the Achaians and the Arkadians. The meaning of συλλόγους is problematic and will be discussed below. Generally speaking, our sources frequently refer to collective action of Arkadians without identifying the cities involved. Apart from precise identification, the question is whether we should view these collective references as testifying to the existence of an Arkadian Confederacy or an *ad hoc* alliance, or simply as a summary reference to ethnic identity.¹²⁰

Overall, the impression is that if there was an Arkadian *Koinon* after 362 – whatever its nature – it appeared intermittently.

Shortly after the battle of Mantinea, the Arkadians appear to be divided in two: one group, presumably including Mantinea, concluded a treaty with Athens, Achaia, Elis and Phleious (Tod 1948, no.144;¹²¹ Nielsen 2002, 493). Megalopolis appears as the head of another alliance of Arkadians. This is rather surprising since Megalopolis did not appear to have had a significant role in the events leading up to the battle. More specifically, Polybius (4.33.9) referring to the negotiations for peace following the battle of Mantinea writes about Μεγαλοπολίται καὶ πάντες οἱ κοινωνοῦντες Ἀρκάδων τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας ('the Megalopolitans and all those Arkadians participating in their alliance'). This latter testimony is very interesting but not necessarily credible. It is rather surprising that while Tegea had been the major Arkadian opponent of Mantinea, Polybius presents Megalopolis as having the leading role in the negotiations. Polybius might reflect a reality, i.e. that Megalopolis had outgrown Tegea in importance by 362 or, being a Megalopolitan himself, he might complaisantly retroject the situation of his own times.

However, it seems that the Megalopolitans did pose as representatives of the Arkadian *ethnos* in the mid-340s, when they asked to become members of the Delphic Amphictyony which was a union of *ethnē* – the petition was denied (see p.55).¹²² Nielsen (2008, 199–206) plausibly suggests that the petition of the Megalopolitans (and the Messenians) aimed at international recognition and boosting of those states' prestige vis-à-vis Sparta and, in the case of Megalopolis, especially as regarded Mantinea with which it competed for leadership of the Arkadians after 362.

In 352, the Megalopolitans had to face a Spartan attack without the support of other Arkadians. They did get the support of Argos, Sikyon,

Messene, Phleious and Orneai but of no other Arkadian state (Diod. Sic. 16.39.1–3; Nielsen 2002, 494). On the other hand, in 348/7 Aischines spoke in front of an assembly of *myrioi* in Megalopolis: ἐπιτιμᾷς δέ μοι καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς μυρίοις ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ δημηγορίαν καὶ πρεσβείαν ('But you find fault with my service as ambassador in Arkadia and my speech before the Ten Thousand'; *On the False Embassy* 79).¹²³ The use of the official term μύριοι could be taken to show that an Arkadian Confederacy still existed with Megalopolis as its centre, if not as its leader. But how do we reconcile this evidence with the military isolation of 352? What, if anything, could have happened in the meantime? Furthermore, even if there was a Confederacy, the term *myrioi* would have surely been misleading since this group would have consisted of far fewer Arkadians than in the 360s. A solution is offered by Nielsen (2002, 495): Megalopolis employed federal institutions and terms, posing as but not actually being the head of an Arkadian Confederacy. This does not necessarily mean that in 348 Megalopolis was completely isolated; only that if there was any Megalopolitan sphere of influence, this would not have included major Arkadian *poleis*. However, the most revealing piece of evidence is the *Scholia* on Aischines' *Against Ktesiphon*, where Megalopolis appears to be on its own in 342.

In 361 Mantinea appears as the leader of certain Arkadians who attempted to dismember Megalopolis (Diod. Sic. 15.94.1–3). In 342 the Mantineans and 'those Arkadians with them' concluded a treaty with Athens, along with the Achaeans, the Argives, the Megalopolitans, and the Messenians: Ἀχαιοί, Ἀρκάδες οἱ μετὰ Μαντινέων, Ἀργεῖοι, Μεγαλοπολίται, Μεσσηνιοί (*Scholia* on Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 83).¹²⁴

It has been argued that Philip II either allowed the Arkadian Confederacy to exist after the battle of Chaironeia or even that he restored it in its entirety.¹²⁵ If he did either, this Confederacy would have included Megalopolis but it would have been effectively dissolved in 331/0 when Megalopolis followed its own separate way in the War of Agis III against Macedon (see pp.70–1).

In autumn 335 Arkadians of unspecified number and identity campaigned to the Isthmos to help the Thebans against Alexander (see pp.68–9). According to the perhaps exaggerated statement of Aischines (*Against Ktesiphon* 240), all the Arkadians had taken arms to help the Thebans against Alexander. On the other hand, according to Arrian (*Anab.* 1.10.1), only certain Arkadians set out to help Thebes: Ἀρκάδες μὲν, ὅσοι βοηθήσοντες Θηβαίοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ὤρμήθησαν ('the Arkadians, as many as they set out of their country to help the Thebans'). These Arkadians had Astylos as their *stratēgos* (Deinarchos, *Against Demosthenes* 20).

Even if all the Arkadians had set out to help the Thebans, this would not constitute solid proof of the existence of an Arkadian Confederacy. Those who had decided to help the Thebans might have done so as members of a Confederacy, to which Arrian does not refer, or as members of an *ad hoc* alliance. The Arkadians did form an army that marched to the Isthmos and had a *stratēgos*, but still one could argue for a loose form of *Koinon*, coming to life or coming together in an assembly whenever need arose, in this case war against Macedon. Whether there existed other federal officials or whether the Arkadian army was a standing federal army we cannot tell.

A significant moment for the Arkadians came in 331/0 when the Spartan king Agis III led a war against the Macedonian regent Antipatros. Of all the Arkadians only the Megalopolitans did not join Agis. Macedon was now *the* decisive factor determining attitudes of Peloponnesian states in general, and of the Arkadians in particular, towards Sparta. Megalopolis apart, this war does signal united Arkadian action in which, most notably, the former rivals Tegea and Mantinea joined forces. The joint action alongside Sparta could be taken to indicate the existence of an Arkadian Confederacy but again this could very well be an *ad hoc* alliance.

What happened in the Peloponnese after 331/0 and especially after 322/1, i.e. after the victory of the Macedonian regent Antipatros in the so-called Lamian War against the coalition of Athens and Aitolia? Discussion generally evolves around possible measures taken by Alexander and Antipatros. The issue of the existence or not, at that time, of an Arkadian Confederacy is also interwoven with the fortunes of the Achaian Confederacy for which there is evidence testifying to its existence at least until 302 (see p.101).

After the War of Agis, Alexander and Antipatros would have had very good reason to dissolve both the Arkadian and the Achaian groupings, whatever their form and range of activities, since both the Arkadians and the Achaians had participated in it. However, there is no straightforward evidence.¹²⁶ An indication of Antipatros' hostile attitude towards unions of *poleis* is the fact that he treated the *poleis* separately, both in 330 and in 322/1. On the other hand, evidence afforded by Hypereides is rather perplexing.

In the extremely fragmentary speech *Against Demosthenes* (col.18), Hypereides records an order of Alexander concerning the *syllagoi* of the Achaians, the Arkadians and perhaps the Boiotians as well.¹²⁷

τὰ δ' ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ Ἑλλάδι οὕτως ἔχοντα κατέλαβεν [Harpalos]
ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφίξεως τῆς Νικάνορος καὶ τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων ὧν ἦκεν φέρων παρ'
Ἀλεξάνδρου περὶ τε τῶν φυγάδων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινούς συλλόγου
Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων καὶ Βοιωτῶν... (see below for the translation).

On the basis of this passage it has been suggested that in 324 Alexander ordered the dissolution of the aforementioned *syllogoi*, along with the return of the exiles.¹²⁸ However, as Aymard (1937, 9) long ago pointed out, the word *syllogos* means *ekklesia* (assembly) in ancient Greek literature. The *koinos syllogos* = common assembly of Arkadians does testify to the existence of a group of Arkadians coming together, but whether this was a fully-fledged Confederacy with all the associated institutions – federal *stratēgos*, federal officials, federal army – is quite another matter. Elaborating further on the term *syllogos*, Worthington (1986, 117–19 and nn.10–12) argues that in this passage it has a military sense – which I believe to be correct.¹²⁹ Worthington restores the final line of col. 18 as καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοῦς κοινῶς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ γίνεσθαι], and translates col. 18 as follows (1986, 121 and 1999, 103):

He [Harpalos] found affairs in the Peloponnese and in the rest of Greece being in such a state owing to the arrival of Nikanor and the orders with which he came from Alexander, concerning both the exiles and the prohibition of the joint military levies of the Achaeans, Arkadians, Boiotians and the rest.

Thus, we are probably dealing with a group that would assemble *ad hoc*, for military purposes but no more. In Worthington's view, Alexander would have tried to forestall 'any joint muster of forces' after the announcement of the restoration of the exiles. Furthermore, nothing excludes the possibility that we are dealing with more than one Arkadian *syllogos*: one including Megalopolis and affiliated communities and another one including, for instance, Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos.

After 324 the situation becomes even more uncertain. In association with the Lamian War of Athens and Aitolia against Macedon, ps.-Plutarch records in the *Lives of the Ten Orators* (*Mor.* 846c–d) that first Polyeuktos and then Demosthenes (while in exile for the Harpalos affair) spoke to the κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων.¹³⁰ Ps.-Plutarch reports that Demosthenes managed to persuade the *Koinon* to abandon the Macedonian alliance but we know that no Arkadian state participated in the Lamian War. So either ps.-Plutarch is wrong or, perhaps more likely, the Arkadians did agree, initially and in the heat of the moment, to join Athens only to change their mind later.¹³¹ Again, we cannot know what form this *Koinon* had or which *poleis* were its members. It could be no more than a group of Arkadians, loosely associated and (occasionally) assembled to discuss a political/military alliance. As to the identity of the Arkadians receiving Demosthenes, they could very well have been the Megalopolitans and certain lesser Arkadian *poleis* affiliated to them, since these were the Arkadians who had

continuously remained loyal to Macedon. And in this case, the Megalopolitans could have posed as the head of an Arkadian *Koinon* as they had probably done in 348/7. On the other hand, it would surely make sense if the Athenians had (additionally) approached the other Arkadians who had shown in the past their anti-Macedonian credentials.

Given the firm interference of Antipatros in Greek affairs (i.e. installation of garrisons and oligarchic regimes) after his victory in the Lamian War in 322/1, it might be thought that he would not tolerate the *Koina*, whatever their character. Apart from the lack of relevant, explicit evidence (which is not necessarily a decisive objection), there are certain problems with such a view: firstly, neither the Arkadians nor the Achaians participated in the Lamian War; there was serious reason for punishment in 331/0 but not in 322/1. Secondly, the Achaian Confederacy continued to exist at least until 302 when it participated in the Hellenic League of Demetrios Poliorketes. Polybius (2.41.9) states explicitly that Achaian unity was dissolved after Alexander's death because, thanks to the intervention of the Macedonian kings (διὰ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων), the Achaians turned against each other. He does not say that any of the Macedonian rulers *ordered* the dissolution of the Achaian Confederacy.¹³²

However, it is difficult to imagine Antipatros allowing the existence of nuclei of co-ordinated action against Macedon. A way out of the problem is to argue that Antipatros did not have to do much with the Peloponnesian *Koina* – if more than one existed – because they were already *de facto* in pieces and therefore there was no need for *de jure* intervention, especially if the Arkadians were united loosely anyway and most probably intimidated enough already after Agis' War to refrain from any hostile action. The fact that they punished their leaders after the destruction of Thebes shows that they were faced with severe discord. As to the *poleis* of Achaia, the state of affairs described by Polybius could very well have started while Alexander was still alive. The defeat of 331/0 and the fine imposed on Achaia then (Curtius 6.1.19–20) could have given rise to discord and accusations about mistaken foreign policy.

It is possible that the Arkadian Confederacy was politically invigorated after Antipatros' death, in c.319/8, as a result of the initiative of the Macedonian regent Polyperchon (see pp.92–3). Roy, in fact, suggests that the Arkadian Confederacy continued to exist in a very loose form until c.235 when the last Arkadian *poleis* joined the Achaian Confederacy. This view, however, is based on the use of the ethnic 'Arkas' in non-Arkadian sources.¹³³ The fact that a (limited) number of Arkadian *poleis* participated in the Chremonidean War in the 260s *individually* (this is how they are recorded in the decree of alliance between Athens and Sparta: *IG* II²

686/687) can very well be taken as evidence that no Confederacy existed then (Aymard 1937, 16, n.4). Or, if it did exist, it either consisted of *poleis* other than those participating in the war or it did consist of the participants in the war but their individual identity had overridden the Arkadian – and this would be a very loose form of confederacy indeed.

The new political entities: Messenia and Megalopolis¹³⁴

Messenia

The foundation of Megalopolis by the Arkadian Confederacy and the foundation of independent Messenia by Epameinondas exercised a decisive and long-lasting influence on the political history of the Peloponnese. Both Megalopolis and Messenia were meant to exercise a permanent check on Sparta or, in Mitsos' metaphor (1945, 31), to act as a breakwater. Not surprisingly Messenia joined the Arkadian Confederacy in 365/4.¹³⁵

In the course of the first Theban campaign in 370/69 Epameinondas founded the independent state of Messenia,¹³⁶ thus dealing a most severe blow to Sparta which lost the territory west of Taygetos. As Cartledge (2002b, 5) has put it, 'the political geography of the Peloponnese as it had been for some three centuries had been altered dramatically'. Messenian independence was translated into a significant diminution of Spartan territory, although Sparta kept the southern part of Messenia (Shipley 2000a, 385). Indeed Sparta was deprived of its most fertile territory, which increased heavily its chronic and acute socio-political problems. The creation of this state can be set into the wider context of 'redefinition of ethnic boundaries' in the Peloponnese in the early 4th century, such as that between Elis and Arkadia (Luraghi 2008, 212). The newly founded state was centred round the fortified settlement of Ithome at the foot of Mt. Ithome.¹³⁷ The *polis* was probably called Ithome until roughly the mid-3rd century while the name 'Messene' appears only in literary texts, ambiguously denoting either the region or the *polis*.¹³⁸ But later on Polybius employs the name 'Messene' for the city (Grandjean 2003, 98–9; Luraghi 2015, 288).

The ethnic Μεσσάνιοι or Μεσσηνιοι, used already in the 5th century, is employed in both coinage and inscriptions to denote the new state.¹³⁹ But the name 'Messenians' could also denote only the citizens of Ithome/Messene.¹⁴⁰ By the second half of the 3rd century we encounter in inscriptions the phrase ἡ πόλις ἡ Μεσσανίων ('the *polis* of the Messenians') as equivalent to Μεσσάνιοι.¹⁴¹

Ithome/Messene was founded by Epameinondas and assumed a leading role in the region;¹⁴² it outdid in size every other settlement there.

It comprised the Soulima valley, the Stenyklaros plain and probably the southern Messenian plain west of the river Pamisos; on top of this it was endowed with a massive wall circuit (Luraghi 2008, 251 and map at p.240).

Probably the new state was first organized as a loose federal union under the leadership of Ithome/Messene, and became more and more centralized after 338 and the increase of Messenian territory by Philip II (see pp.62–3). In the 3rd century Ithome/Messene came to dominate the lesser Messenian *poleis*, not least because of its strategic location.¹⁴³

The Argives took an active part in the foundation of Ithome/Messene (Luraghi 2008, 214–15). The Argive Epiteles was put in charge of the building of the *polis* (Paus. 4.26.7). The heroine Messene, of Argive origin, received a cult (Paus. 4.31.11).¹⁴⁴ Strong Argive influence is also detected in one of the Messenian tribes, Daiphontis, which bears the same name as an Argive *phratra* (named after the Argive Heraklid hero).¹⁴⁵ On the political front the Messenians and the Argives pursued similar policies down to the Lamian War. As to the population, the Theban version of the story is that Epameinondas brought the Messenians back from exile. However, reality must have been much more complicated than that. The Lakonian *perioikoi* who joined the Theban army could very well have formed part of the new Messenia together with Messenian *perioikoi*, Lakonian and Messenian helots as well as settlers from abroad.¹⁴⁶ This mixed identity should be borne in mind when examining Messenian relations with Sparta in the 3rd century. Interestingly enough, Polybius (4.31.2) reports the existence of Messenian ephors in the late 3rd century, a proof of the lasting influence of Spartan institutions on Messenia. Contrary to what one might have expected, relations between the two states were not always or overtly hostile (see pp.122–6).

The plain of Stenyklaros and the Soulima Valley became part of the new state (Luraghi 2009, 120) but our sources are not clear as to its size. Within Messenia, Sparta probably retained control of Asine (on the southeast coast of Messenia) and of Mothone (on the southwest coast) until 338.¹⁴⁷ Their populations were believed to have (partly) descended from exiles from the Argolid and to have been settled in Messenia by the Spartans.¹⁴⁸ Notably, Asine retained bonds with the Argolid – with Hermione in particular – in the Hellenistic period (see pp.460–1).

It appears that not all former perioikic communities were eager to become part of the new state. The large territory of Messene/Ithome must have looked menacing, and being part of the new state will have bordered on subordination at least for some communities (Luraghi 2008, 251). Kyparissia and Koryphasion/Pylos¹⁴⁹ on the western coast of Messenia had to be conquered by the Arkadians in order to become part of the new state,

in 365/4 (Diod. Sic. 15.77.4). In fact, there is substantial evidence that Messene was at odds with Pylos as late as the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries.¹⁵⁰

The status of the southern plain east of the river Pamisos remains ambiguous. It is probable that Thouria and Pharai became part of independent Messenia since, as Luraghi (2008, 32–3, 229–30) has pointed out, this would explain the absence of Spartan military activity west of the Taygetos in the 350s and the 340s.¹⁵¹ The case of Thouria is more certain since its walls appear to have been constructed by Theban engineers (Luraghi 2008, 33 and n.57). Both Pharai and Thouria (along with Abia) were detached from Messenia by the Achaian Confederacy in 182 and became its members as independent *poleis* (after the violent (re)incorporation of Messene into the Achaian Confederacy: Polyb. 23.17.2; see pp.358–63).

Megalopolis: a megalē polis?

Megalopolis – *Megala* or *Megalē* (in the attic dialect) *polis* was actually its name – was founded sometime after 371,¹⁵² possibly in 368 and consisted of numerous communities (Paus. 8.27.1–8; Diod. Sic. 15.72.4). With the exception of Orchomenos, the largest and most important *poleis* of the Confederacy – Mantinea, Tegea, Kleitor – along with the Mainalians and the Parrhasians, appointed two *oikistai* each to found Megalopolis (Nielsen 2002, 421, 434). Orchomenos did not provide any *oikistes*, possibly due to its pro-Spartan stance in 370 (Roy 1972b, 80). The foundation of Megalopolis was a defensive measure but at the same time, as its eminently programmatic name indicates, the Arkadians intended it to be an important *polis*. How important, or whether it was indeed a *megalē polis*, is a quite problematic issue.

As to the composition of Megalopolis, we have a list of 39 communities in Pausanias (8.27.3–4) including communities from the Aigytai¹⁵³ and the tribes of the Mainalians, the Parrhasians, the Kynourians and the Eutresians, as well as those forming part of the *synteleia* of Orchomenos. We also have Diodorus' brief report concerning 20, unidentified, communities from the Mainalian and the Parrhasian tribes (15.72.4).¹⁵⁴ Thus, two main theories have developed, one by Roy (1968, summarized by Nielsen 2002, 430 and *passim*) and one by Moggi (1974; esp. the summary at pp.98–100).¹⁵⁵ In Roy's view, Megalopolis was planned as Pausanias reports, but it took until 361 for the *synoikismos* to be implemented. Megalopolis came to measure c. 1,500 km², but in the long run the *synoikismos* proved to be unstable. On the other hand, in Moggi's view Megalopolis started as a *polis* of less ambitious dimensions, as reported by Diodorus, extending to c.400 km² (larger than Tegea but smaller than Kleitor: Nielsen 2004a, 520–1) and including the Parrhasians, the

Eutresians and the southwestern Mainalians, but expanded continuously until c.200 to include all the communities listed in Pausanias (Nielsen 2002, 434). These alternative theories are discussed at length by Nielsen (2002, 413–42 and 2004a, 520–1) who very wisely admits that the problem is practically insoluble (2002, 414). The status of certain Arkadian communities remains quite uncertain since concrete evidence of Megalopolitan control over them dates after the mid-3rd century. Neatly summarizing what is fairly certain about the *synoikismos* of Megalopolis, Roy (2005, 263) pointed out that in order to unite the Megalopolis basin federal officials had to incorporate the Eutresians (N, NW), the Parrhasians (S, SW) and the territory further to the south, recently cut off from Spartan territory (Map 1).

Nielsen (2002, 352, 421–2, 439, 442) argues plausibly and cautiously that Pausanias, probably drawing on a federal decree, but not necessarily the original one,¹⁵⁶ presents what was initially planned but Diodorus reports what in fact happened, i.e. a *synoikismos* of much smaller dimensions. In this modest *synoikismos* only part of the populations concerned, mainly from Mainalian and Parrhasian communities, would have resettled.¹⁵⁷ And in this case, the name *Megalē polis* can be taken as an indication that it was feared to be too small or at least too small to rival Sparta.

A strong argument in favour of Diodorus' account against Pausanias' is the list of *oikistai* provided by Pausanias in which only three of the seven groups of Arkadians are represented.¹⁵⁸ The list of *damiorgoi* in the federal honorific decree for the Athenian Phylarchos (*IG* V.2.1 / *Tod 1948, no.132), probably dating between 366 and 361 or 363,¹⁵⁹ also affords evidence that at least Kynouria was part of the Arkadian Confederacy but not part of Megalopolis when the decree was passed, since it had provided *damiorgoi* to the federal council.¹⁶⁰ The absence of Kynouria from the *synoikismos* would have deprived Megalopolis of control over important routes to Elis and Triphylia but its incorporation might not have been deemed strategically necessary at the time of Megalopolis' creation. The decree also affords testimony that 3 out of at least 10 Mainalian communities had provided *damiorgoi*, i.e. not all Mainalians had been incorporated into Megalopolis from the beginning. As Roy (2005, 268–9) has pointed out, we only have a patchy picture of 'the interplay of interests' in the Arkadian Confederacy, and the Kynourians and certain southern Mainalian communities might have been somehow able to negotiate their non-participation.

On the other hand, there is evidence indicating later expansion (Nielsen 2002, 442). Plutarch (*Phil.* 13.5) records that Philopoimen (in the mid-190s), had many communities detached from Megalopolis, '*instructing them*

to say that they neither took part in the *synoikismos* nor did they belong to the Megalopolitans from the beginning':¹⁶¹ ἀπέστησε πολλὰς τῶν περιουκίδων κομῶν, λέγειν διδάξας ὡς οὐ συνετέλουν οὐδ' ἦσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκείνων (Plut. *Phil.* 13.5). Plutarch's wording is illuminating: Philopoimen *instructed* constituent communities *to say* (λέγειν διδάξας) that they did not belong to Megalopolis from the beginning. In other words, in the early 2nd century neither the citizens of the detached communities nor the other Megalopolitans knew for certain which communities comprised their city back in the 4th century.

The communities detached by Philopoimen could be identified with those issuing coinage as independent members of the Achaian Confederacy in the first half of the 2nd century.¹⁶² Pallantion, Asea, Dipaia and Helisson from eastern Mainalia, Alipheira and Gortys (or Kortys) from Kynouria, Methydriion, Teuthis and Thisoa (from the *synteleia* of Orchomenos).¹⁶³ However, we cannot be certain that these were the communities detached or that these were all the communities in question.¹⁶⁴

Before the aforementioned major intervention of Philopoimen, the sack of Megalopolis by Kleomenes III in 223 (Plut. *Kleom.* 12 and *Phil.* 5) could very well have provided the opportunity for certain communities to re-emerge as independent, but this is speculation (Nielsen 2002, 429–30, 433). Prior to the late 3rd century, evidence is largely absent or ambiguous. Summary information on certain communities of ambivalent status is necessary here because their relations with Megalopolis form part of our study below.

It is certain that in 362 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.5) and in 358 (*CID* II.5, 1.21) Pallantion was an independent *polis* as it was also in the late 4th century (after 318) when seven envoys received honours from Argos (see pp.437, 441–2). We are in the dark as to its history for most of the 3rd century. When it re-emerges on record in the 220s, it is an independent *polis*.¹⁶⁵ As to the Mainalian Helisson, it seems that it either never became part of Megalopolis (at least not before the Roman period) or, if it did, it re-emerged as an independent *polis* in the late 3rd-early 2nd century.¹⁶⁶ However, evidence testifying to independence is too scattered and mostly too late to allow us any definite conclusions about the 4th and especially the 3rd century: it dates from 351, c.300 or slightly later,¹⁶⁷ and 207. Helisson was independent in c.182 when it was involved in arbitration with Megalopolis (see p.367). Thisoa appears to be part of Megalopolis in 358, but perhaps it is a dependent *polis*.¹⁶⁸ It issued two honorific decrees in the late 3rd-early 2nd century (*IG* V.2.510, 511; see p.451).

Methydriion and Alipheira are also noteworthy here. Relations between Methydriion and Megalopolis appear quite irregular. It could be the case that Methydriion was originally part of Megalopolis but the considerable

distance between the two communities would have helped it to break away (Nielsen 2002, 452), at least occasionally. The regulation of boundaries between Orchomenos and Methydriion is probably part of Methydriion's incorporation in Megalopolis. In 274, in 207 and in the early 2nd century Methydriion appears to be an independent *polis*. Before 219, its status is uncertain (see pp.186–7). Kleomenes captured it in 228/7, which might be an indication that it belonged to Megalopolis and therefore was considered as hostile territory (Plut. *Kleom.* 4.4). On the other hand, whether or not Methydriion was part of Megalopolis, it was certainly strategically important for Kleomenes since from it he could get easily to his allied *polis* of Orchomenos (Marasco 1981, 389). For 219 Polybius (4.10.10) refers to Methydriion as part of the Megalopolitis.¹⁶⁹

There is no concrete evidence for Alipheira in the 4th century as regards its relation to Megalopolis.¹⁷⁰ Its status in the first half of the 3rd century is quite uncertain. At some point a certain Kleonymos liberated Alipheira from a (Macedonian?) garrison but the relevant inscription has been variously dated to the 270s, 219/8 or in the early 2nd century. If it was already, or became, independent in the 270s – the latter seems more likely (see pp.134–5) – then we should envisage aggression on Megalopolis' part sometime after that date, since Alipheira does appear to be under the control of Megalopolis in the 240s when the Megalopolitan tyrant Lydiadas turned it over to the Eleans for unknown reasons (Polyb. 4.77.10; see pp.292–3).¹⁷¹

In the second half of the 3rd century, Alipheira appears first in Elean hands and from 219/8 in the hands of Philip V of Macedon (Polyb. 4.78). In a corrupt text Polybius (4.77.10) seems to state that it belonged to Megalopolis from the beginning but this is hardly an impartial statement from a Megalopolitan, especially since Polybius writes this after reporting that the Eleans (an enemy of the Achaian Confederacy) had recently taken over Alipheira, and thus could very well have intended to show that Elis had no right over the place. According to Livy (28.8.6), in 208 the Megalopolitans presented proof to Philip V of Macedon that Alipheira belonged to them, and in the winter of 199/8 (32.5.4–5) they claimed restoration of Alipheira because, on the basis of an Arkadian federal decision, it was one of the communities that had contributed to the foundation of Megalopolis. On this occasion the Megalopolitans most probably presented an Arkadian federal decree (Nielsen 2002, 439). It is quite doubtful whether there was a restoration of territories by Philip in 208, while the authenticity of the Arkadian decree is also dubious. There must have been one such decree (or two) originally, but this does not necessarily mean that it was implemented in its entirety or that it was

identical with the one presented by the Megalopolitans. It is probable that Polybius makes the above-mentioned statement in the knowledge precisely of this alleged federal decree. The fact that in c.194 certain communities, following Philopoimen's instructions, were able to argue that they did not belong to Megalopolis from the beginning (Plut. *Phil.* 13.5) shows that the federal decree presented in 199/8 was not the original one, and the Megalopolitans knew it. It is also possible that the original federal decree was lost or destroyed during the sack of Megalopolis by Kleomenes in 223 (see pp.227–9). Furthermore, the Megalopolitans did not claim that Alipheira *continuously* belonged to them until the mid-3rd century.

In any case, Alipheira was most probably restored to Megalopolis by Philip in the winter of 199/8.¹⁷² A few years later, it appears as an independent *polis*, as testified by an inscription recording arbitration with Lepreon (*IPArk* 26; see p.297).¹⁷³

The reasons for the non-implementation of the initial plan for Megalopolis could very well be the result of reluctance on the part of the communities concerned to let (part of) their population go, now that the Spartan shadow had been removed. On this basis, we can conjecture that, in the future, for at least some of these communities non-participation in the *synoikismos* of Megalopolis would have represented a threat. In the case of the *poleis* associated with Orchomenos via *synteleia*, we could easily imagine that the Orchomenians had serious objections to their incorporation in the new *polis* or at least that they held a grudge, and that co-existence between the two *poleis* must have been rather uneasy. Furthermore, whether or not the Mantineans had embraced the project of Megalopolis' foundation initially, they, along with other Arkadians and the Eleans, favoured the dismemberment of Megalopolis in 361 (see pp.30–1). This in turn might be taken to show that the Mantineans had been unhappy with the incorporation of the Mainalians and the Parrhasians.

Tension was inherent in Megalopolis, since not all relocated populations had their heart in the project. According to Diodorus (15.94.1–3), shortly after the dismemberment of the Arkadian Confederacy, in 361, the Megalopolitans faced a rebellion which was suppressed by the Thebans. Diodorus does not identify the rebels. His report could be associated with a passage of Pausanias (8.27.5–6) according to whom the people of Lykaia (of either the Mainalian or the Kynourian tribe),¹⁷⁴ Trikolonoi (of the Eutresian tribe), Lykosoura (of the Parrhasian tribe) and Trapezous (also Parrhasian), tried to return to their previous settlements, with the help of the Mantineans. In the event, according to Pausanias, Lykaia and Trikolonoi were relocated to Megalopolis, Trapezous was annihilated but Lykosoura was spared, perhaps because it controlled an important

sanctuary.¹⁷⁵ Notably, however, Lykosoura exists as a *polis* in the late 3rd–early 2nd centuries when it honours the sculptor Damophon of Messene (ed. pr. Themelis 1988 [1991], 79 = *SEG* 41.332; see pp.451–2),¹⁷⁶ which may denote either that Lykosoura remained a *polis*, despite its subjection, or that it re-emerged as an independent *polis*.

Furthermore, the aforementioned detachment of certain communities by Philopoimen indicates that in the late 3rd–early 2nd century there was still no unity or sense of common identity among the composing elements of Megalopolis, whatever the interpretation of Philopoimen's action (see pp.363–4).

An independent indication for the size of Megalopolis in the late 4th century is provided by Diodorus (18.70.1) who, in the context of its siege by the Macedonian regent Polyperchon in 318, reports that 15,000 citizens, metics and slaves took part in the defence of the *polis*. On this basis, Forsén (2000, 41 and n.21, 44, n.36) argues for a total of c. 70,000 and calculates that they would have needed at least 1,000 km² to live off. In this case, it is legitimate to suggest that not only had Megalopolis expanded¹⁷⁷ since the days of the initial *synoikismos* but also that this expansion, through means unknown to us, may have made the Megalopolitans intimidating for the other Arkadians.

It is uncertain whether Megalopolis was intended to serve as the capital of the Confederacy¹⁷⁸ but at some point, possibly before 363, it provided 10 *damiorgoi* while Mantinea, Tegea, Kleitor, Orchomenos, Heraia, Thelphousa,¹⁷⁹ and Kynouria supplied only five each.¹⁸⁰ This shows that it enjoyed a privileged position, whether because the Arkadians wished to emphasize its very creation by them (Roy 2000b, 312–13) or because of the size and, especially, the mixed composition of its population. To elaborate on this point: the fact that Megalopolis comprised various Arkadians could very well have led to a representation as wide as possible.¹⁸¹

Demosthenes' speeches bear testimony to the significant role Megalopolis had come to assume in Arkadia in his own time. Nielsen (1999, 30 and 2002, 494 and n.369) observes that in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* Demosthenes refers to the latter using either the *polis*-name 'Megalopolitans' or the regional ethnic 'Arkadians' interchangeably. Also in his speech *On the Crown* (64), Demosthenes, when castigating the pro-Philip, 'selfish' policies of Argos (ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ἰδίας πλεονεξίας ἐλπίδι), Messene and Megalopolis, refers to the Megalopolitans as Arkadians, i.e. he identifies Megalopolitan policies with policies of the Arkadians as a whole. One could say that the Arkadian regional-ethnic identity had assumed priority over the individual identity of any Arkadian *polis*, at least in the

mind of Demosthenes and his Athenian audience, pretty much as had previously happened with Xenophon in his *Anabasis*.¹⁸² Another interpretation is that, due to the Spartan threat, of all Arkadian *poleis* it was Megalopolis that had mainly received Philip's, and because of that, Demosthenes' attention.

As mentioned above, Polybius (4.33.9), writing about the peace negotiations after the battle of Mantinea in 362, refers to Megalopolis as the head of an Arkadian alliance. Polybius might be transmitting either a reality of 362 or an attempt of the Megalopolitans of his own time to pose as the representatives of the entire Confederacy. This information looks very much like a representation of what actually was the case in his own time. Furthermore, Polybius and his compatriots might have consciously and purposefully constructed this past supremacy of Megalopolis to justify the policies pursued by Megalopolitan politicians and solidify their position in the Achaian Confederacy.

Megalopolis was a *polis* without any history other than the history of its individual components, which was far from impressive. For this reason its citizens, given the opportunity, would have been all the more eager to make their mark on history. The Messenians, contrary to the Megalopolitans, could and did construct an elaborate, pre-Leuktra history and identity. Contrary to their very name, the Megalopolitans of the early Hellenistic period, down to the late 3rd century, could at the most construct a 4th century history.

These major changes on the map of the Peloponnese shaped, to a large extent, Peloponnesian politics in the Hellenistic period. Megalopolis or, to be more precise, Megalopolitan leaders came to play a major political role in the 3rd and the early 2nd centuries, while the Messenians did not loom large (Luraghi 2008, 252). Grandjean (2003, 68, n.82) comments upon the remarkable solidarity between Megalopolis and Messene, which lasted until the early 2nd century. This is not quite accurate: the solidarity is mostly evident in the 4th century. In any case, while both *poleis* had started their existence as rivals of Sparta, Megalopolis came to be the enemy of the two others. The Megalopolitan Philopoimen forced both Messene and Sparta to join the Achaian Confederacy.

In the long run, however, the rivalry between Sparta and Messene proved to be the most lasting among Peloponnesian *poleis*, going down at least until the age of Tiberius and possibly even to the late 2nd century AD (Spawforth 2002, 138–9; Grandjean 2003, 250–1). But it is notable that only in the late 3rd century was this rivalry between Sparta and Messene translated into largely unfruitful attacks by Sparta against Messene, first under king Lykourgos and, a little later, Nabis (Polyb. 5.5.4–5, 17, 20,

92.1–6 and 16.13.3; Livy 34.32.16; Plut. *Phil.* 12.4; Paus. 4.29.10–11 and 8.50.5). Essentially, the Spartans and the Messenians largely kept submitting to arbitration, without actually fighting.

Notes

¹ See Ryder 1965, 25–33 and Hornblower 2002, 218–26, on Spartan expansionism leading to the war.

² There were exceptions: the *poleis* of Asia would belong to the king (including Cyprus and Klazomenai), while Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros would belong to Athens. See Ryder 1965, 34–7, on the terms of the peace; at p.39 on the problems generated by the autonomy clause, especially ‘to what extent should existing states be dismembered’; at p.40 on benefits for small *poleis*. Dmitriev 2011, 27–8, observes that the autonomy clause was expanded to include the entire territory of Greece but that it did not contain any provisions for the actual status of individual Greek *poleis*.

³ Initially, *autonomia* meant independence but later it came to refer to conduct of internal affairs while ‘*eleutheria*’ appears later and it means freedom to conduct one’s foreign policy: see Dmitriev 2011, 32, on the use of *eleutheria* after 386 and the transformation in the meaning of *autonomia* which brought about the differentiation between *eleutheria* and *autonomia*.

⁴ Amit 1973, 8; Ryder 1965, 40–8; Dmitriev 2011, 28.

⁵ Hornblower 2002, 240; Dmitriev 2011, 41–2 with notes, on the inclusion of *eleutheria* alongside *autonomia*.

⁶ The Thebans were fast bringing Boiotia under their control; in 373/2 they had destroyed Plataia, an old ally of Athens.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1–20; Diod. Sic. 15.50.4; Ryder 1965, 63–9 and 127–30.

⁸ Cartledge 2002a, 250; Beck 2001, 363–5.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18–4.15; Plut. *Pel.* 23; Diod. Sic. 15.50–5; Cartledge 2002a, 251–2.

¹⁰ The Athenians felt progressively more and more uncomfortable with Theban power; cf. their reaction at the news of the Spartan defeat: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19–20. After the battle the Athenians had summoned a conference at Athens with the purpose of renewing the King’s Peace; the participants are not listed but Sparta must have sent delegates. In this peace treaty it was again obligatory to provide armed guarantees of the peace (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1–3; Ryder 1965, 71–4 and 131–3).

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28–32; Roy 1994, 193; Buckler 1980, 106–7, for the political significance of this battle.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.25–32; 7.2.2; *id.* *Agesilaos* 2.24–5; Diod. Sic. 15.65.1–5. David 1981, 87; Hamilton 1987, 39; Cartledge 2002b, 5; Luraghi 2009, 122.

¹³ Funke 2009 (esp. at p.1), emphatically attributes the abolition of the Peloponnesian League and the downfall of Sparta to already existing ‘centrifugal impulses’ within it and to the ‘awakening of ethnicity’. He shows that Theban propaganda of the Hellenistic period, preserved in Pausanias and in Plutarch’s *Pelopidas*, stressed the Theban role while the contemporary Xenophon and Diodorus present the Peloponnesians as having the initiative.

¹⁴ Cartledge 2002a, 253–4; Roy (1971, 573) and Funke (2009, 5) draw attention to the fact that after the battle, the Argives, the Arkadians and the Eleans approached Athens first and that only after the Athenian refusal did they resort to the Thebans.

Chapter 1

An additional incentive was the invasion of Arkadia by Agesilaos (David 1981, 84). See Roy 1971, 597–9, for the terms of the Arkadian-Theban alliance.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.16–20, 22–23; Diod. Sic. 15.62.30. See Buckler 1980, 72–7 for the Theban reluctance to campaign in the Peloponnese.

¹⁶ Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.16–17) notes the participation of a large number of Tegean hoplites while the Argives had not campaigned in full force.

¹⁷ Epameinondas had not been reelected Boiotarch in 368; furthermore, the Boiotians had turned their attention to Thessaly. See Roy 1971, 576 and n.47; 1994, 192; Buckler 1980, 104–5, on possible reasons for the Theban absence from the Peloponnese in 368; at pp.138–45 for the charges mounted against Epameinondas (and Pelopidas) after the first invasion of the Peloponnese.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36–39; Plut. *Pel.* 30.7; the Spartans were the first to send an embassy to the Persian court; Athenian envoys followed suit; Arkadian and Elean envoys went along with Pelopidas to Sousa; see Buckler 1980, 151–60. Roy (1971, 578) notes that the Arkadian envoy was actually a Triphylian, in other words the Arkadians aimed at ridiculing Elean claims to Triphylia.

¹⁹ Beck 1997, 223–4, on the issue of hegemony between Thebes and the Arkadian Confederacy. Buckler (1980, 73) acutely observes that the fact that the Thebans had not been officially assigned the position of the *hēgemōn* opened the possibility for another state to claim this position. Upon his return Lykomedes was murdered by Arkadian exiles (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.3); Roy (1971, 582, n.69) suggests Spartan implication in the murder.

²⁰ Buckler 1980, 193–8; Beck 1997, 223–4.

²¹ Piérart (2004a, 599–600) notes that it is unclear how many cities were included.

²² Mitsos 1945, 9–26; Piérart and Touchais 1996, 56–8; Piérart 2004a, 603, for a synopsis of Argive hostile relations with Sparta, especially after 421 and during the Corinthian War. On Elis's political history in the Classical era, see Roy 2004, 495. Elis had been a member of the Peloponnesian League but relations with Sparta turned sour after 421 (Thuc. 5.47–50). In c. 400 the Spartans forced the Eleans to grant autonomy to their perioikic communities and Elis rejoined the Peloponnesian League until the battle of Leuktra: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23–5; Nielsen 1997, 137–9; Ruggeri 2009, 50–1.

²³ See Bauslaugh 1991, 199–200, for a criticism of Xenophon's emphasis on loyalty (*Hell.* 6.4.18).

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.18–19, 5.40–6; 7.1.15–18, 2.2.

²⁵ In 370/69 a treaty was concluded between Athens, Epidaurios and the *poleis* of the Akte, as part of the alliance between Athens and Sparta (Aristotle, *Rb.* 1411a11; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1–11; *IG* IV 748 and Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 76–80, for Troizen and Athenian relations with the *poleis* of the Akte, in the 5th and early 4th centuries; Piérart 2004a, 606–7 on Athenian relations with Epidaurios.

²⁶ Hornblower 2002, 112; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 80–1) also draw attention to the resources in manpower, money and supplies possessed by the *poleis* of the Akte in the early 4th century as well as later, in the time of Philip II; Buckler 1980, 94–5.

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1–11, 8.13–15, 34; Diod. Sic. 14.86.1–2, 91.2–92.2. Corinth became independent again after the King's Peace: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34. See Mitsos 1945, 18–26; Ryder 1965, 26, on this unification as a suitable target for the Spartans in the name of

an autonomy policy. Griffith (1950, 242–56) demonstrates that the arrangement was an *isopoliteia* and argues for an Argive takeover in two stages; see also Robinson 2009, 141–2; *contra* Salmon 1984, 360–2, who thinks that Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.4.6) reflects propaganda by the enemies of the union who, in his view, aimed at strengthening the anti-Spartan element in the Corinthian citizen body; Hornblower 2002, 86, 115.

²⁸ See the speech of the Corinthian envoy before the Athenian assembly in 370/69: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.37–38.1.

²⁹ The Corinthians convinced the Athenian commander Chares to leave Corinth, replacing Athenian garrisons with Corinthian (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.4–5). Shortly afterwards, the Corinthians experienced the short-lived tyranny of the aristocrat Timophanes who executed many of the leading oligarchs; eventually, he was assassinated by his brother Timoleon: Isokrates, *Philipp* 51; Diod. Sic. 16.65.3; Plut. *Tim.* 4.4–8; Salmon 1984, 384–5; Bauslaugh 1991, 207–8; Buckler 1980, 199.

³⁰ Isokrates, *Archidamos* 24, 29, presents the Spartan claim as ultimately being based on the division of the Peloponnese by the Herakleidai: see Roebuck 1941, 44. See Diod. Sic. 4.57–8 and Apollodoros II.8.2 for the myth: Temenos took Argos, Kresphontes took Messenia while the sons of Aristodemos (Eurysthenes and Prokles) took Lakadaimon.

³¹ See Salmon 1984, 371–83, on Corinthian ‘exhaustion’.

³² It is not easy to call the peace of 365 a Common Peace since, as Roebuck (1941, 43, n.76) observed, if this had been a Common Peace it would have included the recognition of Messenia as an independent state.

³³ Bauslaugh 1991, 208–10. Skalet (1928, 76) suggests that Sikyon could have been a signatory to the peace because the Phleiasians evacuated the fortress of Thyamia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.11); Lolos (2011, 70) remains sceptical.

³⁴ Diodorus (15.57.3–58) notes that those executed, i.e. the enemies of the democracy, were many and wealthy (πολλῶν [καὶ] μεγαλοπλούτων). Following this execution, the populace, being suspicious of their own leaders, executed them as well. See Fuks 1974, 71–2 and Piérart and Touchais 1996, 59–60, on the social-economic causes of the struggle. See also Gehrke 1985, 31–3 who stresses that there was no redistribution of property to poor citizens.

³⁵ On connections between Lakonia and the Akte see Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 70–1. For an account of the gradual Argive expansion in the Argolid, from the Archaic era to the 460s, see Piérart 1997, 327–40. Mykenai and Tiryns (and a few other small communities) had been victims of Argive expansionist policy. In the late 460s Mykenai was razed to the ground, the site was probably abandoned and its territory was divided among Argos, Kleonai and Tenea; the refugees were transferred to Kleonai, Keryneia and Macedon. At some point Argives were installed at the site and founded the *kōmē* of Mykenai (Paus. 2.16.5; 5.23.3; 7.25.6; 8.27.1; Diod. Sic. 11.65.5; Strabo 8.6.19). See Piérart 2004a, 612, for a synoptic history of Mykenai in the Classical period; Boethius 1921–23, 415–23, dates its revival to the 3rd/2nd century; on evidence of coins, largely minted by Argos, see Dengate (1974, 95 and n.4; 96–99) who dates Mykenai’s political revival to the late 4th / early 3rd century; Piérart (1992, 377–83) also tentatively suggests that the Argives might have turned Mykenai into a *kōmē* in the late 4th century.

³⁶ Epidaurian territory had been repeatedly ravaged by the Argives in 419/8 (Thuc. 5.26.2, 53–8, 75.4–5); on relations between Argos and Epidaurus see Piérart 2004b, 27–30. See Alcock 1991, 428–32, for a brief political history of Phleious and Piérart

2004a, 613 for the eminently hostile relations of Phleious with Argos in the 5th century. It is indicative of the exhaustion suffered by the Phleisians that they had chosen to remain neutral in the Corinthian War and were only dragged into it, on the Spartan side, after repeated Athenian incursions into their territory.

³⁷ On Argive ambitions see Roy 1971, 572 and n.20; 574.

³⁸ The Argives occupied the Trikaranon in 366; Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.1. The Theban harmost of Sikyon, with help from Sikyon and Pellene, also attacked Phleious, unsuccessfully – but this was the last straw for the Phleisians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.12–13).

³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18; Diod. Sic. 15.69.1; Buckler 1980, 99–101.

⁴⁰ Diod. Sic. 15.69.1; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 80.

⁴¹ The Argives had plundered the Epidauria in autumn 369; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.25.

⁴² Burford 1969, 28, 53–5; Piérart 2004b, 607.

⁴³ Burford 1969, 36, 58, 63–4, 107, 143, 151–2, 201–2; Piérart 2004b, 22 and n.35, 31.

⁴⁴ Mitsos 1945, 39–40 and Hornblower 2002, 87, on Argive exhaustion; cf. Roy (1971, 582 and n.73) who thinks that the Argives renounced their ambitions but nevertheless notes the retention of a fortress in Phleisian territory.

⁴⁵ Bauslaugh (1991, 206–7) notes that ‘the Arcadian – Elean – Argive alliance may have considered Achaean neutrality a blessing’.

⁴⁶ Pellene was cut off from the other Achaian *poleis*, bordering Sikyonia; Paus. 7.6.1, 26.14; Anderson 1954, 74, 82. It had been the first Achaian *polis* to join the Peloponnesian League in 431; in the Peloponnesian War, Pellene joined the Spartans from the beginning (Thuc. 2.9.2). On the dominant position of Pellene in literary sources, see Mendoni 1991, 68–9. For a brief history of Achaian policies towards Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and in the early 4th century, see Anderson 1954, 83–5; Rizakis 1995, 26–9; Beck 1997, 58–60; Morgan and Hall 2004, 474; Freitag 2009, 16–17.

⁴⁷ Robinson (2009, 144) observes that the word ἡλευθέρωσεν in Diodorus could be taken to indicate that the garrisons had been installed to secure Achaian oligarchic control, in which case Dyme would appear shaky in its loyalty to the Achaian Confederacy.

⁴⁸ Roy 1971, 579; Mackil 2013, 75–6.

⁴⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.43; Diod. Sic. 15.75.2; see Buckler 1980, 188–91, on the opposition to Epameinondas and Pelopidas; Beck 1997, 61; Morgan and Hall 2004, 478; Freitag 2009, 24.

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44–6, 3.2–3; Diod. Sic. 15.70.3; Roy 1971, 579–81 and n.67; Lolos 2011, 69–70.

⁵¹ Xenophon employs the phrase ‘τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων’ three times (7.4.35, 38, 5.1). In at least two of these cases the term has the meaning of ‘assembly of the Arkadians’. Notably he also writes ‘τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων’, clearly referring to the assembly of the *homoioi* (*Hell.* 6.1.2). Elsewhere Xenophon writes ‘τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν’, in the sense of confederacy, most notably in 6.5.22: Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες...στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἡραϊδῆς, ὅτι τε οὐκ ᾔθελον τοῦ Ἀρκαδικοῦ μετέχειν (‘the Arkadians...campaigned against the Heraians because they did not wish to be part of the Arkadian Confederacy’); also 6.5.11: Ὀρχομενίων δὲ οὐκ ἐθελόντων κοινωνεῖν τοῦ Ἀρκαδικοῦ (‘the Orchomenians not wishing to participate in the Arkadian Confederacy’); 7.4.12–13: συντελοῦντα εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν (referring to Lasion: ‘being part of the Arkadian Confederacy’); 6.5.6, 12; 7.1.38, 4.33. Note, however, the more general

meaning in 7.1.23: πλείστον δὲ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν φύλων τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν εἶη ('the Arkadian people were the most numerous of all the Greek peoples').

⁵² See Pikoulas 1999a, 255: ancient Arkadia comprised a much larger territory than the modern region. It included part of western Korinthia (Stymphalia and the Pheneatike), the NNW corner of Argolid (Alea), part of Achaia (Nonakris, Lousoi, Kynaitha, Kleitor, Psophis), eastern Elis (Heraiitis, Alipheira, Thisoa, Phigaleia) and the NNE part of Messenia (SSW Lykaion); Kynouria belonged to Lakonia (before Leuktra). See also Nielsen 1999, 49–51, on the fluctuation of Arkadian borders.

⁵³ On fear and hatred of the Spartans as a negative bond with an 'irrational power' see Hornblower 2002, 258.

⁵⁴ See Nielsen 2002, 474–5, on the term 'confederacy' in the case of the Arkadian *Koinon*.

⁵⁵ See Larsen 1968, 186–9; he suggests that the vote in the assembly was taken by heads, not by cities; Nielsen 1996, 96–8; *id.* 2002, 474–82 and 2015, 261–5; Dušanić 1970, 337–45; Beck 2001, 358–9, on the absence of explanation of the Arkadian *Koinon*'s constitutional framework in Xenophon.

⁵⁶ Beck 1997, 80–1.

⁵⁷ Diodorus (15.62.2 and 67.2) refers to a force of 5,000 called the *epilektoi* but it is quite uncertain whether they are to be identified with the *eparitai*. Both Thompson (1983, 154–6) and Pritchett (1974, 223) argue that the *eparitai* were a much smaller group numbering a few hundred: his crucial objection is that a standing army of 5,000 would require a very large sum for its pay. In Thompson's view the *eparitai* and the *epilektoi* were two different groups, the first possibly appearing for the first time only in 364. Beck (1997, 82, 202) accepts Diodorus' figure and suggests that the cost for the *eparitai* was covered by the member-states and that when financial crisis arose the cost was covered by the Olympic treasury (in 364). Nielsen 2002, 481 leaves the matter open but in 2015, 264, tends to accept that the *eparitai* numbered 5,000. A comparison with the Achaian Confederacy in the late 3rd century can be helpful: during the Social War Aratos was only able to put together a standing army of 3,000 foot and 300 horse. An indication of the corps' size may be provided by Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.33): when conflict broke out between the Mantineans and the federal officials over the use of Olympic funds, the officials sent *the* (N.B.) *eparitai* to arrest the Mantinean leaders. Mantinean violent reaction was surely anticipated but how likely is it that a massive force of 5,000 would have been sent – significantly, Xenophon employs the definite article, which indicates that the entire force had been dispatched. Thus, Hesychios may be right in saying that the *eparitai* were δημόσιοι φύλακες, a body which would not have numbered as many as 5,000.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.43. It is unclear whether the Achaian Confederacy had come into existence already before the Peloponnesian War but it existed by the late 5th–early 4th centuries; Anderson 1954, 80–1; Rizakis 1995, 25 and n.5 and *id.* 2015, 120–1; Beck 1997, 62–6; Corsten 1999, 163–5; Morgan and Hall 2004, 474–5, 478; Freitag 2009, 26; Mackil 2013, 46–52, 62–3. See Hdt. 1.145, for the division of Achaia into 12 regions (*merē*): Pellene, Aigeira, Aigai, Boura, Helike, Aigion, Rhypes, Patrai, Pharai, Olenos, Dyme, Tritaia; Helike disappeared after an earthquake and a tidal wave in 373; see Baladić 1980, 150–5. By the time of Polybius (2.41.7) Aigai, Rhypes and Olenos had been abandoned; see Anderson 1954, 73; Walbank 1957, 230–2; Morgan and Hall 2004, 472–3; Rizakis 1995, 56, 160, 262; Mackil 2013, 341–2.

⁵⁹ See Roy 1971, esp. p.585, on the Arkadian Confederacy's consistent but ultimately unsuccessful policy of intervention in favour of democrats: in Achaia in 366, in Pellene and Elis in 364; Roy 2000b, 311–15; Nielsen 2002, 486–90. Robinson (2009), as a whole, emphasizes that apart from the Arkadian case, democratic and ethnic movements rarely combined in the Peloponnese.

⁶⁰ Nielsen 1996, 66: a *sympoliteia* is a purely political union of two or more *poleis*, some of which cease to be independent states but they do not necessarily cease to be *poleis*.

⁶¹ Funke (2009, 10) ascribes to this tendency the political unification of Argos and Corinth (392–387/6) as well as the *sympoliteia* between Mantinea and Helisson.

⁶² Nielsen 1996, 94; *id.* 2015, 260.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23–4, 39; Diod. Sic. 15.59; Pretzler 2009, 90–1, on the allusion to mercenary service for which the Arkadians were renowned; see also Nielsen 1999, 40–1 and Roy 1999b, 346–9, for the vast number of Arkadian mercenaries.

⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.6–7; Diod. Sic. 15.5.4; Paus. 8.8.9; Polyb. 4.27.6. Amit 1973, 168–74; Moggi 1976, 140–56; Gehrke 1985, 103–5; Nielsen 1996, 91 and 2015, 255–6; Roy 2000b, 309 with notes. Dmitriev (2011, 29) argues that the Spartans probably acted in the name of the *autonomia* for the Greek *poleis* stipulated by the King's Peace. It seems, however, that there was an immediate cause for Spartan action: before the *dioikismos*, there seems to have existed in Mantinea a division between the (sixty) ἀργολίζοντες (sympathizers with Argos) and the προστάται τοῦ δήμου on the one hand, and the βέλτιστοι on the other (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.6–7).

⁶⁵ Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981, 239–41) emphasize the strategic location of Mantinea, Tegea and Pallantion in the modern valley of Tripolis which was directly linked to the valley of Sparta by at least two routes; thus, it was of vital importance for the Spartans to keep the inhabitants 'subservient' to their interests. See also Beck 1997, 68.

⁶⁶ On the massacres during the Peloponnesian War see Ducrey 1999, 118–27.

⁶⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3–5; Roy 1971, 570 and 2000b, 309; Demand 1990, 108–10; Nielsen 2004a, 518.

⁶⁸ Before the *dioikismos*, Agesilaos had refused to take the field against Mantinea on the grounds of the *polis'* services to his father. Instead, Agesipolis led the army, whose own father Pausanias had enjoyed cordial relations with the *prostatai tou demou* in Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3); see Beck 2001, 366–7, for the favourable presentation of Agesilaos.

⁶⁹ On the new fortification of Mantinea see Winter 1989, 189–92.

⁷⁰ According to Xenophon certain Arkadian *poleis* helped with the *synoikismos*. This suggests that some Arkadians, possibly including some of those previously under Mantinean control, viewed the *synoikismos* as serving their best interests, and this despite the fact that Mantinea had in the past entertained micro-imperialistic ambitions. In this case, the experience of Mantinean micro-hegemony might not have been so discouraging after all. Pretzler (2009, 87) finds this co-operation rather surprising. The notion of 'micro-imperialism' is owed to Ma 2004, 199: 'la pression micro-impérialiste des petits sur le plus petits encore'.

⁷¹ Larsen 1968, 181–3; Amit 1973, 121–82; Gehrke 1985, 152–3; Nielsen 1996, 87–9 and 2004a, 518, 531; Beck 1997, 71–3. See Nielsen 2002, 389–91 and 405, for relations between Mantinea and Sparta, determined to a large extent by Tegean attitude towards Sparta (Mantinea adopted the opposite stance) and by the wish of

the Mantineans to maintain their hegemony; *ibid.* 393–6 for Spartan–Tegean relations. See also Nielsen 1999, 52–3, on Mantinean pride in their hoplite prowess, almost in competition with Sparta.

⁷² Xenophon employs the term ‘Ἀρκαδικὸν’ but the context is such that it implies the existence of some form of the Confederacy already before the Spartan attack on Mantinea in late 370; see Hornblower 1990, 72 and Dušanić 1970, 282–5. See Bearzot 2015, 506, on the two conflicting political attitudes in Tegea, for and against federalism.

⁷³ See Gehrke 1985, 154–5 and Nielsen (2002, 475–6 and 2015, 258–60) on Tegea and Mantinea. The Spartans did invade Arkadia but in the end neither side offered to give battle (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.18–21). Beck (1997, 75) stresses the danger the political unification of Tegea and Mantinea represented for Sparta. David (1981, 84) argues that the intervention of the Mantineans in Tegea was conveniently viewed by Agesilaos as a violation of the autonomy principle confirmed in the peace conference of late 371.

⁷⁴ Nielsen (1999, 44) stresses the crucial role played by opposition to Sparta in the formation of a collective Arkadian identity; Pretzler (2009, 92–9) also explores evidence of an Arkadian identity, similarly stressing the role of Sparta (at pp.100–6).

⁷⁵ Nielsen 1996, 65, 87; Pretzler 2009, 102–6.

⁷⁶ Beck 1997, 228–9.

⁷⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11–12, 21; Larsen 1968, 184; Nielsen 1996, 94; 2004a, 514; 2002, 342, 386–7, on Spartan relations with Orchomenos and Heraia.

⁷⁸ Nielsen 2002, 477–9, on the members of the Arkadian Confederacy.

⁷⁹ The Mainalians and the Parrhasians were tribal states, that is, populations settled in numerous small communities (Nielsen 2004a, 508 with references). The other tribal states of Arkadia were the Kynourians and the Eutresians (and the Triphylians until the late 5th century). See Nielsen 1999, 52, on the Parrhasian identity. See Pikoulas 1990, 474–7, on the emancipation of the Mainalians and the Parrhasians, after having become part of Megalopolis.

⁸⁰ Thucydides (4.134.1) refers to ἐϋμμάχοι ἐκατέρων (‘allies of either side’); see Thuc. 5.28.3–29.2, 33.1–3 and Nielsen 1996, 79–84, 101, on Mantinea: the Parrhasian tribe was allied to it until 421; *ibid.* 86 and Nielsen 2002, 142–5, 366–7 and 2015, 252–3, on the Tegean hegemonic alliance preceding that of Mantinea; Nielsen 2002, 367–73 on the Mantinean alliance; Funke 2009, 9–10; Forsén 2000, 49–54, on the population of the Mainalian tribe being at least as large as the Mantinean and on the formation of the Mantinean alliance. Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981, 289) consider pressure upon the resources of the Mantinike as an important factor of Mantinean expansion.

⁸¹ See Pikoulas 1999a, 262–3, on the location of Helisson and on a road connecting Mantinea with Helisson and Methydrion.

⁸² ed. pr. Te Riele 1987 = *SEG* 37.340. Funke (2009, 9) also accepts a date before 385. Thür and Taeuber (*IPArk*, pp. 99–100) hesitantly date the treaty to c.350–340. On the numerous (15) types of ‘dependent *poleis*’ see Hansen 2004, 87–93; also Nielsen 2002, 347 with notes.

⁸³ Nielsen 1996, 68–70; 2002, 359–63, 448 and n.103; 2004a, 513; Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 245–6. In Mack’s view (2015, 218–20), Helisson was allowed to retain part of its *polis* identity by conducting its festivals and receiving sacred delegations.

⁸⁴ Roy (2005, 264) suggests that Mantinea might have got in return the curtailment of Orchomenos, which is surely plausible.

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⁸⁵ See Pretzler (2009, 96–7) stressing the use of Arkadian rhetoric and symbols by Tegea and Mantinea to consolidate their local hegemonies; see also Beck 1997, 72.

⁸⁶ Paus. 8.27.4: ἐκ δὲ τῶν συντελούντων ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν ('of those belonging to Orchomenos').

⁸⁷ See also Plassart 1915, 98–115, no.IV / *SV4* II, 297 / Piccirilli 1973, no.52 / Moggi 1976, 273–92, no.43 / Dušanić 1978, 333–46, no.I / Migeotte 1984, no.26 / Dubois 1988, II, 146–63. *IG* V.2.343 does not provide the whole text.

⁸⁸ Dubois (1988, II, 149) notes that the term *synoikismos* appears only in the late 4th century. Nielsen (1996, 65) defines a *synoikismos* as involving 'either the creation of a new polis or the reinforcement of an existing polis, by the physical relocation of a number of settlements, which were either completely abandoned, or allowed to persist, if the relocation affected only part of the population (a partial synoecism)... If a synoecism was partial, one or more of the affected settlements could persist as *poleis*, usually as dependent *poleis*'. According to Nielsen (1996, 71; 2002, 350–2 and 2004a, 511), Euaimon probably continued to exist as a dependent *polis* of Orchomenos; see also Jost 1985, 120, on the respect shown by the Orchomenians for the sanctuaries and traditions of Euaimon.

⁸⁹ For a date before 363/2 see Nielsen 1996, 71. Moggi (1976, 276–7) dates it between 369 and 363, on the basis of the reference to Ἀρκάδων in ll. 24–5; furthermore, according to Moggi, close relations between Heraia and Orchomenos, evident in the inscription, are attested for the immediate post-Leuktra period, but not between 360–350; on the other hand, Thür and Taeuber (*IPArk*, pp.138–42) date it to 360–350, as Plassart 1915; Dušanić 1978, 338–9, dates it to c.378, at the time of Orchomenos' war with Kleitor, which he thinks was a suitable period for reinforcement of Orchomenos' population. Migeotte (1984, 99–100), for palaeographical reasons, dates it before 350, between 380 and 360.

⁹⁰ Nielsen 2002, 500–1 and 2004a, 514.

⁹¹ Dubois (1988, II, 152) suggests that Heraia might have been chosen because it too had undergone a *synoikismos* in 370 and therefore had the experience to deal with problems arising from it.

⁹² Nielsen 1996, 86–7; 2002, 193–7, 348, 324–5, 365–6; 2004a, 515.

⁹³ Larsen 1968, 181–2; Roy 1999b, 324, 357.

⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11–21; Diod. Sic. 15.62.1–2; Larsen 1968, 184; Nielsen 2004a, 524.

⁹⁵ The Spartans do not appear to have opposed Orchomenian expansion, i.e. they did not consider it a threat: Nielsen 1996, 92.

⁹⁶ It is indicative of Spartan control over Arkadian affairs that the Spartans stopped the war because they needed Kleitor's mercenaries to invade Boiotia (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.36–7).

⁹⁷ *IPArk* 14, dating probably from the 360s, refers to a common boundary between Orchomenos, Methydrion and Torthyneion; see also Plassart 1915, 53–97, no.III (= Dušanić 1978, 346–58, no.II / Dubois 1988, II, 133–46 / Daverio Rocchi 1988, no.2. Plassart argued that this regulation of boundaries could be related to incorporation of Methydrion by Megalopolis. His view is generally accepted. See, for instance, Nielsen 2002, 449–52 and 2004a, 523–4; Daverio Rocchi 1988, 98–9; Roy 2005, 265. Dušanić (1978, 348–51) dates it between 369 and 361 and argues that the delineation of boundaries involves Orchomenos and Torthyneion, not Methydrion. See Nielsen 1996, 84–6 and 2002, 352–7, on the status of Thisoa,

Methydriion and Teuthis; Roy 1972b, 78–9, on the date of Orchomenian expansion; *id.* 1999b, 334, for the exploitation of woodland lying on the frontier between Orchomenos and Methydriion.

⁹⁸ See Nielsen 1999, 59 and Pretzler 2009, 107, emphasizing hostility against Sparta as a cohesive factor for the Arkadians.

⁹⁹ Shortly after Leuktra, the Eleans refused to withdraw their claim on Triphylia (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1). For the Elean policy of expansion southwards, from the early 6th century, see Roy 2009, 32–3.

¹⁰⁰ Roy (2004, 499 and 2009, 31) notes that the term *perioikoi* is only attested for *poleis* dependent on Elis, in non-Elean authors. See Roy 1997 for relations between Elis and its *perioikoi*; Nielsen 1997, 139–41 and 2004b, 540–6; Roy 2000a, 144–5.

¹⁰¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30; Nielsen 1996, 75–7; Roy 2009, 41; Nielsen 1999, 45 on the claiming of Lasion as a proof of a sense of solidarity among the Arkadians.

¹⁰² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26; Diod. Sic. 15.77.2–3; Roy 1994, 194–5 and 2000a, 136: the frontier between Arkadia and Elis fluctuated and it should be seen as dividing a range of *communities* not states.

¹⁰³ Larsen 1968, 189–90; Roy 2000a, 139–45 and 2009, 42–3; Ruggeri 2009, 62. Nielsen 1997, 145–57, has established that ‘Triphylia as a political, ethnic and geographical concept was a construct of the first half of the fourth century’ on the basis of pre-existing *poleis*. It was organized as a tribal or federal state which was probably dominated by Lepreon and had mysteriously disintegrated politically by 219, perhaps already after the dismemberment of the Arkadian Confederacy in 362. See also Nielsen 2002, 230–69, 456–8 and 2004b, 540–6. See Ruggeri 2009, 55–9, for the formation of a new mythical tradition contemporaneous with the creation of the Triphylian state.

¹⁰⁴ Nielsen 1997, 145–6; Ruggeri 2009, 61; Jacquemin 1999, 313, no. 066.

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12–13; Diod. Sic. 15.77.1–2; Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.15–16, 26–7 for the Arkadian attempt to help the democrats in Elis and for the exile of 400 democrats; these exiles occupied Pylos with Arkadian help; it was recaptured by the Eleans a little later.

¹⁰⁶ Roy 1971, 582–5 and 1994, 203.

¹⁰⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.17–20. On the date of the alliance of Elis with Sparta and Achaia see Roy 1971, 583, who views the alliance in terms of a natural association between oligarchs.

¹⁰⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–32; Diod. Sic. 15.78.1–3; Paus. 6.4.2; Nielsen 1999, 55–6; Roy 1994, 203–4; Luraghi 2008, 213; Giangiulio 2009, 67–70; see Roy 2004, 501 and 2015, 283, for the ambiguous status of Pisatis as either a *polis* or a confederacy of small *poleis*.

¹⁰⁹ Roy (1971, 586) argues that this demonstration of piety by the Mantineans might have originated with the Mantinean oligarchs, sympathizers with the Elean oligarchs. This is plausible but we have no information as to Mantinean internal politics. See also Beck 1997, 230.

¹¹⁰ See Larsen (1968, 189), Roy (1971, 587) and Buckler (1980, 204, n.35), for the divided sympathies in the Confederacy: the federal officials went for Tegea, the army and the assembly for Mantinea.

¹¹¹ Diodorus (15.82.1–4) presents the Mantineans as warmongers, seeking war against Elis because they feared that they would be liable to prosecution for usurping dedications, in sharp contrast with the other Arkadians who wished for peace. This,

however, probably reflects sheer propaganda of their rivals (Roy 1971, 586 and n.87). Diodorus' entire narrative is extremely brief compared to that of Xenophon; this does not mean that Xenophon is entirely unbiased.

¹¹² For the events leading to the dismemberment of the Arkadian Confederacy see Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33–5.3; Larsen 1968, 188–92; Roy 1971, 585–7 and 2000b, 316–19; Gehrke 1985, 155–8; Nielsen 2002, 490–2.

¹¹³ See Beck 1997, 252, stressing the rivalry between Tegea and Mantinea.

¹¹⁴ Pausanias (8.8.10) ascribes this Mantinean change of sides to fear of the Thebans; see Thompson 1983, 160 and n.39; Nielsen 2004a, 531.

¹¹⁵ It is not certain that Pallantion actually sent troops: Nielsen 2004a, 526; Diodorus (15.85.2) includes Sikyon, which is probably a mistake; see Skalet 1928, 76 and n.62.

¹¹⁶ While Xenophon mentions by name the Arkadian allies of the Tegeans, Diodorus (15.84.4) states that οἱ πλείστοι καὶ κράτιστοι τῶν Ἀρκάδων (the majority and the most powerful of the Arkadians) were on their side.

¹¹⁷ See Roebuck 1941, 45: 'the battle and the dragging years of war before it had temporarily sickened the Greeks of their blickering'.

¹¹⁸ Cartledge 2002a, 258 and *id.* 2002b, 7–8; Ryder 1965, 84–5 and 140–4.

¹¹⁹ The reply was recorded in an inscription found at Argos and now lost (Tod 1948, no.145) – there is no mention of Argos or any other *polis* in it. Bauslaugh 1991, 211–14 (text and commentary with new restorations in ll.11–13), considers the decree immensely important for the study of neutrality, a proof of the 'desirability of having a formally accepted position of abstention'. Ryder (1965, 142–4) points out that this inscription bears the first epigraphic attestation of the term *Koinē Eirēnē* and two of its seven certain uses in the 4th century. See also Cartledge 2002b, 8; Hornblower 2002, 259.

¹²⁰ See Nielsen 2002, 493–7, for a discussion of the relevant evidence. Nielsen (at p. 496) believes that 'there existed one or two organisations claiming to be the Arkadian Confederacy, but neither of them united the entire region'.

¹²¹ *IG* II² 112 / *SV* A II, 290.

¹²² Decree of the Amphictyony in Didymos, *On Demosthenes* (*Syll.*³ 24 / *CID* IV 7 / Harding 2006, 54–5). See also Luraghi (2008, 254–5 and nn. 15, 17–18) who emphasizes that the Messenians and the Megalopolitans were nevertheless proclaimed benefactors of the Amphictyony (the only example of such a grant to cities).

¹²³ See Dem. *On the False Embassy* 10–11, 303–4.

¹²⁴ Nielsen 2002, 495 and 2004a, 519; Dušanić 1970, 306–10.

¹²⁵ Roebuck (1948, 85 and n.97) thinks it is possible. Dušanić 1970, 311–12, considers it almost certain mainly on the basis of the Arkadian federal decree for Phylarchos (*IG* V.2.1 / *Tod 1948, no.132; translation in Harding 1985, no.51) which he dates before 335 (see this chapter, n.159 on its dating).

¹²⁶ Antipatros in general exercised a firm rule, among other things installing or supporting a regime favourable to him in Megalopolis.

¹²⁷ Aymard 1937, 9 and 15, observes that the restoration 'Boiotians' by Blass in the Teubner edition is doubtful; see also Worthington 1986, 115, n.2 with a review of the relevant bibliography.

¹²⁸ See e.g. Dušanić (1970, 313) who thinks that *sylogos* means *Koinon*; Nielsen (1999, 28–30 and 2002, 497) remains uncertain.

¹²⁹ See also Worthington 1990, 202, n.26. Aymard 1937 (esp. 15, 25–6) explicitly rejects

the dissolution of the *Koina*; he explores the possibility that Alexander might have wished to paralyze reaction of the *Koina* as regarded the restoration of the exiles, but prefers the idea that Alexander wished for the federal assemblies to award him divine honours.

¹³⁰ On the embassy to the Peloponnese, arguing against Antipatros' envoys, see also Plut. *Dem.* 27.1–6.

¹³¹ Piérart 1982, 133; Dušanić 1970, 313–14.

¹³² Aymard 1937, 19–21, on the interpretation of the Polybian passage.

¹³³ Roy 1968, 249–75, as summarized by Nielsen 2002, 497; Nielsen (1999, 21–31 and 2002, 54–66) assembles evidence for employment of the regional ethnic 'Arkas', rarely found before the 4th century and afterwards almost exclusively outside Arkadia.

¹³⁴ The common form 'Megalopolis' is employed here, which is attested only in late sources (Nielsen 2004a, 520; Auberger 2005, 198).

¹³⁵ *Olympiabericht VII*, 211–17, no.I (= *SEG* 22.339), shows Messenia, Sikyon and Pisa in alliance with the Arkadian Confederacy; see *Olympiabericht XI*, 413–20 (= *SEG* 49.466), for the publication of a new fragment.

¹³⁶ The role of Epameinondas in the foundation of Messenia is beyond doubt but no strong bonds developed between Messenia and Thebes subsequently: Luraghi 2008, 209–10, 216–18. See also Demand 1990, 110–11.

¹³⁷ The division between Lakonia and Messenia was set between Oitylos and Thalamai (Shipley 2004a, 549). For the symbolic connotations of Ithome, especially as the centre of the revolt against Sparta in the 5th century, see Luraghi 2008, 209–10.

¹³⁸ Roebuck 1941, 37–8. Grandjean (2002, 543–50; 2003, 93–9) observes that the name Ithome is attested neither in the coinage issued shortly after the foundation of the new state nor in inscriptions before 330; it does appear, rarely, between 330 and 280 (see also Matthaiou 2001, 222, 225); the name 'Messene' appears in inscriptions only in the Imperial period; see also Shipley 2004a, 562.

¹³⁹ Grandjean 2002, 544–5; 2003, 93–4.

¹⁴⁰ Luraghi 2008, 266–8; *id.* 2015, 286–8.

¹⁴¹ Grandjean 2002, 549; 2003, 97–8; Luraghi 2008, 267; 2015, 288.

¹⁴² Diod. Sic. 15.66; Paus. 4.27.5–7, 31.10, 32.1: Epameinondas was honoured as an *oikistēs*; Roebuck 1941, 27–40; Luraghi 2008, 216–17; Themelis 2000, 41–57.

¹⁴³ Roebuck 1941, 109–17; Grandjean 2002, 551–60; 2003, 99–105; Shipley 2004a, 562; Luraghi 2015, 288–95.

¹⁴⁴ Luraghi 2008, 272–3; Sineux 1997, 2, 10; Themelis 2000, 5–24.

¹⁴⁵ Luraghi 2008, 214–16, 231–2; 2009, 117–18, 124; Mitsos 1945, 30–1; Roebuck 1941, 33.

¹⁴⁶ On the *perioikoi* of the Skiritis, Karyai and the Belminatis joining Epameinondas see Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.25–6, 32 and Cartledge 2002b, 4–5. Lykourgos, *Against Leokrates* 62, refers to the Messenian population as assembled 'from men of indiscriminate origin' (ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων). Luraghi (2008, 220–30, 245–8 and 2009, 119, 122–3) sees proof of the mixed identity of the Messenians in their cults and emphasizes the Spartan element in them (2008, 230–9; 2009, 123–7); see also Roebuck 1941, 34–7; Shipley 2004a, 562; Christien 2006, 174–5.

¹⁴⁷ Roebuck 1941, 38–9; Cartledge 2002a, 255; Luraghi 2008, 254; Henning 1996, 21–2. Asine is identified with modern Korone while Mothone is identified with Petalidi: Shipley 2004a, 561 with bibliography.

¹⁴⁸ Shipley 2000a, 385 and 2004a, 549, 559; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 65, on the Argives driving the people of Asine into exile in c.700.

¹⁴⁹ Pylos is not attested as *polis* in the Classical era; Koryphasion was the Lakeldaimonian name while Pylos was the Messenian one: see Shipley 2004a, 557.

¹⁵⁰ See Ch. 7, p.281 and n.47; Ch. 8, p.325 and n.67.

¹⁵¹ Luraghi (2009, 121–2 and n.35) also argues that both Pharai and Thouria (and possibly Kalamai) became part of free Messenia, even if unwillingly. Shipley (2004a, 550, 565) thinks that Pharai might have remained Spartan while Thouria might have become independent. Grandjean (2002, 555 and 2003, 101) thinks that Thouria was awarded to Messenia, along with Asine, in 338/7.

¹⁵² Xenophon characteristically omits the foundation of both Megalopolis and Messene. See Roebuck 1941, 31–2 and n. 21, for a presentation of the sources on Messene's foundation; Roy 2000b, 308; Hornblower 1990, 71–2. As to chronology, Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in 371/0 but Diodorus in 368. Roy (1971, 578) views the foundation as a result of the 'Tearless Battle' of 368; also Demand 1990, 113. Hornblower 1990, 73–6, viewing the foundation of Megalopolis as a 'process' (at p.76), plausibly distinguishes between decision and implementation arguing that the decision for its foundation was taken very soon after Leuktra and that Diodorus, based on a chronographer, 'misplaced under 368 an entry which in the chronographer related to 371' (at p.73). Dušanić (1970, 282–3, 293–7) and Hornblower (1990, 76–7) detect Theban influence in the foundation of Megalopolis, though not necessarily a direct one. Dušanić (1970, 293–4) thinks that Epameinondas envisaged a really *megale polis* but the Arkadians, especially the Mantineans, objected and thus the Megalopolis came to be of a moderate size by 362. *Contra* Roy (1971, 578) thinks that neither Epameinondas nor Boiotia as a whole played any part; Demand (1990, 116–18) argues against Epameinondas' personal involvement.

¹⁵³ On the land of the Aigytaí see Pikoulas 1983a, 257–62; Jost 1998, 219.

¹⁵⁴ Paus. 8.27.3–4: Ἀλέα Παλλάντιον Εὐταία Σουμάτειον Ἀσέα Περαιθεῖς Ἐλισσών Ὀρεσθάσιον Δίπαια Λύκαια• ταύτας μὲν ἐκ Μαινάλου• ἐκ δὲ Εὐτρησίῳν Τρικλώνοιν καὶ Ζοΐτιον καὶ Χαρισία καὶ Πτολέδεσμα καὶ Κναῦσον καὶ Παρώρεια• παρὰ δὲ Αἰγυτῶν <Αἶγυς> καὶ Σκιρτώνιον καὶ Μαλέα καὶ Κρώμοι καὶ Βλένινα καὶ Λευκτρον• Παρρασιῶν <δὲ> Λυκοσουρεῖς Θωκνεῖς Τραπεζούντιοι Προσεῖς Ἀκακήσιον Ἀκόντι<ον> Μακαρία Δασέα• ἐκ δὲ Κυνουραίων τῶν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ Γόρτυς καὶ Θεισά ἢ πρὸς Λυκαίῳ καὶ Λυκαῖται καὶ Ἀλίφηρα• ἐκ δὲ τῶν συντελούντων ἐς Ορχομενὸν Θεισά Μεθύδιον Τεῦθις• προσεγένετο δὲ καὶ Τρίπολις ὀνομαζομένη, Καλλιὰ καὶ Δίποινα καὶ Νώνακρις.

Diod. Sic. 15.72.4: ἔκτισαν ἐπὶ τινος ἐπικαίρου τόπου τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Μεγάλην πόλιν, συρρίψαντες εἰς αὐτὴν κόμας εἴκοσι τῶν ὀνομαζομένων Μαιναλίων καὶ Παρρασιῶν Ἀρκαδῶν. ('they founded on a favourable location the so-called *Megalē polis*, combining twenty villages of the Arkadians known as Mainalians and Parrhasians.').

¹⁵⁵ Mention must also be made of Dušanić 1970. On the basis of the English summary of his book his theory runs as follows (at pp.308–30): Very shortly after Leuktra the Arkadians (before the establishment of the Confederacy) decided on the foundation of a modestly sized town but the decision did not take effect immediately. Following the first Theban campaign in the Peloponnese and under the influence of Epameinondas a much wider *synoikismos* was decided, which is described in Pausanias 8.27.2–4. However, this plan was met with strong opposition by the northern Arkadians and there followed a second decision returning to the initial modest size.

This is the *synoikismos* described by Diodorus, and it actually started after the ‘Tearless Battle’ of 368; the western Mainalians and the *synteleia* of Orchomenos were added in 361.

¹⁵⁶ Moggi (1974, 90, 98–9) argues that Pausanias’ text is a later fabrication intended to justify territorial ambitions of Megalopolis in the late 3rd century but he does acknowledge that there was much authentic material in the list.

¹⁵⁷ Moggi (1974, 80) argues for transfer of populations in their entirety.

¹⁵⁸ Moggi 1974, 73–4; Nielsen 2002, 439.

¹⁵⁹ The decree records *damiorgoi* from Tegea, the Mainalians, Lepreon, Megalopolis, the Kynourians, Orchomenos, Kleitor, Heraia and Thelphousa. Members from northern Arkadia, such as Stymphalos and Lousoi, are absent but Aineias of Stymphalos was *stratēgos* of the Arkadians in 366, so at least Stymphalos cannot have been absent from the Confederacy. Therefore, the list could very well reflect some sort of rotation system in the election of the *damiorgoi*: see Roy 1971, 571, who dates the Phylarchos decree between 368 and 361; Roy 2005, 263, narrows down the span of time, noting that the decree must be dated between 366, the date of the Arkadian-Athenian defence pact, and before 363, the year of the dismemberment of the Arkadian *Koinon*; alternatively, the decree could be dated after an unknown re-unification; see also Roy 2000b, 312. As we shall see below, such a re-unification, including Megalopolis, appears unlikely. Nielsen (1996, 94–5 and 2002, 435 with n.60, 440) opts for the 360s. See also Roebuck 1948, 85–6, n.97. *Contra* Dušanić 1970, 336–7, dates the decree between 338 and 335, mainly on the basis of Megalopolis’ prominence. On the principle of proportionate representation see Larsen 1955, 73.

¹⁶⁰ Moggi 1974, 73–6; Nielsen 2002, 435 and n.60, 440–1.

¹⁶¹ Loeb translation: ‘...they did not belong to the city and were not under their rule’.

¹⁶² Moggi 1974, 82–4. According to Moggi (esp. at p.84), if these communities are identified with those detached at the instigation of Philopoimen, then they could not have been part of the initial *synoikismos*. See also Nielsen 2002, 437–8 and Jost 1992–93, 15.

¹⁶³ The Achaian *poleis* issuing coinage amount to 45 or 46: Warren 2008, 91 and n.5. The *terminus post quem* is set by the incorporation of Elis and Messene in 191; Warren (2008, 94) tentatively dates the federal bronze coinage to c. 167–164.

¹⁶⁴ Errington 1969, 91; Rizakis 2008b, 277, n. 32 with bibliography. Roy (1972a, 41) argues that Alipheira could not have been one of these communities since, according to Philopoimen, these had not been part of Megalopolis from the beginning, unlike Alipheira (according to the argument of the Megalopolitans in Livy 32.5.4–5).

¹⁶⁵ Moggi 1974, 85–7; Nielsen 2002, 452–3.

¹⁶⁶ Moggi 1974, 88–9; Nielsen 2002, 447–9.

¹⁶⁷ Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981, 245), on the date of *IG IV*².1.42 which records a payment of money by the Epidaurians to the Elisphasioi (ll. 2, 16); text and commentary in Migeotte 1984, no.21. Diod. Sic. 16.39.5 calls Helisson a *polis* (πόλιν Ἑλισσοῦντα), in the context of 351, when it was sacked by the Spartans being at war against the Megalopolitans; in the context of 207, Polyb. 11.11.6 writes of the Ἑλισφασίων χώρα.

¹⁶⁸ Nielsen 2002, 453–5; in the accounts of the *naopoioi* at Delphi there appears a Βαθυκλῆς Θισσαῖος ἐν Μεγάλῃς Πόλει (CID II.5, ll. 23–4).

¹⁶⁹ See Moggi 1974, 93–4; Nielsen 2002, 449–52; In *FD* III.1.83, l. 16 and p.384,

dating to 274, the 'Methydrieus' qualifies a personal name; *IPArk* 16 (dating shortly after 235), records a debt of Methydriion to Megalopolis. In *I.Magnesia* 38, l. 61, Methydriion acknowledges *asylia* to Magnesia on the Maiander, in 208 (*Syll.*³ 559 / Dubois II 1988, 273–83 / Rigsby 1996, no.88; on the date of the grant see Rigsby 1996, 182–3).

¹⁷⁰ Dušanić 1970, 327, suggests that Megalopolis could have got Alipheira after the War of Agis III.

¹⁷¹ Moggi 1974, 89–91; Nielsen 2002, 444–6 and 2004a, 509. On the possible date of Lydiadas' rise to power and the handing over of Alipheira, Walbank 1957, 531 is superseded by *id.* 1988, 308.

¹⁷² In the context of 208, Livy (28.8.6) reports that Philip restored (*reddidit*) Triphylia and Heraia to the Achaian Confederacy and Alipheira to Megalopolis. There are three possibilities: 1) Philip made a promise he did not fulfil; 2) Livy mistakenly recorded the same event twice; 3) in 208 Philip turned over Alipheira and the other territories temporarily, to serve immediate military needs, and Livy gave a shortened and mistaken version of events. That Livy got it totally wrong in 28.8.6 does not seem very likely since this account differs from 32.5.4 in that Orchomenos is not included in the former; secondly, in 208 it is the king himself that declares the restoration whereas the second time it is an envoy of his.

Aymard (1938b, 59–61, n.53) observes that the Achaian *stratēgos* Aristainos, while in favour of abandoning the alliance with Philip in 198 and of siding with the Romans, did not complain that Philip did not keep his promise. See also Walbank 1967, 606–7; *id.* 1988, 405 and n.1, 423; Briscoe 1973, 174–5.

The Romans most probably confirmed possession of Alipheira by Megalopolis in 196 although mention of Megalopolis has dropped out of Livy 33.34.9: see Robertson 1976, 265 and n.26.

¹⁷³ It is also possible that Alipheira was involved in a judicial process with Heraia, in c.200 (**IvO* 48 / Ager 1996, Appendix, 514–15, no.4 / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 112, no. 13c; also Tod 1913, no.X [no text]).

¹⁷⁴ Moggi (1974, 78–9 and n.28) thinks that it was the Mainalian Lykaia; Nielsen (2002, 441) leaves the matter open.

¹⁷⁵ Nielsen 1996, 99 and 2004a, 517, 521. Demand (1990, 113–14) argues that we are dealing here with two different rebellions, the one in Pausanias dating to the time of Megalopolis' initial establishment; Nielsen (2002, 416–17, 425–6) also thinks this is possible; see also Moggi 1974, 78 and n.27 and Roy 2005, 267.

¹⁷⁶ Nielsen 2002, 433, 449.

¹⁷⁷ Beloch (1922, 279) suggests a total of c.60,000; Woodhouse (in Gardner *et al.* 1892, 3) suggests c. 65,000. These figures also indicate later expansion.

¹⁷⁸ Larsen (1968, 185–6) acutely observes that choosing either Tegea or Mantinea would mean trouble (he believes that Megalopolis was planned to be the capital from the start). On Megalopolis as capital see Beck 1997, 75–7, 203.

¹⁷⁹ For the variations of the toponym see Nielsen 2004a, 533.

¹⁸⁰ See this chapter, p.27 and n.159.

¹⁸¹ Megalopolis possessed an assembly hall, called 'the Thersilion', which could accommodate 6,000 people (Jost 1998, 238) and must have served both the assembly of the Arkadian Confederacy (Paus. 8.32.1) and also the *polis* itself. On its multiple uses see Tsiolis 1995, 53–8, 61–4; see also Beck 1997, 80–1; cf. Roy 2000b, 315, who

observes that the only meeting-place of the Arkadians, reported by Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.36), is Tegea.

¹⁸² See Nielsen 1999, 27, for the use of the ethnic ‘Arkas’ in the *Anabasis* and at pp.27–31 for the Arkadian ethnic identity and the frequent use of the ethnic ‘Arkas’ in 4th-century inscriptions, especially after the foundation of the Arkadian Confederacy.

IN THE ARMS OF THE ARGEADS: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD FOR THE PELOPONNESE

From the battle of Mantinea to the emergence of Philip II: weakness of all sides

In this chapter we shall first explore attitudes of Peloponnesian states towards Sparta and war after the dismemberment of the Arkadian Confederacy. The main theme of the chapter is the impact of Philip II on interstate Peloponnesian relations, on the Peloponnesian geopolitical map as well as on Peloponnesian attitudes towards war and monarchs.

Xenophon's *Hellenica* ends with the battle of Mantinea in 362. Thereafter the history of the Greek world as a whole and of the Peloponnese in particular suffers from the lack of a detailed, contemporary narrative. The only continuous narrative left to us is the much later history of Diodorus who, however, focuses on the rise and expansion of Macedon under Philip II; the Peloponnese (like the rest of the Greek world) figures in his work mostly in relation to Philip's intervention in it. Additional, elliptical or biased information is drawn from certain speeches of Demosthenes.

In this period, warfare initially – before the emergence of Macedon – consists of inadequate attempts of the Spartans to restore their hegemony and, correspondingly, of limited, defensive reactions by their rivals. The inability or reluctance of Sparta's opponents to face the Spartans without external help remains a constant feature. The Argives, the former rivals of Sparta for supremacy in the Peloponnese, now showed no sign that they wished to, or could, assume Sparta's position of leadership. In 346, Isokrates (*Philip* 30, 32) still counted Argos among the four great Greek *poleis* – the other three being Athens, Sparta and Thebes – all of them so important, in his view, that, if Philip managed to establish concordance (*homonoia*) involving himself and them, he would be able to establish peace all over Greece.¹ The reason for the inclusion of Argos among the four most important Greek *poleis* largely had to do with the fact that it was considered to be the birthplace of the Argead, Macedonian, dynasty.² Isokrates, however, draws a very gloomy picture of Argive affairs,

apparently referring to both remote and contemporary misfortunes, with a certain degree of exaggeration (*Philip* 51). According to Isokrates, the major problems of the Argives are twofold: first, constant warfare with their neighbours, in which they hardly excel. They are so unfortunate in war (οὕτω δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀτυχοῦσιν) that they are in danger of having their territory plundered every year – Isokrates probably alludes to the Argive defeat by the Spartans at Orneai in the Argolid, in 353/2 (Diod. Sic. 16.34.3). However, according to Isokrates, a greater calamity to afflict the Argives was civic strife in which they proved most ferocious. He may have had in mind the notorious *skytalismos* of 370 first and foremost but still his phrasing points to a recurring phenomenon.³ Surviving evidence does not allow us to establish whether this state of affairs was indeed characterized by the ferocity depicted in Isokrates (*Philip* 52):

αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους καὶ πλουσιωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολλύουσιν, καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες οὕτω χαίρουσιν ὥς οὐδένες ἄλλοι τοὺς πολεμίους ἀποκτείνοντες.

they themselves put to death the most eminent and wealthy of their citizens; and they have more pleasure in doing this than any other people have in slaying their foreign enemies.

There are indications that civic strife went on until the early 3rd century when tyranny was eventually established.

The Argives appeared to be content with the maintenance of the *status quo* which entailed limited military activity, and only insofar as this was a response to threats presented by the Spartans. They continued acting as a group with the two newly founded *poleis* in search of a place in history, Messene and Megalopolis, while the Spartan threat lasted, but without any impressive results (Isokrates, *Philip* 74). Sparta appeared more threatening than in the first decade after Leuktra but, to be sure, not capable of returning to prominence in the Peloponnese.

Except for Megalopolis, the important Arkadian *poleis*, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Mantinea remain in the shadows. Partly responsible for this obscurity is the tendency of ancient authors to use the collective name ‘Arkadians’ without further specification.⁴

The Corinthians, the Epidaurians and the Achaians retained their traditional allegiance fighting on the Spartan side during the Third Sacred War (356/5–346) between the Lokrians, the Thebans, Philip II of Macedon (from 353) on the one hand, and the Phokians and the Spartans on the other, over control of Delphi.⁵

Participation in the Third Sacred War was for the Spartans a means of halting ongoing Theban influence on Peloponnesian affairs (Cartledge 2002b, 9–13).⁶ In the 350s the Spartans turned against Argos and Megalopolis

and once again found the Thebans in the way. The Spartans lacked the manpower necessary to pursue their plans vigorously but neither were their rivals easily capable of facing an attack. It was under the leadership of the Eurypontid king Archidamos III (son of Agesilaos) that Spartan ambitions in the Peloponnese resurfaced. The Spartans started by attacking Argos in 353/2 and by actually winning a battle at Orneai in the north-western Argolid (Diod. Sic. 16.34.3, 39.4).⁷ In 352/1, Archidamos and his son Agis (the future king Agis III) attacked the Megalopolitan countryside in an attempt to restore Spartan hegemony (Diod. Sic. 16.39.1–4). The Megalopolitans were not in a position to fight (οὐκ ὄντες ἀξιόμαχοι) and thus the Argives, the Messenians and the Sikyonians, remaining firmly anti-Spartan, came to their assistance.⁸ This is a manifestation of the fear imposed by the Spartan attack, although it is questionable whether these *poleis* levied their full force (πανδημεί), as Diodorus states.

Four things are notable, all pointing to a widespread military weakness. In order to conduct the operation, the Spartans had to receive 3,000 infantry and 500 horse from the Phokians, their allies in the Third Sacred War. After a while the Spartans, having suffered defeat by the Thebans twice, were forced to conclude an armistice with the Megalopolitans (Diod. Sic. 16.39.5–7).⁹ Also, the Megalopolitans were not in a position to defeat the Spartans on their own. Megalopolitan weakness should not be attributed solely to inferior numbers. It must also have to do with fear of their former oppressors as well as with lack of experience. Further, the Mantineans remained benevolently neutral towards Sparta. Archidamos had encamped near Mantinea which indicates that the Mantineans were not hostile but they did not participate in the attack on Megalopolis. Finally, the Argives, having been defeated by the Spartan forces, were unwilling to go on with military activities and promptly withdrew their forces when the Thebans appeared in defence of Megalopolis.

A few years later the Peloponnesians and the entire Greek world would have to deal with the sweeping power of Philip II of Macedon. At first, attitudes to Sparta would determine attitudes to Philip but progressively the Macedonian factor would operate independently of Sparta. However, policies towards Sparta and Macedon would again become interwoven in the 3rd and the early 2nd centuries.

Peloponnesian attitudes to Philip II: avoidance of military clashes or the emergence of a wait-and-see attitude

After the Thebans, Philip II was only the second ‘outsider’ the Peloponnesians had to face, and one far more powerful than the Thebans, as it turned out. (The Athenians had had a restricted and less influential

presence, in the Isthmos area). How do militarily inferior states treat such an outsider? To answer this question we must bear in mind that it would have taken them a while to realize the full extent of Philip's potential and ambitions. Our information largely derives from Demosthenes who is interested in accusing those who did not share Athenian interests and does not give any explanation for the policies of Peloponnesian (and other) cities other than the self-interest of leading politicians. Therefore, we are reduced to conjecture. Exhaustion by previous constant warfare, pre-existing civil strife of which Philip took advantage by supporting one or the other group, division in the ranks of both the leaders and the people as to the attitude to be maintained towards Philip, alternation in power of rival groups, perplexity or even fear – all may constitute underlying causes of what progressively seems to be neutrality or even passivity.

Until the Peace of Philokrates in 346 between Athens (and its allies in the Second Athenian Confederacy) and Philip, the Peloponnese was far away from Philip's sphere of operations. He did not actually set foot in the Peloponnese until after the battle of Chaironeia. But he did not wish the Peloponnesians to be allied with the Athenians, hence his involvement in their affairs after 346 (Griffith 1979, 458). In 330 Demosthenes (*On the Crown* 295) claimed that Philip had succeeded in installing his own sympathizers in power in a number of Peloponnesian *poleis* and elsewhere: Kerkidas, Hieronymos, and Eukampidas in Megalopolis (These men had been *oikistai* for Megalopolis);¹⁰ Myrtis, Teledamos, and Mnaseas held power in Argos; Euxitheos, Kleotimos, and Aristaichmos in Elis; Neon and Thrasylochos, sons of Philiades, in Messenia; Aristratos and Epichares in Sikyon; Deinarchos and Demaratos in Corinth (after 338).¹¹ On the basis of Demosthenes' list it appears that sympathizers of Philip were not installed in power in Tegea or Mantinea. For the rivals of Sparta – Argos, Messene and Megalopolis – Philip entered onto the scene as a reliable force offering protection.¹²

Of all the Peloponnesian states, Elis appears (on existing evidence) to have suffered the most from Macedonian interference. Civil strife was brewing for some time in Elis; Philip got involved by funding one group against the other, thus provoking a large-scale massacre.¹³ Macedonian sympathizers did get the upper hand in summer 343 but they did not survive Philip's death.¹⁴ It is in this period that we should look for the origins of the hostile attitude of Elis towards Macedon (and vice-versa) after Philip II's death and well into the 3rd century.

For the Achaian *poleis* Philip was from the beginning and continuously an enemy, ever since they joined Sparta and Phokis against Thebes in the Third Sacred War, in 354/3 (Diod. Sic. 16.30.4). This anti-Macedonian

policy of the Achaians will reach its peak in the 3rd century policy of the Achaian Confederacy (before, that is, the last quarter of that century). Notably, both the rivals of Sparta and the Achaians forged a defensive alliance with Philip's enemy *par excellence*, i.e. Athens, just a few years before the battle of Chaironeia.

Sparta became aggressive again after the Peace of Philokrates, this time against the Messenians who had the support of the Argives and the Arkadians, most probably the Megalopolitans (Paus. 4.28.1–2). According to Demosthenes, in 344, Philip ordered (ἀφιέναι κελεύων) the Spartans to leave Messene alone (2nd *Philippic* 13, 15). It appears that the threat of Philip's direct intervention put an end to the war (Griffith 1979, 482).¹⁵ Demosthenes (2nd *Philippic* 19–20, 25–6) urged, in vain, the Argives and, especially, the Messenians to distrust Philip's intentions. In Demosthenes' pro-war argumentation, avoidance of war is presented as dangerous because it can lead to tyranny – presumably the tyranny of Philip – and warns the Messenians: μή πολέμου ζητοῦντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι δεσπότην εὔρητε ('lest, seeking to be rid of war, you find a master'). Some two centuries later, Polybius (18.14.5–7) bitterly reproached Demosthenes for calling traitors those Peloponnesian politicians who favoured Philip (*On the False Embassy* 10–12). In Polybius' Achaian Confederacy perspective, these politicians were patriots who struggled to protect their own *poleis* from Sparta. The citizens of smaller states, in particular, may have seen in Philip a protector against either the Athenians or the Spartans or the Thebans (Errington 1990, 72–8). However, Polybius was not thinking only of the menace Sparta represented in the 4th century. Above all, he must have borne in mind that in the late 3rd century (220s), as well as in his own time, Sparta once more constituted a major threat – first under the leadership of Kleomenes III and later of Nabis.

Shortly after the Peace of Philokrates, in 343, Demosthenes (*On the False Embassy* 260–2) was outraged at the fact that many Arkadians (Ἀρκάδων πολλοί) set up bronze statues of Philip and decreed to welcome him in their cities if he ever set foot in the Peloponnese; according to Demosthenes, the Argives demonstrated the same attitude. The Megalopolitans must be included among the Arkadians, but there must have been others. In 330 Demosthenes (*On the Crown* 64) accused the Arkadians, the Argives and the Messenians of allowing disaster to befall Greece, for reasons of self-interest. In any case, it is not quite certain whether this over-friendly disposition towards Philip was also translated into a formal alliance. An alliance of the Argives and the Arkadians with Philip is mentioned in the 4th *Epistle* (8) of Demosthenes, in the context of the Harpalos Affair in 324/3 and before the outbreak of the Lamian War.¹⁶ According to

Pausanias (4.28.2) the Messenians also forged an alliance with Philip. Slightly later, still according to Pausanias (5.4.9), the Eleans, exhausted by civic strife, also joined a pretty insincere (as it turned out) alliance with Philip.¹⁷

If the Argives, the Eleans, the Messenians and some Arkadians had indeed an alliance with Philip, then this must have been one that did not oblige them to follow Philip's lead, since it was not translated later into participation on Philip's side at Chaironeia.

In 342 the Mantineans with other Arkadian *poleis*, the Argives, the Megalopolitans and the Messenians pursued an ambiguous and even precarious policy. Apparently without renouncing their *philia* (Bauslaugh 1991, 241) or alliance with Philip II, they concluded an alliance with the Athenians (*Scholia* on Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 83; Dem. 3rd *Philippic* 72; *IG* II² 225).¹⁸ The Achaians also took part in this alliance.¹⁹ The situation was now different from 348, when the assembly in Megalopolis refused to turn a benevolent ear to the Athenian calls against Philip. As Aischines vividly put it, not a single person listened to him then (*On the False Embassy* 79).

The *Scholia* on Aischines' *Against Ktesiphon* refer to Ἀρκάδες οἱ μετὰ Μαντινέων ('those Arkadians who are with the Mantineans'). From the perspective of intra-Arkadian politics, it is interesting that the Mantineans appear to retain their appeal for certain of the Arkadians or, to be more precise, to lead certain Arkadians (Nielsen 2002, 495 and 2004a, 519). On the other hand, the Megalopolitans appear to be on their own (Dušanić 1970, 335). If the assembly of the *myrioi* in 348 (when Aischines spoke in Megalopolis) consisted of other Arkadians, in addition to the Megalopolitans, then these Arkadians did not join Megalopolis in the alliance of 342. We have here an indication that the Megalopolitans had started 'walking alone' in Arkadia, from the perspective of interstate politics.

In any case, at least partly because of Philip II, we have here former rivals, Megalopolis and Mantinea, coming together, even if only indirectly and temporarily as it turned out, as members of an alliance with Athens. McQueen (1978, 50 and n.43) actually writes about a 'rapprochement between the two Arcadias', but this is a rather optimistic view, in need of qualification. Firstly, we cannot exactly talk about 'two Arcadias'. It was Megalopolis on the one hand, a group of Arkadians on the other. The 'two Arcadias' had not come together on their own initiative and they did not engage in common action. Thus we should not take this to amount to fully-fledged and lasting reconciliation, as indeed became obvious later. The Arkadians did appear to share the same anti-Macedonian attitude later, in 336/5 and 331, with the important exception of Megalopolis (see pp.68–9, 71).

This alliance with Athens must have been a defensive one, i.e. without the obligation to take the field against Athens' enemies. As mentioned above, in 330 Demosthenes (*On the Crown* 64) accused the Arkadians, the Argives and the Messenians of pursuing disastrous policies, presumably alluding to the fact they did not help Athens at Chaironeia. It is unlikely that he would have omitted to charge them with transgression of the alliance's terms, had that accusation been available.

How are we to explain this agreement with Athens? The Achaians had never favoured Philip. But what about the other cities? First of all, those leaders supported by, and supporting, Philip in each city must have lost a substantial part of their appeal to the people. This in turn begs the question: why would anti-Macedonian leaders have gained the upper hand and why would (the majority of?) the people in each city have decided to forge an alliance that would annoy Philip? Or to put it differently, why did the Argives, the Messenians and the Megalopolitans decide to put their eggs in two baskets? Pressure by the Athenians may be one answer. We could also see the alliance with Athens as the product of a wish to have the protection of both powers against Sparta. Archidamos III was campaigning in Tarentum but the Spartan threat was not eliminated, since Archidamos had an adult son, the future Agis III, to take his place (the other king, the Agiad Kleomenes II, was hardly visible). Or was the alliance a move towards independence from Macedon? (McQueen 1978, 42–4). Or, did these alliances or friendly relations with both Macedon and Athens aim at procuring neutrality and maintaining a balance of power, as Griffith (1979, 591–2) argues? It is quite possible that many citizens, in various *poleis*, had become progressively aware of the menace Philip represented through his extensive involvement in Peloponnesian affairs. We have no information as to discussion in assemblies in the various cities but all the aforementioned considerations could be in play simultaneously.

It is quite possible that especially the Messenians and the Megalopolitans, or at least part of them, had been disappointed with Philip, because he had not supported their petition to become members of the Delphic Amphictyony (perhaps in the mid-340s, after the end of the Sacred War).²⁰ They might have even grown wary as to his intentions and policies after his involvement in the affairs of Elis had caused a massacre.

From the perspective of intra-Peloponnesian relations, the noteworthy point is that former rivals came together, albeit indirectly – Mantinea and the Achaian *poleis* on the one hand, Megalopolis, Argos and Messene on the other – twenty years after the dismemberment of the original Arkadian Confederacy.

War between Athens and Macedon broke out probably in 341.²¹ Finally,

the Athenians achieved an alliance with the Thebans and met the Macedonians at the battle of Chaironeia in August 338.²² Of all the Peloponnesians, only the Achaiaans and the Corinthians, i.e. Athens' neighbours, sent troops to the Athenian side – they, and they alone of the Peloponnesian states, had agreed to an alliance with Athens in 340 (Plut. *Dem.* 17.4–5; Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 96–8).²³ No other Peloponnesian troops participated on either side.²⁴

For the Achaiaans, the detachment of Naupaktos from their control by Philip in spring 338, as promised by him in 341 (Dem. *3rd Philippic* 34), was good enough reason to propel them to the Athenian side.²⁵ The Corinthians, or at least those Corinthians who were not friendly disposed towards Philip and had apparently won the upper hand in Corinthian politics, had specific reasons to feel threatened by Philip. Following the end of the Third Sacred War, Philip excluded the Corinthians from the organization of the Pythia of 346 because they had allegedly shared Phokian sacrilege (Diod. Sic. 16.60.2); Corinthian presence at Delphi was further reduced later on.²⁶ Having acquired control of Phokis, Philip also acquired access to the Corinthian Gulf. In 343/2, he had attacked the Corinthian colonies of Ambrakia and Leukas in western Greece (Dem. *3rd Philippic* 34, 72) thus threatening the Corinthian trade route.²⁷ The Corinthians asked for and received Athenian help and thus the way was prepared for Corinthian participation in the battle of Chaironeia. This is the last time we hear of Corinthian military activity until the early 2nd century by the side of Philip V of Macedon and against the Achaian Confederacy and the Romans (in the Second Macedonian War: Livy 32.23 and 33.14.4–5; see pp.320–2).²⁸

Notoriously, the Spartans were absent from the battle of Chaironeia²⁹ as they were absent from the League of Corinth established by Philip shortly afterwards. The Argives and the Arkadians, the Eleans and the Messenians also did not participate in the battle. The *poleis* of the Argolic Akte also abstained. However, at least in Epidauros and Troizen, public opinion seems to have favoured the Athenians without this being translated into active support.³⁰

On the whole, the aforementioned Peloponnesian *poleis* chose what could be called neutrality, carefully avoiding military clashes.³¹ Neutrality, however, was not acceptable. For one thing it 'created serious uncertainty in the belligerent parties' and at least in the case of Philip, it allowed the ambitious to promote their hegemonic ambitions (Bauslaugh 1991, 241, 243). Demosthenes was a major critic of this policy, understandably, since it seriously undermined Athenian efforts to contain Philip's power. Centuries later, Pausanias (8.27.10; also 7.15.6), adopting an anti-Macedonian

as well as anti-Arkadian stance, observed that Arkadian hatred for the Spartans increased Philip's and Macedonian power as a whole: Φίλιππον δὲ τὸν Ἀμύντου καὶ Μακεδόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐχ ἥκιστα αὐξηθῆναι τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Ἀρκάδων ἐξ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐποίησε.... Pausanias underlines rather contemptuously that the Arkadians participated neither in the battle of Chaironeia nor in the Lamian War.³² On the other hand, he exonerates both the Messenians and the Eleans stating that, despite their alliance with Philip, they could not bring themselves to attack fellow Greeks (4.28.2–3 and 5.4.9). However, their absence from Chaironeia must have been very embarrassing for the Messenians later on (Luraghi 2008, 254).

In Mitsos' (1945, 52) and McQueen's view (1978, 43) Argos, Messene and Megalopolis, being allies of both Athens and Philip, could only remain neutral. But the question is why these states had established friendly relations with both powers in the first place. We could argue that citizen bodies were so divided as to the policy to be pursued towards Philip and Athens that a precarious balance was achieved which led to abstention from war. At least in the cases of Argos and Messene, we observe here an attitude that will become almost constant in the next century, namely a reluctance or inability to take up arms.³³ But this should not be equated with 'apathy' (so McQueen 1978, 50). Quite the contrary. All these states knew that great powers were capable of massive destruction: in 427 the Spartans had executed 200 Plataians and the Thebans had razed Plataia to the ground (Thuc. 3.52–68.3); in 416/5 the Athenians had executed the captured Melian citizens and sold into slavery the women and children (Thuc. 5.116); in 364 the Thebans had depopulated the Boiotian Orchomenos (Diod. Sic. 15.79.3–6); in 348 Philip had destroyed Olynthos (Dem. *On the False Embassy*, 266–7). In 338, Greek citizens, the Peloponnesians in our case, quite possibly preferred to see who the winner would be at the same time trying to avoid being at the receiving end of the victor's wrath.

* * *

One would not have expected Philip II to reward these *poleis* for their neutrality. Yet he did: large parts of Spartan territory were awarded to Sparta's rivals. Presumably, weakening Sparta was more important than punishing his friends for their neutrality. Overall, Philip's treatment of the defeated was rather clement.³⁴

In 337 Philip established a *Synedrion*³⁵ of allies and was acknowledged as its military leader (*bēgemōn*; during the first meeting after its establishment). This is the so-called (by modern historians) League of Corinth, in which all

Greek states apart from Sparta participated (Paus. 7.10.3). Not forcing Sparta to join the League bore ‘testimony to the ostensibly voluntary character of the organization’ (Cartledge 2002b, 18). Not only that: Philip did not even have to coerce Sparta. It was a weak state and he made it even weaker. Through the League Philip presented himself as a guarantor of peace and good order which at least for some Peloponnesian *poleis*, such as Argos, was a necessity.³⁶ Not much is known about the organization of the League or its character – whether it was both a Common Peace and a military alliance or just one of the two.³⁷ There survive only two small fragments from an Athenian inscription recording an oath of peace and allegiance as well as a list of Greek *poleis* and *ethnē* from northern and central Greece, followed by numerals of uncertain significance (*SV4* III, 403).³⁸ This inscription should be read together with the pseudo-Demosthenic speech³⁹ *On the Treaty with Alexander*.⁴⁰

The peace agreement stipulated that all the Greek states should be free and autonomous (*On the Treaty with Alexander* 8). Philip actually ‘rounded out the developments of the slogans of peace and freedom by including all Greeks’ (Dmitriev 2011, 109). Nevertheless, Corinth’s all-too-important location – ‘the gate-keeper of the Peloponnesus’ (Roebuck 1948, 83) – excluded it from this provision (Thebes and Ambrakia also received garrisons).⁴¹ The Corinthians surrendered after the battle of Chaironeia, and Philip established a pro-Macedonian oligarchy and a garrison on Akrokorinthos, either before or after the foundation of the League of Corinth (Dixon 2014, 21–2, 27–9). Akrokorinthos was a mountain 575m high which guarded the Corinthian *asty* and the roads into the region and the Peloponnese.⁴² Corinth was not to be rid of Macedonian garrisons until its destruction in 146 (apart from a short spell of freedom between 243 and 224). On Philip’s part, this was perhaps more of a strategy than a punitive measure; how the Corinthians or part of them viewed it is another matter.

According to the surviving part of the Athenian inscription, member-states swear not to take arms against other members but to provide military assistance in case of a threat against the agreements. This clause would go a long way towards establishing concord among the Greeks, though states would inevitably see it as a transgression of their sovereignty.⁴³ Members also swear not to attempt to depose Philip or his descendants. Emphasis is laid on the maintenance of the political regimes existing at the time of the peace (also *On the Treaty with Alexander* 10). It is also explicitly stipulated that there will be no banishments, no cancellation of debts or land redistribution (*On the Treaty with Alexander* 15). On the positive side, there would be hardly

any room for external interference (Ryder 1965, 103) but, as Cawkwell (1978, 174) observed, another result could be that a legally constituted government would not be *permitted* to carry out redistribution of land and cancellations of debts, if it wanted to – admittedly, not many would, but still there was a matter of principle and sovereignty.

Thus both internal and interstate peace was guaranteed by an outsider who was physically much nearer than the Persian king and, as regards Peloponnesian states, more remote than Sparta. It was both a more carefully thought out and a more precarious peace than those of the past because it depended on the will of a single man – despite the existence of the *Synedrion*, actually no *polis* alongside Philip was guarantor. In the event of the man's death or departure from power, the members of the *Synedrion* could very well feel free to act as they pleased. As it turned out, after Philip's death, at least certain great *poleis* had not wholeheartedly embraced peace. And there was still Sparta to be reckoned with.

The League survived Philip's death but Alexander, after having been hailed as its *hēgemōn* (Walbank 1988, 575–7), ignored it when he levied ships and troops and placed them under Macedonian officers and when he assigned to Antipatros responsibility for Greek affairs without consulting the *Synedrion* (Errington 1990, 92–3). Even worse, he practically had the *Synedrion* vote Thebes' annihilation (Cartledge 2002b, 19). As to the Peloponnesians, most of them proved that their loyalty was very shaky when in 331 they responded to the call of Agis III against Macedon. Similar lack of loyalty was demonstrated by some of them when they later participated in the Lamian War. The League became effectively a dead letter when Antipatros, against the letter of the Peace, intervened in the *poleis'* regimes after his victory in the Lamian War (Dixon 2007, 156). The League of Corinth would be revived in 302 by Demetrios Poliorketes. But then, ironically enough, it was aimed directly against the ruler of Macedon (see pp.101–2).

The re-arrangement of borders after Chaironeia: territories as gifts

It was claimed above that the aftermath of the battle of Chaironeia in 338 is the real starting point in the history of the Hellenistic Peloponnese. This remark depends in part on hindsight, but the events of 338/7 must have had quite a forceful and immediate impact on the minds of the Peloponnesians. This was the second time in some thirty years that the Spartans suffered reduction of their territory, and humiliation. What in 370/69 might have seemed as temporary, now appeared final.

With this intervention by Philip II, there emerges forcefully the phenomenon of territories as gifts, i.e. territories which are transferred

from the possession of one state to that of another by an external authority. In the 240s Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis, turned over Alipheira to Elis. In 226 Kleomenes gave Lasion to Elis. However, in the second half of the 3rd and early 2nd centuries the authority of the ‘transactions’ was mainly external: first the Aitolians acted thus, then two more Macedonian kings, namely Antigonos III Doson and Philip V, and finally the Romans.⁴⁴ With the exception of Argos and Corinth, all the other *poleis*/territories to become gifts were Arkadian (or, like Triphylia, considered themselves to be). The beneficiaries were Elis, the Achaian Confederacy and on certain occasions Megalopolis.

According to the Akarnanian Lykiskos (addressing the Spartan assembly in 210), even after Philip’s victory, the rivals of Sparta still dared not deal with Sparta without external help. Instead, the Messenians and the Arkadians, acting in concert, ‘dragged Philip into the Peloponnese’ (Polyb. 18.14.5–6: ἐπιποασάμενοι Φίλιππον εἰς Πελοπόννησον); this was not of his own choice (Polyb. 9.33.9: οὐ κατὰ γε τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν). To judge by the identity of beneficiaries from Philip’s presence in the Peloponnese, the Arkadians in question included at least the Megalopolitans and perhaps the Tegeans. From the perspective of intra-Peloponnesian relations the concord between Messenians and Arkadians or Megalopolitans, intensified because of Philip, is worth underlining.

The Argives do not appear to have invited Philip. Had the leaders and the people, or rather a majority of them, at that moment, grown so wary of Philip’s intentions as to want him not to set foot in the Peloponnese?

To be sure, Lykiskos, and Polybius, might very well exaggerate the degree of initiative shown by Sparta’s rivals and, correspondingly, Philip’s hesitation. However, the main objective of Philip’s politics in the Peloponnese was Sparta’s neutralization, not its annihilation. To this end, he favoured states smaller than Sparta.⁴⁵ He did invade Lakonia⁴⁶ after he had sent a letter of unknown content to the Spartans, and quite possibly demanded the surrender of territories.⁴⁷ In the event he drastically reduced Spartan territory to the benefit of Sparta’s old rivals – Argos, Messene, Megalopolis and also Tegea. This re-arrangement, along with Sparta’s chronic socio-political problems – a shrunken citizen body polarized between rich and poor – was bound to have far-reaching repercussions. Polybius (18.14.6–7) insists that through Philip’s intervention the entire Peloponnese could breathe freely and enjoy liberty. Polybius indeed presents the Arkadians and the Messenians as being the original cause of Peloponnesian freedom, via their invitation to Philip. Secondly, the Messenians, the Megalopolitans, the Tegeans, and the Argives increased their territories and power:

οὗτοι [those from Arkadia and Messene] γὰρ ἐπισπασάμενοι Φίλιππον εἰς Πελοπόννησον καὶ ταπεινώσαντες Λακεδαιμονίους πρῶτον μὲν ἐποίησαν ἀναπνεῦσαι καὶ λαβεῖν ἐλευθερίας ἔννοιαν πάντας τοὺς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατοικοῦντας, ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν χώραν ἀνακομίσάμενοι καὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἃς παρήρηντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν Μεσσηνίων, Μεγαλοπολιτῶν, Τεγεατῶν, Ἀργείων, ἠϋξησαν τὰς ἐαυτῶν πατρίδας ὁμολογουμένως.

For the latter, by dragging⁴⁸ Philip into the Peloponnese and humbling the Lakedaimonians, in the first place allowed all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese to breathe freely and to entertain the thought of liberty, and next recovering the territory and cities of which the Lakedaimonians in their prosperity had deprived the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, unquestionably increased the power of their native towns.

That the rivals of Sparta were relieved for quite a while is certain: after a brief revival in 331, under Agis III and against the Macedonian regent Antipatros, it took Sparta a long time to show signs of military resurgence (in the 280s under king Areus; see pp.116–20). Whether the Peloponnesians enjoyed freedom in the long run is another matter.

We do not know precisely how Philip detached territories from Sparta and there is also uncertainty as to what exactly the rivals of Sparta received. After the invasion of Lakonia, things become complicated, all the more so since available evidence is of much later date. It consists of Polybius (9.28.7 and 9.33.11–12; 18.14.6), Livy (38.34.8 on Megalopolis),⁴⁹ Justin (9.5.1–3), Pausanias (2.20.1, 38.5–6 and 7.11.2 on Argos),⁵⁰ Tacitus, *Annales* 4.43.1–3 and Strabo 8.4.6 (on Messene).⁵¹ We do not know whether Sparta's rivals presented their claims to Philip or whether Philip, aware of the old bones of contention, took the initiative and, in this case, exactly what kind of initiative he took. We know that a tribunal was involved but it is uncertain whether Philip first had the territories detached and then had his action sanctioned by a tribunal, or the reverse. It is also uncertain which tribunal was involved – the League of Corinth, part of it, or another Panhellenic tribunal? If it was a tribunal other than the League, then there is also the question whether it reached its decision(s) before or after the foundation of the League. It is highly unlikely, if not impossible, that the Spartans humiliated themselves to the point of sending representatives (Piérart 2001, 28 and n.23 at p.38; 32). In the end, the only certain thing that emerges from the sources is that Philip had an all-powerful role and that a Panhellenic tribunal pronounced judgement.⁵²

The above issues need not detain us here, since whatever the legal framework, Philip evidently pulled all the strings. It is sufficient to present the main Polybian passages illustrating his role. Polybius shows the Aitolian Chlaineas claiming that Philip himself detached territories from Sparta, and

then presents the Akarnanian Lykiskos emphasizing that Philip did not act himself as judge but established a Greek tribunal instead (κοινὸν ἐκ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καθίσας κριτήριον).⁵³ The two views are not mutually exclusive. Both may present different aspects of the reality, Chlaíneas probably being closer to its essence. He simply points out that Philip was the driving force, no matter what the legal framework was. One need not even envisage coercion of the tribunal on Philip's part: in view of Philip's military successes, how many Greek states would have openly objected to a drastic reduction of Lakonian territory, especially if the tribunal was (part of?) the League of Corinth (whether each member had a single vote or whether votes were proportionate to the military strength of each).⁵⁴ To be sure, there could very well have been reservations, for instance on the part the Mantineans, but in the end Sparta's friends would not have been either numerous or bold enough to come forward.⁵⁵

In early 337, the former Lakonian territories of the north – the Belminatis, the Thyreatis and the Dentheliatis – as well as the perioikic communities of southern Messenia, changed hands. Aigyti in the northwestern part of Lakonia had probably already become Megalopolitan (Moggi 1974, 95; Shipley 2000a, 371, 375). The case of the Skiritis (to the east of the Aigyti) is more perplexing. It is uncertain whether it had been Spartan or Arkadian/Megalopolitan at the time of Philip's intervention⁵⁶ and, furthermore, it is uncertain to which Arkadian *polis* it was allotted by him, whether to Tegea or to Megalopolis, or whether it was divided between the two. Sparta, however, was left with the Eurotas valley, the Mani peninsula (it included the important port of Gytheion), the eastern Malea peninsula and possibly the Parnon seaboard – still quite a substantial part of the Peloponnese.⁵⁷

Let us take a closer look at the new state territories (Map 1). The ancient bone of contention between Messenia and Sparta, the Dentheliatis, was given to Messenia. This was a territory at the border, not coastal land, between Lakonia and Messenia, on one of the roads that crossed Taygetos,⁵⁸ where the famous sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis was located, 'a true icon of Spartan power and Messenian freedom' (Luraghi 2008, 23).⁵⁹ Luraghi (2008, 23–5), having observed the association of the sanctuary with the *casus belli* of the First Messenian War,⁶⁰ underlines that by depriving the Spartans of the Dentheliatis, Philip endorsed the Messenian version of the Messenian Wars as being a struggle against Spartan aggression. Far more importantly, he signalled the end of the Spartan hegemonic power. Apart from the Dentheliatis, the Messenians now also received Mothone and Asine on the Messenian Gulf and the western coast of the Mani peninsula as far south as Leuktron and the river Pamisos. Messenian

territory was now defined by the rivers Neda to the north (on the border with Phigaleia) and Pamisos to the southeast (in the modern Mani peninsula in Lakonia), and by Mt. Taygetos in the east.⁶¹ On the other hand, that the territory south of the Pamisos remained in Spartan hands, may indicate that Philip had not forgotten the Messenian alliance with Athens of 342 (Christien 2006, 178).

The territory given to Megalopolis was the Belminatis and possibly also the western part of the Skiritis. The gift of land to Tegea is the most problematic to identify but it was probably Karyai and the eastern part of the Skiritis (Moggi 1974, 96).⁶² If the Skiritis had been Arkadian/Megalopolitan before 337 and part of it was now taken away from Megalopolis, then the reason could be that Tegea was 'a more appropriate guardian' of the area, since that area was an 'upland territory between Sparta and Tegea' (Shipley 2000a, 371–2, 374 and 2004b, 577).⁶³ We may add that Philip II might very well have wished for a powerful barrier against Sparta – i.e. Megalopolis – but not so large as to suffocate the Tegeans. If that was the division, then the Megalopolitans must have resented it.

Argos benefited greatly from the new territorial arrangements. Given both the long-lasting hostility with Sparta and the traditional belief that Argos was the birthplace of the Argead dynasty, it is not surprising that Philip would have favoured Argos. On the other hand, the city's previous political stance was rather too ambivalent to merit extremely favourable treatment. It is uncertain which territories exactly the Argives received: was it the Thyreatis, that is the northern part of Kynouria;⁶⁴ was it the east Parnon seaboard (Shipley's term: 2000, 377), or was it both? The region had been an old bone of contention between Argos and Sparta: according to Argive tradition, once upon a time (before the mid-6th century), Thyreatis had been theirs, as allegedly had been all the west coast of the Argolic Gulf down to Cape Malea and Kythera.⁶⁵ Both the Spartans and the Argives based their claim on the legendary division of the Peloponnese by the Herakleidai, which would have suited Philip very well since the Argead dynasty claimed descent from Herakles (Paus. 3.2.2–3; Roebuck 1948, 84–5).

Scholars have been in agreement that Argos probably received the Thyreatis from Philip II,⁶⁶ mainly based on the testimony of Pausanias (2.38.5–6). However, recently discovered lead tablets from Argos dating to the early 4th century refer to *kōmai* (villages) of the Thyreatis as the place of origin of Argive citizens, which complicates things even further. In his presentation of the evidence afforded by the tablets, Kritzas (2006, 429–30 and *id.* 2013, 293) convincingly argues that the Argives had annexed the Thyreatis in c.370, probably after the battle of Leuktra.⁶⁷ Consequently,

there are two possibilities: either the Argives had not been able to keep the area⁶⁸ and it was granted to them by Philip II or they had kept it and Philip granted them the east Parnon seaboard. In the former case, especially, we would have an additional proof of Argos' military weakness and inability to pursue hegemonic ambitions.

The east Parnon seaboard included five towns, from north to south: Tyros, Prasiai, Polichna, Kyphanta, and finally Zarax. The problem of the gifts to Argos is associated precisely with possession of Tyros and Zarax, which appear to be in Lakonian hands in the mid to late 270s.⁶⁹ If Philip had indeed re-arranged the borders on the basis of the (alleged) division by the Herakleidai, as Piérart (2001, 30–7) argues,⁷⁰ then Argos would have received the Parnon seaboard down to Zarax but would not have been able to keep it. However, shortly before 223, Zarax appears to belong to Argos.⁷¹ Polybius (4.36.4–6 and 5.20) also presents Zarax among Argive possessions in 219. Since it is rather unlikely that the Argives would have (re?)conquered Zarax without at least the consent of the Macedonians, it is suggested that they acquired it as a gift either from Antigonos Gonatas in the 260s or from Antigonos Doson before 222 (see pp.250–1).

It would not be that surprising if Philip did not trust the Argives so much as to turn them into a great power in the place of Sparta. The alliance with Athens in 342, whatever its nature, and the very fact that the Argives had not sent a contingent to the battle of Chaironeia would have shown to friends and foes alike that they were less than fully committed to Philip's cause. According to a vague piece of information in Diodorus (17.3.4–5), after Philip's death the Argives (as well as the Eleans, the Spartans and others) 'moved to recover their independence' (Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ τινες ἕτεροι πρὸς τὴν αὐτονομίαν ὥρμησαν). Diodorus probably alludes to unfruitful discussions in the assemblies or contacts between leaders. However, his report is a strong indication that certain Argives, or at least certain Argive leaders, were opposed to Macedon already in Philip's time. The Argives did not participate in the War of Agis against Macedon but they did take part in the Lamian War against Macedon in 323/2. Given the 'anonymity' of Argive politics (Tomlinson 1972, 147), we can only say that Argive policies were not steady but we cannot know the precise motives leading to this or the other direction, at a given time.

Plassart (1915, 123–4) argued that a fragmentary inscription found in the agora of Argos (in 1912) and dealing with boundaries involved the territory assigned to Argos by Philip II.⁷² In his new edition of the inscription Pikoulas (2004–9, 280–1, 291 = *SEG* 59.356) establishes that the Argives, already having a dense network of defences, re-arranged patrol areas and guard posts, probably on the mountainous western Argive

frontier. He tentatively dates the re-arrangement to 340–330, cautiously endorsing Plassart's association with the re-allocation of territories by Philip II (at pp. 292–4). It would surely be perfectly sensible on the Argive part to guard their newly acquired territory with special measures. If they do belong in the aftermath of Chaironeia, then they afford testimony that at least for the Argives, the Spartans were still a force to be reckoned with.

Along with the city of Elis, the territory of which comprised more than 1,000 km² (Hansen 2004, 72; Roy 2004, 494 and 2015, 271–2), Argos and Megalopolis emerged as the great powers in the Peloponnese, in terms of territory. They now belonged to an elite of no more than 13 *poleis*; along with Athens they were the largest on the Greek mainland. Argos might have come to comprise c. 1,400 km² (Beloch 1922, 278; Hansen 2004, 72; Piérart 2004a, 603) or less (depending on whether Argos acquired the entire east Parnon seaboard in 337; it certainly possessed it by the late 3rd century).⁷³ The size of the Megalopolitan territory is also a disputed matter. However, by the late 4th century it comprised probably more than 1,000 km² (see p.31). The city of Messene /Ithome was smaller – at the most half the size of Megalopolis – but the whole of Messenia had grown to comprise c.2,900 km².⁷⁴ This figure could be of maximum consequence only if all communities of the region were of one mind or if Messene had control over the other *poleis* of Messenia.

The territory of the new Peloponnesian great powers, either separately or taken together, came nowhere near the c. 8,400 km² of the Lakedaimonian territory before the battle of Leuktra (Hansen 2004, 72; Shipley 2004b, 587). Even after 337, Lakonian territory still exceeded the territory of each one of the above-mentioned *poleis* taken separately. In this respect none could replace Sparta. However, territory alone cannot be automatically translated into military and political superiority. Territory acquires political weight when combined with significant population numbers or military competence. The main problem for the great Peloponnesian *poleis* other than Sparta was not numbers. It was their lack of experience in military and political leadership.

The population of free men and their families in Lakedaimon has been calculated as c.75,000 or less in the Hellenistic period (without Kynouria, Kythera, Sparta and the other urban centres).⁷⁵ The Spartan citizens (the *bomoioi*) who after Leuktra numbered c.1,000 or slightly more⁷⁶ were far inferior to the citizen population of Elis, Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis. Obviously, the Spartans, if they wished, had to find a way to replenish their citizen army – it took more than century before Agis IV made the first attempt.⁷⁷

On the other hand, among the new great powers, none was overwhelmingly superior to the other. For Megalopolis we have a piece of evidence for its population in the late 4th century. For Argos and Elis our evidence comes mainly from the late 5th and the early 4th centuries. Needless to say, we cannot know how far such figures might apply to the late 4th, the 3rd or the 2nd century.

A figure of c. 12,000 citizens of hoplite status is estimated for Argos in 394, on the basis of the 7,000 foot and 500 horse at the battle of Nemea (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17).⁷⁸ The total number of citizen males would have been c. 24,000 and the number of both sexes c. 48,000 (not including metics and slaves).⁷⁹ The Argive population was increased by the incorporation of Kleonai in the early 4th century, the population of which has been assessed at c.8,000 (Piérart 2004a, 610), but the upper strata of Argive society were seriously diminished after the *skytalismos* of 370 – by more than 1,000.⁸⁰ The Argive upper class was again brutally reduced in 316/5 (see pp. 93–4) – by 500 – but still it would probably have exceeded that of Megalopolis.

As for Megalopolis, citizens, male foreigners and slaves amounted to c. 15,000 in the late 4th century while its total population (including women and children) has been calculated by Forsén (2000, 41 and n.21, 44, n.36) to amount to c. 70,000 – as much as Corinth in the 5th century but the latter had a smaller territory of 500 km² minimum.⁸¹ The number of Megalopolitan citizens must have been less than 10,000.

On the population of Elis there is also very limited evidence. Beloch (1922, 281–2) calculates a total of 80,000 inhabitants in the 4th century. As to the citizens, 3,000 hoplites are recorded in 418 and 3,000 jointly from Elis, Triphylia, Akroreia and Lasion in the battle of Nemea in 394.⁸² With regard to the late 3rd century Polybius (4.73.6–7) informs us that Elis was more densely populated and had many more slaves than any other state in the Peloponnese. In 217 (during the Social War), probably 2,000 Eleans participated in an expedition against Achaian *poleis* (Polyb. 5.94.3–6). Neither piece of information enlightens us as to the total number of Elean citizens.

As to Messene and Messenia, Grandjean (2003, 254 and n.59) has pointed out that the only solid data we have, and these for the whole of Messenia, concern the Social War of 220–217. The Messenians were asked then by the Achaian Confederacy to contribute 2,500 foot and 250 horse (Polyb. 4.15.6); later on they levied a force of 2,000 foot and 200 horse. Polybius (5.20.1) notes that these men were in their prime (τοὺς ἀκμαιοτάτους ἄνδρας), i.e., a select force.⁸³ A figure of c. 5,000 citizens or more sounds reasonable but, still, we do not know what portion of the citizenry the above-mentioned levies represented (Roebuck 1945, 163–4

with bibliography). For the record, in the same period the Spartans were also asked to levy a force of the same size (Polyb. 4.15.6).

However, much more significant is the fact that, after the mid-4th century, there was not much room to exercise authority within the Peloponnesian beyond what was allowed by the Argead kings of Macedon first and by the *Diadochoi* later. In other words, there was no longer an overbearing Peloponnesian authority. The vacuum would be only partially filled after the mid-3rd century, by the Achaian Confederacy which reached its peak in the early 2nd century, but with serious challenge from Sparta and with external backing.

Thanks to Philip, the Argives and the Megalopolitans became major Peloponnesian powers – in terms of territory – practically without lifting a finger or, more accurately, without showing any signs of military excellence. This might have looked like quite a success for the two states in question but it also means that in the near future neither would have had the background of a leading player on the political-military scene. Neither Megalopolis nor Elis nor Messene nor even Argos attempted to fill the vacuum created by Sparta's fall from power. None had any experience of exercising large scale imperialism. It would take both Argos and Megalopolis quite a while to achieve even the status of active agents in the Peloponnesian political and military events: to be exact, not until the last decades of the 3rd century, and this as members of the Achaian Confederacy. Argos and Megalopolis would in fact share leadership of the Confederacy for a short period, Megalopolis being much more influential in the long-run. Moreover, its prominent role would be a direct result of Sparta's re-emergence.

At the time of the re-allocation of territories, the arrangement must have seemed quite promising to the beneficiaries, all the more so since the Macedonians were physically far away. But the latter would cast too long a shadow to be ignored. As we shall see further below, although there must have been conflicts between Peloponnesian *poleis* later on (as proved by evidence for their settlement), no Peloponnesian *polis* invited a king to settle such conflicts. Not until the late 3rd century do we see a Macedonian king, Antigonos III Doson, re-arranging borders again. Instead, there is a certain number of settlements either with the involvement or under the aegis of the Achaian Confederacy. One reason must be that the mighty *Diadochoi* clashing against each other had bigger fish to fry; Peloponnesian distrust of a superior, external power with its own agenda is another.

Philip was a central, powerful authority with which a community could register its claims, but he was far from impartial. Cartledge (2002b, 15) observes that 'as the Spartans could not but be aware, power not legality

was the real arbiter now of their – and indeed all the mainland Greeks’ – destiny’. Not only the Spartans, but all the Peloponnesians would have been immediately aware of the arbiter’s nature. Hence, in the future, they would largely avoid inviting any Macedonian king to settle their disputes.

For a while things remained as Philip II had arranged but this arrangement proved far from final. The territories awarded, having been a bone of contention from the Archaic age, produced enduring conflict, most notably the one between Sparta and Messene over the Dentheliatis which, as already mentioned, went down to the age of the emperor Tiberius (25 AD) at least and possibly later (see p.250).⁸⁴

Philip’s most decisive interference after Chaironeia would have given Peloponnesian states a very clear idea of what to expect of a monarch’s power and methods. Although it was pleasing to many if not most of them, it must have also been alarming or awesome for the simple reason that at a stroke Philip had achieved what they had come nowhere near to achieving for centuries, i.e. reduce Sparta to Lakonia. A couple of years later, Alexander’s treatment of Thebes certainly showed to everyone the cruel aspect of a monarch’s power who had at his disposal an army far superior in numbers to that of a single *polis* and whose ambitions could not be assessed. Both sides of monarchic rule would have influenced Peloponnesian attitudes towards Alexander’s *Diadochoi* and relations between Peloponnesian *poleis*.

Agis’ War:⁸⁵ traditional allegiances revitalized and the differentiation of Megalopolis

In 335 the Thebans revolted against Alexander. The Argives, the Eleans and Arkadians (all, or some? see p.20)⁸⁶ showed signs of restlessness (Diod. Sic. 17.3.4–5, 8.5–6).⁸⁷ Probably there was a change of leadership in Argos and Elis around this time: Arrian (*Anab.* 1.10.1) refers to Elean exiles recalled after the punishment of Thebes by Alexander.

All the Peloponnesians mentioned above accepted the Theban request for help but hearing of Alexander’s imminent arrival dared not cross the Isthmos (Diod. Sic. 17.8.5–6). According to Aischines’ account (*Against Ktesiphon* 240), all the Arkadians campaigned to help the Thebans (πάντων Ἀρκάδων ἐξεληλυθόντων) but Demosthenes refused to provide them with the nine talents necessary (the money belonged to the Persian king and they had not been officially accepted by the Athenians) – apparently he considered the whole thing futile. But it is quite possible that Aischines is exaggerating the extent of Arkadian support for Thebes in order to magnify Demosthenes’ supposed crime. For one thing, it does not seem very likely that the Megalopolitans would have taken arms against Macedon.

More vaguely than Aischines, Deinarchos initially refers to Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων (18), without the definite article. He makes the same charge as Aischines against Demosthenes.⁸⁸ According to Arrian (*Anab.* 1.10.1), certain Arkadians, n.b. not all, set out to help Thebes: Ἀρκάδες μὲν, ὅσοι βοηθήσαντες Θηβαίοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ὠρμήθησαν.... In the end, whoever these Arkadians were, the fact that they needed financial support from Demosthenes suggests they were ill-prepared for the war and not so fully-committed to it (Bosworth 1980, 91–2). Additionally, the request for financial help may indicate that they wanted it as a public proof of Athens' commitment to the war. In either case, these Arkadians were not prepared to take the initiative and face the Macedonian garrison on Akrokorinthos⁸⁹ in order to get to Thebes.

The Theban revolt affords a clear manifestation of the 'playing it safe' tactics on the Peloponnesian part, appearing to take up arms without actually doing it, as well as an indication of an acute sense of self-preservation.⁹⁰ As the Arkadians put it, when the Thebans went to them as suppliants, they were forced by circumstances to offer their bodies to Alexander while their heart was with the Thebans and the cause of Greek freedom: ὅτι τοῖς μὲν σώμασι μετ' Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ἀκολουθεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο, ταῖς δ' εὐνοίαις μετὰ Θηβαίων καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἦσαν (Deinarchos, *Against Demosthenes* 20). Those Arkadians who had campaigned were so frightened as to condemn to death those leaders who had advised war – another indication that they had never been whole-heartedly committed – while the Eleans recalled the exiles who were friendly disposed towards Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.1).⁹¹

In any case, Alexander's eventual destruction of Thebes would have made mainland Greeks in particular fear even more a (Macedonian) ruler's power and would have gone a long way towards determining future attitudes towards monarchs. Arrian (*Anab.* 1.9.1), admittedly employing hindsight, compares the effect of the destruction of Thebes with the effect of earlier disasters such as the battles at Aigos Potamoi and Leuktra and comments:

καὶ πάθος τοῦτο Ἑλληνικὸν μεγέθει τε τῆς ἀλούσης πόλεως καὶ ὀξύτητι τοῦ ἔργου, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τῷ παραλόγῳ ἕς τε τοὺς παθόντας καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας, οὐ μείον τι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἢ καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς μετασχόντας τοῦ ἔργου ἐξέπληξε.

This disaster of Greeks, both by the size of the captured city, and by the sharpness of the action – and not least by the unexpectedness of the event, both to victims and victors – caused no less horror to the other Greeks as to those who were involved in it.

Nevertheless, five years after Philip II's death and while Alexander was in Asia, in the spring of 331 Agis III, displaying the traditional Spartan sense of *kairos*⁹² (opportunity), called the Peloponnesians to arms against Macedon, with Persian support. His appeal was welcomed by most.⁹³ The fact that the traditional leaders of the Peloponnesians were again in the lead, must have gone a long way towards generating confidence. Alongside the 'it's now or never' factor, we have to bear in mind that in the eyes of the Greeks the regent Antipatros, in charge of Macedon then, was not a monarch, he was simply a high-ranking military official, no matter if he was regent, and therefore perhaps not so frightening.

Agis' allies included the Eleans, most of Arkadia except for Megalopolis, and all the Achaians except for the Pellenaïans.⁹⁴ The absence of Pellene can be attributed to the tyrant Chairon, installed or supported by Alexander.⁹⁵ As Badian (1967, 181) put it, in this war: 'much of Peloponnese had returned to its traditional allegiance'. The Achaïans and the Eleans had already shown their hostility towards Macedon in 338 (Plut. *Dem.* 17.5) and after Philip's death respectively (Diod. Sic. 17.3.4–5, 8.5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.1).

Being away from Spartan control and effectively under Macedonian domination had proved to be a frustrating experience, involving (further) political instability, uncertainty and even fear. To the old problems of *staseis*, there had been added an omnipotent outsider who provoked or intensified civic strife. Perhaps more than anything else, Alexander's notorious destruction of Thebes⁹⁶ would have alarmed many if not all the Greeks as to the way the Macedonians would treat those who did not succumb to their leadership. Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had destroyed Greek *poleis* in the past but the Greeks knew their limits. This was not the case with the Macedonian king whose territory and resources in money and manpower were superior to those of the most important Greek *poleis* (taken together).

Although Agis' War would prove only a transient return to Spartan leadership, it marks a turning point for three reasons: as it turned out this was the last time for many years that the Spartans acted as leaders of Peloponnesians (the next time was in 280). Secondly, it is the last time, until the battle of Sellasia in 222, that we hear of Peloponnesians participating in war in impressive numbers. Finally, we should pay attention to the differentiation of the Megalopolitans from the rest of the Arkadians, at least from those Arkadians with whom they had formed part of an Arkadian alliance after 363.

Corinth, Argos, Messenia and Megalopolis naturally enough were the great absentees from the Spartan coalition. The absence of Corinth can be easily explained by the presence of the Macedonian garrison on Akrokorinthos along with the rule exercised by the pro-Macedonian

oligarchy.⁹⁷ The non-participation of Argos, Messenia and Megalopolis can be explained by deeply hostile relations with Sparta as well as by their having benefited greatly from Macedon.⁹⁸ They had had their territories increased in 337 through the intervention of Philip and had everything – the world should be taken literally at least in the case of Messenia and Megalopolis – to lose if the Spartans defeated their benefactor.

The attitude of the Megalopolitans deserves special comment. As mentioned above, Agis' War showed the Megalopolitans distancing themselves from most of the other Arkadians. This differentiation was important because it showed the Megalopolitans not sharing the ideal of liberation from Macedon. More than ten years later, in 318, they would demonstrate this differentiation again by remaining loyal to the house of Antipatros (that is, his son Kassandros) instead of siding with the regent Polyperchon as did most Arkadians (and most Peloponnesians for that matter). In the 3rd century, the Megalopolitans would again distance themselves from other Arkadians by not participating in the so-called Chremonidean War against Antigonos II Gonatas of Macedon in the 260s (see pp.130–1). The Megalopolitans were anti-Spartan by birth and over the years this quality became so pronounced as to take precedence over the collective Arkadian identity. Megalopolis consisted largely of Mainalian and Parrhasian communities; both had in the remote past been under the control of the most important Arkadian *poleis*, i.e. Tegea and Mantinea.⁹⁹ Thus, a Megalopolitan identity would also have developed from rivalry against Mantinea and Tegea. This rivalry as well as Megalopolitan ambition would only have been intensified by the fact that by the late 4th century Megalopolis' territory (c. 1,000 km² and possibly more) had outgrown the territory of the other two together. The territory of Mantinea was well above 200 km², perhaps near 300, while Tegea's may have been twice as large.¹⁰⁰ Megalopolis' population of c. 70,000 in the late 3rd century would have been equally intimidating: the total population of Mantinea is estimated at a maximum of 14,000–18,000 while Tegea could have had a population twice as large, with a minimum of 16,000–20,000.¹⁰¹

The joint Arkadian action against Macedon is very interesting from the perspective of intra-Arkadian cohesion. Former rivals, Orchomenos and Mantinea, and especially Mantinea and Tegea, were brought together because of a common enemy. This would not automatically mean that they had truly become reconciled but, in fact, there is evidence that this 'coming together' outlived the war of 331/0. A few years later, in 324, Alexander issued a *diagramma* ordering the restoration of exiles all over the Greek world (Diod. Sic. 17.109.1–2). A decree from Tegea regulating property and other matters occasioned by the return of the exiles provides for a

foreign tribunal – Mantinea? – to sit in judgment for 60 days. Incidentally, this is the earliest Peloponnesian testimony, in the post-Chaironeia period, for the employment of a foreign court for settlement of internal problems. Among other things it is stipulated that ‘As many as are not adjudicated in the sixty days, it shall not be possible for them to go to law in the foreign court with reference to property, but always in the city’s court: if they find anything later, in sixty days from the day the court is established. ... If any return later, when the foreign court is no longer in existence, let him register the property with the *stratēgoi* in sixty days, and if there is any defence against him the court shall be Mantinea’ (Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 526–33, no.101, translation of ll. 24–35 at p.529).¹⁰² Rhodes and Osborne (2003, 530) observe that this arrangement is remarkable given that ‘when last heard of, at the end of the 360s, Tegea and Mantinea were in opposite camps’. Though we lack information as to relations between Mantinea and Tegea from 330 to 324, it seems that the Macedonian danger, with Sparta as an intermediary, had brought them together.

Let us return to Agis’ War and the Arkadians. It is not immediately obvious why most of Arkadia would return to the Spartan side. The attitude of the Mantineans can be partly explained on the basis of their Spartan allegiance after 363. Moreover, they had no reason whatsoever to be grateful to the Macedonians since they had received no territory when Philip re-arranged the Peloponnesian borders (McQueen 1978, 50). On the other hand, their old rival Tegea had benefited from Philip’s arrangements and yet it also joined Agis. On the basis of their lenient treatment by Antipatros after the war, McQueen (1978, 50–1) thinks that the Tegeans, being less well fortified than the Megalopolitans,¹⁰³ must have been forced (by ‘deception, duress or even treachery’) by pro-Spartan leaders to join the war. The pro-Spartan credentials of the Tegean leaders are obvious enough but it is much less credible that the people were carried away or deceived. Bosworth (1988, 198) thinks that the Tegeans accepted Spartan proposals in order to avoid invasion, which *prima facie* seems more plausible and yet how credible is it that Agis III would have been able simultaneously to prepare for a large-scale war against Macedon and at the same time deploy forces against Tegea, in the process reminding everyone in the Peloponnese of Sparta’s menacing character? Accepting that the Tegeans were not severely punished after the war – according to Curtius (6.1.19–20) they only had to surrender their leaders – one could argue that this might very well be the result of limited Tegean participation in the war. The same could be argued for Mantinea. We have to bear in mind, however, that Curtius is our only source, and he makes no mention of any other Arkadian *polis* receiving a fine or other punishment.

To interpret Arkadian behaviour we should take into account past relations with Sparta, the intimidating Macedonian role in Greek affairs, but also the situation created in the Peloponnese after the foundation of Megalopolis and especially after the re-arrangement of borders by Philip II.

The Mantineans and the Megalopolitans had been at odds ever since the dismemberment of the Arkadian Confederacy. It is possible that both the Tegeans and the Mantineans felt threatened by the increase of Argive and Megalopolitan territory, especially the latter (Map 2). For the Mantineans in particular the increase of Tegean territory would have also been menacing but they could set this fact aside hoping that a Spartan victory would re-establish the pre-Chaironeia *status quo*. Thus, both *poleis* would have been led to war hoping that they would be rid of Macedon, the benefactor of Megalopolis and Argos.

For the Tegeans the Peloponnesian enemy or overlord they knew might very well have been preferable as an ally or leader to an outsider, or, to put it differently, the enemy from within was preferable to the enemy from without, one who had been the cause of (further) civil strife. Sparta had indeed a bad record but at least enemies and friends alike knew its limits. This was not the case with Alexander. The preference of most of the Arkadians for the Spartans in general and for the Spartans over the Macedonians, for the 'insiders' over the 'outsiders' as leaders, will become even more manifest in the late 3rd century. Between the Achaian Confederacy on the one hand, and Kleomenes III of Sparta on the other, the eastern Arkadian *poleis* chose Sparta; when the Achaian Confederacy forged an alliance with Macedon, the choice of these Arkadians was again Sparta (see pp.245–7).

Agis managed to put into the field a formidable army, between 22,000 and 30,000. Diodorus is not to be trusted with numbers, but he does give us an idea of scale. According to Diodorus (17.67.7–8) Agis put together 20,000 infantry and 2000 horse. According to Deinarchos (*Against Demosthenes* 34) 10,000 mercenaries were part of Agis' army but it is uncertain whether they were part of the 22,000. If they were not, then the Lakedaimonians would have mustered a force of up to 6,000 while the Peloponnesian allies would have numbered up to 16,000.¹⁰⁴ Now, this number looks rather high if we take account of Diodorus' additional information (17.62.7) that the Peloponnesian *poleis* only sent select forces consisting of the best of the young men (τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀρίστους). Thus, the Peloponnesian troops would have amounted to less than 10,000, perhaps equal to the number of Lakedaimonian troops. In the early 360s the Arkadian Confederacy had a select force (*epilektoi*) amounting to 5,000 (Diod. Sic. 15.62.2 and 67.2). In the Third Sacred War, the Achaians had

dispatched 1,500 and 2,000 soldiers, on two occasions (Diod. Sic. 16.30.4 and 37.3). It is possible that the Achaians and the Arkadians dispatched roughly the same number of troops to Agis. And if the Peloponnesian allies were less than 10,000, then the mercenaries would have been part of the 22,000.

Agis III's main target appeared to be Megalopolis which he invested with a long siege.¹⁰⁵ In 330¹⁰⁶ he met Antipatros' superior army (over 40,000 according to Diod. Sic. 17.63.1–2) and fell in a major battle, 'the largest battle on Greek soil after Plataea', along with 5,300 Lakonians and allies (Diod. Sic. 17.62.7–63.4; Curtius 6.1; Cartledge 2002b, 23).¹⁰⁷ Alexander called Agis' War a 'myomachia' ('battle of mice', Plut. *Agessilaos* 15.5), as compared to his own war against Dareios III. However, the very fact that he thought it necessary to comment on the war indicates the exact opposite, namely that he took the war quite seriously. This was not the last 'myomachia' of the Peloponnesians. In the early 2nd century the Roman consul Flamininus described in essentially the same terms the protracted clash between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta (Plut. *Flam.* 13.2; see Ch. 8).

The *Synedrion* decided on the fate of Sparta's allies. The Tegeans had to surrender their leaders while the Achaians and the Eleans had to pay a serious fine of 120 talents (Curtius 6.1.19–20).¹⁰⁸ The punishment for the latter two can be explained by the fact that they had been consistently anti-Macedonian and therefore their punishment had to be exemplary. On the other hand, the importance of Tegea's 'decapitation' should be taken into account when considering its absence from the Lamian War (see p.87). As to Mantinea, it might have withdrawn before the final battle, and thereby avoided punishment: Badian (1967, 181, n.4).

On Antipatros' order the fine paid by the Achaians and the Eleans was given to Megalopolis. This was both a reward and a means of securing Megalopolitan gratitude in the future. It must have created a grudge against Megalopolis, all the more so since the money was used to beautify their grandiose theatre with stone seats (the largest theatre in Greece: Paus. 8.32.1).¹⁰⁹ In other words, the theatre would serve as a constant reminder of the humiliation that the defeated had suffered and of the resulting elevated status of Megalopolis. Similarly, the portico built in Megalopolis by Philopoimen in the early 2nd century, with money deriving from the sale of 3,000 enfranchised Spartans, would have served as a constant reminder of Sparta's defeat and incorporation in the Achaian Confederacy (Plut. *Phil.* 16.4; Gardner and Loring 1892, 78–85).

Antipatros referred the matter of the Spartans to the League of Corinth. Notably, the *Synedrion* failed to reach a decision on the Spartans and referred

the problem to Alexander. This failure is interesting. It leads us to think that the majority of the *Synedroi* seriously objected to imposing harsh punitive measures on Sparta, no matter if they were not particularly fond of that city. However, Antipatros received fifty Spartans as hostages and Alexander may have forced the Spartans to join the League of Corinth (Diod. Sic. 17.73.5; Plut. *Mor.* 235b; McQueen 1978, 53–8). Needless to say, even if such a thing happened it would not have amounted to any real commitment on the Spartan part.

To the best of our knowledge, the Spartans were not active in the Peloponnese for another fifty years.¹¹⁰ During that period the Peloponnesian *poleis* would have to learn to live without Sparta but with outsiders who were unimaginably more powerful, i.e. Alexander's *Diadochoi*. How far their encounter with the Argead kings had prepared them for that will be examined below.

Notes

¹ Griffith 1979, 456–8, on the utopian character of Isokrates' suggestions.

² Griffith (1979, 457) notes that Argos was 'lucky' to be included in the 'big four' but was surely a perfect candidate for reconciliation.

³ An indication of Argive dire straits might be the fact that, in 344, 3,000 Argives were dispatched, presumably in mercenary service, to help the Persians against Egypt: see Tomlinson 1972, 143–4; also Hornblower 2002, 87, who does not exclude political sympathies as a motivation for the campaign; Mitsos (1945, 50) sees this as a sign of prosperity; McQueen (1978, 44) prefers to view this as an indication of a feeling of security vis-à-vis Sparta. In our view, one does not exclude the other.

⁴ In his narrative after the battle of Mantinea, Diodorus employs the collective 'Arkadians' three times: in 16.63.5, 17.3.4 and 17.8.5; see this chapter, n.87 for the error in 17.3.4.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 16.24–31; McQueen 1978, 45–6. Eventually Philip II settled the issue and assumed the most prominent role in the Delphic Amphictyony; see Griffith 1979, 267–81, 329–46; Cawkwell 1978, 62–8, 91–113; Ellis 1994a, 739–42 and 751–9; Buckler 1996, 79–84; Hornblower 2002, 267–9; Worthington 2008, 53–73, 93–106.

⁶ The Thebans had instigated the Delphic Amphictyony to impose a fine of 500 talents on Sparta for the seizure of the Kadmeia in 382 (Diod. Sic. 16.29.2–4).

⁷ Mitsos 1945, 46–8; Piérart 2004a, 612.

⁸ Amit 1973, 181–2 and n. 234; Tomlinson 1972, 144; Grandjean 2003, 67; Worthington 2008, 96; Lolos 2011, 70 and n.60, refuting the objections of Skalet 1928, 76 as to the Sikyonian participation (Lolos is based on Paus. 2.7.4, reporting tombs of the Sikyonians who fell in the battle).

⁹ Demosthenes' speech *For the Megalopolitans* represents a failed attempt to persuade the Athenians to help Megalopolis so that the Spartans would not become threatening again; see esp. 16–17, 20. See Hornblower 2002, 267, on the exaggerated tone of the speech; Cartledge 2002b, 12.

¹⁰ See Moggi 1974, 73–4, n.11, on Hieronymos.

¹¹ On Aristratos see also Plut. *Arat.* 13.2–3. The ps.-Demosthenic speech *On the Treaty with Alexander* (4, 7) reports that the sons of Philiadēs were tyrants; they were expelled, presumably after Philip's death, but restored by Alexander, which is an indication of civil strife caused by conflicting views on foreign policy (Luraghi 2008, 255 and n.20). The date of the speech is uncertain, possibly between 336 and 333 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 376). Polybius (18.14.1–5) partly reproduces Demosthenes' list.

¹² Isokrates, *Philip* 74; Tomlinson 1972, 144–5; McQueen 1978, 41–3; Griffith 1979, 457; Worthington 2008, 104, 106. Errington (1990, 78 and n.11, 80) underlines the difference of interests between a small state and a major power.

¹³ Paus. 4.28.4–5; Dem. *On the False Embassy* 259–61, 294; *3rd Philippic* 27; ps.-Dem. *4th Philippic* 10; Diod. Sic. 16.63.4–5. Griffith 1979, 499 and n.3, 500–1.

¹⁴ Arrian (*Anab.* 1.10.1) refers to sympathizers of Alexander being recalled from exile after the destruction of Thebes; see McQueen 1978, 48 for the hostile reception of Philip at Olympia.

¹⁵ Roebuck 1941, 49. Griffith (1979, 476–8) argues, on the basis of Demosthenes' *2nd Philippic* (15), that Philip had actually sent mercenaries and money to the Messenians and the Argives.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the authenticity and the date of the *4th Epistle* see Goldstein 1968, 3–5, 31–4, 72–3; also Worthington 2006, 99–101.

¹⁷ Griffith 1979, 483; Ellis 1976, 158 and 1994b, 765. Bauslaugh (1991, 230–1) doubts the Argive alliance, arguing that Demosthenes would not have failed to mention it; he does not discuss, however, the *4th Epistle*. An objection to Bauslaugh's view is that Demosthenes' charges are more severe, and aimed at presenting the Argives and the Arkadians as servile flatterers.

¹⁸ From the Athenian decree there has survived only the preamble recording the Messenians' name; Roebuck (1941, 51) argues that the others were also participants.

¹⁹ Bauslaugh (1991, 231) argues that the inclusion of the Arkadians in the *Scholia* is a mistake since they appear to have done nothing on either side (for Philip or Athens). It is a reasonable hypothesis, but Arkadian inactivity need mean no more than that their agreements did not oblige them to take arms and that they chose to remain neutral when the time came. Furthermore, Bauslaugh is rather inconsistent since he does not apply the same argument to the Messenians who also did nothing and whose alliance with Philip he accepts; he himself notes that 'neutrality resulting from conflicting alliances was not unprecedented' (at p.232). However, he is generally right when he argues for a pronounced tendency for neutrality on the part of the Peloponnesian states.

²⁰ Griffith 1979, 481; Ellis 1994b, 765; Grandjean 2003, 68 and n.82.

²¹ [Dem.] *Letter of Philip* 23 and Buckler (1996, 86–90) for the date of the outbreak of the war, arguing against Griffith's date in the late summer 340 (1979, 492–4, 564–78). Buckler translates correctly, in our view, the closing lines of the *Letter of Philip* 23 to mean declaration of war by Philip: 'having made the gods witnesses, I shall deal with you about these matters' (καὶ μάρτυρας τοὺς θεοὺς ποιησάμενος διαλήφομαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ὑμᾶς); he is followed by Worthington 2008, 128–9. Trevett (2011, 212–14) follows Griffith's date for the outbreak of the war, thinking that the closing lines are ambivalent. The letter is probably genuine but it does not belong to the Demosthenic corpus: Trevett 2011, 211, 213.

²² Diod. Sic. 16.86; Polyainos, *Stratagems* 4.2.2; Griffith 1979, 589–603; Cawkwell 1978, 144–9; Ellis 1994b, 777–81; Worthington 2008, 136–51.

²³ Griffith 1979, 548–51; Dixon 2014, 18.

²⁴ Buckler (1996, 96, n.89) notes that ‘at most only some eight states willingly took the field against Philip at Chaironeia’.

²⁵ Beck 1997, 61; Worthington 2008, 146–7.

²⁶ Dixon (2014, 16–17) points out that, while there is no indication in our sources of a formal alliance between the Corinthians and the Phokians, the presence of Phokian exiles in Corinth a year later is an indication that the Corinthians were not ill-disposed towards the Phokians.

²⁷ Salmon 1984, 382–3; Worthington 2008, 117–18; Dixon 2014, 17–18.

²⁸ Dem. *On the Crown* 237. In *Mor.* 851b, ps.-Plutarch mistakenly includes Messene among those who opposed Philip (Roebuck 1948, 75–6, n.16); Strabo 9.2.37, on Corinthian participation in the battle of Chaironeia; Salmon 1984, 383 and n.61; McQueen 1978, 46; Roebuck 1941, 52; Dixon 2014, 18–19 and n.26 at p.38.

²⁹ According to Diodorus (16.63.1–2, 88.3–4), Archidamos III died in war against the Lucanians right at the time of the battle of Chaironeia. See Badian 1967, 171–2, on why Agis, then only a regent, would have been prevented from joining in the battle against his father’s policies. As a whole, Badian thinks that the Spartan decision was wise.

³⁰ Following the battle the Athenians asked for the help of the Troizenians and the Epidaurians (Lykourgos, *Against Leokrates* 42). However, the Argive Mnasiades instigated a pro-Macedonian revolution in Troizen in the winter of 338/7 (Hypereides, *Against Athenogenes* 31); see Roebuck 1948, 83, on Troizen.

³¹ Bauslaugh 1991, 230–51; Landucci Gattinoni 2006, 314.

³² See Habicht 1998a, 106, on Pausanias’ judgement of Greek states depending ‘first on where they stood when the freedom of Greece was at stake’; also Jost 2002, 374, on the negative political image of the Arkadians.

³³ See Bertoli 2006, 295–7, on Argive political weakness. Roebuck (1948, 76) thinks that a convenient excuse for the Argives not to fight on Philip’s side would have been the blocking of the Isthmos by Corinth and Megara.

³⁴ Philip, however, did detach Naupaktos from Achaia, offering it to his allies the Aitolians (Roebuck 1948, 77–8, 83–4). See Aelian, *VH* 6.1 for the separate settlements between Philip and the allies of Athens, with Roebuck 1948, 73, n.1 on the omissions in Aelian’s account and the general lack of detailed information in our sources. For Philip’s arrangements see Roebuck 1948; Ellis 1976, 203–4 and 1994b, 782–5; Cawkwell 1978, 166–9; Griffith 1979, 604–23; Errington 1990, 84–6; Hornblower 2002, 279–80; Worthington 2008, 154–7.

³⁵ Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 254: τὸ συνέδριον τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων; Diodorus (16.89.3) refers to the κοινὸν συνέδριον. In 16.89.1–3 Diodorus focuses on war against the Persians as the chief motivation of Philip in founding the League but it is quite uncertain whether this campaign was discussed during the first meeting of the *Synedrion*.

³⁶ Tomlinson 1972, 145: peace was ‘the new cornerstone of Argive policy’.

³⁷ Ryder 1965, 150–4, 157–9; Cawkwell 1978, 169–76; Griffith 1979, 623–46; Ellis 1976, 203–10 and 1994b, 782–5; Hornblower 2002, 280–1; Cartledge 2002b, 15; Walbank 1988, 571–4; Errington 1990, 87–90; Worthington 2008, 158–60. Dmitriev 2011, 73–90. It does make sense if the Common Peace preceded a military alliance given that Philip was preparing for a campaign against Persia.

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³⁸ *IG II² 236 / Syll.³ 260* / Tod 1948, no.177 / Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 373–9, no.76; translation in Harding 1985, no.99. Worthington (2008, 162 and 2009, 217–21) argues that the first fragment could refer to a bilateral peace between Philip and Athens that concluded their war of 340–338 (he associates it with Diod. Sic. 6.87.3).

³⁹ See Trevett 2011, 287–8 with notes.

⁴⁰ Diod. Sic. 16.89 and Justin 9.5.1–7 are inaccurate; see Worthington 2009, 216–17.

⁴¹ Polyb. 38.3.3; Roebuck 1948, 76; Ellis 1994b, 783 and n.9; Griffith 1979, 612.

⁴² Paus. 2.4.6–7, 5.1; Strabo 8.6.21; Plut. *Arat.* 16.4; Wiseman 1979, 468–72. See Freitag 2012, for a synoptic history of Akrokorinthos.

⁴³ Ryder (1965, 104–5) sees this clause as the nearest to a ‘compromise between city sovereignty and the rule of law’.

⁴⁴ See pp.245–51, 291–7, 320–7.

⁴⁵ See Errington 1990, 86, on Philip’s lack of ambition to rule *directly* over southern Greece.

⁴⁶ According to Pausanias (5.4.9) Philip II invaded Lakonia with the aid of the Eleans who were driven by their ancestral hostility towards Sparta. It is often assumed that the Argives, the Arkadians and the Messenians also took part in this invasion but this is only a reasonable inference; see McQueen 1978, 48; Cartledge 2002b, 14. Griffith (1979, 617 and n.4) observes that it is odd that only the Eleans are recorded as having sent troops while they did not receive any territory. Piérart (2001, 28) thinks that the invasion might have followed the re-allotment of territories by a Hellenic tribunal, which he believes was the League of Corinth; see also Piérart and Touchais 1996, 61.

⁴⁷ Spartan tradition preserved in Plutarch’s *Moralia* (*Apophthegmata Lakōnika*) 235a–b, presents the Spartans as reacting proudly to Philip’s demands: Φιλίππου τοῦ Μακεδόνοιο προστάσαντός τινα δι’ ἐπιστολῆς, ἀντέγραψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ‘Φιλίππου· περὶ ὧν ἄμμιν ἔγραψας, οὐ’. ὅτε δ’ ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐδόκουν ἅπαντες ἀπολεῖσθαι, εἶπε πρὸς τινα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν ‘τί νῦν ποιήσετε, ὦ Λάκωνες;’ ‘τί γάρ’ ἔφη ‘ἄλλο ἢ ἀνδρείως ἀποθανοῦμεθα; μόνοι γὰρ ἡμεῖς Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθεροὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπακούειν ἄλλοις ἐμάθομεν’ (‘When Philip of Macedon sent some orders to the Spartans by letter, they wrote in reply, “Concerning what you wrote to us about, ‘No’”. When he invaded the Spartans’ country, and all seemed about to be killed, he said to one of the Spartans, “What shall you do now men of Sparta?” And the other said, “What else than die like men? For we alone of the Greeks have learned to be free, and not to be subject to others.”’)

On the content of Philip’s letter see Roebuck 1948, 87–8 and Magnetto 1994, 286, n.14 (where there is a collection of similar anecdotes).

⁴⁸ ‘Inducing’ in the Loeb translation. But the ἐπισπασόμενοι bears a more violent meaning.

⁴⁹ Livy (38.34.8) refers to a decree of the ‘Achaians’ (*ex decreto veterē Achaeorum quod factum erat Philippo Amyntae filio regnante*) and Roebuck 1948, 91, rightly points out that ‘Achaians’ could very well stand for *Hellenes*; along these lines see also Walbank (1957, 244) who argues that the *Achaeorum* is probably synonymous with *sociorum*, i.e. the Greek allies of Philip II. Magnetto (1994, 295) observes that Livy’s is the only passage, except for Polybius, that mentions a Greek tribunal set up by Philip II.

⁵⁰ Pausanias actually refers to *dikē* with Philip acting as judge, which is technically a mistake but might very well reflect the essence of the matter.

⁵¹ The tribunal recorded in *Syll.³ 665* is more likely one set up by Antigonos III Doson.

⁵² See Roebuck 1948, 88–9 and especially 91–2, explicitly rejecting Treves' view (1944, 105) that the Spartans agreed to submit to arbitration, and arguing that the League determined ownership of the territories but did not define boundaries. See also Ch. 6, pp.248–250 and nn.134–6. Roebuck's main argument about one arrangement *de facto* (by Philip) and one *de jure* (by the League) is widely accepted: Griffith 1979, 617–8, 636; Ryder 1965, 159; Walbank 1967, 172–3; Ellis 1976, 203–4 and 1994b, 783; Ager 1996, 42. Piérart (2001, 28) thinks that the decision was taken, without Spartan presence, by the League of Corinth and further suggests that the invasion of Lakonia might have taken place after the vote.

On the other hand, Calabi 1950 (and, following her, Piccirilli 1973) thinks that it is not imperative that we identify the tribunal with the League of Corinth or part of it, because the wording of Polybius is too generic (κοινὸν κριτήριον); Piccirilli (1973, 225) argues that there might have been more than one tribunal which however did not object to Philip's wishes. Luraghi (2008, 18) writes of a Panhellenic jury working 'perhaps in the framework of the newly founded League of Corinth'. Magnetto (1994, 287–91) reviews the bibliography on the subject and agrees with Calabi that Polybius (9.33.10–12) does not establish any distinction between a *de jure* and a *de facto* decision but she points out that this might be due to Lykiskos' wish to present Philip as acting legally.

⁵³ Chlineas (addressing the Spartans; 9.28.7): ἀποτερόμενος καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑμῶν προσέειπε τὴν μὲν Ἀργείοις, τὴν δὲ Τεγεάταις καὶ Μεγαλοπολίταις, τὴν δὲ Μεσσηνίοις, ἅπαντας βουλόμενος καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον εὐεργετεῖν, ἐφ' ᾧ μόνον ὑμᾶς κακῶς ποιεῖν ('amputating ['partitioning' in the Loeb translation] your cities and your territory, he assigned part of it to the Argives, part to the Tegeans and the Megalopolitans, and part to the Messenians, wishing to confer ill-merited benefits on all of them if by doing so he could only damage you.').

Lykiskos (9.33.11–12): καταπληξάμενος δὲ κἀκείνους καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ τῷ κοινῇ συμφέροντι διὰ λόγου τὴν ἐξαγωγήν ἀμφοτέρους ἠνάγκασε ποιήσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, οὐχ αὐτὸν ἀποδείξας κριτὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀντιλεγόμενων, ἀλλὰ κοινὸν ἐκ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καθίσας κριτήριον ('he struck equal terror into the Spartans and their enemies and compelled them to their common good to settle their differences by negotiation ['a congress' in the Loeb], not assuming himself the right of judging their opposing arguments, but appointing a court of arbitration selected from all the Greek states.').

Lykiskos implies that the Spartans agreed under compulsion to submit to arbitration but we must bear in mind that he was speaking in favour of an alliance with Philip V, presenting him as a factor of unity against a powerful enemy, and, therefore, it served his purpose to present the Spartans as playing a part in the events of 338/7 and Philip as treating Sparta's opponents in the same manner. An alternative interpretation of the passage could be that Philip obliged the Spartans not to resort to armed conflict but no more than that.

See Wooten 1974, 339–40, on the structure of these speeches and the efforts of both envoys to prove that the policy they advocate 'is honorable and historically consistent'.

⁵⁴ It has often been argued that representation and voting were proportionate to the military strength of members (e.g. Ellis 1976, 205) but cf. the objections of Cawkwell 1978, 172–3.

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⁵⁵ See Roebuck (1948, 88, 90, 92) and Magnetto (1994, 306), on the absence of risk in Philip's decision and, at the same time, his wish to employ well-established institutions, i.e. arbitration.

⁵⁶ Moggi (1974, 95) thinks it was Spartan; Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 83; on the uncertainty see Shipley 2000a, 371, 374; Pikoulas (1987, 123–4), based on the silence of the sources, argues that it was Arkadian.

⁵⁷ For a convenient and comprehensive picture of the diminution of Spartan territory from the late 4th to the early 2nd centuries see Shipley 2000a, 388–9, Table I and Map.

⁵⁸ Pikoulas 1991, 279, on the location of the Dentheliatis; at pp.280–1 he underlines that its control was translated into control of the road network of Taygetos and of the passes into Messenia; Shipley 2000a, 386, n.175.

⁵⁹ See also Tod 1913, 55–6 and Daverio Rocchi 1988, 198–9.

⁶⁰ Paus. 4.4.2–3: innocent Spartan maidens or Spartan young men in disguise – the Spartan and the Messenian version respectively – had been killed by the Messenians.

⁶¹ Luraghi 2008, 254 and n.14; Shipley 2000a, 385–6 and 2004a, 550; Grandjean 2003, 69. See also Valmin 1930, 25–6; Roebuck 1941, 56–7.

⁶² In Livy 38.34.8, the Belminatis is restored to the Megalopolitans by the Romans in 189/8 on the basis of a decree promulgated by the *Hellēnes* in the reign of Philip II and awarding the region to them (see this chapter, n.49; Ch. 8, p.331 and n.84). The Belminatis had probably been conquered by the Spartans at some point between 219 and 189, perhaps in 208 by Machanidas (Shipley 2000a, 373 and n.43, accepting the view of Kolbe in *IG* V.1, p.11). Piccirilli (1973, no.60, at p.226), thinks that both the Aigyitis and the Skiritis were given to Megalopolis by Philip II; also Walbank 1967, 172–3.

⁶³ Piccirilli (1973, 224) thinks that Tegea got the 'Karyatis' but Shipley (2000a, 372 and n.26, 374) has pointed out that Karyatis is not an ancient name while Karyai was probably not a *polis* and therefore did not have a *chōra*. Shipley (2000a, 375) also observes that the only evidence for Tegean ownership of Karyai is a Tegean legend of the Roman period (Paus. 8.45.1) while it may have remained Spartan after 368. See Pikoulas 1987, 137–9, firmly rejecting the inclusion of Karyai in the Skiritis.

⁶⁴ The modern fertile plain of Astros, to the southeast of the Argive plain: Piérart 2001, 28. On the problem of the extent of ancient Kynouria, see Shipley 2000a, 376–7 with bibliography; also Piérart 2001, 30, 34–5 and *id.* 2014, 229, n.46.

⁶⁵ Hdt. 1.82; Thuc. 5.41; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 70; Cartledge 2002a, 125, 128–9; Hornblower 2002, 83–4.

⁶⁶ Paus. 2.20.1, 28.5; 7.11.2; Polyb. 9.28.7, 33.8; Tomlinson 1972, 145–6; Piérart and Touchais 1996, 61; Shipley 2000a, 376–8; Cartledge 2002b, 14; Christien 2006, 177.

⁶⁷ In 2006 Kritzas left the question open but in 2013 (Greek translation of his 2006 article with some modifications) he noted that further examination of the tablets clearly shows that Thyreatis was annexed by the Argives in c. 370. Piérart (2014, 226–30) thinks that Diod. Sic. 15.64.2 may afford evidence for a conquest of Thyreatis by Argos (with the correction of Bölte 1929, cols. 1303–4: Θυρεάτιδος instead of Τερεάτιδος). Bölte (1929, 1303–4), on the basis of Vollgraff 1914 (see this chapter, n.72), also thought that the Argives re-occupied the Thyreatis from 370/69.

⁶⁸ Christien (2006, 171–2) argues that the Spartans reconquered the Thyreatis, perhaps in 357; Piérart (2014, 229 and n.47) accepts this as a possibility.

⁶⁹ In c.275 the port of Tyros, north of Zarax, appears to have been Lakonian since it made a dedication to the Delphic Apollo as ‘a *κῶμῆ* of the Lakedaimonians’ (*FD* III 8.68 / *Syll.*³ 407). Piérart (2001, 30–1) suggests that the dedication could be explained as a reconquest by the Spartans. Zarax appears to have been Lakonian also when the exiled Spartan regent Kleonymos attacked it, probably in c.272 and while in the service of Pyrrhos. See Paus. 3.24.1: Κλεώννυμος ὁ Κλεομένους τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλειδος μόνον τοῦτο τῶν Λακωνικῶν πολισμάτων ἐποίησεν ἀνάστατον (‘Kleonymos the son of Kleomenes, son of Agesipolis depopulated only this Lakonian town’). The wording of Pausanias indirectly suggests that it might have been expected of Kleonymos to attack more Lakonian communities. Cf. Charneux (1958, 11–12) who suggests that Pausanias might simply refer to the geographical situation of the city. Piérart (2001, 31 and n.75 at p.40; 2007, 39 and n.54) similarly thinks that we cannot be certain on either the Argive or the Lakonian identity of Zarax at the time, and that Kleonymos could have campaigned while still a regent. Christien (1987, 118, 123) thinks that Pyrrhos’ campaign does not provide the most appropriate context for Kleonymos’ attack against Zarax and argues instead that this occurred during the Chremonidean War.

See Cartledge 2002b, 34 and Marasco 1980a, 112 and n.78, dating Kleonymos’ assault during Pyrrhos’ invasion in the Peloponnese. In any case, in the late 3rd century Zarax and therefore the entire Parnon seaboard, since Zarax was the last community to the south, belonged to Argos: Polyb. 4.36 and 5.20; Shipley 2000a, 378–9; Piérart 2001, 30.

⁷⁰ Piérart (2001, 30–7) argues that the entire re-arrangement of borders after Chaironeia (between Sparta and Messenia, Sparta and Arkadia as well as Sparta and Argos) was presented as a restoration of the division of the Peloponnese by the Herakleidai. Luraghi (2008, 18 and n.8) finds this theory attractive.

⁷¹ In the Argive honorific decree for the Mantinean Theainetos, the secretary of the council is from Zarax (ed. pr. Charneux 1958, 7–13, no. II B = *SEG* 17.143 / Perlman 2000, 221, A 15).

⁷² Ed. pr. Vollgraff 1914. Vollgraff dated the inscription to 369/8 and thought that it concerned delineation of the boundaries of the Arkadian Confederacy, in which the Argives (allegedly) played a decisive part. See Pleket and Stroud in *SEG* 36.336 for the text and discussion of the relevant bibliography.

⁷³ This territory includes Kleonai which comprised some 135 km² (Piérart 2004a, 610 with references). The date of Kleonai’s incorporation has been the subject of a long discussion with views ranging from the early 330s to the 310s but lead tablets recently discovered in Argos show that it was a privileged *κῶμῆ* of Argos in the early 4th century: in that period men from Kleonai appear to occupy high offices. Kritzas (2006, 427–8, 434) cautiously suggests that Kleonai might have become a *κῶμῆ* during the Corinthian War or shortly afterwards.

⁷⁴ Roebuck 1945, 157; Grandjean 2003, 69 with the observations of Luraghi 2008, 254, n.14; Shipley 2004a, 561, 563; Luraghi 2008, 251.

⁷⁵ Shipley 2002, 307–8; at pp.313–6, comparison with other areas in the Peloponnese.

⁷⁶ Cartledge 2002a, 251, 270; Shipley 2004b, 590.

⁷⁷ See Ch. 6, n.2.

Chapter 2

⁷⁸ Piérart 2004a, 603, based on Hansen's model (1985, 11–13, 16–21). According to Hansen (1985, 16–19) a full draft of armed forces would have involved no more than 80% of males aged up to 40 or 50 years. Males aged between 20 and 49 are estimated at c. 42% of all males (at p.12).

⁷⁹ See Forsén (2000, 38 and nn.7–9) who draws attention to variables such as the fact that we cannot be certain as to what percentage of the population the hoplites represented. Beloch (1922, 311) calculates a total of 125,000 inhabitants for Argos in 362.

⁸⁰ See Ch. 1, p.7 and n.34.

⁸¹ Salmon 1984, 165–9; Legon 2004, 465–6.

⁸² Thuc. 5.58.1, 75.5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16; Roy 2004, 495.

⁸³ On the basis of the annual consumption of wheat produced by the fertile land of c.200km² available to Messene, Roebuck 1945, 157–64, calculates a maximum of 47,583 inhabitants for Messene (men, women and children of all classes) and c.112,500 for Messenia as a whole.

⁸⁴ See Luraghi (2008, 16–23) on the Dentheliatis changing hands 'mostly in connection with turning points in the history of the Peloponnese'. See Piccirilli 1973, no.61, assembling the evidence; Tacitus, *Annales* 4.43.1–3, on the embassy of the Messenians and the Spartans to Tiberius. Magnetto (1994, 293) argues that the Messenians might have also referred to a formal verdict pronounced by Philip II (based on the *neque Philippum potentia sed ex vero statuissē*); Shipley 2004a, 551, 563.

⁸⁵ Agis' War is often called a revolt but this word implies subjection which does not apply to Sparta. See Cartledge 2002b, 22; he does use the word 'revolt' in the title of his chapter (at p.16); Badian called it a revolt in 1967 but calls it a war in 1994 (*passim*).

⁸⁶ Landucci Gattinoni (2006, 316) sees the help promised by the Arkadians to the Thebans as a result of their old friendship.

⁸⁷ See Ryder 1965, 155–6 and McQueen 1978, 44–5, n.19, for the error in Diod. Sic. 17.3.4: first he writes mistakenly that the Arkadians alone did not acknowledge Philip's hegemony and then that the Lakedaimonians made a move to acquire their independence, along with the Eleans and the Argives; therefore the 'Arkadians' and 'Lakedaimonians' should be transposed.

⁸⁸ Deinarchos (*Against Demosthenes* 20) specifies that it was the Arkadian *stratēgos* Astylos who asked for ten talents (ὀνίου ὄντος, 'open to bribery') but as Dušanić (1970, 312–13 and n.187) observes, Deinarchos is probably carried away by his enmity towards Demosthenes. See also the commentary by Worthington 1992, 160–8, who sees in Astylos' demand 'calculated inactivity' (at p.167).

⁸⁹ Dixon 2014, 25.

⁹⁰ Mitsos 1945, 54–5, regarding Argos, but actually a principle that applies to all.

⁹¹ The Arkadians, while at Isthmos, had been quite bold sending away an embassy from Antipatros who was presumably asking either for their support or their neutrality (Deinarchos, *Against Demosthenes* 18: καὶ τὴν μὲν παρ' Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον ἀποστειλάντων).

⁹² On the Spartan policy of waiting for the special opportunity in order to proceed to military action see Powell 2001, 121–9, 144–56, esp. the table at p.150.

⁹³ Badian (1967, 190–2) dates the war from spring to autumn of 331 following Curtius 6.1.21; but in 1994, 272–7, he follows Cawkwell 1969, 170–1 and n.6, who

dates the end of the war well into 330; see Bosworth 1988, 200, n.14. See Cartledge 2002b, 20–1, on Agis' dealings with the Persians. Contrary to Badian's positive appraisal of Agis, de Ste Croix 1972, Appendix XXX, 378, thinks that 'the revolt of Agis was an act of folly' and justifies the Athenians for not supporting it, also pointing out that Athens' war in 323/2 against Antipatros gained many more supporters. One cannot disagree with the latter statement but, on the other hand, we should not underestimate the fact that Sparta had regained some or much of its appeal as a leader among the Peloponnesians.

⁹⁴ Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 165; Diod. Sic. 17.62.6–7; Deinarchos, *Against Demosthenes* 34, mentions only the Achaians and the Eleans. Most importantly, Deinarchos, blaming Demosthenes for his persuading the Athenians not to join Agis, comments, with a certain degree of exaggeration, that the whole of Greece, being in turmoil because of the traitors in each *polis*, was most willing for a change. These traitors should presumably be people favouring Macedon, possibly receiving Macedonian money to maintain themselves in power.

⁹⁵ [Dem.] *On the Treaty with Alexander* 10; Paus. 7.27.7; Roebuck 1948, 84 and n. 82; followed by McQueen 1978, 47; Rizakis 2008a, 257–8 and n.49; Dixon 2014, 30–1. On Chairon in particular see Marasco (1985, 111–2, 115–6) who views his installation as a deliberate attempt on the Macedonian part to create discord among the Achaian *poleis*; he suggests that Chairon's rule ended in 330; see also Bollansée 2002, 32–6.

⁹⁶ Diod. Sic. 17.11–14; Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.1; see Bosworth 1988, 220–8 and esp. 220–1, on the autocratic language of Alexander's edict imposing the return of the exiles; also Errington 1990, 91–2, on the change of Macedonian attitude towards 'fickle' southern Greeks and the tendency of Alexander to treat them as subjects.

⁹⁷ Dixon (2014, 26) suggests that the one hundred ships sent by Alexander to the Peloponnese (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.3) might have been accommodated in the Corinthian harbour of Kenchreai.

⁹⁸ McQueen 1978, 41–2; the non-participation of Argos is an argument *ex silentio*: Tomlinson 1972, 148.

⁹⁹ See Ch.1, p.12 and nn.79–80.

¹⁰⁰ Forsén 2000, 40; Nielsen 2004a, 517, 530 and Hansen 2004, 71.

¹⁰¹ According to Forsén 2000, 42–3, 51–3, based on army figures; see Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 274–9, for a lower estimate; see Nielsen 2002, 327–9 on the impossibility of precise estimates.

¹⁰² *Syll.*³ 306 / Tod 1948, no.202 / *Heisserer 1980, 204–29. Rhodes and Osborne follow Heisserer 1980; the latter differs from Tod's text in ll. 1, 37, 44. Thür and Taeuber in *IPArk* 5 restore certain letters in ll. 63–6. See also Dubois 1988, II, 61–77; Bencivenni 2003, 79–101 (Heisserer's text, extensive bibliography and commentary); translation also in Harding 1985, no.122 and in Bagnall and Derow 2004, no. 4. See also Dmitriev 2004, 348 with notes on sources and bibliography. On the uncertainty as to the date of the decree see Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 530 with references (two other possibilities are 319 and 317; at the beginning of the inscription there is only the end of a proper name: $\nu\phi\omicron\varsigma$ which could be Alexandros or Kassandros). Heisserer (1980, 219–22) dates the decree to 324 but he also explores the possibility of a date after Polyperchon's edict in 319; see also Worthington 1993, 62–3, arguing persuasively for a date in 324; also Dmitriev 2004, 351–4, who argues that the Tegea decree was not the official *diagramma*. Worthington 1990, 197–9, underlines the severe character

of the provisions for the exiles; see *ibid.* 200 and n.17 and Heisserer 1980, 216 for the possibly Mantinean identity of the foreign tribunal; also Dmitriev 2004, 377.

As to the identity of the exiles, Heisserer (1980, 221–2) observes that if they included the instigators of Tegean participation in Agis' War, both Tegea and Antipatros would have found themselves in a very embarrassing situation. See also Bencivenni 2003, 95–6; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 530. According to Bosworth's elaborate argument (1988, 223–4), more than one generation of exiles must have returned, including the survivors and descendants of those exiled in the 360s and people who had opposed Philip II after 338, but not those exiled at the instigation of Alexander (on the mixed identity of the exiles see also Worthington 1993, 61 and n.11; Dmitriev 2004, 353); in Bosworth's view, the decree aimed at creating instability and at preventing local uprisings since local authorities would be busy with regulating the re-incorporation of exiles. Still, it appears possible that Alexander would not have allowed the restoration of people who had participated in Agis' War. For a much more positive evaluation of Alexander's *diagramma* see Dmitriev 2004, 378–80.

¹⁰³ Nielsen 2004a, 532, on Tegean fortifications.

¹⁰⁴ See de Ste Croix 1972, 164–6 and Cartledge 2002b, 22–3 and nn.16–17 at p.237, for the composition of Agis' army.

¹⁰⁵ Bosworth (1988, 203) argues plausibly that the prolonged siege of Megalopolis laid the Peloponnese open to the invasion of Antipatros.

¹⁰⁶ See this chapter, p.70 and n.93.

¹⁰⁷ Badian (1967, 182–4) lays the blame for the failure of the war on Demosthenes and Athens' refusal to join forces. Cartledge (2002b, 23) observes that the Spartan-Persian co-operation would have made the Athenians particularly reluctant. See also Worthington 1992, 186–9, with bibliography.

¹⁰⁸ The Cretan Philonidas, ἡμεροδόμος καὶ βηματιστὴς τῆς Ἀσίας in the service of Alexander might have supported the Achaians before Alexander; see an honorific inscription found at Aigion, probably of the Achaian Confederacy and dating between 330–323: Bingen 1954b, 407–9, no.19 (= *SEG* 14.376) / Rizakis 2008a, 170–2, no. 117.

¹⁰⁹ Gardner and Loring 1892, 69–91; Themelis 2006 [2008], 35–6 with n.2 at p.35.

¹¹⁰ Unless they took the field to occupy the Parnon seaboard.

HOW DID THE PELOPONNESIANS FARE WITH THE *DLADOCHOI* AND WITHOUT THE SPARTANS? (323–280)

The Lamian War: lack of commitment to military engagement

Shortly after Alexander's death in 323, the Athenians and the Aitolians resolved to go to war against Macedon.¹ The notorious *diagramma* of Alexander in 324 ordering the restoration of the exiles (Diod. Sic. 17.109.1–2) had already lit the fuse, at least in Athens and Aitolia.² The list of Peloponnesian participants in Diodorus (18.11.2)³ does not match the list of participants in the battle of Chaironeia; it is also very different from the list of participants in Agis III's War, with the exception of Elis. In 338 it was Corinth and the Achaian *poleis* who fought alongside Athens. In 331/0 it was Elis, the Achaian *poleis* and most of the Arkadians who took the field with the Spartans. In 323/2 other Peloponnesian states were mobilised. Among the allies of Athens and Aitolia we find Elis, Messenia, Argos, Sikyon, Epidauros and Troizen.⁴ In the time of Philip II, pro-Macedonian leaders had dictated their respective policies.⁵ After Philip's death, the Eleans, the Argives, the Troizenians and the Epidaurians had shown anti-Macedonian tendencies. We have to assume that in 323/2 the anti-Macedonian, pro-war leaders prevailed or, conversely, that public opinion changed and so did leadership. The 'essential anonymity' of the politics of the above-mentioned cities does not help us understand the underlying causes of their policies.⁶ The same consideration applies more or less to the policies of those who had allied with Agis III but did not participate in the Lamian War, i.e. the Arkadians and the Achaians – especially the former.

According to Pausanias (7.6.5) the Achaians had suffered heavy losses in the battle of Chaironeia which prevented them from participating in the Lamian War. But this statement is unconvincing since all Achaians had earlier on accepted Agis' call to arms, except for Pellene which was ruled by the pro-Macedonian tyrant Chairon. It could be that Achaian participation in Agis' War was too small to count. Or Pausanias is trying to find an excuse for the Achaians (as he does with the Eleans and the

Messenians) – which is more likely. It is thus possible that pro-Macedonian elements had prevailed in the Achaian *poleis* at the time.

Corinth once again was absent. It had a Macedonian garrison and its policy was dominated by a pro-Macedonian oligarchy. It was thus neutralized, as before (Dixon 2014, 32–3).⁷ The Spartans and the Arkadians were now the great absentees.⁸ The Spartan absence can be explained by a combination of factors: first of all, their recent failure under Agis III, combined with the casualties suffered at the battle of Megalopolis; the hostages held in Asia (assuming that they still existed); the fact that the war was led by the Athenians who had not participated in the War of Agis III; finally, should they choose to participate, the Spartans would have to fight alongside their enemies Argos and Messene (Cartledge 2002b, 24–5).⁹ According to Plutarch (*Mor.* 220e–f), the Spartans were or appeared to be favourably disposed to war but king Eudamidas I openly objected:

πυνθανομένου δέ τινος διὰ τί, τῶν πολιτῶν αἰρουμένων τὸν πρὸς Μακεδόνας πόλεμον, αὐτὸς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν δοκιμάζει, ‘ὅτι’ ἔφη ‘οὐ χρήζω ψευδομένουσιν αὐτοῦς ἐλέγξαι.’

Someone inquired why, when the citizens professed to be all for war against the Macedonians, he himself decided in favour of keeping the peace. He replied: “Because I do not want to prove that they are lying”.

We may doubt whether Eudamidas spoke exactly in this way or whether the Spartans favoured war. But it is worth commenting on the projected political mood of the Spartans: what Eudamidas implies is that the Spartans were not favourably disposed to war; they only wished to appear so, presumably because the opposite would be unbecoming.

As to the Arkadians, a peculiar unanimity is observed here. The Megalopolitans had already shown their cards in Agis’ War. We do not have any clue as to debates and policies in Mantinea or Tegea or Orchomenos or Kleitor, let alone smaller Arkadian *poleis*. We do not know whether the Arkadian *poleis* had come to be dominated by leaders favourably disposed towards Macedon or whether caution and fear had caused them to abstain from the Lamian War. Taking account of the violent reaction of the people against their leaders in various Arkadian *poleis* after Thebes’ destruction, we can at least suggest that peace-orientated leaders had taken the upper hand, whether they were pro-Macedonian or not. An indirect indication of debate – in Megalopolis? – is afforded by ps.-Plutarch (*Mor.* 846c–d) where it is reported that Demosthenes, while in exile, persuaded the Arkadian *Koinon*¹⁰ to abandon the Macedonian alliance. Since there is no trace of any Arkadian state participating in the war, ps.-Plutarch is either entirely mistaken or the Arkadians promised to

support the Athenians but later changed their mind, preferring to remain neutral.

As to Tegea, Worthington (1990, 202 and n.26) has argued that its absence is an 'indication that the state was adhering to the terms of the recently sworn decree' on the restoration of the exiles according to Alexander's *diagramma*. It is not certain that an oath exchanged with a now dead king would have been much of an obstacle, but Worthington's view should be endorsed insofar as the restoration of the exiles must have caused enough internal problems to the Tegeans to deter them from participating in a war. To this we should add the fact that the Tegeans had been deprived of their leaders after Agis' defeat. As a whole, the failure of Agis' War must have cowed unruly Arkadians and, furthermore, politicians either friendly towards Macedon or against war in general must have taken over. A preference for peace, though, is not necessarily translated into pro-Antipatros sympathies.

In this war, the Peloponnesian participants demonstrated lack of commitment. Initial agreement on the alliance was not translated into active participation, at least not throughout the war.¹¹ Apart from the Aitolians, Diodorus does not identify by name the other Greek allies when describing the operations. He does state, however, that not only the Aitolians but many other Greeks returned to their native cities after the initial success against Antipatros (18.15.1 and 18.17.1). This attitude must have been the result of both gross miscalculation and a lack of commitment to the war. Also, the fact that no Peloponnesian state had a leading role must have rendered the Peloponnesians, accustomed only to Spartan leadership, uncommitted to a certain extent.

In the aftermath of their defeat in the Lamian War (Diod. Sic. 18.17.3–5), the *poleis* – unidentified by Diodorus (18.17.7–8) – negotiated separate peace terms with Antipatros. With the exception of the Aitolians, all Greek states previously opposed to Macedon were faced with Antipatros' interference in their political regimes.¹² Furthermore, Antipatros appointed the Corinthian (?) Deinarchos as *epimeletēs* (superintendent) of the Peloponnese.¹³ Later on, in 318, Deinarchos was executed by Polyperchon (Plut. *Phoc.* 33.8), Antipatros' successor to the regency.

Antipatros discriminated against democratic regimes but, on the other hand, not all oligarchies could be relied on to favour Macedon. We should rather think that Antipatros interfered everywhere by installing in power people he trusted, even in the case of pre-existing oligarchies. Diodorus does not offer a list of the *poleis* in which pro-Macedonian regimes were installed but it seems that Antipatros made no exceptions.¹⁴ In 318 his successor to the regency, Polyperchon, during his clash with Kassandros

(son of Antipatros), had to struggle against these regimes in the Peloponnese and elsewhere. At least Argos and Megalopolis had been under the control of pro-Macedonian or, to be more exact, pro-Antipatros leaders.¹⁵ The case of Megalopolis is indicative of the complexity of Greek politics at the time as well as of the exercise of firm rule on the Macedonian part. The Megalopolitans had not taken part in either Agis' War or in the Lamian War; they had shown no sign of hostility against Macedon that we know of, and yet a pro-Antipatros regime had been established there. Either some Megalopolitans had shown signs of dislike for Macedonian rule or Antipatros wanted to be absolutely certain of the *polis*' loyalty. The latter appears more likely.

Peloponnesian interstate relations during the clash of the *Diadochoi*: from the death of Antipatros to the battle of Ipsos (319–301)

Between Polyperchon and Kassandros

After the Lamian War and until the mid-3rd century we can only construct a very patchy picture of political interstate relations in the Peloponnese. For the last twenty years of the 4th century, Diodorus, our main literary source, is primarily interested in the clash of the *Diadochoi* and their deeds or failures. The Peloponnese (as every other part of the Greek world) is subordinate to this interest. Furthermore, his books referring to the events after 301 have survived only in a fragmentary state. Plutarch's *Demetrios* fills only part of the gap for the late 4th-early 3rd century. As to epigraphic evidence, it is meagre but not totally unhelpful.

Acknowledging the inadequate nature of our evidence, our task here will be to draw a picture of Peloponnesian attitudes towards the *Diadochoi*, to examine the impact of the *Diadochoi*'s struggle for power on relations between Peloponnesian states, its effect on their internal affairs as well as on their attitude towards warfare in general. It can be noted in advance that initially the *Diadochoi*'s involvement in the Peloponnese had a curiously positive impact leading to relative unanimity, especially among the majority of the Arkadians – assuming that there was something positive about a situation in which neutrality was not an option for the Peloponnesians (or for the entire Greek world) and their very existence was threatened.

Before examining closely the attitudes and relations of Peloponnesian states, it is helpful to give a brief sketch of the *Diadochoi*'s operations in the Peloponnese until the early 3rd century.

After Antipatros' death in the summer of 319, the whole of the Peloponnese, with the notable exception of Sparta,¹⁶ was caught in the struggles of the *Diadochoi*, and first in that between the regent Polyperchon

(appointed by Antipatros) and Kassandros, Antipatros' son, who decided that he wanted Macedon for himself (Diod. Sic. 18.54.1).¹⁷ Polyperchon proclaimed the restoration of regimes in Greek *poleis*, as they were in the time of Philip II and Alexander (Diod. Sic. 18.55.2, 56). Because of this, he initially enjoyed some success but Kassandros had won the day by 315, both in Macedon and in mainland Greece.

The second major conflict facing the Peloponnesians was that between Kassandros and the Antigonids, i.e. Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes (in the event, Monophthalmos never set foot in the Peloponnese). The struggle between the two lasted until Antigonos' death in 301. In its course both sides employed command over the Peloponnese to lure both Polyperchon and his son Alexandros. First Antigonos Monophthalmos concluded an alliance with Polyperchon appointing him *stratēgos* of the Peloponnese (Diod. Sic. 19.60.1–2, 61.1; Billows 1990, 113). Immediately afterwards, in an attempt to weaken Kassandros, Antigonos famously declared freedom and autonomy for the Greek *poleis*, in 315 at Tyre (Diod. Sic. 19.61.3).¹⁸ Shortly afterwards Kassandros allied himself with Polyperchon's son, Alexandros, who also received the title of *stratēgos* of the Peloponnese (Diod. Sic. 19.64.4). In the next three years Antigonos had quite an impact on the Peloponnese, sending three expeditions. In 313, while Kassandros was operating in the north-west, the Antigonid official Telesphoros freed all Peloponnesian cities from their garrisons, except for Corinth and Sikyon (Diod. Sic. 19.74.2).¹⁹ But in 311, following the disastrous battle of Gaza, Antigonos was forced to conclude peace with Kassandros, Ptolemy and Lysimachos on the basis of the *status quo* (Diod. Sic. 19.105.1). Antigonos would remain *stratēgos* of Asia, while Kassandros would remain *stratēgos* of Europe.²⁰ As for the 'freedom and autonomy' for the Greek *poleis*, proclaimed once again in the treaty and in a letter of Antigonos to Skepsis (*OGIS* 5 / *RC* 1, ll. 53–61), in effect it must have been in the discretion of the rulers of each area (Hammond 1988, 161).²¹ We do not have any solid information as to what happened in the Peloponnese after 311 but, as emerges from Diodorus (20.100.6, 103.4–6), when Demetrios Poliorketes campaigned to the Peloponnese in 303, there were certainly garrisons of Kassandros in the northern and central Peloponnese (e.g. in the Achaian Boura, the Arkadian Orchomenos and its neighbourhood). Therefore, Kassandros at some point must have regained control of at least some Peloponnesian *poleis*. We know that in 309/8 he came to terms with Polyperchon (he had not sworn to the peace of 311) and appointed him *stratēgos* of the Peloponnese²² – this does not mean that Kassandros renounced control over the Peloponnese, only that Polyperchon was now in his service.²³

The fact that Polyperchon tried to invade the Peloponnese shortly afterwards, reportedly with 4,000 Macedonian infantry and 500 Thessalian cavalry (Diod. Sic. 20.28.4), may serve as an indication that Kassandros was facing difficulties there.

Yet another Macedonian, Ptolemy I Soter of Egypt, also promised freedom and autonomy to the Greek *poleis* (Diod. Sic. 19.62.2) shortly after Antigonos' declaration. But he seriously claimed a share of influence over the Peloponnese only in 309/8 where he acquired control of Sikyon and Corinth (Diod. Sic. 20.37.1–2).²⁴ In 303, Demetrios Poliorketes campaigned in the Peloponnese, striking a decisive blow against Kassandros' dominance (Diod. Sic. 20.100.5–7, 102–3; Plut. *Demetr.* 23–7). He was welcomed as a liberator but his dominance ended abruptly in 301 after the battle of Ipsos where the Antigonids were defeated by the allied forces of Lysimachos, Seleukos and Kassandros. Notably, however, he did retain Corinth (Diod. Sic. 20.106–13; 21.1, 4; Plut. *Demetr.* 28–30.1).²⁵

Let us start with the indirectly positive impact on relations between Peloponnesian states, especially the Arkadian ones. The reaction to Polyperchon was almost unanimously favourable on the Peloponnesian part, due to his promise to restore peace and the *poleis*' constitutions. It is even possible that Polyperchon revived both the League of Corinth and the Arkadian Confederacy (assuming that it had ceased to function as a fully-fledged political and military entity). This might have helped him to stir up revolt against the regimes installed by Antipatros and to gain Peloponnesian loyalty against Kassandros, especially after the latter's alliance with Antigonos Monophthalmos (Diod. Sic. 18.55.2–4).

Polyperchon crucially decided to declare restoration of the *poleis*' regimes as they had been in the time of Philip II and Alexander (before the oligarchies set up by Antipatros) by means of a *diagramma*, in the name of king Philip III Arrhidaios, in autumn 319 (Diod. Sic. 18.55.2, 56).²⁶ The Peloponnesians, pretty much like the Athenians, were not willing or strong enough to take up arms against the garrisons of Antipatros. Two supplementary factors account for this pattern: the regimes installed or supported by Antipatros and the bonds developed as a result between members of the elite and the house of Antipatros. Correspondingly, those of the people who were averse to Antipatros' control would have been cowed. Instead, they preferred to be offered their freedom.

The *diagramma* was followed by a letter to Argos and to the other *poleis* urging them to send into exile the leaders of the pro-Antipatros regimes or even to execute some of them and confiscate their property (Diod. Sic. 18.57.1; also 18.69.3–4). It is indicative of the importance attributed to Argos, the alleged birthplace of the Argead dynasty, that it is the only

recipient mentioned by name in the letter.²⁷ Evidently the Argives believed Polyperchon or at least preferred him to Kassandros.²⁸

It is not at all certain that exile and executions occurred immediately or everywhere after Polyperchon's letter to the *poleis*, which could mean either that those loyal to Antipatros were too numerous or too powerful to be destroyed, or that the Peloponnesian *poleis* were not willing to fall back, immediately, on old habits, unless seriously threatened.²⁹ Shortly before Kassandros embarked upon his expedition to the Peloponnese, Polyperchon had to dispatch envoys carrying more severe instructions, or rather orders, this time calling for the execution of pro-Antipatros leaders and the restoration of autonomy (Diod. Sic. 18.69.4). Caught between the two leaders and having chosen Polyperchon, the assemblies of certain unidentified *poleis* felt obliged to follow his dictation. Diodorus writes that friends of Antipatros were either executed or sent into exile in many *poleis*, but not, we note, in all.

Diodorus (18.69.3) records that Polyperchon (after his departure from Attike), probably in the summer of 318 (Dixon 2007, 158 and n.24), assembled *synedroi* from the *poleis*. The term *synedroi* inevitably reminds us of Philip II's *Synedrion*, i.e. the League of Corinth:

Πολυπέρχων δὲ βουλόμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον διοικῆσαι συμφερόντως παρήλθε καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων συνέδρους διελέχθη περὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν συμμαχίας.

But Polyperchon, in his anxiety to settle affairs in the Peloponnese to his own advantage, went there and discussed with delegates, whom he had gathered from the cities, the question of their alliance with himself.

Neither the location of the meeting nor the *poleis'* names are mentioned. Dixon (2007, 158–62), however, has argued plausibly that the only place strategically convenient for Polyperchon was Corinth (especially since Kassandros was operating in the Saronic Gulf). It was also a place associated with Philip II and Alexander, the arrangements of whom Polyperchon was promising to restore in the *poleis*. Furthermore, although the *diagramma* itself does not refer to freedom or autonomy, these two slogans were present in Polyperchon's words and deeds, as in Diodorus 18.69.3.³⁰ Thus, a revival of the League of Corinth is probable.³¹ On the negative side, it has to be added that the fact that Polyperchon issued orders to the *poleis* to execute leaders installed by Antipatros, shows that he was acting as *hēgemōn*.

Regarding the *poleis* sending *synedroi*, these must have been Peloponnesian states, since the meeting is explicitly associated by Diodorus with management of Peloponnesian affairs. Thus, the League of Corinth envisaged by Polyperchon would have been much narrower than the

League of Philip II. It would have been employed by one Macedonian ruler against another but at least this time most of the Peloponnesians had a vested interest in its success. However, if Polyperchon did restore the League of Corinth, then it did not outlive Kassandros' arrival in the Peloponnese.

To return to the subject of unanimity among the Peloponnesians: most of the Arkadians, as they had done in the war of Agis III and in the Lamian War, demonstrated a common political stance. The Megalopolitans, continuing their policy of isolation from the other Arkadians and, on this occasion, from the majority of the Peloponnesians, fought fervently against Polyperchon. The zeal shown by the Megalopolitans indicates that loyalty to Antipatros' house was not only a consequence of the tight grip of the leaders over the people. Diodorus (18.69.4–72.1) emphasizes that only Megalopolis remained loyal to Kassandros, stoutly resisting Polyperchon's siege, under the leadership of Damis who had campaigned in Asia with Alexander (Diod. Sic. 18.70–72.1).³² Notably though, we do not know what might have ensued, had Polyperchon not broken off the siege, for reasons unspecified by Diodorus.³³ Epigraphic evidence shows that citizens of Pallantion had also fought on the side of Kassandros (Guarducci 1941–43 [1948], 149; see pp.441–2). This does not cancel the overall impression that the major Peloponnesian *poleis* generally assumed a common stance, favourable to Polyperchon, at least initially. But it should also make us alert to the fact that Diodorus or his source did not bother to record the reaction of small *poleis*.

It is possible that the almost unanimous pro-Polyperchon Arkadian reaction provided the basis for a revitalization of the Arkadian Confederacy, without Megalopolis of course, in c.318–317, although existing evidence is obscure. Combined with the probability that Polyperchon attempted to revive the League of Corinth, the idea of Polyperchon encouraging or himself revitalizing the Arkadian Confederacy, becomes more attractive.

In a very fragmentary inscription (*IG* IV 616) Argos appears to impose fines, assessed in golden staters, on an Arkadian *Koinon* and on the Arkadian *polis* of Stymphalos, which notably is not part of the *Koinon*, for offences committed against the Nemeia administered by Argos (either during those games or during the associated sacred truce). The inscription cannot date before the late 330s³⁴ but a more precise dating is much more difficult to establish. The Argives could have been at odds with the Arkadians during Agis III's War in 331/0 when the latter (except Megalopolis) had joined the Spartan king while the Argives had abstained. Another possible context is Argos' capture by Kassandros in 316 when the Argives and the Arkadians

found themselves in opposite camps. This is Piérart's choice (1982, 136–8) who argues with due caution that Polyperchon's campaign in 318/7 could be an appropriate context for a revitalization of the Arkadian Confederacy. We have no information on the composition or the character of this Arkadian *Koinon* other than that Stymphalos was not a member. If the context suggested by Piérart is accepted, then Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenos are plausible candidates (Piérart 1982, 136).

However, if there was a revival of the Arkadian *Koinon*, under the auspices of Polyperchon, it played no military role during the campaigns of Kassandros in the Peloponnese. Nor did the League of Corinth. Assuming that either organization had come into existence, then their military absence should be ascribed to lack of leadership. Polyperchon was in Macedon from 317 to 316 and fled to Aitolia when Kassandros assumed control of the country.³⁵

According to Diodorus (18.74.1) Polyperchon's failure at Megalopolis turned the tables in the Peloponnese in favour of Kassandros, but this is a rather misleading evaluation of Peloponnesian attitudes (Heckel 1992, 198 and n.139). Instead, it emerges from Diodorus' own narrative that certain Arkadian *poleis* (Stymphalos, Tegea, and to a lesser extent Orchomenos), Argos and Messene remained loyal to Polyperchon or rather they did not rush to take sides with Kassandros. However, Peloponnesian loyalty to Polyperchon did not survive confrontation with Kassandros who ascribed great importance to the Peloponnese³⁶ and campaigned there in 317 (summer), in 316 (summer) and in 315 (spring-summer).³⁷

It was particularly in the course of Kassandros' last campaign that things became rough for the Peloponnesians both on the external and the internal front. They had seen or confronted Philip II's and Antipatros' armies but nothing had prepared them for the armies of more than one powerful military leader at a time campaigning throughout the Peloponnese, and attempting to gain control over it. In short, they must have thought that they were faced with the fate of Thebes should they make the wrong choice. This time the issue was no longer a choice between independence and Macedon. It had come down to choosing the right Macedonian in order to avoid annihilation. And this life or death crisis brought about or intensified pre-existing internal problems.³⁸

The Argives remained loyal to Polyperchon and his son Alexandros (he was campaigning in the Peloponnese and kept the Isthmos blocked) until the summer of 316 when they were forced to change sides (we are not told how exactly) and tolerate the presence of a garrison and Apollonides as *stratēgos* in charge of their city (Diod. Sic. 19.54.3–4, 63.1). Diodorus'

narrative indicates that there was hardly any armed resistance on the part of the Argives, but it emerges that supporters of Polyperchon and his son Alexandros remained numerous enough. It also emerges that the Argives would not dare, or have the military strength, to get rid of the garrison on their own initiative but they invited over Alexandros while Apollonides was busy against Stymphalos. This choice had tremendous consequences. Apollonides literally annihilated opposition in Argos: 500 followers of Polyperchon were burnt alive in the *Prytaneion*.³⁹ The loss was most significant both in terms of numbers and leadership. After the notorious *skytalismos* of 370 this was the second time in some sixty years that Argos was 'decapitated'.⁴⁰ We lack figures for the Argive population in the late 4th century but in the early 4th adult male citizens of hoplite status could have amounted to c. 12,000.⁴¹ Thus, a loss of 500 leading citizens would have amounted to a loss of c. 1/20 of the hoplite class. This disaster must have had a long-lasting impact on Argive attitudes towards the kings and at least partly explains the subsequent inclination of the Argives not to get involved in Peloponnesian affairs, such as the Achaian Confederacy (see pp. 169–75). As to the immediate results, Kassandros most probably installed an oligarchy which remained in power until the liberation of the *polis* by Demetrios Poliorketes in 303.

The Tegeans seem to have put up a unanimous front against Kassandros. They had to undergo a siege by him, possibly in the summer of 317 (during the first, brief incursion of Kassandros into the Peloponnese). The siege was lifted and a treaty was concluded in haste because Kassandros had to return to Macedon (Diod. Sic. 19.35.1).⁴² There is no mention of Mantinea or other Arkadian *poleis* in this context. It appears, however, that at least Stymphalos too had not changed allegiance, since Apollonides (the aforementioned commander of Argos), had to attack it in the spring of 315 (Diod. Sic. 19.63.1). Stymphalos proved an easy prey, succumbing after a single night attack. As to Megalopolis, Kassandros installed Damis (the man who had led opposition to Polyperchon) as *epimeletēs* (superintendent) of the *polis* (Diod. Sic. 19.64.1). Diodorus nowhere records any Megalopolitan opposition to Kassandros, but the installation of an *epimeletēs* – as was the case in Athens with Demetrios Phalereus – can be taken as an indication that Kassandros did not have absolute faith in Megalopolitan loyalty.

Orchomenos' case is notable since the struggle between Kassandros and Polyperchon evidently caused savage civil strife. In 315 Kassandros, having failed in his attacks, was admitted into the city by opponents of Polyperchon's son Alexandros and he turned over his opponents to the *dēmos*. Their punishment was cruel and sacrilegious: they were dragged away from the temple of Artemis and put to death (Diod. Sic. 19.63.5).

The initial operations of the Macedonian rulers in the Achaian *poleis* are not recorded. We are informed that Aigion and Patrai had to suffer the presence of garrisons installed by Kassandros in the context of the assault on these garrisons by the Antigonid official Aristodemos in 314/3 (Diod. Sic. 19.66.3). The encounter with the *Diadochoi*'s armies was a devastating experience for Aigion and Dyme. Aristodemos evicted the garrison installed by Kassandros at Aigion and according to Diodorus, Aristodemos had every intention of restoring liberty to the city but in the event did not. He could not control his own mercenaries who engaged in looting and came to blows with the people of Aigion; numerous Aigieis were slaughtered and most of their houses destroyed. Following this incident, Aristodemos had to install his own garrison primarily because the Aigieis would surely have harboured ill feelings against him and the Antigonids (Rizakis 1995, 103–4).

Dyme affords another example of massacre and civic strife provoked by the *Diadochoi*. Furthermore, it testifies to solidarity abolished among Achaian *poleis*. Kassandros had installed a garrison on the citadel of the city. It is significant that the people of Dyme were bold or reckless enough to react relying on their own strength. They built up a wall dividing the city from the citadel and engaged in assaults against the latter but they had not taken account of Kassandros' alliance with Alexandros. Alexandros took over the city and executed a large part of the population; others he put in prison or sent into exile (Diod. Sic. 19.66.4–6). The citizens of Dyme were stunned by the disaster, so much so that they dared not take up arms again, having been left without allies (χρόνον μὲν τινα τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, καταπεπληγμένοι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συμφορᾶς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ συμμάχων ὄντες ἔρημοι: Diod. Sic. 19.66.6). Like the Orchomenians, the Dymaians also executed citizens who had remained loyal to Alexandros and Kassandros. Later on, they took advantage of Aristodemos' campaign and asked him to free their city (after his campaign to Aigion).

The clash between the *Diadochoi* had devastating effects on the Achaian Confederacy. Polybius (2.41.9) clearly declares that the Achaian Confederacy (τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα; at 2.41.6) was dissolved chiefly because of the Macedonian kings (καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων), in the period following Alexander's time (κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ὑστέρους μὲν τῶν κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον καιρῶν). Disagreement over the choice between Kassandros and Polyperchon or between Kassandros and the Antigonids would have been one cause of dissension. Fear of an external enemy was more than enough to break bonds, at least in the case of the Achaians. One aspect of this rupture within the Achaian Confederacy is provided by the case of Dyme which after the massacre by Alexandros was left without

any allies. The least we could say is that the other Achaian *poleis* remained aloof.

Sikyon also experienced slaughter in 314 and offers another aspect of the complexity of Peloponnesian politics at the time. Apparently a group of leading citizens had come to terms with Alexandros, with a certain Alexion acting as their leader (he is the only one mentioned by name in Diodorus). Nevertheless, Alexion and his friends decided to be rid of Alexandros, not by inviting in an Antigonid official but by murdering him (Diod. Sic. 19.67.1). It is possible, however, that they acted at Antigonid instigation.⁴³ As a political reaction, this extreme measure was unique in the Peloponnese, and a sign of inability to evict the garrison by assaulting it. However, the Sikyonians had not taken account of Alexandros' widow, the aptly-named Kratesipolis, who proved quite capable of stepping into her husband's shoes, holding the army together through benefactions. The Sikyonians scorned her and dared her to battle, which they came to regret since Kratesipolis, true to her name, slew many and crucified thirty captives, Alexion probably being one of them (Diod. Sic. 19.67.2).

Hermionis⁴⁴ and Messenia, with the notable exception of Messene/Ithome,⁴⁵ proved to be easy targets for Kassandros, at least on the basis of Diodorus' very summary report (19.54.4). The former succumbed following an agreement (δι' ὁμολογίας) while the *poleis* of Messenia were brought over to his side by Kassandros (προσηγάγετο). We are not informed as to whether the Messenians resisted at all.

On the subject of interstate relations, Kassandros' intervention brought about a rupture between Messene/Ithome and the other *poleis* of Messenia (Luraghi 2008, 256). Messene/Ithome chose its own separate way by concluding a treaty with Polyperchon in c. 319–317 (Matthaiou 2001, 221–2 = *SEG* 51.456).⁴⁶ In fact this is one of only two surviving treaties between a Peloponnesian *polis* and a king, the other being between Messene and Lysimachos.

Kassandros also failed to occupy Messene in his second campaign, because of the presence of a garrison installed by Polyperchon. Admittedly, he does not seem to have tried very hard (τὸ μὲν πολιορκεῖν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀπέγνω: Diod. Sic. 19.64.1). However, Messene must have effectively passed under Kassandros' control a year later when he allied himself with Alexandros (Roebuck 1941, 60; Grandjean 2003, 71), and the situation remained the same until the liberating expedition of the Antigonid official Telesphoros in 313. Thereafter, or rather after the peace of 311, the situation is very unclear, as with the rest of the Peloponnese.

To move to a different incident: Diodorus (19.66.2) reports an interesting instance of expansionism on a small scale in those turbulent

times – in 312. Of all the Peloponnesian states, it was the Eleans who tried not simply to survive but to gain something out of the situation. Along with Alexandros (then allied with Kassandros) they laid siege to the strategic harbour of Kyllene. Kyllene had been used by the Eleans as a base for their fleet in the 5th century – it is actually called the seaport of Elis (ἐπὶ νείον; Thuc. 1.30.2 and 2.84.5; Roy 2004, 499).⁴⁷ It was left under Elean control by the Spartans in c.400 but the Eleans were forced to dismantle its walls (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30; Roy 1997, 300–4). The siege of the late 4th century proves that at some point Kyllene had been fortified anew.⁴⁸ Not only that, but the Elean attack shows that at some time in the 4th century, perhaps during the campaigns of the *Diadochoi* in the Peloponnese, the Eleans had lost control of Kyllene or, conversely, that Kyllene had found its opportunity for emancipation. One might suggest that the Eleans were forced by Alexandros to dispatch troops, but the strategic importance of Kyllene and its past relations with Elis argue against this hypothesis.

Initially the Eleans did not gain much since the siege was raised by the Antigonid official Aristodemos who left troops of his own at Kyllene. However, the case of Elis affords an example of how problems encountered by Antigonos Monophthalmos, in his attempts to remove the Greek *poleis* from Kassandros' control, could turn to a *polis*' advantage. More specifically, Telesphoros revolted – the man who had freed Peloponnesian *poleis* from Alexandros' garrisons.⁴⁹ Appearing as still in the service of Antigonos, he captured the citadel of Elis, became master of the city, occupied Kyllene (whether by force or simply in the name of Antigonos), and even plundered Olympia to recruit mercenaries (Diod. Sic. 19.87.2–3). Another Antigonid official Polemaios, a nephew of Antigonos, appointed στρατηγὸς τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πραγμάτων ('*stratēgos* responsible for Greek affairs'), arrived at Elis, demolished the citadel, replenished the treasury of Olympia and restored freedom to Elis (Diod. Sic. 19.87.3). We are not informed whether 'freedom' should be understood to mean strictly freedom from Telesphoros or freedom from any garrison in general, in accordance with the treatment of Greek *poleis* by Polemaios before Telesphoros' revolt (Diod. Sic. 19.78.2; Billows 1990, 429). Polemaios even persuaded (πείσας) Telesphoros to restore Kyllene to Elis – for πείσας we should understand 'Telesphoros was forced by the circumstances'.⁵⁰

Corinth appears as a most coveted object. First Polyperchon and then his son Alexandros maintained a garrison on Akrokorinthos. In 315 Kassandros besieged the harbour of Kenchreai (on the Saronic Gulf), ravaged Corinth,⁵¹ took two fortresses but did not take the city (Diod. Sic. 19.63.4). After Alexandros' assassination, Corinth and Sikyon remained in

the hands of the lady Kratesipolis (Diod. Sic. 20.37.1–2; Polyainos, *Stratagems* 8.58). In spring 308 (Billows 1990, 144) they both passed into Ptolemy's hands, who had finally made a move to materialize his declaration of freedom for the Greek *poleis*. Both *poleis* appear to be simply an object of transaction, although Diodorus' account is very summary. However, Ptolemy did not pursue his goal. For one thing, he did not commit enough resources of his own. According to Diodorus (20.37.1–2) he relied on the Peloponnesians who had promised him corn and money but eventually contributed nothing (ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι συνταξάμενοι χορηγήσειν σίτον καὶ χρήματα τῶν ὁμολογημένων οὐδὲν συνετέλουν). Thus Ptolemy was forced to make peace with Kassandros on the basis of the *status quo*, leaving garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth. Corinth, however, after 306 and before 303, evidently passed into Kassandros' hands since in 303 it was garrisoned by Prepelaos, Kassandros' *stratēgos* (Diod. Sic. 20.103.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 15.1; Dixon 2007, 174–5 and 2014, 58–9).

The Peloponnesians who promised help to Ptolemy are not identified.⁵² The collective ethnic name indicates, if inconclusively, that they came from more than one region and it is reasonable to suggest that these regions were under the control of Kassandros and Polyperchon (Hammond 1988, 170) and wished to be freed. The Corinthians are the first to come to mind but we do not know who the rest might be – if indeed there were others. It is unclear whether this decision was a decision of assemblies or whether Ptolemy had concluded private agreements with individual leaders. The latter hypothesis seems preferable, since if such agreements were public they would have jeopardized the entire plan. It is perhaps more difficult to explain why the Peloponnesians did not pursue their initial decision. If we are talking about individual leaders then we could suggest that either there was no unanimity among them or that they failed to persuade the people as to the expediency of getting actively involved in yet another clash between the *Diadochoi*. Alternatively or additionally, it is also possible that they lost heart in view of Ptolemy's inadequate preparation.

Diodorus (20.37.2) records that Ptolemy I intended to liberate the other Greek *poleis* as well, in the belief that the goodwill of the Greeks would serve his best interests. Combining this with the information provided by the Suda that Ptolemy declared freedom for the Greeks and invited them to the Isthmia (conducted in April/May), the conclusion is that Ptolemy imitated Philip II by attempting to re-establish the League of Corinth.⁵³ Nevertheless, this effort was short-lived and belied by Ptolemy's subsequent policy. In the long run, Ptolemy II, son and successor of Ptolemy I, played the card of 'freedom and autonomy for the Greeks' more vigorously (in the Chremonidean War).

The liberation of the Peloponnese by Demetrios Poliorketes

A few years later, in the context of the so-called Four Years' War against Kassandros,⁵⁴ Demetrios Poliorketes appeared on the Peloponnesian scene to give substance to his father's declaration of freedom and autonomy. He brought over to his side or – to put it more bluntly – acquired control of at least the northern and central Peloponnesian states which appeared pleased to be relieved of the garrisons of Kassandros and Polyperchon.

For these last years of the 4th century, evidence about intra-Peloponnesian relations is practically non-existent in literature. Nevertheless, presentation of the state of affairs in the Peloponnese in this period is necessary in order to give as complete a picture as possible of Peloponnesian attitudes towards the *Diadochoi* and the effect of Poliorketes in particular on intra-Peloponnesian relations.

In 304 Demetrios captured the harbour of Kenchreai (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.2). In 303, first Sikyon⁵⁵ and Corinth, then Achaia (autonomy was restored to Boura), the *poleis* of the Argolic Akte, Argos and Arkadia, except for Mantinea, went over to him (Diod. Sic. 20.103.2–7; Polyainos, *Stratagems* 4.7.8; Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1).⁵⁶ Judging by surviving evidence Poliorketes was met with some resistance by the garrisons, not by the citizens, with the exception of some Corinthian and Orchomenian citizens.⁵⁷ Why and how Mantinea remained outside Demetrios' control is puzzling. Whether or not the Mantineans had been faced with an attack and resisted it successfully (unlikely in our view), it is tempting to suggest that Mantinea was not important enough for Demetrios to waste time on it, inasmuch it was encircled by Arkadian *poleis* under his control.

Another important aspect of this campaign concerns Sikyon. Diodorus (20.102) relates how Poliorketes moved the city of Sikyon to the akropolis, for safety reasons. In return he received divine honours,⁵⁸ and Sikyon was for a while renamed Demetrias.⁵⁹ As far as the Peloponnese is concerned, this was the first instance of relocation of an entire *polis* by a foreign ruler.⁶⁰

A Stymphalian inscription affords evidence as to the influence exercised by Demetrios in particular and the clash of the *Diadochoi* in general on interstate relations in the Peloponnese. It is also an excellent example for demonstrating how much is missing from literary sources. In this case, Stymphalos provides us with one of the longest (200 lines) and most elaborate Peloponnesian inscriptions, a bilateral judicial agreement (*symbola*) with Sikyon/Demetrias (*IPArk* 17),⁶¹ dated by Taeuber (1981) between 303 and 300.⁶² Elaborate provisions are made for settlement of disputes involving seizure of property, damage caused by animals, fugitive slaves, and metics. Of the two *poleis*, Sikyon was the more important (Thür 1995, 270). The agreement presupposes substantial presence of Stymphalians in

Sikyon and vice-versa. Excavations at Stymphalos have brought to light numerous Sikyonian coins dating to the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods, indicating intense economic relations between the two *poleis*.⁶³ As Thür (1995, 271–2) has argued, this agreement afforded a means of protection against further clashes of the *Diadochoi*; he also suggests that Sikyon might have had a similar agreement with Corinth.

As to the liberation of Argos, it is worth noting the Argive version of events – very much befitting the image of a great city and a far cry from reality. In the epigram on a dedication to Leto by an Argive *thiasos*, the liberation of Argos from Pleistarchos – a brother of Kassandros and garrison commander at Argos – is presented as a result of help received from Apollo, while Poliorketes is very conveniently ignored (*ISE* 39).⁶⁴ The liberation from the Macedonian garrison also signalled a new direction in Argive foreign policy, namely the forging of bonds, via honorific decrees, with *poleis* across the Aegean which were allegedly colonies of Argos (Rhodes, Aspendos, and Soloi). As Piérart and Touchais (1996, 65) put it, this was a proclamation to the Greek world of Argos' restored prestige.

Poliorketes' main target was Corinth, which had also been on the top of his father's list.⁶⁵ In this case, we hear of an unidentified number of Corinthian citizens taking an active part in events by opening a gate for Demetrios, presumably after having come into secret contact with him.⁶⁶ The subsequent attitude of the Corinthians is unique in the sense that they actually asked for a garrison to remain in Akrokorinthos until the end of the war against Kassandros (Diod. Sic. 20.103.3) – in fact an Antigonid garrison remained there until 243 (see pp.161–2). Of course the request suited Demetrios very well. As Dixon (2007, 152–3) remarked, Corinth never benefited from declarations of freedom and autonomy. Corinth could not be in the hands of a rival otherwise any declaration 'would be hollow', i.e. anyone declaring liberation for the Peloponnese had to keep Corinth in order to prevent his rival(s) from acquiring access into the Peloponnese. It is quite possible that the request for a garrison originated with a pro-Antigonid faction (Billows 1990, 171; Dixon 2007, 176) – the same people who had opened the gate – but this does not have to mean that the rest of the Corinthians objected. At least with Demetrios there was a chance of liberation at the end of the war. In any case, one could not think of a clearer sign of weakness and resignation even on the Corinthian side.⁶⁷ Here is the culmination of a process that had been set in gear already in the early 4th century.

Demetrios' conquests in the Peloponnese are presented in a summary way in literature. On the basis of Elis' participation in the Hellenic League,

Roebuck (1941, 61 and n.12) has plausibly argued that Demetrios might have acquired control over Elis as well. It is equally possible that the Eleans simply went over to Demetrios voluntarily after his successful campaign in the Peloponnese. Roebuck also suggests that Messene might have gone over to his side but rightly notes the extreme uncertainty of the evidence.⁶⁸ Plutarch (*Dem.* 13.3) records that the Messenian politician Nikosthenes, having been a supporter of Kassandros, switched over to Demetrios famously declaring αἰεὶ γὰρ εἶναι συμφέρον ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν κρατούντων ('it is always advantageous to listen to whoever is stronger'). No indication of date is provided. The phrase τῶν κρατούντων, obviously referring to Demetrios, indicates that the latter had the upper hand in Greek affairs at the time of Nikosthenes' change of allegiance. But this could refer to either 303 or to c. 295 when Demetrios besieged Messene with unknown results. It could even point to the period after Demetrios' ascent to the Macedonian throne in 294.

In the spring of 302 Demetrios (re)founded the Hellenic League of Corinth, which sealed his dominance over the Isthmos area (Diod. Sic. 20.101–103; Plut. *Demetr.* 25.3–4). A copy of the foundation charter from Epidauros has survived in twelve fragments (*ISE* 44).⁶⁹ We get only the slightest idea about the identity of the League members. Corinth was obviously one. The Eleans and the Achaians (ll. 135–7) are mentioned. This suggests that the Achaian Confederacy was still in existence in 302 (Aymard 1937, 22–3), although, admittedly, the Ἀχαιοὺς might denote something looser than an Achaian Confederacy.⁷⁰ Epidauros, where the copy has been found, and the other *poleis* taken over by Demetrios in 303, must surely have been included – as well as the *poleis* of the Argolic Akte, Argos, Sikyon, and most if not all of the Arkadians.⁷¹ On the other hand, there is no evidence of Messenian participation (Luraghi 2008, 256).

This charter was a treaty of friendship and alliance between the Greeks, and the Antigonids and their descendants (ll. 6–10), providing for a *Synedrion* of representatives of the allies, but its primary aim was different from that of the League established by Philip II. The alleged unification of the Greeks was directed by a Macedonian against the ruler of Macedon, not against an alien power; it was 'one starting point among others for the seizure of Macedon from Cassander' (Will 1984, 58–9).⁷² The *Koinē Eirēnē* (l.150) among the Greeks was primarily a means to military success against Kassandros and, consequently, legal measures were taken to enforce obedience to the Antigonid rulers (ll. 95–8, 139–51); unlike the League of 338/7, the oath of 302 does not refer to any obligation to protect the constitution of the Greek states (Harter-Uibopuu 2003, 319, 328–33).

It was stipulated in the foundation decree that, in peacetime, meetings of the League would be held during the games, presumably the Isthmia, but quite possibly also others (ll. 66–73). In the event, this never happened.

On the face of it, this League brought most of the Peloponnesians together, united against a common enemy, but this unity, brought about by an external authority, did not last. The League became effectively obsolete after the Antigonid defeat at the battle of Ipsos in 301 but Demetrios retained certain maritime bases, notably Corinth.⁷³

The early 3rd century (301–280)

A few years after the battle of Ipsos, in 296/5, Demetrios re-appeared briefly in the Peloponnese. This time he started with Messene which he besieged. Plutarch (*Demetr.* 33.2–3) does not state whether Poliorketes eventually succeeded, only that during his attack on the walls he was wounded in the face and left to conquer other – unidentified – *poleis*, presumably in the Peloponnese; then he invaded Attike.⁷⁴ It does not seem very probable that he succeeded at Messene, because a success would have been significant enough in this context to have been clearly stated (Roebuck 1941, 61 and n.13; Paschidis 2008a, 269–70).⁷⁵

It is perhaps to this period that we should ascribe a treaty of alliance and friendship between the Messenians and king Lysimachos of Thrace, arch-rival of Poliorketes (Matthaiou 2001, 228 = *SEG* 51.457).⁷⁶ Matthaiou (2001, 231) argues plausibly that if the treaty is dated c.295,⁷⁷ it must have been concluded in the aftermath of Demetrios' assault, on the basis of ll. 15–17 in which Lysimachos seems to undertake the obligation to recover (ἀνασώζειν) something or somebody (either people or goods or territories).⁷⁸ The Messenians seem to expect (another?) assault. More specifically, in ll. 8–11 reference is probably made to the obligation of Lysimachos to help the Messenians in case of an attack against them or their allies or if someone attempts to restore the exiles:

καὶ εἴ τις καὶ ἐπὶ Μεσσο[σάνους στρατε]ύηται ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσανίων
 συμμάχους ἢ τὸ πο[λίτευμα καταλ]ύη[ι σφῶν ἢ προδιδ]ῶι ἢ φυγάδας κατὰγῃ,
 βοσθεῖν [Λυσίμαχον παντὶ σθένει ἐφ'] ὧι καὶ Μεσσανιοὶ παρκαλῶντι, καὶ |

And if anyone campaigns against the Messenians or against the allies of the Messenians or [attempts to abolish their constitution or to betray them] or to restore the exiles, [Lysimachos] is to provide his support [with all his might] if the Messenians ask him.

These lines are illuminating in two ways: firstly, the reference to φυγάδας (exiles) indicates that there had been internal strife in Messenia. Secondly, the Messenians had allies. If the Messenians are citizens of Messene/

Ithome, then it is reasonable to suggest that these allies were other *poleis* in Messenia. Whether this is the case or whether the 'Messenians' denote citizens from all the *poleis* in Messenia, the gap created between Messene and other Messenian *poleis* c. 318/7 (when Messene alone allied itself with Polyperchon) would have been bridged at some point, perhaps after 303, i.e. when Kassandros was removed from the picture and there was no problem of choice between two Diadochoi to drive the Messenians (and others) apart.

However, following his operation at Messene, Demetrios proceeded to recapture certain *poleis*, unidentified by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 33.3, 39.1) but Argos could have been one of them.

Following his recapture of Athens in April 295 (Habicht 1997, 87) Poliorketes returned to the Peloponnese. This time his target was Sparta (Plut. *Demetr.* 35.1–3; Paus. 1.13.5; Polyainos, *Stratagems* 4.7.9). *Prima facie*, it is rather surprising that he had not attempted this move in 303. Possibly, the fact that there was no garrison of Kassandros there rendered Sparta useless as an instrument of liberation propaganda. However, in the 290s Demetrios aimed at tightening his control over the Peloponnese. King Archidamos IV was defeated in the area of Mantinea and a second Spartan defeat took place near Sparta itself.⁷⁹ We shall never know what might have been because Demetrios promptly and characteristically left, without exploiting his victory.⁸⁰

Three things are notable in this incident. First, this was the first time after many years that the Spartans had to take arms to defend themselves. They were spectacularly unsuccessful and sustained severe casualties. Secondly, Mantinea – probably not captured by Demetrios in 303 – must have kept at least a favourably neutral attitude towards Sparta since Archidamos IV had stationed his troops in its area.⁸¹ Thirdly, Sparta remained independent. It had severe problems, but internal strife concerning the policy to be followed towards this or the other Macedonian was not one of them. Fifteen years later the Spartans would assume the military initiative under the leadership of Areus I (see pp.115–21).

Shortly after his departure from the Peloponnese, Demetrios became king of Macedon, taking advantage of the strife between Kassandros' heirs.⁸² His reign was turbulent to say the least. On the one hand, he had to face the attacks of Lysimachos of Thrace and Pyrrhos of Epeiros, on the other he pursued his dream of conquering Asia. He died a prisoner of Seleukos I in 283 (Plut. *Demetr.* 52).⁸³ His son and heir Antigonos II Gonatas was left in Greece struggling to ascend to the throne of Macedon as well as to keep his Greek possessions.

As to the state of affairs in the Peloponnese, there is very little information for the period after 301 and before 280, both with regard to interstate relations and to relations with Antigonos Gonatas and his involvement in internal affairs. It is largely with the invasion of king Pyrrhos of Epeiros in the Peloponnese – in 272 – that information reappears in some quality.

The Macedonian garrison remained on Akrokorinthos (Plut. *Demetr.* 31.2).⁸⁴ On the other hand, Sikyon/Demetrias reverted to its old name after 301 (Taeuber 1981, 184–6), and it is possible that it did not remain under Demetrios' control.⁸⁵ It is also unclear whether Gonatas acquired control over it. In 272, however, it appears as a member of the Amphictyonic Council, which testifies to its autonomy (Lolos 2011, 74). As to its internal affairs, Plutarch lists a succession of tyrants until 251 (*Arat.* 2–4; see also Paus. 2.8.1–3).⁸⁶

According to Polybios (2.41.9–10) certain Achaian *poleis* had to sustain the presence of Macedonian garrisons, first of Kassandros and later of Demetrios Poliorketes, while in others tyrannical regimes were installed by Gonatas, in the early 3rd century – before 280,⁸⁷ in which year four Achaian *poleis* re-established the Achaian Confederacy (see p.116). In fact, we only know for certain that Aigion had a garrison. There were tyrants in Achaian *poleis* in the early 3rd century but we have no direct evidence as to possible connections with Antigonos Gonatas.

It is not known whether Argos remained under Antigonid control after 301, whether it was (re)conquered by Demetrios in 295 or whether it came under Gonatas' control later on.⁸⁸ Plutarch (*Demetr.* 33) vaguely records that Demetrios reconquered certain Peloponnesian cities which had revolted. It is possible that Argos was one of them but Plutarch's formulation does not allow us definite conclusions. Argos appears to have been independent but divided between factions in 272 (at the time of Pyrrhos' invasion of the Peloponnese; see pp.126–7). The *poleis* of the Argolic Akte were perhaps among those recaptured by Poliorketes in 295. Indirect evidence is provided by the fact that Troizen had to provide the latter with ships and men for his expedition to Asia in 286.⁸⁹ It is not known whether, after Demetrios' death, Gonatas retained control of all the Akte *poleis*, but at least Troizen had a Macedonian garrison in the early 270s – which was driven away by the Spartan regent Kleonymos (see pp.132–4). As for Elis, it appears to have been independent but tormented by civil strife which in 272 resulted in Aristotimos' brief tyranny (see p.127). In c.280, the Messenians seem to have been independent – when they had to face the attacks of the Spartan regent Kleonymos. Next to nothing is known about the Arkadian *poleis*, other than that Aristodemos was tyrant

of Megalopolis, from the 260s (Chremonidean War) and perhaps before that, until 251 (Paus. 8.27.11).

* * *

In the last decades of the 4th century, the Peloponnesian *poleis* were forced by the *Diadochoi* to switch from their largely neutral or ‘wait-and-see’ attitude towards the Macedonians (Agis’ War is the exception to this pattern) to taking sides. The choice between Kassandros and Polyperchon was, at least with hindsight, straightforward, since the latter allegedly offered freedom from the pro-Antipatros regimes. Previously, territories had been cut off from Sparta and offered as gifts to its rivals. Now the gift to all the Peloponnesians was proclaimed to be freedom for all. This led to Peloponnesian unanimity, most notably among the Arkadians, except for Megalopolis. This unanimity, however, was not translated into concerted military action against Kassandros’ leadership. The armed intervention of Kassandros showed the severe military weakness of the Peloponnesian *poleis*. It appears as if they were not motivated enough to resist him and this could, at least partly, be the result of lack of leadership – whether Macedonian or Peloponnesian. When Demetrios Poliorketes appeared, the Peloponnesian *poleis* had become simply passive recipients of freedom. Unity among the Peloponnesians was temporarily achieved by Poliorketes’ League of Corinth but it did not last long enough for it to be seen whether it would have had any positive effect. In the early 3rd century, there was no state superior to others, no unifying force in the Peloponnese. ‘Freedom’ was translated into Macedonian control, direct or indirect, over a large part of the Peloponnese. Only Sparta had remained free but weak, and maintained its reputation of a city difficult to capture (Le Bohec 1987, 54). And it was Sparta that was going to become a unifying force in the Peloponnese, before the mid-3rd century, albeit temporarily and to a limited extent.

Notes

¹ On the Lamian War see Will 1979, 29–33 and 1984, 31–3; Hammond 1988, 107–17; Errington 1990, 95–9; Heckel 1992, 43–6; Habicht 1997, 36–42.

² See also Diod. Sic. 18.8–10 and the commentary by Landucci Gattinoni 2008, 60–73. Dmitriev (2004, 373–6) argues that the *diagramma* angered the Athenians and the Aitolians but it was neither an immediate cause of the Lamian War nor did it create a united Greek front against Alexander.

³ The alliance put together was impressive: Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες πρῶτοι συνέθεντο τὴν συμμαχίαν, καθάπερ προείρηται, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Θετταλοὶ μὲν πάντες πλὴν Πελλινναίων,

Οἰταῖοι δὲ πλὴν Ἡρακλεωτῶν, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ Φθιώται πλὴν Θηβαίων, Μηλῆες δὲ πλὴν Λαμίας, ἐξῆς δὲ Δωριεῖς ἅπαντες καὶ Λοκροὶ καὶ Φωκεῖς, ἔτι δ' Αἰνιᾶνες καὶ Ἀλυζαῖοι καὶ Δόλοπες, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀθαμᾶνες καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Μολοττῶν οἱ περὶ Ἀρυπταῖον...τῶν τ' Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ Θρακῶν ὀλίγοι συνέθεντο συμμαχίαν διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνas μῖσος. ἐξῆς δὲ συνελάβοντο τοῦ πολέμου Καρύστιοι μὲν ἐξ Εὐβοίας, τελευταῖοι δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων Ἀργεῖοι, Σικυῶνιοι, Ἡλεῖοι, Μεσσηνιοὶ καὶ οἱ τὴν Ἀκτὴν κατοικοῦντες. (Diod. Sic. 18.11.1–2). See also Pausanias (1.25.4) who, contrary to Diodorus, does not mention the Aitolians, and Landucci Gattinoni 2008, 73–4, on this difference.

⁴ For Messenia see also Paus. 4.28.3. A Macedonian garrison had previously been stationed at Sikyon; on Sikyon see the Athenian honorific decree *IG* II² 448 (passed in 323/2 and re-affirmed in 318/7) for Euphron II, and Griffin 1982, 76–7 and n.17; Lolos 2011, 71; on the decree for Euphron II see Habicht 1997, 45, 49.

⁵ See Ch. 2, p.52 and nn.10–11, on the pro-Philip leaders installed in power.

⁶ Applying Tomlinson's view (1972, 147), on the Argive *dēmos* and leaders; Luraghi 2008, 255.

⁷ Dixon (2007, 155–6) considers the garrison an important factor for Corinth's absence which he, nonetheless, finds surprising.

⁸ Paus. 8.27.1. Athenian envoys were dispatched to the Peloponnese to attract allies; they were joined by Demosthenes (he was living in exile in Troizen) and they confronted the orators Pytheas and Kallimedes who were trying to deter the Arkadians from joining the Athenians (Plut. *Dem.* 27.2–5). According to Justin 13.5.10, Hyperides was a member of the Athenian mission while Demosthenes eventually managed to bring over Argos, Sikyon, Corinth and other states. The inclusion of Corinth must be a mistake, in the face of Diodorus' detailed list; see Dixon 2007, 155, n.14.

⁹ Cartledge also argues that the well-off Spartans would have been favourably disposed towards 'a Macedonian settlement of Greece' given that the Macedonians favoured oligarchies, but the substantial decrease of Spartan territory after Chaironeia, which was to the disadvantage of every single Spartan, including the well-off, argues, to some extent, against such a disposition.

¹⁰ See pp.22–3 on the problem of its composition.

¹¹ It is only for the Sikyonians that we can be certain that they participated in the war. Dixon (2014, 47 and nn.4 and 5 at p.68) argues that the rest of the Peloponnesians were unable or unwilling to force their way past the garrison on Akrokorinthos. But they might have crossed to central Greece sailing across the Corinthian Gulf, as the Sikyonians probably did.

¹² Diod. Sic. 18.18.8; Plut. *Phoc.* 26–8 and Diod. Sic. 18.1–7 on Athens.

¹³ Suda, s.v. Δ 333, mistakenly identifies the *epimelētēs* with the orator. For different views on the origin of the *epimelētēs* see Dixon 2014, 31–2 and n. 106 at p.43; 49 and nn.17, 18; at p.51 for Deinarchos' execution by Polyperchon; Paschidis 2008a, 70 and nn.1, 2; see Worthington 1992, 3–10, on the orator.

¹⁴ See Landucci Gattinoni (2006, 318–20), on the probable inclusion of Argos among those *poleis* which negotiated a separate peace, and the installation of regimes friendly to Antipatros; 'filoantipatride' (i.e. not quite the same as pro-Macedonian) is the very appropriate term used by Landucci Gattinoni.

¹⁵ With particular regard to the *poleis* of the Akte, Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 87) attribute the independence of Kalaureia (in the Saronic Gulf) from Troizen to Antipatros' intervention as a punitive measure (*IG* IV 839 / **Syll.*³ 359).

¹⁶ Justin (14.5.6–7) records that during Kassandros' invasion in the Peloponnese, in 317, the Spartans enclosed their city with defences, not trusting their ability in arms. The information is not confirmed by either archaeological data or other literary sources but it should not be discarded. See Kourinou (2000, 36–62; esp. 57–62) who presents the different stages in the history of Spartan fortifications in the Hellenistic period (the final stage being 207–192). If Justin's information is reliable, then this was the first time that the Spartans fortified their city (Marasco 1980a, 22), a sign of weakness of course but also a sign of positive change. Bearzot (1997, 269) considers this as an act of hostility but we should see it rather as a defensive measure and as an indication of a wish not to get involved in the clash of the *Diadochoi*. Later on, the Spartans are also recorded as providing 8,000 mercenaries from Lakonia to Aristodemos of Miletos acting upon the orders of Antigonos Monophthalmos: Diod. Sic. 19.60.1; Cartledge 2002b, 27. This could be a sign of hostility as Bearzot thinks, but it can also be a sign of poverty; Marasco (1981, 82) argues that Spartans were included among the mercenaries.

¹⁷ On Antipatros' preference for Polyperchon – a man inexperienced in politics – over Kassandros, as well as on the relations between Polyperchon and Kassandros prior to their open clash in the Peloponnese see Will 1979, 46 and 1984, 40; Landucci Gattinoni 2003, 30–40 with references and 2008, 210–14, with bibliography; Waterfield 2011, 73.

¹⁸ See Wehrli 1968, 106–13 and Briscoe 1978, 145–6, for a negative appraisal of Monophthalmos' declaration of freedom and autonomy for the Greek *poleis*; Tomlinson (1972, 151) labelling it an 'insincere crusade'; also Will 1984, 48; Waterfield 2011, 76–7; Errington (1990, 139–40) arguing that it aimed primarily at Antigonos' soldiers in Tyre. On the wider changes in the correlation of power as a result of this declaration, see Will 1979, 55–65. Billows 1990, 113–16, observes that this propaganda of Antigonos represents his first claim over the whole of the Macedonian empire (Billows' chronology of events is based on Errington 1977, 496–500, but see Wheatley 1998, 261–8, 279–80, for a revised chronology of the Wars of the *Diadochoi*; see also this chapter, n.37). See Dmitriev (2011, 96, 113–20, 140–1) for all the declarations of freedom by the *Diadochoi* as a means of undermining the military strength of their enemies, as well for the change in the use of 'freedom' from a general slogan to one applying to particular cities and their relations with the rulers in whose domain they belonged.

¹⁹ Billows 1990, 121; Hammond 1988, 159.

²⁰ Billows (1990, 131–4) views the peace as a personal success of Antigonos since his position as ruler of Asia was acknowledged; Will 1979, 61–4 and 1984, 50–2; Buraselis 1982, 11–12 (and nn.34–5), 18; Hammond 1988, 160–2.

²¹ Wehrli 1968, 52–5 and esp. 54, 57, on Kassandros' attitude towards the Greek *poleis* after the peace.

²² Polyperchon intended to proclaim Herakles, allegedly a son of Alexander, king of Macedon: see Diod. Sic. 20.20, 28; Justin 15.2.3–5. Billows 1990, 140–1 and n.11, sees the hand of Antigonos behind the plan to install Herakles on the Macedonian throne; Will 1979, 68.

²³ Diodorus (20.28.2) states that Polyperchon 'would be partner in everything in Kassandros' realm' (πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ δυναστείᾳ τῇ Κασάνδρου κοινωνός) but this is a misleading overstatement.

²⁴ See Will 1979, 56–8 (on Ptolemy's motives for his declaration), 68–71, *id.* 1984, 54–5 and Landucci Gattinoni 2003, 63–4, on the causes of his falling out first with Kassandros and later with the Antigonids. See Buraselis 1982, 48–50 and Billows 1990, 144–5, on Ptolemy's campaign in Greece.

²⁵ See Will 1979, 79–83; Billows 1990, 175–85 on the partitioning of the Antigonid territory between Lysimachos and Seleukos.

²⁶ Dixon 2007, 157 with nn.20 and 21, for the evaluation of Polyperchon's *diagramma* by scholarship either as amounting to a restoration of the League of Corinth or as an opportunistic declaration (the most recent tendency); *ibid.*, p. 162 on the anti-Antipatros character of the *diagramma*; review of the bibliography also in Landucci Gattinoni 2008, 231–2. See also Will (1984, 43–4) for the failure of Polyperchon to attract allies in central Greece.

²⁷ Bielman (1994, 52), on Polyperchon and Argos: 'l'un des bastions de sa politique péloponnésienne'.

²⁸ Tomlinson 1972, 149; Landucci Gattinoni 2008, 234.

²⁹ Paschidis (2008a, 275) underlines that Polyperchon's initial order was not followed by most *poleis* concerned.

³⁰ Dixon 2007, 163–9, esp. 167–9; see also *id.* 2014, 52.

³¹ The fact that Diodorus does not mention it is not of much significance, given that he also fails to mention the League of Corinth established by Demetrios Poliorketes in 302; see Dixon 2007, 173, n.63.

³² On the siege of Megalopolis see Landucci Gattinoni 2008, 262–5 with bibliography; on Damis see Paschidis 2008a, 275–6.

³³ Paschidis (2008b, 239–43) argues cautiously that the reason was to prepare for an expedition to Asia to help Eumenes against Antigonos Monophthalmos.

³⁴ Piérart 1982, 130–1: the fact that the fines are inflicted in golden staters points to a date after Alexander's campaigns, since it was then that gold flowed into Greece in massive quantities.

³⁵ Heckel 1992, 197–200; Meeus 2012.

³⁶ Bearzot (1997, 269–70) argues that Kassandros' difficulties in the Peloponnese were strongly reminiscent of those encountered by Epameinondas and suggests that Kassandros' refoundation of Thebes can be viewed as an act of propaganda aimed at reminding the Peloponnesians of Epameinondas' benefactions and at cancelling his [Kassandros'] negative image; furthermore, Bearzot suggests that this course of action might have been suggested by the Megalopolitans.

³⁷ See Piérart (1982, 133–5) for a very useful summary of events in the Peloponnese between 317 and 315; Wheatley (1998, 261–8, 279–80) on Diodorus' chronology and the date of Kassandros' campaigns.

³⁸ Errington (1990, 95) observes that 'the high emotions inevitable in a time of crisis could not be absorbed within their [the city-states'] small confines'.

³⁹ Shortly after the massacre, Kassandros paid homage to Argos by appearing in person to celebrate the Nemeia (Diod. Sic. 19.64.2). This appearance should be associated with his claim over Macedon; see Kralli 2013, 156.

⁴⁰ See Tomlinson 1972, 150, commenting that 'once more Argive politics had achieved a bloody outcome'.

⁴¹ See Ch. 2, p.66 and n.78.

⁴² Kassandros was informed of the return of Olympias and the execution of Philip III Arrhidaios and his wife Eurydike.

⁴³ Paschidis (2008a, 230) reasonably suggests that Alexion acted ‘de facto if not consciously’ in the interests of the Antigonids. See also Griffin 1982, 77; Lolos 2011, 72.

⁴⁴ Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 87–8 and Appendix B.2.2, 360–1) argue that the reference to the territory ‘Hermionis’ might be an indication that Halieis had been incorporated into the *polis* of Hermione.

⁴⁵ See Ch. 1, p.24 and n.138 on the name.

⁴⁶ ed. pr. Themelis 1991 [1994], 96–7, no.1 (= *SEG* 43.135). Two kings are mentioned in l. 10 (τῶ βασιλῆῃ) who in both Themelis’ and Matthaïou’s view should be identified with Philip III Arrhidaïos and Alexander IV; in this case the *terminus ante quem* would be the assassination of Philip III in autumn 317 (Diod. Sic. 19.11.5). The other option is Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes after the assumption of the royal title in 306. The reference to the hipparch in the Messenian inscription (ll. 10–11), identified by Matthaïou with the ἱπάρχης τῶν ἐταίρων, a high-ranking official in the Macedonian state, seems to show Matthaïou to be correct about the identification of the kings. Themelis and Matthaïou differ on the interpretation of ‘*praxis*’ in ll. 7, 11, 14. For Themelis this represents an agreement concerning the installation of a garrison by Polyperchon while for Matthaïou (at p.225) it refers to the execution of a judicial decision concerning the restoration of exiles in Messene since the *diagramma* of Polyperchon / Arrhidaïos stipulated their return without laying down specific guidelines. Hatzopoulos (1998, 614, no.233) accepts the dating and adduces the parallel afforded by *OGIS* 4 as regards the formula of the two kings, the *stratēgoi* and high ranking officials (*philoi*) taking the oath; Grandjean (2002, 546–7; 2003, 71–2) also accepts this dating.

⁴⁷ It is called a *polis* only by ps.-Skylax 43. See Servais 1961, 130–7, on its location; Roy 1997, 287 and 304 with references, on the importance of Kyllene due to the scarcity of harbours in the western Peloponnese; Kyllene and Pheia were the only major harbours of ancient Elis; see Roy 1999a, 162–3 and 2004, 492; Baladié 1980, 243–4.

⁴⁸ Kyllene was certainly fortified by the late 3rd century: Polyb. 5.3.1; Servais 1961, 125, 140; also Roy 2004, 499.

⁴⁹ Diodorus attributes the revolt of Telesphoros to a personal grudge over the promotion of Polemaios; see also Billows 1990, 131, who notes that Antigonos must have pardoned Telesphoros since the latter was a member of Demetrios’ entourage in 307/6.

⁵⁰ Polemaios revolted shortly afterwards; he allied himself first with Kassandros and later with Ptolemy (Diod. Sic. 20.19.2; Billows 1990, 142–3, 429–30; Will 1979, 68–9).

⁵¹ Dixon (2007, 177 and n.74 with bibliography on the subject) observes that we are never going to know how much devastation Corinth suffered in those years, mainly because of its destruction by Mummius in 146. See also Dixon 2014, 54–6.

⁵² Mitsos (1945, 60–1) assumed that the name ‘Peloponnesians’ here denotes a Peloponnesian League which, in his view, started developing after the liberation by Telesphoros and was probably completed after the peace of 311. He admits, however, that we only know of two instances of joint action of Peloponnesians: their preventing

Polyperchon from getting into the Peloponnese in 309/8, shortly after his alliance with Kassandros and the aforementioned promise of support for Ptolemy (Diod. Sic. 20.28.4 and 20.37 respectively). Mitsos' view is unfounded, and not only because there is no reference to a new Peloponnesian League in Diodorus or elsewhere. Diodorus uses the collective name *Peloponnēsiōi* largely for the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. Other than that, he uses the term very rarely, and in a geographical sense: in 12.43 (*chōra*), 17.62, 18.11; in the latter two cases the name is used to denote the common geographical origin of those who took part in Agis III's War and in the Lamian War respectively.

⁵³ Suda, s.v. Δημήτριος, 431: ὁ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος...αὐτονόμους τε δὴ τὰς πλείστας τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἀφίησι, καὶ τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδὰς ἐπήγγελλε, κελεύων οἷα ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει θαλασφοροῦντας θεωρεῖν εἰς τὰ Ἰσθμια ('Ptolemy...indeed, he leaves the majority of the Greek cities autonomous and began announcing the Isthmian armistice, encouraging them to make the pilgrimage to Isthmia bearing olive branches as though [they would be gathering] for the purpose of liberation'; trans. in www.stoa.org/sol/; D. Whitehead, senior editor, 2014); see Buraselis 1982 [1984], 49–51 and n.5; 1993, 262; Billows 1990, 144–5 and n.18; also Dixon 2007, 173–5 with notes; *id.* 2014, 57 and n.60 at p.71.

⁵⁴ On the Four Years' War see Will 1979, 77–8; Hammond 1988, 175–7; Habicht 1997, 74–7.

⁵⁵ After a surprise night attack the Ptolemaic garrison at Sikyon fled to the akropolis while the people do not appear to have resisted Demetrios at all, at least according to Diodorus (20.102.2–3; see also Polyainos, *Stratagems* 4.7.3).

⁵⁶ Plutarch mistakenly states that Demetrios bribed the garrisons to leave Argos, Sikyon and Corinth: see Mitsos 1945, 62, n.1 and Lolos 2011, 70, n.63; cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 15.1–2, reporting that earlier on Demetrios had tried unsuccessfully to bribe the Ptolemaic garrisons out of Sikyon and Corinth. Possibly, Plutarch confused the two events. On Argos see also Athen. 10.415a; Billows 1990, 171–2. On the capture of Corinth see Dixon 2014, 60–4.

⁵⁷ In Orchomenos Demetrios was met with strong opposition by the garrison commander Strombichos installed by Polyperchon; eventually he demolished the walls with siege engines and crucified eighty who had opposed him strongly. On the basis of Diodorus' wording (20.103.6) it is unclear whether those who opposed Demetrios were mercenaries or citizens: τὸν μὲν οὖν Στρόμβιχον τὸν ὑπὸ Πολυπέρχοντος καθεσταμένον φρούραρχον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἄλλοτρίως διατεθέντων πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς ὀγδοήκοντα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀνεσταύρωσε, τῶν δ' ἄλλων μισθοφόρων ἐλὼν εἰς διασχίλους κατέμειξε τοῖς ἰδίοις στρατιώταις ('As for Strombichos who had been made garrison-commander by Polyperchon, and at least eighty of the others who were hostile to him, Demetrios crucified them in front of the city, but having captured at least two thousand others who were mercenaries, he incorporated them with his own men'). Our own impression is that τῶν ἄλλοτρίως διατεθέντων and the punishment fit better Orchomenian citizens; for one thing, it would have been much simpler to write, e.g., 'Strombichos and his soldiers'.

⁵⁸ Kotsidu 2000, no.79.

⁵⁹ On the relocation see also Strabo 8.6.25 and Paus. 2.7.1. See Griffin 1982, 78, on the interest of Demetrios in Sikyon as going beyond military considerations.

⁶⁰ The Achaian Aigeira was relocated perhaps with Macedonian encouragement in the 270s: Rizakis 2008a, 226–7.

⁶¹ See also the text in *IG V.2.357* / Hondius in *SEG* 11.1105 / *SV A* III, 567; Bravo 1980, 912–15, on ll. 83–100 (= *SEG* 30.418). Bibliography, text, translation and exhaustive commentary by Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, pp.158–251; see also Cataldi 1992, 132–4, focusing on the treatment of foreigners; Gauthier 1972, 238–40, 295–306. Lolos (2004, 51–2) publishes the first photos of the inscription. English translation by Arnaoutoglou 1998, 133–7, no.106.

⁶² It had been thought that the other *polis* was the Achaian Aigeira and the inscription was dated to the mid to late 3rd century but Taeuber (1981, 181–6, restoration of ll. 173–81 at p.181 = *SEG* 31.351) advanced a convincing argument in favour of Sikyon.

Thür (1995, 270–2) suggests a date between autumn 302 (after the foundation of the Hellenic League) and autumn 301 (after the Antigonid defeat at Ipsos). Lolos (2011, 72–3 and n.69) dates it in early 303/2, on the basis of a treaty of alliance between Athens and ‘the Sikyonians’, dating to the end of 303/2 (l.9; ed. pr. by Camp 2003, 273–5 of *Agora* I 2636n = *SEG* 53.101). Lolos believes that the Sikyonians had by then reverted to their old name. It is possible, however, that some time elapsed between the capture of the city by Demetrios and its relocation and renaming; or that the Athenians continued to use the old name. See Gauthier 1972, 295–6, on the history of the text and its dating; Gauthier 1972, 296–8 and n.41, cautiously dates it to the second half of the 3rd century ‘perhaps after 219/8’, based on the fragile, as he admits, argumentation of Hiller von Gaertringen (in Lattermann and Hiller von Gaertringen 1915, 84–7) that *IG V.2.351*, which he dates to c.218, antedates the *symbola*; see Ch. 9, pp.456–7 and nn.243–6. However, Gauthier 1995, 468–9, no.264, appears convinced by Taeuber 1981. Rizakis (1995, no.701) hesitantly dates the text to 218.

⁶³ Thür 1995, 268–9; Lolos 2004, 53–4.

⁶⁴ See Landucci Gattinoni 2006, 324–5, on the hostility towards Kassandros borne out by this epigram; Piérart and Touchais 1996, 64.

⁶⁵ Dixon (2007, 171–2) views the agreement between Monophthalmos and Polyperchon and the appointment of the latter as *stratēgos* of the Peloponnese as an attempt of Monophthalmos to gain control via his subordinates; the same applies to the successive missions of Telesphoros and Polemaios.

⁶⁶ According to Polyainos (*Stratagems* 4.7.8) Demetrios first attacked the gate leading to Lechaion, and all the Corinthians ran there to repulse the enemy, apart from those who opened the other gate to him. See Dixon 2014, 62 for factionalism in Corinth upon the appearance of Poliorketes.

⁶⁷ As Dixon (2007, 177) has put it, the loss of autonomy for about 35 years would have had a demoralizing effect on the Corinthians.

⁶⁸ Grandjean (2003, 72) also underlines the uncertain nature of the evidence.

⁶⁹ *IG IV*².1.68 / *SV A* III, 446 / *LAEPid* 23 = ll. 1–16, 56–68, 81–99, 104–16. I employ the continuous numbering of lines in *ISE* 44. See translation of ll. 59–98 by Harding 1985, no.138 (ll. 5–44 in his text); translation of ll. 61–99 by Austin 2006, no.50.

⁷⁰ In l. 137 Moretti (*ISE* 44, p.114) tentatively restores Ἀχαιοὺς δ’ εἰς [Ἀἴγιον?]; at p.118, n.21 he alternatively suggests: Ἀχαιοὺς δ’ εἰς [Ἀμάριον, alluding to the Achaian federal sanctuary at Aigion. Larsen (1968, 216) vividly describes the situation of the Achaian Confederacy after 302 as ‘coma’ or ‘trance’.

⁷¹ See in general *ISE* 44; Will 1979, 77–9; Wehrli 1968, 122–5; Harter-Uibopuu 2003; Doukellis 2004b, 88–9. Billows (1990, 172–3 and esp. 228–30) emphasizes that

the charter provided that in peace time the Antigonid position would be simply that of a state represented in the *Synedrion*. On the other hand, we should not fail to note the severe fines to be inflicted upon cities failing to send representatives or troops in wartime (ll. 92–9).

⁷² Dmitriev (2011, 132) observes that in the surviving text there are references to ‘alliance’ or ‘common war’ but not to ‘common peace’.

⁷³ Plut. *Demetr.* 31.2; Wehrli 1968, 152–3, on Demetrios’ retaining possessions in the Aegean and Asia Minor; see also Will 1979, 85 and 1984, 59–61.

⁷⁴ Plut. *Demetr.* 33.2–3: καὶ προσμαχόμενος τοῖς τεύχεσιν ἐκινδύνευσεν, καταπελτικῷ βέλους εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ στόμα διὰ τῆς σιαγόνος ἐμπεσόντος. ἀναληφθεὶς δὲ καὶ πόλεις τινὰς ἀφεστῶσας προσαγαγόμενος πάλιν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐνέβαλε... (‘Here, in an attack upon the walls, he came near losing his life; for a missile from a catapult struck him in the face and passed through his jaw into his mouth. But he recovered, and after restoring to their allegiance certain cities which had revolted from him, he invaded Attike again...’).

⁷⁵ Wehrli (1968, 162) and Grandjean (2003, 72) leave the matter open.

⁷⁶ Ed. pr. Themelis 1990 [1993], 83–85 no.1 (ph.), inv. nos. 3017a & b (= *SEG* 41.322); see the corrections by Gauthier 1995, 467, no. 263, on ll. 8–9; accepted by Matthaiou; see also Gauthier 2002, 661, no.200.

⁷⁷ Themelis prefers to date the inscription to c.285, after the capture of Poliorketes by Seleukos I; Matthaiou 2001 wishes to leave the question open but he does seem to prefer a date in c.295, having noted that there are no known military operations in the Peloponnese in c.285.

⁷⁸ ἀνασώζειν δὲ Λυσίμαχον ν ν | | c. 23 25 δέονται παρακαλούμενον εἰς | [τὸ δυνατόν. In his first brief discussion of the text, Matthaiou (1990–91, 269–70) suggested that the treaty could be dated immediately before the siege; Matthaiou also argues that *IGV*.1.1426 might allude to the siege of Messene by Demetrios.

⁷⁹ Marasco 1980a, 49; Cartledge 2002b, 31.

⁸⁰ Demetrios was informed that Lysimachos had taken over his possessions in Ionia, Ptolemy had taken Cyprus and Seleukos Kilikia. In Plutarch’s narrative, news of the clash between Kassandros’ sons reached Demetrios immediately after the bad news. Thus, Marasco (1980a, 51) argues that most probably the reason for Demetrios’ departure was the opportunity to conquer Macedon.

⁸¹ Marasco (1980a, 49–50) actually thinks that the Mantineans and the Spartans must have been allies but there is no mention of the former participating in the battle. Furthermore, Marasco (1980a, 51–4, 57) argues that the expedition of the Spartan regent Kleonymos to help Thebes against Demetrios in 293 or 292 (Plut. *Demetr.* 39.2–3) can be explained as an official Spartan reaction to Demetrios’ assault on Sparta, in order to divert his attention from the Peloponnese. David (1981, 124–5) remains sceptical; Cartledge (2002b, 31) suggests that the Spartans might have concluded an alliance with the Aitolians. See also Kolde 2003, 266–8. Dixon (2014, 101, n.11) points out that if Kleonymos got to Boiotia by land, then this is ‘one of the very few times that a force hostile to Antigonid interests crossed the Isthmos’, to be explained either by a Spartan victory over the Macedonian garrison or by the latter’s passivity.

⁸² Kassandros had died in 297; Plut. *Demetr.* 36–37.1; Wehrli 1968, 166–8; Will 1979, 89–94; Walbank 1988, 215–18.

How did the Peloponnesians fare with the Diadochoi and without the Spartans?

⁸³ Will 1979, 94–7; Walbank 1988, 219–34.

⁸⁴ Dixon 2014, 75–85 and n.4 at p.101.

⁸⁵ So Griffin 1982, 78; *contra* Lolos 2011, 74.

⁸⁶ Paschidis (2008a, 230–1 and nn.1, 2 at 231) dates Kleon, the first tyrant named by Plutarch and one coming after a reference to a series of unidentified tyrants, before 272.

⁸⁷ Polybius (2.41.1, 9, 11) emphasizes that discord among the Achaians, along with garrisons and tyrannies, occurred before the last year of the 124th Olympiad (i.e. 280).

⁸⁸ Tomlinson (1972, 151) thinks it is unlikely that Argos remained garrisoned after 295 since it was not as important strategically as Corinth. This is plausible but location would not be the only reason for Demetrios to have a *polis* garrisoned, especially since he must have wished to re-affirm his prestige.

⁸⁹ *IGIV* 750, probably dating to 286/5, honours two citizens and a foreigner, either Halikarnassian or Myndian (both Halikarnassos and Myndos were colonies of Troizen), for having rescued Troizenian citizens and boats captured by Lysimachos and Seleukos I; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 88; Bielman 1994, no.19; Paschidis (2008a, 226–9) suggests that the foreign honorand was probably a citizen of Myndos; at pp.228–9, n.1, he underlines that 5 out of 9 Troizenian Hellenistic decrees deal with rescue of captives.

THE SPARTANS RETURN – MACEDON AND SPARTA BRING PELOPONNESIANS TOGETHER

Areus I against Macedon in 280 and Peloponnesian support for Sparta

The first half of the 3rd century is extremely poorly documented. As mentioned above, Diodorus' narrative concerning the period after 301 is largely lost. Thus, for events until the emergence of the Achaian Confederacy in the mid-3rd century we have to rely on scattered references in Justin, Pausanias and Plutarch. It is only for Pyrrhos' invasion of the Peloponnese, in 272, that we have a continuous narrative, that is, Plutarch's *Pyrrhos* – it is no coincidence that our information is related to a king. Relations between Peloponnesian *poleis* and Macedon can only be guessed. Our lack of knowledge of the latter is related to our (lack of) knowledge of relations between Peloponnesian *poleis*. Sparta reappears on the scene of events attempting to fight on a par with the Hellenistic kings as well as to regain some of its control over the Peloponnese. We do not learn how the Spartans succeeded in attracting allies in the Peloponnese, first in 280 and then in the 260s. Additionally, in certain cases, information on relations between Peloponnesian *poleis* suffers from lack of precise dating.

The Spartans attempted to revive their old hegemonic role in two ways. First they led or participated in wars against Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon and second they assaulted their rivals in the Peloponnese: Messenia and Megalopolis. War largely takes now the form of liberation from Macedon. Wherever possible we shall explore, first, relations of Sparta with other Peloponnesian *poleis* in the context of the wars against Macedon: the campaign of king Areus I against Aitolia and indirectly against Antigonos Gonatas, as well as the so-called Chremonidean War waged by Egypt, Athens, Sparta and its allies against Gonatas. Both wars, especially the former, remain largely in the shadows. However, these military actions signal the return of a significant number of Peloponnesians to the Spartan side, even if temporarily. Relations between Sparta and its allies, developed in this context, are not wholly reminiscent of the old Spartan treatment of its allies. On the other hand, Spartan attempts to

regain control in the Peloponnese do recall the situation generated after the battle of Leuktra.

The Spartans had been left to their own devices after the war of Agis III. Interestingly enough the *Diadochoi* were not much interested in them. As mentioned above, only Poliorketes attempted a rather half-hearted assault on Sparta, and this in 295, twelve years after his first appearance on the Greek mainland. About fifteen years later, in 280, the Agiad king Areus I, son of Akrotatos,¹ attempted to revive the Spartan hegemonic role and find a place among the great kings of his time. Areus led an allied army against the Aitolians on the pretext of their seizure of Kirrha (sacred to Apollo), and indirectly against their then ally Antigonos Gonatas. His uncle and appointed regent Kleonymos would also exercise a significant role in Spartan foreign policy and in Peloponnesian affairs in the 270s.²

The opportunity for Areus and Sparta was presented by the struggle between Antigonos Gonatas and Ptolemy Keraunos for the Macedonian throne and the naval defeat of the former in late 281-early 280 (Marasco 1980a, 64–5 and n.9 at p.66). This war also shook whatever control Gonatas still held over mainland Greece. Greek *poleis* saw it as an opportunity to be rid of Macedonian garrisons, among them four Achaian cities – Dyme, Patrai, Tritaia and Pharai. These four cities refounded the Achaian Confederacy, in 281/0 (the 4th year of the 124th Olympiad; Polyb. 2.41.11–12). Since its first *stratēgos* year extended from May 280 to May 279, discussions about the re-establishment of the Confederacy must have been going on before May 280 but we cannot tell how long before that or whether they took place before, during or shortly after Areus' campaign, since the latter is not precisely dated. However, if plans for revival of the Confederacy were under way before Areus' campaign, then apart from Gonatas' severe problems, the anti-Macedonian plans of the Spartan king, which must have also taken some time to materialize, would have reinforced Achaian plans. On the other hand, Walbank (1988, 249–50, 299 and n.5) has suggested that the Confederacy was formed after Areus' defeat, as a result of distrust for Spartan leadership as well as fear of Macedonian retaliation.³ In either case, the rebirth of the Achaian Confederacy was associated with Sparta, one way or the other: either with its resurgence or with its defeat.

Justin's narrative, our only source (writing an *Epitomē* of the works of Pompeius Trogus), is problematic but his report on the formation of Areus' alliance does seem credible. He writes (24.1.2, 5) that following the lead of the Spartans the Greek *poleis* exchanged embassies and eventually selected Areus as their leader.⁴ The appeal of Spartan leadership, whatever its extent, is certainly interesting but perhaps not surprising in view of the

years spent under Macedonian domination. Furthermore, we have to take account of the positive impression that must have been made by the military activities of the regent Kleonymos some years before Areus' campaign: first the campaign to help Taras against the Lucanians and the Romans,⁵ and, perhaps more importantly, his expedition to help Thebes against Demetrios Poliorketes in 293 or 292 (Plut. *Demetr.* 39.2–3). Whatever Kleonymos' aims (see this chapter, n.2), his campaign showed that the Spartans were capable of standing up to a king, especially if he got to Thebes by land, after defeating the Macedonian garrison on Akrokorinthos (Dixon 2014, 101, n.11).

That Areus did not automatically assume leadership of the Peloponnesians against the Aitolians, despite his key role, is a sign that he viewed or that he was obliged to view his role differently from that of his predecessors of the Classical era.

Areus chose to appear in the role of the protector against the Aitolians of Apollo's sacred land at Delphi but, at least according to Justin (24.1.3–4), his real target was Gonatas, allied then with the Aitolians. This sounds credible, since otherwise we have to believe that his Peloponnesian allies undertook a military engagement which was no immediate concern of theirs, and this while the Macedonians were still present in the Peloponnese. A campaign that would harm Gonatas is much more understandable. On the one hand, this Spartan initiative appears to be in keeping with the past Spartan role: the Spartans had been involved in two so-called Sacred Wars, allegedly for the protection of Apollo's sacred land, in 449/8 (Thuc. 1.112.5) and in 356/5–346 (see p.50). On the other hand, Areus' campaign appears so much at odds with Spartan weakness in the early 3rd century that Will (1979, 107) views Areus as 'quelque peu mégalomane'. Areus, though, was a king of the 3rd century and as such he was trying to catch up with the other Hellenistic rulers of his time (Oliva 1971, 205). In the 5th and the 4th centuries, Spartan kingship was an anachronism but in the 3rd century the spreading of Macedonian kingship had actually given Spartan kingship more legitimacy and had perhaps made it look much less of an oddity in the Greek world.⁶

Justin reports that almost all the Greeks sided with Areus – which is surely an exaggeration – and, worse, he does not specify how many or who these Greeks were. According to Justin, then, at least 9,000 were slain by only 500 Aitolians, which sounds unreal. He must exaggerate either the high number of casualties or the small Aitolian number, or even both. It is highly likely that the number of Spartan allies was much lower than 9,000, which would be more than half the army assembled by Agis III (see pp.73–4) for the most decisive final battle against the Macedonian regent,

in the heart of the Peloponnese. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Areus would have employed only an insignificant force.⁷ Measures of comparison can be provided by the armies put together by the Achaian Confederacy. In the most crucial battle of Sellasia (in 222) 4,300 Achaian infantry participated; a standing army put together by the Achaian Confederacy later on in the 3rd century (during the Social War) consisted of no more than 3,000 soldiers (see p.277). Therefore, Areus' army could have consisted of c.3000 men at the most.

It is conceivable that Areus' allies were largely if not exclusively Peloponnesians. Roebuck (1941, 62) views Areus' alliance as a re-organization of the Peloponnesian League, which is a rather far-fetched view. It was only a partial, military reunion of Peloponnesians, and only in this sense did Areus' allies form a League. Furthermore, Justin's brief narrative does not allow us to know the nature of Areus' leadership, i.e. whether the Spartans had changed their old, strict ways of leading. Justin's report that Areus was selected as leader may point in this direction, but no more than that.

Areus' allies have been largely identified as those who got rid of the Macedonian garrisons in the same period, but this is not a safe assumption for two reasons. First, we do not know for certain which *poleis* were liberated in the late 280s. Secondly, freedom is not to be automatically translated into armed clash with the former master – although victory in such circumstances would strengthen the possibility of his permanent removal. However, a common element in scholarly views is the inclusion of the liberated Achaian *poleis* and of most Arkadian *poleis*, apart from Megalopolis; the Messenians are also excluded.⁸ Presumably, scholars have been influenced both by the later participation of certain Arkadians and the Achaians in the Chremonidean War on Areus' side and, probably, also by their much earlier alliance with Agis III. The Achaians and the Arkadians indeed appear as the most plausible allies of Sparta – for one thing Areus had to cross Arkadia⁹ and Achaia in order to get to Aitolia – but this is only a reasonable hypothesis. At least we can say that the central-eastern Arkadians and the Achaians would not have been hostile to the Spartan army.

Of the four Achaian *poleis* which refounded the Achaian Confederacy – Dyme, Pharai, Tritaia, Patrai – the latter must have played a crucial role since Rhion, just outside Patrai, provides the easiest crossing to Aitolia (Morgan and Hall 2004, 472) – Areus would probably not risk crossing to Aitolia over land since the Isthmos was blocked by a Macedonian garrison. On the other hand, in the next year, Patrai sent a contingent to help Aitolia against the invading Gauls, allegedly because of friendship with the

Aitolians (Paus. 7.18.6).¹⁰ How can we reconcile this with participation in Areus' campaign against the Aitolians? We are left with mere speculation. Perhaps, the reason was that Patrai was in more danger in 279 from the Gauls than any other Peloponnesian *polis* precisely because of the Rhion-Antirrhion strait (Scholten 2000, 35).¹¹ It is possible, however, that Patrai's contribution to Areus' campaign amounted to just a small contingent or only to allowing Areus to sail from Rhion. Of course, one might cynically argue that even if the Patreis were not part of Areus' alliance, they might not have bothered to try to stop him and risk being killed.

Of the *poleis* of the Argolid, there is some indirect evidence related to Epidauros,¹² afforded by the markedly pro-Spartan hymn (*IG* IV².1.128) dedicated by Isyllos of Epidauros to Apollo Maleatas and Asklepios.¹³ Kolde (2003, 268–91) makes a case for dating it to c.280, either during Areus' campaign or in his second attempt to form an alliance.¹⁴ The former is more likely since it would be rather odd for Isyllos to record such a pro-Spartan hymn after the defeat of Areus. It is full of admiration for the Spartan constitution (ll. 70–1) and for essential Spartan values such as *καλοκαγαθία* and *εὐνομία* (ll.23–4) still entertained among the aristocratic circles in the Peloponnese.¹⁵ Most tellingly, it praises Asklepios for helping the Spartans against Philip – most probably Philip II (ll. 57–61, 69–75):

καὶ τόδε σῆς ἀρετῆς, Ἀσκληπιέ, τοῦργον ἔδειξας | ἐγ κείνοισι χρόνοις, ὅκα δὴ
στρατὸν ἄγε Φίλιππος | εἰς Σπάρτην, ἐθέλων ἀνελεῖν βασιληῖδα τιμῆν. | τοῖς
δ' Ἀσκληπιὸς ἦλθε βοαθὸς ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου | τιμῶν Ἡρακλέος γενεάν...
(ll. 57–61).

and of your power you, Asklepius, gave this example in those days, when Philip, wishing to destroy royal authority, led his army against Sparta. To them from Epidauros Asklepius came as a helper, honoring the race of Heracles... (trans. Edelstein and Edelstein 1998, 144, T.295).

Set against this background, the hymn can also be viewed, on a practical level, as an attempt to persuade the Epidaurians to fight on Areus' side. In this context it is probable that Epidauros was free of a Macedonian garrison at the time; otherwise the *stèle* with the poem would have been quite a provocation for the Macedonians. The possibility of Epidaurians participating in Areus' campaign appears stronger if we take into account that they had fought by the side of Sparta for the protection of Delphi in the Third Sacred War (Diod. Sic. 16.24.1–2, 29.1, 30.4), i.e. protection of Apollo's land was part of Epidaurian tradition.

Participation of Argos and Elis is much more dubious. Elis would have been a plausible candidate, given its overall history of relations with Sparta in the 3rd century, but it is possible that the regime of the time was not

favourably disposed towards Sparta (Paus. 4.28.5–6). Furthermore, as Tarn (1913, 133, n.46) acknowledged, the inclusion of Elis depends on dating the statue for Areus at Olympia (Paus. 6.12.5) in this period rather than in the Chremonidean War in the 260s; the latter date is preferable given that in the 260s the Eleans took part in the aforementioned war as Areus' allies.¹⁶

With regard to Argos, it would have been quite a turning point in intra-Peloponnesian relations if it had joined Sparta, and one to thank the Macedonians for. But in the present state of the evidence, there is no way of telling. We do not know whether there had been a Macedonian garrison and if so whether the Argives got rid of it in 280.¹⁷ Furthermore, absence of a Macedonian garrison (if there was one) does not necessarily indicate participation in warfare under Spartan leadership. It is also possible that the civil strife evidenced for the late 270s had already started. However, the co-operation between Argos and Sparta during the invasion of the Peloponnese by Pyrrhos of Epeiros in 272 does raise the question of earlier co-operation.

The Aitolians imposed a humiliating defeat upon Areus (Justin 24.1.6). In the end, we can view his campaign either from the viewpoint of the final defeat or endorse the positive view of Oliva (1971, 203) who underlines that, despite the ultimate failure, Sparta now led Peloponnesian *poleis*, for the first time in fifty years. Employing hindsight, we can tell that this campaign signals the first step towards Spartan military resurgence. Areus' campaigns must have left a legacy of ambition to his successors and revived the idea of the Spartans and their kings in the position of (would-be) liberators from Macedon. On the other hand, Areus' failure might very well have made his successors think that Sparta could not play the role of the liberator from Macedon on its own. Hence, almost fifteen years later, in the so-called Chremonidean War against Macedon, the Spartans attempted to play again the role of the liberator not on their own, but allied with Athens and Egypt.

When later Areus tried to re-assemble his allies, he was turned down because the Greeks by then thought that the Spartans were aiming at domination not liberation – so says Justin (24.1.7).¹⁸ Unfortunately, Justin does not specify when exactly Areus made this attempt, but it could date after the invasion of Delphi by the Gauls in 279 (Kolde 2003, 290, n. 156; 297). It is also possible that this attempt coincided with the assault of the Spartan regent Kleonymos against Messenia and the threat to Megalopolis (see pp.135–8). Therefore one could legitimately argue that at least some of Areus' former Peloponnesian allies would have been alarmed. On the other hand, it is possible that many Arkadians would not be so displeased to see Megalopolis at the receiving end of a threat. In any case, Cloché

(1945, 233)¹⁹ rightly argues that the most important factor for the rejection of Areus' proposal was precisely previous Spartan failure, the fact that the Spartan king had proved to be an inadequate and even dangerous leader, unworthy rival of a Macedonian ruler.

A year after Areus' failure in Aitolia, the Peloponnesians, with the sole exception of Patrai, were no longer interested in taking up arms, this time against the Gauls²⁰ who had reached down to Delphi.²¹ That no other Achaian *polis* was activated shows that the newly-founded Confederacy still had a loose organization (Mackil 2013, 99).

Pausanias (7.6.7–8) attributes the unwillingness of the Peloponnesians to their belief that they were not running any danger since the Gauls had no ships and thus could not cross to the Peloponnese. He gives an additional reason for the absence of both the Messenians (4.28.3) and the Arkadians / the Megalopolitans (8.6.3). He reports that the Arkadians were afraid that the Spartans would ravage their country if it was deprived of its defenders. Pausanias is more specific about the Messenians: they had to face the attacks of Kleonymos who would not grant them a truce. The absence of the Spartans is equally noteworthy, since they had long wished to appear as the protectors of the sacred land of Delphi. But if indeed they had suffered severe casualties in the previous year, their absence would be quite understandable.

In Pausanias' narrative the inability or unwillingness of both the Messenians and the Megalopolitans to join the defence against the Gauls comes last in a list of non-participation in major events in Greek history, i.e. the battle of Chaironeia and the Lamian War. In these latter two cases, the cause was primarily their friendly disposition towards Macedon but in the case of the Gallic invasion, weakness or unwillingness to join in a cause that did not immediately concern them becomes apparent. In this they were in company with the rest of the Peloponnesians. Nevertheless, the impression remains: in the early 3rd century, both Messenians and Megalopolitans, particularly the latter, still had no impressive military record.

The invasion of Pyrrhos in 272 and the temporary change of relations of Sparta with Argos and Messene

In the spring of 272 Pyrrhos of Epeiros, still struggling to remove Antigonos II Gonatas from the Macedonian throne,²² decided to deal a blow to him by acquiring Sparta as a base of operations in the Peloponnese.²³ Pyrrhos' invasion of the Peloponnese led to astonishing turns in political relations, first between Sparta and Macedon and, most important, between Sparta and its traditional enemies, the Argives and, even more surprisingly, the Messenians. As Tarn (1913, 272) observed with

regard to Macedon and Sparta, 'Pyrrhos had accomplished the feat of driving two great rivals into each other's arms'.²⁴ The same observation can be applied to relations of Sparta with its Peloponnesian enemies. From a Peloponnesian viewpoint, of course, this was hardly regrettable. Errington (2008, 87) acutely observes that Pyrrhos' invasion provoked 'an unprecedented Peloponnesian solidarity'. It is an attractive formulation but we have to note that not the whole of the Peloponnese came to the aid of Sparta. As Errington himself sees, it was the Messenians and the Argives that 'swallowed their historical pride' and supported Sparta – which is surely a momentous turn.

The clash between Pyrrhos and Gonatas brought back to the surface the old question for Peloponnesian states: which attitude should be adopted towards Sparta? However, this major issue of policy was set into a totally new context. It was no longer predominantly a question of pro- or anti-Spartan factions or of oligarchs versus democrats. It was a question of choosing between Sparta and a particular king – Pyrrhos (Walbank 1988, 265), irrespective of political beliefs. But siding with Sparta was also translated into siding with another king, Gonatas.

Peloponnesian attitudes towards Pyrrhos are difficult to assess. Our information concerns Sparta, Megalopolis, Argos, Messene and (unidentified) Achaian *poleis*. When Pyrrhos disembarked on the Peloponnese²⁵ he was met by embassies from the Athenians, the Achaians and the Messenians (Justin 25.4.4). The aims of the envoys are not recorded and they were not necessarily identical.²⁶ First of all, seeing yet another king on Peloponnesian soil would have at least called for an exploratory mission. Pyrrhos' rivalry with Gonatas was surely known and therefore certain envoys would have sought his help or protection, like the Athenians or the Achaians. Most of the Achaian *poleis* were already liberated from Gonatas – certainly Dyme, Patrai, Pharai, Tritaia, Aigion, Boura, Keryneia (Polyb. 2.41.11–15) – but this does not exclude the possibility that they saw Pyrrhos as a powerful guarantor of their liberty, which was exactly Pyrrhos' propaganda (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.11). It is also possible that the Patreis facilitated Pyrrhos' crossing to the Peloponnese via Rhion (Errington 2008, 87). Even so, this does not automatically mean that the Achaians joined him in his subsequent campaign.

The Messenian mission is more difficult to explain. Probably, the Messenians were not controlled by a Macedonian garrison at the time because in such a case it would have been difficult to explain the freedom to dispatch envoys. Still, Gonatas' permanent elimination could have been an objective. We do not know whether Messenia was still facing attacks by the Spartans, for which there is evidence concerning 279. Pyrrhos'

intentions against Sparta were not known then (as indicated by the accusations of the Spartans later), but we cannot exclude the possibility that this mission might have aimed at securing Pyrrhos' help against Sparta. On the other hand, things become much more complicated with Pausanias' report that shortly afterwards the Messenians supported Sparta, which is not that incredible. The safest hypothesis is the one formulated by Walbank (1988, 264–5) who suggests that the initial mission of the Messenians to Pyrrhos might have been purely 'exploratory' or 'they later changed their mind about where their interests really lay'.²⁷

Megalopolis presumably welcomed Pyrrhos since Spartan envoys met him there (whether in the city itself or at the outskirts is not known) shortly before his attack on Sparta (Walbank 1988, 265; Marasco 1980a, 105). There is no report, however, of Megalopolitans actually participating in the subsequent attack on Sparta – not that Pyrrhos was in need of men – he had arrived with 25,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 24 elephants (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.9).

On the basis of a statue for Pyrrhos dedicated by a certain Thrasyboulos at Olympia (Paus. 6.14.9) it has been suggested that the Eleans also joined Pyrrhos,²⁸ but due to lack of relevant information in the sources, this has to remain only a possibility. For one thing, this is a private dedication, not a result of the Elean *dēmos*' decision, although it is significant that it was allowed to be erected at Olympia.²⁹ Beyond the obvious favourable disposition to Pyrrhos, it could be taken to imply either an anti-Spartan stance or an anti-Gonatas stance but no more than that. The anti-Gonatas stance becomes more likely if we accept the identification of Thrasyboulos³⁰ with the Elean who instigated the assassination of the Elean tyrant Aristotimos who had usurped power shortly after Pyrrhos' death and had subsequently received Gonatas' help.

According to our sources, Pyrrhos launched an assault against Sparta, accompanied and encouraged by the former Spartan regent Kleonymos (he had been sent into exile a few years earlier; before 274)³¹ while king Areus was in Crete recruiting mercenaries. Initially Pyrrhos concealed his true intentions, declaring his intention to liberate the Greek *poleis* from Antigonos and expressing his wish to send his sons to participate in the *agōgē*. The Spartans later accused him of deception and he returned the compliment (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.10–11). The Spartans did put up a stout resistance, in which Akrotatos, Areus' son, played a leading role. It is indicative of Spartan hunger for glory that the Spartan old men and the women wildly applauded his performance as they saw him covered with the blood of his victims (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 28.2–3; Eckstein 2006, 198). Areus returned in time, but it was Antigonos Gonatas' troops that saved the day

(Plut. *Pyrrh.* 27–9, especially 29.6 on the help from Gonatas; Paus. 1.13.7). Given Philip's re-arrangement of borders in 338/7, Demetrios' assault in 295 and Areus' campaign in 280, one could legitimately argue that there was not much love lost between Sparta and Macedon. Yet, hostility between them had not been such as to exclude co-operation against the threat represented for both by Pyrrhos. Had Sparta been captured, it could have been used as a base of operations against other regions held by Antigonos, eventually and most notably Corinth, one of the 'fetters' of Greece. As to the Spartans, faced with an invasion by a numerically superior force they would welcome help from wherever it came.³²

However, good relations between the Spartans and Antigonos did not last long. Pyrrhos had to withdraw from Sparta and this success, no matter if it was not mainly the doing of the Spartans, went a long way towards boosting their morale. So much so that a few years later they went to war (the Chremonidean) against Macedon.³³

According to Pausanias (4.29.6; 1.13.6) the assault of Pyrrhos brought about a most astonishing turn in the relations of the Spartans with the Messenians, or at least with part of the Messenians,³⁴ as well as with the Argives, both of whom provided military support to Sparta. Argive help, reported without any details, has been questioned, on the grounds that Argos was tormented by civil strife between Aristippos, supported by Gonatas, and Aristreas who eventually had to ask for the support of Pyrrhos.³⁵ But it is quite possible that help for Sparta was instigated precisely by the supporters of Aristippos during Pyrrhos' invasion; not out of any sympathy for the Spartans but to prevent Pyrrhos from getting the advantage over Antigonos Gonatas and eventually getting control of Argos. It is even more interesting that, as reported by Plutarch, the Spartans also provided help to Argos when it, in turn, was faced with Pyrrhos' attack (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30.2–5), for much the same reasons.

It is the Messenian support that looks more surprising. Pausanias (4.29.6) reports that the Messenians went to help the Spartans on their own initiative: *Λακεδαιμονίοις αὐτεπάγγελτοι βοηθήσαντες ἀφίκοντο*.³⁶ This testimony has been accepted by Lévêque (1957, 589, 596), Marasco (1980a, 116–17) and David (1981, 131) while it has been disbelieved by Roebuck (1941, 62–3 and n.20) on the grounds that shortly before the Messenians had been at war with the Spartans and later on they did not participate alongside Sparta in the Chremonidean War. The second objection is weak, since an *ad hoc* support is not inevitably translated into long-lasting alliance. The first objection carries more weight, partly depending, however, on whether the Spartans had re-conquered the Dentheliatis area on Mt. Taygetos just a few years ago, which is quite dubious.³⁷ In any case, it is not inconceivable

that a certain faction might have prevailed temporarily in Messene (Grandjean 2003, 74). This group need not be labelled as pro-Spartan. They only needed to be unfavourably disposed towards Pyrrhos, or rather unwilling to see yet another king interfering in the Peloponnese and in all likelihood playing for keeps. The odds were that Pyrrhos, should he become master of Lakonia, would turn his attention to Messenia as well. Consequently the Messenians, or a substantial part of them, could be willing to let bygones be bygones, at least on that occasion.

We should also take account of an impressive passage of Polybius (4.32.2–4), who (referring to the late 3rd century) observes that the Messenians were ‘never whole-heartedly enemies of the Lakedaimonians or friends with the Arkadians’.³⁸ A factor contributing to this should be the mixed origins of the Messenian population (see p.25). As Pausanias (4.29.6) reports, following the incident in 272 a period of peace ensued which was so pleasing to the Messenians that they were unwilling to join the Achaian Confederacy for fear of reviving the ancestral hostility with Sparta.³⁹ Corroborating this point, Marasco (1980a, 117–18) observes that there are no known hostilities between the Spartans and the Messenians until 219. This of course can be viewed as an argument *ex silentio* but we can be pretty confident that it is valid with regard to the reigns of Agis IV (244–241) and Kleomenes III (235–222) for which we have the *Lives* by Plutarch. Marasco (1980a, 117–18) also brings into the argument the fact that Nikagoras of Messene was a paternal⁴⁰ *xenos* of Archidamos, brother of Agis IV (Polyb. 5.37.1) and the fact that Archidamos had found refuge with Nikagoras when he went into exile. This information is surely an indication of complexity in the relations between the Spartans and the Messenians, or, perhaps more accurately, in relations between members of their respective elites. But this is not necessarily a sign of good relations between the two states, as the relations of *xenia* between the Athenian Perikles and the Spartan king Archidamos II (Thuc. 2.13.1) show us. It is, however, a sign that Nikagoras and at least part of the Messenian elite were not on the best of terms with the Agiads, either Leonidas II or Kleomenes III,⁴¹ i.e. the ‘official’ Sparta. Also indicative of complexity is the help provided to Kleomenes by Messenian exiles which enabled him to enter Megalopolis in 223 (see pp.227–8).

An inscription of striking content recently discovered at Messene seems to corroborate Pausanias’ story, at least the part concerning the peaceful co-existence between Sparta and Messenia (Themelis 1997 [1999], 108–12; text by Matthaiou = *SEG* 47.390). A Spartan by the name of Damostratos was honoured by the Messenians with a monument on which an epigram praises him for having transformed ancestral hostility into friendship.

Most important, this reconciliation was ‘something many had wished would happen’.⁴² Themelis (2001, 202)⁴³ offers two possible dates with a preference for the second: either 272 or 210 when Sparta, along with Messene and Elis, allied with the Aitolians and the Romans against Macedon and the Achaian Confederacy (Polyb. 16.13.3). Either hypothesis is reasonable but it is equally possible that Damostratos’ services were offered at some point between 272 and 210, which in turn could account for the peaceful relations between the two states reported by Pausanias.

This period of peaceful relations between the Spartans and the Messenians is one of the most notable incidents of preference for peace over traditional hostility. We need not think that Pausanias tells here the whole story. Polybius (4.32.1) states that it was the Messenian oligarchs who were always for peace, for reasons of self interest:

Οἱ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων προεστῶτες ὀλιγαρχικοί, [καὶ] στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ παρὰ τὰ κατ’ ἰδίαν λυσιτελοῦς, φιλοτιμότερον τοῦ δέοντος αἰεὶ διέκειντο πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην.

The oligarchs who were then in power in Messenia, aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too warm advocates of peace.

Allowing for a certain degree of malice on Polybius’ part, his observation, nevertheless, points to the ambivalent stance of the Messenian elite towards Sparta. From a wider point of view, peace is degraded by being associated with personal interests.

To return to Pyrrhos: failing to capture Sparta, Pyrrhos marched against Argos, upon the invitation of Aristetas, where he eventually met his death (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30.1, 34; Paus. 1.13.7–8).⁴⁴ The attack on Argos brought to the fore the Argive tendency to avoid military clashes and also provided the occasion for the Spartans under Areus to offer in turn their support to Argos (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30.2–5).

The Argives were divided into factions at the time, one led by Aristippos and supported by Gonatas, who had already encamped at the outskirts of the city, and the other led by Aristetas who had asked for Pyrrhos’ support (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30.1–2). As suggested above, it was probably supporters of Aristippos and Gonatas who had previously sent help to Sparta. Another group, probably distinct from these factions (Paschidis 2008a, 213–14), sent envoys (none is mentioned by name), to both kings asking them to allow the *polis* to take sides with none but to remain benevolent towards both: τὴν πόλιν ἔαν μηδετέρου γενομένην, εὖνουν δ’ οὔσαν ἀμφοτέροις. In other words, this group wished to remain neutral (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 31.2). This request comes as a natural development in Argive policy. Ever since the emergence of Macedon as a superpower, the Argives had shown that they wished to

abstain from military clashes. According to Plutarch, Antigonos agreed and even gave (ἑδίδου) his son as a hostage while Pyrrhos offered no surety. This information is quite suspect. For one thing, the Argives are not reported to have asked for such a thing – and it would have been rather too much to ask. It looks more like information deriving from a source friendly to Gonatas and hostile to Pyrrhos. And even if Gonatas ever promised such an astonishing thing, it would have been a promise that never materialized (Tarn 1913, 273, n.39).⁴⁵

As a result of Pyrrhos' death, Antigonos Gonatas secured the Macedonian throne and established his control over a large part of the Peloponnese. His half-brother Krateros was appointed governor of Corinth and Chalkis, while tyrannical regimes seem now to have spread in the Peloponnese (Will 1979, 216–19). Consequently, Gonatas has gained a very bad reputation (Polyb. 2.41.10) but it is not certain that he was directly responsible for all the tyrannies in the Peloponnese. For one thing, in those cases for which we do have information, tyrannies appear to be primarily the result of internal strife. Furthermore, direct installation of tyrants must be distinguished from support of pre-existing tyrants or intervention in favour of one or the other faction.⁴⁶ The clearest case seems to be that of Argos where with Gonatas' support Aristippos established a dynasty of tyrants which lasted until 229. This does not mean *a priori* that Argive rulers were puppets of Macedon, as shown by the truce agreed between Aristomachos (I) and Alexandros, governor of Corinth who revolted against Antigonos Gonatas probably in 249.⁴⁷ Shortly after Pyrrhos' death in 272 and following factional strife Aristotimos was established as tyrant in Elis but was murdered a few months later by members of the rival faction, with Aitolian help. Antigonalid help was offered only when revolt against Aristotimos broke out (Plut. *Mor.* 251a–253f; Justin 26.1; Paus. 5.5.1).⁴⁸ However, more important for our purposes is the beginning of a solid alliance between Elis and the Aitolian Confederacy (see pp.288–95).

Elsewhere, it is much more difficult to assess Gonatas' role. In Megalopolis Aristodemos was installed in power during the Chremonidean War and perhaps before that, under unknown circumstances (Moggi and Osanna 2003, 422). He was assassinated in 251 but tyranny was reinstalled in Megalopolis, under Lydiadas in the 240s, and lasted until 235 (Plut. *Arat.* 30, 35, 37 and *Kleom.* 6; Polyb. 2.44.5; Orsi 2000, 215). In Sikyon a succession of tyrants may have started before 272 and in any case lasted until 251 (Plut. *Arat.* 2–3.2; Paus. 2.8.1–3).

Tyrannies were also established elsewhere in the Peloponnese but we only hear about them when the *poleis* concerned join the Achaian

Confederacy and the tyrannies in question are abolished: specifically, we hear of Iseas at Keryneia (Polyb. 2.41.13–15), Xenon at Hermione, Kleonymos at Phleious (Polyb. 2.44.5–6) and Nearchos at Orchomenos (*IPArk* 16). Quite possibly, tyrannical regimes multiplied following the victory of Antigonos Gonatas in the Chremonidean War about ten years later, but concrete evidence is lacking.

The Chremonidean War, 268–262 (?) and the Spartan alliance⁴⁹

In the early 260s Areus I of Sparta participated in another more serious attempt against Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon, along with Ptolemy II Philadelphos and Athens, in the so-called Chremonidean War, named after the Athenian proposer of the decree of alliance with Sparta (*IG* II² 686/687).⁵⁰ The alliance between Sparta, its allies and Athens followed the alliances between Egypt and Athens, and Egypt and Sparta (ll. 19–22),⁵¹ which probably suggests that Ptolemy had taken the initiative (Habicht 1997, 142–3).

In Chremonides' decree there recurs the old slogan of *eleutheria*. In the opening lines, where the aim of the *symmachia* is laid down, *eleutheria* is not coupled with *autonomia*:

ὁ τε βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος ἀκολουθῶς τεῖ τῶν προγόνων καὶ τεῖ τῆς ἀδελφῆς προ[α]ιρέσει φανερός ἐστὶν σπουδάζων ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας (ll. 17–19; see also l.13).

King Ptolemy, in accordance with the policy of his ancestors and his sister, shows clearly his concern for the common freedom of the Greeks (trans. by Bagnall and Derow 2004, no.19, at p.39).⁵²

Eleutheria and *autonomia* appear together in the last lines of the decree where are presented the terms upon which the alliance is based. It is emphasized that the allies are to remain free and autonomous, retaining their ancestral constitution (ll. 72–4) – this clause seems to concern Sparta more than Athens:

σπονδαὶ καὶ συμμαχία [Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς [Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς Ἀθην]αίων εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον. ἔχειν ἑκατέρους τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐλευθερί]ους ὄντας καὶ αὐτο[νόμους, πολιτείαν πολιτευομένους κατὰ] τὰ πάτρια.

The treaty and alliance [of the Lacedaemonians and the allies] of the Lacedaemonians with [the Athenians and the allies] of the Athenians, [to be valid] for all [time]: [Each (of the parties)], being [free] and autonomous, [is to have its own territory, using its own political institutions in accordance with] ancestral tradition (trans. Bagnall and Derow 2004, no.19, at p.40).

Eleutheria is a broader term and aim than *autonomia*, in fact the latter is part of *eleutheria*. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the goal of all the allies is the common *homonoia* (l. 31) = concord, a more specific term, even more concrete than *eirēnē* (peace) in the sense that it signifies the means to *eirēnē*, or rather a peace based on shared feeling, not just an ‘armed peace’ as there had been in the 4th century. Of course, it has to be an ‘armed peace’ insofar as *eleutheria* has to be protected against a common external enemy. Thus, the Athenian decree presents the allies and in particular Sparta and its allies as sharing the same goal, acting in equality. Ptolemy II does appear to have an instrumental role in the outbreak of the war (ll. 16–18) but no single participant appears as the principal driving force of the war or as the sole guarantor of peace. Although the initiative did not come from the lesser Peloponnesian states (or Crete), the Peloponnesian role does appear more significant, at least in terms of numbers: Athens appears alone, although there are vague references to allies in ll. 71, 75–6, 80, 84; notably there is no such mention in l. 93 where provision is made for possible future amendment of the terms of the alliance (Aneziri 2009, 29). One is tempted to think that the Athenians had no allies but simply referred to them because it was the norm for leading participants in an alliance to be accompanied by allies. On the other hand, Sparta does have allies, mentioned by name, in fact traditional allies as we shall see below. Considering the participants, its importance and its length, the Chremonidean War is one of the most poorly documented wars in ancient history – the sources being Paus. 3.6.4–6, Justin 26.2, the aforementioned Chremonides’ decree and the decree for the Athenian *stratēgos* Epichares (*J.Rhamn.* 3). There are numerous tantalizing problems due to the fact that no continuous, detailed narrative has survived: precise dating; the aims of the participants; who, if any, had the leading role or who was most interested in the war; why Philadelphos appears not to have contributed to the war significantly, and so on.⁵³

The Spartans were independent, so liberation from Macedon cannot have been their primary goal. On the other hand, the recently established Macedonian control over a large part of the Peloponnese might very well have made the Spartans think that their turn would come soon, if they did not try to put an end to Macedonian supremacy – pretty much as when the growing power of Athens had led them to war in the 5th century. Whether liberation of the Greeks would be or was planned to be the stepping stone for Spartan domination has to remain an open question. As Areus’ campaign years earlier had shown, re-affirmation of Sparta’s hegemonic military role was of primary importance.⁵⁴ Now leadership had

to be shared. But that would have to do. Besides, there had already been the precedent of joint action – with the Argives – against Macedon during Pyrrhos' invasion. Pausanias (3.6.5) attributes the Spartans' participation in the Chremonidean War to their friendly disposition towards the Athenians and to their wish to do something memorable (in this order). The first part of Pausanias' statement is surely an idealization of Spartan-Athenian relations⁵⁵ reflecting the propaganda of the decree which very conveniently brushes aside past hostile relations between Athens and Sparta, laying emphasis on their common struggles against the barbarians. Antigonos Gonatas is never mentioned but he is identified as a barbarian by implication.

What is of interest for our purposes is the identity of Sparta's allies: Elis, Achaia (which by then had expanded to include Aigion, Boura, Keryneia; Polyb. 2.41.13–15), Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Kaphyai,⁵⁶ Phigaleia, and certain Cretan *poleis* probably led by Gortyn.⁵⁷ Scholars have generally viewed the Spartan alliance in a positive manner. Roebuck (1941, 64) has gone as far as to observe a return to the political division as it had been in 369/8, except that now Argos, Megalopolis and Messenia did not form a military front against Sparta. However, this last point should be enough to deter us from talking about a return to the situation of 369/8. Roebuck in fact speaks again of a Peloponnesian League but this is misleading. We are only justified in seeing a predominantly Peloponnesian alliance, created *ad hoc*, under the leadership of Sparta. Cartledge (2002b, 36–7) notes the impressive range of the Spartan alliance although, as he observes, it did not match the range of Spartan allies before 365. What is also impressive, however, is that the Chremonidean War alliance is strongly reminiscent of the alliance under Agis III in 331/0: the latter's allies had included Elis, most of Arkadia except for Megalopolis, all the Achaian *poleis* except for Pellene (see p.70). Errington (1990, 167–8) attributes a central role to Areus and emphasizes Peloponnesian enthusiasm for the war (2008, 87–90). A token of this enthusiasm is provided by Orchomenos, one of the most loyal allies of Sparta in the past. The Orchomenians recalled their long-standing devotion to Sparta by dedicating a statue of king Areus in its temple of Artemis, possibly at the beginning of the war (*ISE* 54).⁵⁸

This continuity in political attitudes towards Sparta might be more pronounced if we could be certain as to the identity of Areus' allies in 280. In any case, Marasco (1980a, 140–1) rightly stresses continuity both with the past and the future, pointing out that the Achaians were also allied with king Agis IV in 241 and that the Eleans and the very same Arkadian cities took the side of Kleomenes III against the Achaian Confederacy in the war of 228–222. Continuity of attitudes towards Sparta had its negative

aspect as well: once again the Megalopolitans distanced themselves from their fellow Arkadians, though the latter were not as numerous as in the war of Agis III.

Another point of similarity with the war of 331/0 and possibly with that of 280 is that in the 260s there does not appear to have been exercised any coercion on the Spartan part, at least there was none that we know of, and this marks a development in the relations between Sparta and at least part of the Peloponnesians. A *Synedrion* of allies had been established – as was the case once upon a time with the Peloponnesian League – and the Spartans dispatched two envoys to Athens from among the *synedroi* (πρόεδροι ἀπὸ τῶν συνέδρων ἀπεστάλκασιν: l. 27) – one Spartan and one Elean (ll. 57–8). Contrary to what happened in Sparta's heyday, its allies are now identified by name – the usual formulation had been 'Sparta and its allies'. This and, especially, the specific stipulation that the allies were to retain their freedom, autonomy and constitution (ll. 72–4) show that the Spartans were willing to change their old ways, at least where Macedon was concerned.

The unanimity among the *poleis* of eastern Arkadia is worth stressing. Participation in the Chremonidean War represents the first testimony for military action on the part of the recently refounded Achaian Confederacy.⁵⁹ It is possible that three extremely fragmentary honorific decrees from Orchomenos (inscribed on bronze) date roughly to this period, offering testimony of further bonds between the Arkadian allies of Sparta: Orchomenos thus honoured Larchippos of Tegea, Kleophaes and Tyteas of Kaphyai.⁶⁰

Beyond the wish to be rid of the Macedonians, it is difficult to identify specific reasons which led the Achaians, the Eleans and the Arkadians to align with Sparta. Errington (1990, 168) argues that, apart from Spartan influence, the fear of Macedonian incursions like those of Kassandros or Poliorketes would have been a very strong motive. Marasco (1980a, 141) suggests that the Arkadian alliance with Sparta might have been desirable as a measure offering protection against Megalopolis. This is an attractive hypothesis, although there is no evidence of hostilities and we can only suspect that Megalopolis had been steadily expanding in Arkadia prior to the Chremonidean War (see pp.26–31).⁶¹ However, the continuous differentiation of Megalopolis, no matter how justified by its relations with Sparta, would probably not have made it very popular with most of the Arkadians, especially when the issue was freedom from Macedon. As to Phigaleia in particular, we would also venture to suggest that Sparta might have been a protector against the Messenians, although relevant evidence eludes us. In c.240, a treaty between Phigaleia and Messene stipulates

isopoliteia – in this case, bilateral grant of citizenship – and refers to regulation of past disputes but we cannot tell how far back these went (see pp.279–81).

Participation of Arkadian *poleis* in the Chremonidean War was largely a result of bonds forged between them over time, ever since the war of Agis III. The solidarity among the neighbouring *poleis* of Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenos and Kaphyai is noteworthy. Not only that, but together with Sparta they now appeared to form a menacing circle around Megalopolis.

The three allies were never able to join forces in Attika and it is quite doubtful whether Areus was ever able to cross the Isthmos (Dixon 2014, 87–8 with bibliography).⁶² He was killed in a battle at Corinth, most probably in 265.⁶³ In 262 the Athenians capitulated after a long siege but Sparta remained inviolate. Thereafter and for the next ten years – until the moment that Aratos made his native, non-Achaian Sikyon a member of the Achaian Confederacy – we know very little about what went on in the Peloponnese. The Spartans re-surfaced in the 240s under king Agis IV. What the Spartans (or some of them) might have realized after their failure in the Chremonidean War is that coalition with Athens, i.e. a *polis* outside the Peloponnese, would not serve their purposes. Furthermore, their failure must have taught them that before attacking Macedon they had to strengthen their army and restore, securely, their supremacy in the Peloponnese.⁶⁴

The Spartans as liberators, and signs of re-emerging Spartan imperialism in the 270s

The liberation of Troizen

Shortly after Areus' failure in 280, the regent Kleonymos undertook action in the Peloponnese, on the one hand assuming the role of liberator from Macedon, and, on the other, turning his attention to Sparta's time-honoured enemies in the Peloponnese, Messenia and Megalopolis (Marasco 1980a, 74–5).

In the 270s, before his exile, Kleonymos laid siege to Troizen in which there was a Macedonian garrison under the command of Krateros, Antigonos Gonatas' half brother.⁶⁵ Polyainos (*Stratagems* 2.29.1)⁶⁶ describes how he shot arrows bearing the message ἦκω τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθερώσω ('I have come to liberate the city') and how by releasing Troizenian prisoners without ransom he gained the support of certain Troizenians. Fighting followed inside Troizen between the Macedonian garrison and those who wished to overthrow the regime (τοῖς νεωτερίζουσι). It is not clear how many Troizenians turned against the Macedonians. The participle τοῖς νεωτερίζουσι with the definite article shows that not all Troizenians welcomed Kleonymos (Marasco 1980a, 79).

Eventually Kleonymos captured Troizen, raided it and replaced the Macedonian garrison with a Spartan harmost and a garrison (ἐξέειλε τὴν πόλιν καὶ διήρπασε καὶ Σπαρτιάτην ἄρμωστήν μετὰ φρουρᾶς ἐπέστησεν).⁶⁷ One could argue that the Spartan garrison served as protection against the Macedonians but it could also strongly recall the old Spartan ways.

Another dimension of the Troizenian incident concerns relations between the Spartans and the Argives. Marasco (1980a, 76–9) argues that the Spartans must have had at least the tacit approval of the Argives for the Troizenian operation since they had to cross Argive territory in order to get to Troizen. We can at least argue that the Argives acquiesced in the Spartan presence so near their own territory. Were they assured that Kleonymos had no plans against them or did they have other things in mind? Any answer is purely conjectural. The Argives may simply not have wished to engage in armed conflict with the Spartans, or with anyone else, in keeping with the attitude they had shown in the late 4th century. Alternatively or additionally, they could very well have been already embroiled in internal strife of which there is later evidence (during the invasion of Pyrrhos in 272). Another possibility is that at least part of the Argives wished to see the Macedonians out of Troizen and out of their neighbourhood and therefore approved of Kleonymos' action.

However, at some point between its liberation by Kleonymos and 243 (when it joined the Achaian Confederacy), Troizen was liberated again by a certain Diomedes. It is unclear whether the Spartans still held Troizen or whether Gonatas had recaptured it, perhaps following the installation of a pro-Antigonid tyrant in Argos after 272. An epigram from the Amphiareion of Oropos in honour of Diomedes (he was honoured with a bronze statue) celebrates the expulsion of Troizen's enemy and the restoration of ancestral laws (Peek 1953, 318–25 = *SEG* 13.341).⁶⁸ With this we can associate an inscription from Halikarnassos, a colony of Troizen, in honour of the Troizenian Zenodotos, son of Boukides, who helped his city recover its freedom and expel the garrison (*Halikarnassos* 17, ll.5–9).⁶⁹ Robertson (1982, 14–21) showed that Diomedes was from Halikarnassos, a Ptolemaic ally since the 280s,⁷⁰ and suggested that he could be an official of Ptolemy II who brought Troizen over to the Ptolemaic sphere of influence at about the same time that Methana became a Ptolemaic base, taking the name Arsinoe, 'after c. 275, probably in the period 275–255, and rather more likely in the years 275–268 or 265' (at p. 21). Thus, Robertson suggests that the unidentified enemy of Troizen could be an Antigonid garrison, which would have justified Ptolemaic interest, given the clash between the two monarchs for control of the Aegean.⁷¹ However, as Robertson himself admits (at p.16), there remains

the possibility that the garrison was Spartan. Troizen was useful to Philadelphos whoever had previously occupied it.

The liberation of Alipheira

The Arkadian (Kynourian) Alipheira, on a fortified hill south of the Alpheios valley and 9–10 km south of Heraia,⁷² was quite possibly also liberated from Macedon by Kleonymos in the 270s.

An inscription found at Alipheira (*IPArk* 24)⁷³ records that a certain Kleonymos liberated Alipheira from a garrison under the command of one Aristolaos and expelled the pirates (ll. 3–8). It stipulates general amnesty to remedy previous civic unrest (ll. 8–14).⁷⁴ The Alipheirans describe their community as a *polis*, to which debts were owed, with its own officials (ll. 8–10). Therefore, before its liberation Alipheira was either a totally independent *polis* or a *polis* dependent on Megalopolis.⁷⁵ It was certainly part of Megalopolis some time before the 240s when the Megalopolitan tyrant Lydiadas handed it over to the Eleans under whose control Alipheira remained until 219 (Polyb. 4.77.10). We do not know, however, how long before the 240s Alipheira had been under Megalopolitan control, or whether at some point in the same period it had come under Antigonid rule. We hear again about Alipheira towards the end of the 3rd century. It passed under Philip V's control in 219/8, it was claimed by the Megalopolitans in 208 (Livy 28.8.6) but it seems that it remained in the king's hands until the winter of 199/8. Then, according to Livy (32.5.4), Philip declared his intention to restore Alipheira to Megalopolis, and it appears that he did.⁷⁶ However, a few years later (after 194/3), Alipheira appears as an independent *polis*.

The letter forms and the language of the Alipheira inscription indicate a date in the 3rd century – the Arkadian dialect appears dominant but there are elements of the Dorian *koinē*.⁷⁷ More precise dating is associated with the status of Alipheira at different times in the 3rd century, the identity of Kleonymos and the identity of the employer of the garrison and of the pirates. On the basis of the above, we look for a date either before the mid-240s or after 219. Kleonymos could be the Spartan regent, or an otherwise unknown mercenary commander or a citizen of Alipheira liberating it from either Megalopolis or Macedon.⁷⁸ A mercenary commander would be unsuitable to receive such a grand gift. A citizen is not an unlikely hypothesis but we would expect a reference to an Alipheiran army. As Schwertfeger (1973, 87) put it, Kleonymos must have been a person of authority, in order to be in a position to restore a *polis* to its former status, without reference to any higher power.

Roy (1972a, 44–5) argues for a date between 198 and 196. On the

hypothesis that Livy got it wrong for both 208 and 198 and that Philip never restored Alipheira to Megalopolis, Kleonymos – an Alipheiran in Roy's view – persuaded Philip's garrison to leave, at a time when the king was already toying with the idea of giving up Alipheira. Thus, according to Roy, the Megalopolitans would have accepted Alipheira's liberation because Kleonymos had repulsed the pirates operating in the service of Nabis of Sparta – a major enemy of Megalopolis (and the Achaian Confederacy) at the time. Roy's argument is ingenious but is partly based on the probability (in his view) that Alipheira was continuously part of Megalopolis from the 360s to the 240s, which is uncertain. The presupposition that Livy got it wrong twice is rather unattractive.

As a whole, a more economical hypothesis would go for the only well-known Kleonymos of the 3rd century and one who had taken a similar line of action in the case of Troizen (Schwertfeger 1973, 89).

The next question is when exactly Kleonymos liberated Alipheira: before or after his exile in c.275, as Spartan regent or while in the service of Pyrrhos? In either of these cases the Spartans would have appeared as liberators but rather more so in the former. As regent his objective would have been to weaken either Macedon or Megalopolis, depending on who had installed the garrison. If Kleonymos acted in the service of Pyrrhos, then, bearing in mind that Megalopolis had not been hostile to Pyrrhos, the garrison would have been Macedonian and Kleonymos' aim would have been to weaken Gonatas' position. The latter view is put forward by Schwertfeger (1973, 91–2)⁷⁹ who places the liberation during Pyrrhos' stay in Lakonia, in the course of which he plundered surrounding areas (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30.1; Livy 35.27.14). Both dates stand to reason. Given that there had been internal strife in Alipheira, either the Megalopolitans or Gonatas would have had a reason to install a garrison. However, the fact that pirates had been active in Alipheira, in combination with the garrison, is an indication that it had been in Gonatas' hands – he employed pirates during Pyrrhos' invasion of the Peloponnese (Schwertfeger 1973, 92) as well as later, during the Chremonidean War.

In any case, if Alipheira indeed became independent in the 270s, then we should envisage (aggressive?) expansion on Megalopolis' part sometime after that date, in order to find Alipheira in Lydiadas' hands in the mid-3rd century.

Spartan assaults on Messenia and Megalopolis

As mentioned above, Pausanias (4.28.3) reports that the Messenians did not join the other Greeks against the Gauls in 279 because the Lakedaimonians and Kleonymos refused to grant them a truce. On the

basis of Pausanias' evidence, hostilities between Sparta and Messenia seem to have been going on for a while. Neither the object nor the outcome of these hostilities is recorded. It has been suggested, very cautiously as it should, that the Spartans re-conquered the Dentheliatis in the course of this operation.⁸⁰ But even if they did, this does not have to mean that they were able to keep the territory concerned; and certainly they did not take advantage of it to attack Messenia. At a later date a certain king Antigonos, probably Doson, awards (or reconfirms?) the Dentheliatis to the Messenians (see pp.248–50).

It is possible that Spartan activity in the 270s triggered Messenian action. According to Pausanias (4.28.4–5), not long after the Gallic invasion the Messenians occupied Elis (οὐ πολλῷ δὲ ὕστερον ἔσχον Ἡλιν Μεσσήνιοι).⁸¹ The Spartans were ready to assist 'those who shared the same views with them' in Elis but the Messenians dispatched 1000 picked troops (λογάδες) to Elis and drove out sympathizers of Sparta (employing trickery).⁸² The words οὐ πολλῷ δὲ ὕστερον are not very helpful for dating the incident, especially since Pausanias in a later passage (4.29.1) jumps to the (attempted) capture of Messene by the Macedonians, in c.214/3, using a similar expression: μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον τοῦ ἔργου τοῦ πρὸς Ἡλιδι Μακεδόνες καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φιλίππου⁸³ τοῦ Δημητρίου Μεσσήνην καταλαμβάνουσι ('not long after the affair at Elis, the Macedonians and Demetrios the son of Philip, son of Demetrios, captured Messene').⁸⁴

Thus, the incident should be dated after 279 and before c.214/3. Since it shows that there was dissension between pro- and anti-Spartan factions in Elis, we should also exclude periods for which there is evidence of friendly Elean-Spartan relations, i.e. the 260s when Elis was allied with Sparta in the Chremonidean War, the age of Kleomenes III (235–222) and the period after 220.⁸⁵ While acknowledging the danger of arguing *ex silentio*, we still note with interest that apart from the Messenian-Elean incident, there is no tangible 3rd century evidence, prior to 214, of hostile relations between the Spartans and the Eleans, or any section of the Eleans. We should also perhaps exclude a date between the 250s and the early 220s, when both Elis and Messenia were on friendly terms with the Aitolian Confederacy.⁸⁶ Admittedly, the bond with the Aitolians is not an adequate reason to assume good relations between Elis and Messenia. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that the Aitolians would not have intervened to establish order among their allies, as they did in the 240s between Messenia and Phigaleia.

Roebuck (1941, 63–4) thinks that the Messenian intervention in Elis best fits the period c.279 but he does not exclude the aftermath of Pyrrhos' death, when the tyrant Aristotimos was briefly in power. However, as

Marasco (1980a, 82–3) has pointed out, there is no evidence of Spartan involvement in this regime. Thus, Marasco has plausibly suggested that it was possibly in reaction to Spartan aggression in c.279 that the Messenians took action in Elis, by forestalling the installation of a pro-Spartan regime.⁸⁷ Quite possibly the Eleans were divided into factions some years before Aristotimos' regime. Notably, there is no evidence of a more permanent presence of the Messenians in Elis. For what it is worth, Pausanias employs the aorist ἔσχον, not the imperfect tense.

Themelis (2001, 199–201) associates with this event a casualty list of Messenians fallen at Makiston (in Triphylia; Nielsen 2004b, 544), observing that the lettering of the inscription points to a date before the last quarter of the 3rd century, before Triphylia had been conquered by Philip V (ed. pr. Themelis 1996 [1998], 163–5 = *SEG* 47.406). He further suggests that a battle was fought between the Messenians and the Spartans but there is no mention of such a battle in the inscription.⁸⁸

The involvement in Elis would have been the first time that the Messenians dared take action against Sparta, albeit not actually facing the Spartans on the battlefield. We then have to assume a later change of regime or a change in the political stance on the part of Messenian leaders, since during the invasion of Pyrrhos, the Messenians sent troops to support Sparta.

This is also the last time we hear of such an old-fashioned Spartan intervention. Essentially, what had been a major feature of Peloponnesian politics disappears for ever after this incident, i.e. the involvement of the Spartans in *poleis*' regimes.

As to Megalopolis, Pausanias (8.6.3) refers vaguely to Arkadians being subject to Spartan threat, like the Messenians, at the time of the Gallic invasion, but we can easily identify the Arkadians with the Megalopolitans, since by then they were perhaps the only Arkadian enemy of Sparta or at least the enemy *par excellence*. Furthermore, the later participation of Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenos in the Chremonidean War, on Sparta's side, would have been difficult to explain, if just a few years earlier the Spartans had attacked them. Pausanias' wording shows that the Megalopolitans feared plundering by the Spartans, not that they actually faced it:

πρὸς Γαλάτας δὲ τοῦ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις κινδύνου φασὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἕνεκα οὐ μετασχεῖν, ἵνα μὴ σφισιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κακουργοῖεν τὴν γῆν ἀπόντων τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ.

It was because of the Lakedaimonians, they say, that they took no part in resisting the Gallic threat to Thermopylai; they feared that their land would be laid waste in the absence of their men of military age.

On the other hand, it can be argued with equal plausibility that plundering of Megalopolitan territory had happened already before the Gallic invasion, whence the fear.

After the death of Areus in 265 and before 252/1, perhaps in 262, king Akrotatos, son of Areus, invaded Megalopolis which was then ruled by the tyrant Aristodemos (Plut. *Agis* 3.5; Paus. 8.27.11).⁸⁹ He was defeated and lost his life.⁹⁰ Whatever the date, Akrotatos' action seems to have been dictated by a wish to reinforce Sparta's position in the Peloponnese.⁹¹ In terms of intra-Peloponnesian relations, this is actually the first military success of Megalopolis against Sparta (David 1981, 139), and without external help so far as we know. The Megalopolitans appropriately celebrated by building a portico (Paus. 8.30.7).⁹²

This reversal surely was one more psychological blow for the Spartans, as well as a reason for ongoing hostility and heightened morale for the Megalopolitans. Both the hostility and the elevated morale were to become manifest in the age of the next tyrant of Megalopolis, Lydiadas. This Megalopolitan victory was the first step in a long process at the end of which Megalopolis, or more accurately a Megalopolitan politician, was to outdo Sparta completely: in the early 2nd century Philopoimen forced Sparta to become a member of the Achaian Confederacy.⁹³

Notes

¹ Areus ascended to the throne as a minor in 309/8.

² Marasco (1980a, 31–8) notes the hostility of both Pausanias (3.6.2–3) and Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 26.8–9) towards Kleonymos whom they present as disputing the succession from the beginning of Areus' reign; but cf. Cartledge (2002b, 30) essentially accepting Pausanias' and Plutarch's views on the early ambitions of Kleonymos. David (1981, 118–20) notes the role of the *Gerousia*.

³ On the probable association of the formation of the Achaian Confederacy with the war of Areus, see also Walbank 1957, 233; Urban 1979, 5–7; Rizakis 2005, 260–2, on chronology, its organization and members; *id.* 2008a, 108.

⁴ Yardley and Develin (1994, 183, n.1) note that Hieronymos of Kardia 'remains a likely source for events up to the death of Pyrrhus'.

⁵ In the last years of the 4th century there are recorded two Spartan campaigns: the first, in 315, was led by Akrotatos, son of Kleomenes II, against Agathokles of Syracuse (responding to a joint appeal of Akragas, Messene and Gela): Diod. Sic. 19.70.6, 71.1–6; David 1981, 117–19; Marasco 1980a, 23; Cartledge 2002b, 27. The second, much more ambitious, campaign was undertaken by the regent Kleonymos (brother of Akrotatos) and a mercenary force in 303, initially to help Taras against the Lucanians and the Romans. After bringing about an understanding between Taras and the Lucanians, Kleonymos captured Metapontum and Kerkyra. What is most interesting, he refused an alliance both with Kassandros and Poliorketes and then he continued his operations in Italy; eventually he failed and had to return to Sparta; see

Diod. Sic. 20.104–5; Livy 10.2; Polyainos, *Stratagems* 8.19. Marasco (1980a, 38–48) views Kleonymos' activities as far exceeding the aims of official Spartan policy. See David 1981, 120–3, on the lack of benefits for Sparta. Cartledge (2002b, 30) notes that the most far-reaching result of Kleonymos' campaign was the favourable impression made on Pyrrhos of Epeiros. About twenty years later Kleonymos – being in exile – would join Pyrrhos in the invasion of Lakonia.

⁶ On the instability of Spartan kingship in the Classical era see Powell 2010, 126–9.

⁷ Cloché 1945, 230; David 1981, 125.

⁸ Beloch (1927, 370–1) argued that Areus' allies were limited in number, consisting mainly of the Achaïans. In this he stands alone. Tarn (1913, 132–3) argued for an extensive alliance probably comprising Megara, Boiotia, most of Arkadia apart from Megalopolis, certain towns in the Argolid, the freed Achaïans and Elis. He excluded Troizen, on the grounds that it was probably still under Gonatas' control (this appears correct). He also excluded Messene and Argos. Roebuck (1941, 62) essentially agreed with Tarn, excluding Elis. Marasco (1980a, 66 with notes) excludes Elis but includes a large part of the Arkadian *poleis* and possibly Argos and Epidaurous. Will (1979, 108) excludes both Megalopolis and Argos; also Walbank 1988, 249. Cartledge (2002b, 32) includes the Achaïan Confederacy, most of Arkadia except for Megalopolis and some *poleis* in the Argolid. Very prudently Kolde (2003, 269) presents the problem in the form of questions.

⁹ See Pikoulas 2012, 450–7, for Lakonian routes to the north.

¹⁰ Walbank (1957, 233) acutely observes that the policy of Patrai shows that the newly founded Achaïan Confederacy did not enforce upon its members uniformity in foreign policy.

¹¹ Scholten (2003, 143) suggests that the dispatching of a contingent might indicate renewed interest in the area across the Corinthian Gulf.

¹² Troizen did not participate since it had a Macedonian garrison.

¹³ See Roebuck 1948, 87–8 and Kolde 2003, 12–18; 43–6, for the origin of Isyllos.

¹⁴ Isyllos narrates a miracle (ll. 57–75): When he was a *pais* (a boy or in his early teens) he dreamt of Asklepios telling him that he was going to offer his help to Sparta against Philip. Isyllos reported this epiphany to the Spartans. Much later Isyllos had the incident and a *paian* in honour of Apollo and Asklepios inscribed on a *stêlē*. Unlike most scholars, Kolde (2003, 258–64) attempts to identify Philip with Philip III Arrhidaïos and sets the intended invasion in 317/6 and in the context of Polyperchon's campaign in the Peloponnese. Nevertheless, the case for Philip II is still the stronger. This is the Philip that would come to every Greek's mind when reading the poem, not the obscure Arrhidaïos who never set foot in the Peloponnese. Furthermore, as Kolde herself admits, there is no recorded attack of Polyperchon, in the name of Philip III, against Sparta. On the other hand, a date in the time of Philip II for the attack on Sparta can be reconciled with a date in c.280 for the dedication of the *stêlē*, if we think that Isyllos would have simply been an old man in c.280 (Kolde 2003, 264) – admittedly quite old if he was a *pais* in 337. However, cf. the reservations on the date expressed by Sineux 2005.

Christien (2013, 348–9) argues rightly in our view that the hymn (also) testifies to the wish of the Spartans to liaise with the great sanctuaries of the time. She dates the hymn to c. 296/5, when Demetrios Poliorketes attacked Sparta (in April 295), mainly on the basis of ll. 70–1 where Isyllos states that the Spartans guarded the oracles of

Apollo Pythios which Lykourgos had ordained: Christien views these verses as an allusion to the disrespect shown to Apollo Pythios by Poliorketes. This is not implausible but the respect shown to Apollo's precepts need not be an allusion to anything other than the danger of their becoming obsolete along with the Spartans because of Philip's attack. See also Flower (2009, 200–1) on Sparta still providing 'the divinely sanctioned and divinely supported model of good government'.

¹⁵ Marasco 1980a, 58–60 and Kolde 2003, 47, 276–8. Edelstein and Edelstein (1998, II, 241–2) on the poem as an attempt to persuade the Epidaurians to return to Spartan habits; Burford 1969, 17 and n.3.

¹⁶ Marasco (1980a, 66 and n.13) also considered the participation of Elis very dubious.

¹⁷ Tarn (1913, 132, n.44) believes that Argos had been garrisoned by Gonatas and that it was freed in 280.

¹⁸ Marasco (1980a, 68–9) associates this view of Justin with Plut. *Mor.* 219a–b, where a king Archidamos (identified by Marasco with Archidamos IV, the fellow-king of Areus) was unable to convince the Greeks to cancel their agreements with Antigonos and Krateros and be free, the reason being their fear that the Spartans would prove to be worse masters than the Macedonians.

¹⁹ See also David 1981, 126 and Walbank 1988, 249.

²⁰ Patrai suffered severe losses against the Gauls but nevertheless dedicated, from the spoils of the battle, a statue of Apollo, in the Odeion (Paus. 7.20.6). Indeed, after 279 Patrai underwent a *dioikismos*, with most of its inhabitants settled in 5 *polismata*, but it was not completely abandoned (Morgan and Hall 2004, 484); Mackil (2004, 506) views the *dioikismos* as a positive reaction to the losses suffered against the Gauls and to poverty; see Rizakis (1998, 23) on the credibility of Pausanias' testimony.

²¹ On the Gallic invasion see Nachtergaele 1977, 140–74; Will 1979, 210; Walbank 1988, 251–5; Scholten 2000, 31–45.

²² Gonatas had ascended to the Macedonian throne in 277 after a major victory over the Gauls; see Will 1979, 107–10; Walbank 1988, 255–8.

²³ On Pyrrhos' campaign to the Peloponnese see Plut. *Pyrrh.* 27–34; briefly, Paus. 1.13.7–8; 4.29.6; Lévêque 1957, 583–630; Marasco 1980a, 100–15; Will 1979, 212–16; Walbank 1988 264–7; Errington 2008, 85–7.

²⁴ Similarly, Cartledge 2002b, 34: Pyrrhos showed 'his regrettable talent for throwing sworn enemies together'.

²⁵ Walbank (1988, 264 and n.1), on the basis of Justin 25.4.4, argues that Pyrrhos disembarked at Pleuron, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf.

²⁶ The Athenians might have wished to secure Pyrrhos' help against Gonatas since the Peiraieus was probably still in the latter's hands: Habicht 1997, 124–5.

²⁷ See also Marasco 1980a, 116. Cloché (1946, 36–7) suggests that another reason for Messenian help could have been the fear that Pyrrhos would install Kleonymos in power, the man who had campaigned against the Messenians.

²⁸ Tarn 1913, 269, n.33; Lévêque 1957, 588; Marasco 1980a, 105.

²⁹ See Paus. 6.3.6 for an explicit reference to the Eleans giving permission to erect a statue.

³⁰ See Marasco 1980a, 105 and n.45; Paschidis 2008a, 280–1; Zoumbaki 2005, 188–9, § 21.

³¹ Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.7–9; Marasco 1980a, 93–100; David 1981, 127–8; Cartledge 2002b, 32–3.

³² See Marasco (1980a, 114) on the shared interests of Sparta and Antigonos Gonatas.

³³ Marasco 1980a, 114; Errington 2008, 88.

³⁴ Briscoe (1978, 148) suggests that opinions in Messenia may have been divided.

³⁵ Lénêque 1957, 589; also Marasco 1980a, 118.

³⁶ The latent praise for the initiative of the Messenians might very well be a product of Messenian oral tradition.

³⁷ See this chapter, p.136 and n.80.

³⁸ Polyb. 4.32.2–4: οὐτε τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔχθραν εὐγενῶς ἀνελάμβανον οὐτε τὴν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας φιλίαν. Luraghi (2008, 338–9) observes that ‘Polybius’ views suggest that, in Hellenistic Messenia, opposition to Sparta was not the product of political circumstances or objective conditions and did not have any visible consequences in the Messenians’ foreign policy’.

³⁹ Musti and Torelli (1991, 246) remark that Argos and Arkadia, traditionally on friendly terms with Messenia, were also members of the Achaian Confederacy, and therefore the interpretation of Pausanias does not make much sense. This view presupposes that to the Messenians the friendship of the Arkadians counted more than fear of the Spartans, which does not appear at all clear.

⁴⁰ The ‘paternal’ could very well mean ‘ancestral’: see Paschidis 2008a, 232 and n.2.

⁴¹ Depending on whether Archidamos went into exile before or after Kleomenes’ ascent to the throne; see Bernini 1981, 445–58.

⁴² Ἀθάνατον μ<ν>ἀμ<α>ν ἀρετᾶς, Δαμόστρατε, λε[ίπεις] | ἀρχαίαν ἔχθραν εἰς φιλίαν ἀγαγών. | Σὴν πατρίδα Σπάρταν καὶ Μεσ<σ>ἀνα<ν> δμαλί[σαι] | πολλῶν εὐξαμένων, σοὶ τόδ’ ἔνειμε Τύχη]. Translation by Luraghi 2008, 337–8.

⁴³ See also Themelis 1997 [1999], 111–12.

⁴⁴ See Tarn 1913, Appendix VIII, 448–9, on the credibility of Plutarch’s version of Pyrrhos’ death versus Pausanias’.

⁴⁵ Gonatas had two sons, Demetrios, the future king, and Halkyoneus by a concubine. It is hardly likely that he would have surrendered the successor to the throne as a hostage (if indeed he was present). Thus, we are left with Halkyoneus who, following Pyrrhos’ defeat and death, is reported to have brought to his father the head of Pyrrhos, i.e. either he was never surrendered to them or the Argives had released him – still, it does not seem likely that Gonatas would have surrendered any son of his.

⁴⁶ Paschidis 2008a, 218; Walbank 1988, 272–4. Gabbert 1997, 43–4, on the opportunistic character of Gonatas’ friendships and alliances.

⁴⁷ *ISE* 23; Paschidis 2008a, 217; see Ch. 5, n.39. On the tyranny in Argos see Landucci Gattinoni 2006, 327–35 and Paschidis 2008a, 212–24.

⁴⁸ See Gómez Espelosín 1991, 105–8, on the aristocratic character of the conspiracy against Aristotimos; Bearzot (1992, 143) associates the support of Gonatas for Aristotimos of Elis with a statue of the former dedicated by the Eleans (Paus. 6.11.1). On Aristotimos see also Zoumbaki 2005, 111–13, A 114; also 152–3, E 3 (Ἑλλάνκος); 188–9, Θ 21 (Θρασύβουλος); 229–30, K 54 (Κύλ(λ)ων); 236, 237, Λ 6, 8 (Λάμπις); 377, X 20 (Χίλων). Thrasyboulos, probably to be identified with the supporter of Pyrrhos, was the instigator of the assassination. Paschidis (2008a, 280–1) rightly points out that Thrasyboulos’ action does not necessarily make him a ‘democrat’.

⁴⁹ The date of the Chremonidean War – especially its beginning – has been quite a problem depending on the dating of Peithidemos’ archonship during which the

Chremonides decree was passed; 265/4 and 268/7 have been proposed; for a summary of the views see Aneziri 2009, 28. Here, I endorse the view put forward by Heinen 1972 (102–110), and followed by Walbank 1988 (276–89) and Habicht (1997, 142–4), that the war started in 268/7, because the events described by Justin and Pausanias cannot fit into a span of three or four years. The war probably ended in the year of the archon Antipatros (263/2): Habicht 1997, 146; *contra* Dreyer 1999, 341–75, esp. 374–5 (chronological table).

⁵⁰ *Syll.*³ 434/435; *SV4* III, 476.

⁵¹ Ptolemy II dedicated a statue of Areus at Olympia, perhaps on the eve of the war or posthumously: *IvO* 308 / *Syll.*³ 433; See Paschidis 2008a, 258, n.6, for a discussion of the date. This and the statue erected by the Eleans (Paus. 6.12.5) make Spartan kingship look much more Hellenistic: Christien 2013, 357.

⁵² See also the translation of the decree by Burstein 1985, no.56 and Austin 2006, no.61.

⁵³ Heinen 1972, 95–181, esp. 126–32 for Sparta; Habicht 1997, 142–3; Will 1979, 219–33; Marasco 1980a, 139–53; Buraselis 1982, 157–60, 164; Walbank 1984a, 236–40 and 1988, 276–89; Errington 1990, 167–70 and 2008, 87–90; Scholten 2003, 145–8; Dreyer 1999, 331–3.

⁵⁴ Cartledge (2002b, 37) observes the rather pompous language by which king Areus is referred to in the Chremonides decree, which should be seen as an attempt to make an impression on the allies. See also David 1981, 137–8, on the prominence of Areus.

⁵⁵ Pausanias' narrative is markedly Athenocentric, minimizes the role of Sparta and mistakenly attributes the initiative for the war to Gonatas; on the other hand, Justin agrees with the Chremonides decree on the role of Ptolemy II and Sparta: see Bearzot 1992, 141, 145.

⁵⁶ Kaphyai is classified as a *polis* for the first time precisely during the Chremonidean War, in c. 265, although the city-ethnic is attested in collective use already in the first half of the 5th century, in *FD* III.4.191: see Nielsen 2004a, 514.

⁵⁷ See Marasco (1980a, 84–7, 140) on identification of Sparta's Cretan allies and on Crete as a supplier of mercenaries to Sparta.

⁵⁸ ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 447–9 / Dubois 1988, II, 163–4. See also the Orchomenian honorific decree – the earliest attested grant of *proxenia* by Orchomenos (Nielsen 2004a, 524) – for three eminent Athenian envoys who had presumably been sent to the Peloponnese to prepare the grounds for the Athenian – Spartan alliance (Habicht 1997, 143–4): ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 451–4, no.1 / *ISE* 53 / Dubois 1988, II, 164–6.

⁵⁹ Mackil (2013, 101) also notes that the Achaians had previously expressed unanimity in their welcoming Pyrrhos.

⁶⁰ Larchippos: ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 468–71, no.11 / Dubois 1988, II, 175–6 / *IPArk* 36m = ll. 8–17. Kleophaes: ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 459–61, no. 4 / *Dubois 1988, II, 166–7. Tyteas: ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 462–3, no.6 / *Dubois 1988, II, 169–70 / *IPArk* 36i = ll. 4–14.

⁶¹ On an individual level, Tritaios of Megalopolis had adopted Aristodemos of Phigaleia, son of Artylas, the future tyrant of Megalopolis (Paus. 8.27.11). On the other hand, we cannot know the attitude of the citizens of Phigaleia as a whole.

⁶² O'Neil (2008, 78–9) suggests that the request of Patroklos (the Ptolemaic official

in charge of the operations) to Areus to attack the Macedonians while he (Patroklos) would attack their rear (Paus. 3.6.5) makes more sense if Areus had managed to get into Attike: Πάτροκλος ἀποστέλλων ἀγγέλους προέτρεπε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρέα ἄρχειν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον μάχης, ἐκείνων δὲ ἀρξάντων οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς κατὰ νότου τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἔφρασκεν ἐπιχειρῆσθαι ('Patroklos dispatched messengers urging Areus and the Lakedaimonians to take the offensive against Antigonos. On their doing so, he would himself, he said, attack the Macedonians in the rear'). It is a reasonable hypothesis, but one could very well argue that Pausanias simply records wishful thinking on Patroklos' part.

⁶³ Diodorus (20.29.1) states that Areus died 44 years after his ascent to the throne, which we know was in 309/8.

⁶⁴ Oliva (1971, 208 and n.1) observes that the attempts of Spartan kings 'to behave like Hellenistic monarchs had failed...the road to restoration of Sparta's former place ...was sought in renewal of her inner strength'.

⁶⁵ *IG IV* 769 testifies to the presence of a Macedonian garrison in Troizen.

⁶⁶ See also Frontinus 3.6.7.

⁶⁷ The installation of a Spartan harmost is a strong argument employed by Marasco (1980a, 78, n.54) in favour of a date before Kleonymos' exile.

⁶⁸ Peek thoroughly restored *IG VII* 336; Robert, J. and L. (1954, 133–4, no.128) restore πατρίωι in l. 6 instead of πατρί' ὦι; *ISE* 62 and *I.Omp.* 389 endorse Peek's text as well as the correction by J. and L. Robert. Peek (at pp. 324–5) argues that Diomedes liberated Troizen from the Spartan garrison. He is followed by Will (1979, 219) and Marasco (1980a, 118 and n.101), who date the liberation of Troizen to 272, during the invasion of Pyrrhos, taking Diomedes to be a Troizenian.

⁶⁹ Wilhelm 1911, 21–3; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 90, n.32.

⁷⁰ In the epigram Diomedes is presented as belonging to the splendid generation of Anthas. According to Moretti (*ISE*, I, p. 158, nn.2, 3) the allusion is to the founder of both Troizen and Anthedon in Boiotia. But, as Robertson has shown, the name of Anthas alludes to the family of Antheadai, who according to Stephanos Byzantios (s.v. Ἀθήναι) were 'the most illustrious of the Halicarnassians'. As to the erection of the *stēlē* in the Amphiarcion, this could be explained by the Ptolemaic bonds with the Boiotian Confederacy (Robertson 1982, 19).

⁷¹ Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 90 and n.32) endorse Robertson's identification.

⁷² Walbank 1957, 531; Orlandos 1967–68, 3–9.

⁷³ Te Riele and Orlandos first published the inscription independently of each other. Orlandos 1967–68, 135–51, no.1; Te Riele 1967 (= *SEG* 25.447) and 1971 with corrections in ll. 12, 23; see Robert, J. & L. 1969, 463–4, no. 267. See also Dubois 1988, II, 241–8.

⁷⁴ There is reference to λιποδαμ[ί]ας (ll. 9–10), which appears as a penalty for political offences, and to φυνάδας (l. 22); see Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, p.282; also Te Riele 1967, 217.

⁷⁵ On the 'dependent' *poleis* see Ch.1, nn.82, 88.

⁷⁶ See Ch. 1, p.30 and n.172.

⁷⁷ Orlandos 1967–68, 146–51; Te Riele 1967, 213.

⁷⁸ Orlandos (1967–68, 137–40) dates the liberation of Alipheira between 235 and 230. He identifies the pirates who attacked Alipheira with the Illyrian pirates

mentioned by Polybius (2.5.1–2), the garrison as Macedonian, and Kleonymos with the tyrant of Phleious who gave up power before the admission of Phleious into the Achaian Confederacy in 229/8. Roy 1972a, 43, crucially objects that Alipheira could not have had a Macedonian garrison while it was under the control of Elis; also Schwertfeger 1973, 86.

Te Riele (1967, 222–4) dates the incident in 218, during the Social War (220–217), and argues that Kleonymos liberated Alipheira from the Eleans, being either in the service of Philip V of Macedon or a citizen of Alipheira; the pirates would have been in the service of the Aitolians. There are two serious objections: Roy 1972a, 44) observes that the absence of any reference to Philip V, who had personally conducted the operations against Elis and Alipheira in particular, does not fit such a scenario; Schwertfeger (1973, 86) observes the paradox: Kleonymos liberated Alipheira while Philip V conquered it.

⁷⁹ Schwertfeger's view is endorsed by Walbank 1988, 265 and n.4; also Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, pp.279–81.

⁸⁰ Roebuck 1941, 62; Walbank 1957, 288; Marasco 1980a, 74. Grandjean (2003, 73) leaves the matter open as to whether this was done by Kleonymos or Kleomenes III. Cartledge (2002b, 238, n.12 and 239, n.24) wonders whether the Denthelatis returned into Messenian hands on this occasion or after the Spartan defeat by Megalopolis, possibly in the late 260s – if at all. On the other hand, Shipley (2000a, 386) thinks that Kleonymos' efforts did not have any lasting effects.

⁸¹ Immediately afterwards Pausanias has a digression on how civil strife in Elis went back to the machinations of Philip II.

⁸² According to Pausanias (4.28.5–6), the Messenians carried shields with Lakonian symbols (σημεῖα ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀσπίδι Λακωνικὰ ἔχοντες). It seems that the pro-Spartan Eleans were in need of help when the Messenians arrived and they let them in, hoping that they had come as their allies: ...ὥς δὲ τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐθεάσαντο ὅσοι τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις εἶνοι τῶν Ἡλείων ἦσαν, συμμαχίαν τε ἀφίχθαί σφισιν ἤλπισαν καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐδέχοντο ἐς τὸ τεῖχος.

⁸³ Pausanias, probably writing from memory, is here confusing Demetrios the son of Philip with Demetrios of Pharos, Philip V's associate: Habicht 1998a, 98. See also Polyb. 3.19.11 & 8.12.1 and Plut. *Arat.* 49–51.

⁸⁴ See Musti and Torelli (1991, 246) for the similarity between the two temporal expressions; as to the date of the incident in Elis, they leave the matter open; Auberger (2005, 196) hesitantly suggests a date after Pyrrhos' death in 272.

⁸⁵ During the Social War (220–217) Elis was allied with the Spartans and the Aitolians, while Messene joined the Hellenic Alliance under Philip V of Macedon; in c.213, under obscure circumstances, the Messenians changed sides again (Roebuck 1941, 67, 72–76, 81–4; Walbank 1957, 463; Grandjean 2003, 78–80); see p.300.

⁸⁶ Good terms between the Messenians and the Aitolian Confederacy had been established already in the 260s (Fossey 1996, 159; Grandjean 2003, 75) while Elis came under the Aitolian aegis at the latest in the early 240s (Scholten 2000, 118–19).

⁸⁷ Grandjean (2003, 74) remains hesitant between the early and the late 270s.

⁸⁸ For the date see also Luraghi 2008, 257 and n.28.

⁸⁹ Cloché 1946, 53–4; Marasco 1980a, 153–6 and 1981, 191; Cartledge 2002b, 37; Walbank 1988, 273 and n.2. The *terminus post quem* is established by Plutarch (*Agis* 3.7), who places the defeat of Akrotatos after Arcus' death. Aristodemos became tyrant of

Megalopolis during the Chremonidean War and perhaps before that; his tyranny lasted until 251; see Moggi and Osanna 2003, 422.

⁹⁰ Pausanias (8.27.11) mistakenly calls Akrotatos son of Kleonymos and also mistakenly says that he was not a king: Marasco 1980a, 154, n.62 and Moggi and Osanna 2003, 422–3.

⁹¹ On the assumption that the campaign is dated to 262, i.e. in the final stages of the Chremonidean War, O’Neil (2008, 83) suggests that Akrotatos’ ultimate goal was to force Gonatas to come to the succour of Megalopolis and thus relieve Athens from the siege. However, I think that Marasco (1980a, 155–6) rightly dismisses any connection with the Chremonidean War.

⁹² Moggi and Osanna 2003, 437; Jost 1998, 232.

⁹³ Pausanias (8.10.5–8) reports a deeply problematic piece of information on Spartan aggression against Mantinea. If credible, it should be dated c.251 (Walbank 1933, 36 and n.1), shortly after the liberation of Sikyon from the tyrant Nikokles but before Sikyon became a member of the Achaian Confederacy and probably also after the liberation of Megalopolis from its tyrant Aristodemos. The Mantineans from all age classes under Podares, the Megalopolitans under Lydiadas and Leokydes, as well as all the other Arkadians present (?) (8.10.6: ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο Ἀρκαδικὸν ἐτάσσοντο), the Sikyonians under Aratos and the Achaians, achieved a victory over a Spartan force under ‘king’ Agis who was killed in the battle. A trophy was set up near the sanctuary of Poseidon at Mantinea. Overall, the passage serves to present Mantinean heroism and widespread Peloponnesian support for Mantinea against Sparta. It seems to be based both on oral tradition emanating from the family of Podares as well as at least one written source (Pretzler 2005, 240, 244 and nn. 65, 66).

Apart from the trophy (Larsen 1968, 309 and n.4), which nevertheless could be associated with another battle, far too many of the details are profoundly questionable for the whole passage to be credible (Urban 1979, 38–45; Habicht 1998a, 101–2 and n.23; Walbank 1988, 308; Moggi and Osanna 2003, 343). Clearly, Agis cannot be Agis IV who was put to death by his domestic adversaries in 241 (Bearzot 1992, 157–8), and the only way to get round this problem is to argue that this Agis was another member of the royal family, or that his name was not Agis or that he did not die there. Aratos’ strategy copies Hannibal’s strategy at the battle of Cannae (Walbank 1933, 36, n.1) and the reference to the presence of the Elean seer Thrasyboulos (in 8.10.5) reminds us of the battle of Plataia in 479 (Pretzler 2005, 244, n.66). In other words, Pausanias’ source or Pausanias himself put together information from various battles. Furthermore, the Mantinean leader Podares should be placed in c.300 since, according to Pausanias, he comes two generations after his ancestor Podares, the hero of 362.

There are further questions: Why would the Spartans have attacked Mantinea, only a few years after the latter had participated in the fairly recent Chremonidean War on Sparta’s side? Admittedly, we cannot exclude the possibility of factionalism in Mantinea and that the Spartans interfered in favour of one group against another. Still, this Arkadian anti-Spartan stance looks very strange, since, on the basis of our knowledge, the Arkadians, with the exception of Megalopolis, had a pro-Spartan attitude in the 3rd century. Why would other Arkadians and the Achaians, also allies of Sparta in the Chremonidean War, take arms against the Spartans? Were Aratos and the Sikyonians in any position to be involved in military action shortly after their liberation from tyranny and with all their financial problems?

THE EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION OF THE ACHAIAAN CONFEDERACY: THE POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF THE NORTH-EASTERN AND CENTRAL PELOPONNESE, 251–229

An overview of the development and institutions of the Achaian Confederacy

The Peloponnesians had remained without a leading state for more than a hundred years – after the defeat of Sparta at Leuktra in 371 – when the Achaian Confederacy emerged to take Sparta's place as the most powerful Peloponnesian state, in the second half of the 3rd century.

The (re)-emergence of the Achaian Confederacy represents a re-affirmation of the Peloponnesian tendency for sympolities, evident already in the early to mid 4th century (see p.10). Back then, the Arkadian Confederacy owed its existence to the destruction of Spartan power and to the need for protection against possible Spartan resurgence. The Achaian Confederacy of the 3rd and the 2nd centuries owed its existence largely to the need for protection from Macedon but it came to be allied with Macedon and to be defined by its clash with Sparta.

The Achaian Confederacy is part of a wider development in the Greek world. Federal states had appeared already in the 5th and the 4th centuries, but their political impact had been limited. In the 3rd and the first half of the 2nd century the Greek world came to consist largely of federal states.¹ This development is rightly interpreted as the result of the need of the Greek *poleis* to establish a peaceful co-existence, overcome their limitations of size, and protect themselves against pressure from very large external powers.²

A federal state can very well be founded for defensive reasons but then develop into a hegemony of varying proportions, which is what happened with the Achaian Confederacy (and others). The very fact that the highest office was that of the *stratēgos* shows the largely military character of the Confederacy. The element of expansion is not openly admitted by Achaian leaders who instead pose as defenders of freedom, liberators and so on (Doukellis 2004a, 14–16). Thus, the question is what kind of hegemony

the Achaian Confederacy achieved, what were the nature and the limitations of its power. In the end, the question is whether the Confederacy stepped into Sparta's shoes. To summarize, it outdid Sparta in terms of territory and population but it did not come even close to achieving a really supreme role in the Peloponnese, because very much unlike Classical Sparta it needed external backing to maintain its hegemony. To be fair, in a world dominated by kings with large armies and substantial resources, neither would the Spartans have been able to achieve supremacy without external support.

* * *

The Peloponnesian *poleis*, one after the other, were faced with the challenge of overcoming their particularism and conceding part of their autonomy,³ in order to partake in a much stronger political entity. Citizens of member-states retained double citizenship,⁴ of both their *polis* and the Confederacy, but the *poleis* had to pursue a common foreign policy (Larsen 1968, 237–9). The League of Corinth of 302, designed to operate under the firm guidance of the Antigonids, could very well have provided the model of strict control over policies of individual members, for both the Achaian and the Aitolian Confederacies (Buraselis 2003a, 41–2).

Foreign policy has two interwoven aspects in the case of Peloponnesian *poleis*: attitude(s) towards an external power (Aitolia, Macedon and later on Rome) and intra-Peloponnesian relations. The Peloponnesian *poleis* had learned to live under the control or fear or the shadow of Macedon – though attitudes towards the latter had not been unanimous. As we shall see, participation in the Achaian Confederacy affected positively relations between certain member-states. Partial loss of autonomy was not a sacrifice provided that three conditions were met: that no or little coercion was exercised; that the Confederacy offered protection from external enemies, and that there was clearly no alternative. In order to ensure protection and thus be viable, the new organization would have to demonstrate a capacity to protect and to lead. And this is where loyalties frayed.

On the one hand, the Achaian Confederacy, in its initial stages, would have been attractive precisely because it had no history of hegemony, and therefore would be much less intimidating than Sparta. On the other hand, the Achaian Confederacy – especially its initial kernel of Achaian *poleis* – was unaccustomed to lead. Expansion, in its initial stages, also included other *poleis* that were equally unaccustomed to being leaders – Sikyon and the *poleis* of the Argolic Akte. The Arkadian *poleis*, which enrolled in the 230s, were greater in terms of size and territory and had a more notable record. Tegea and Mantinea had once upon a time controlled some of

their neighbours but they had long foregone their micro-imperialistic ambitions. On the other hand, Megalopolis was *megalē* in terms of territory and population consisting of several communities, and there are indications that it exercised an expansionist policy within Arkadia. Furthermore, it had followed a policy distinct from that of most Arkadian *poleis*. Argos, which willy-nilly enrolled in 229, was another great *polis* in terms of territory and population, and one with bonds with Macedon. However, it had not sought hegemony, which, of course, could theoretically be very positive for the internal stability of the Confederacy, as long as Argive leaders did not push excessively their own policies and as long as there was no alternative to the Achaian Confederacy. Notably, both Argos and Megalopolis had been granted extensive territories by the Macedonians, but none had the experience of leadership of a grand organization.

Achaian expansion was too rapid (Walbank 1984b, 459), especially when compared to the expansion of the Aitolians.⁵ There had been insufficient time to develop mechanisms of expansion and hegemony, other than straightforward incorporation, quite unlike the Aitolians who had used *isopoliteia* – in this case grant of potential citizenship to entire *poleis* – as ‘a fine method of preparation’ in the process of integrating members (Buraselis 2003a, 45; see also Larsen 1968, 304–5).⁶ As Larsen (1975, 161) acutely remarked, the Achaians, in contrast to the Aitolians, ‘tended to make Achaeans out of all communities absorbed.’ Already before 389, the Achaians had made the Aitolian Kalydonians Achaian citizens: πολίτας πεπονημένοι τοὺς Καλυδωνίους... (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1).⁷ Thus, we read in Plutarch (*Arat.* 23.4) that Aratos συνέπεισε τοὺς Κορινθίους Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι (‘Aratos persuaded the Corinthians to become Achaians’). In an exaggerated manner, Polybius (2.38.1, 4) states that the name ‘Achaians’ became dominant, and the Peloponnesians, once they became members of the Confederacy, also assumed the name.⁸ Accordingly, the collective ‘Achaians’ is by far Polybius’ preferred term to denote the Confederacy.⁹ On the other hand (with regard to the Achaian Confederacy), he employs the term *sympoliteia* 8 times as a technical term (16 in all),¹⁰ and the term *Koinon* only 3 times (2.70.5; 4.60.9; 28.19.3).¹¹ By contrast, the ‘*Koinon of the Achaians*’ is the term employed by the authorities of the Confederacy in inscriptions (Rzepka 2002, 228 and n.12).

Polybius (2.37.9–10) claims that the Achaian Confederacy succeeded in making the Peloponnesians share a common interest (ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ συμφέρον ἀγαγεῖν) while many in the past had tried but failed because they only aimed at increasing their own power, not at common freedom. Polybius may equally allude here to both internal and external powers. In the latter case, we should think of the Macedonian kings, especially the Antigonid

Demetrios Poliorketes and his League of 302. The internal power can only be Sparta. Polybius presents an ideal, appearing to abhor hegemonic rule,¹² but the Achaian Confederacy (or rather its leaders) did exercise violence, as we shall see below. The difference, as compared with Spartan hegemony, was that in the case of the Achaian Confederacy there was no single *polis* officially exercising this rule. Moreover, Achaian hegemony needed an external *hēgemōn* to be exercised: shortly after the capture of Akrokorinthos in 243 (see pp.161–2), the Achaians proclaimed as their *hēgemōn* the absentee Ptolemy III of Egypt and, in 224, when they were losing the war against Kleomenes III of Sparta, they proclaimed as *hēgemōn* the very much present (albeit briefly) Antigonos III Doson of Macedon and, following his death, his successor Philip V (see pp.164, 211).

Further below, Polybius (2.37.11), presumably having in mind the peak in the Achaian Confederacy's expansion in the early 2nd century (after the incorporation of Elis, Sparta and Messenia), states that the Peloponnese nearly became a single *polis* thanks to the Achaian Confederacy. This statement conceals severe problems in the matter of unity. Polybius does admit (2.38.7) that a fair number of Peloponnesians had to be persuaded to join the Confederacy and that some were even coerced, but goes on to claim that they later accepted what they had previously been forced to do (Walbank 1984b, 456):

αὕτη τινὰς μὲν ἐθελοντὴν αἰρετιστὰς εἶρε Πελοποννησίων, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοῖ καὶ λόγῳ προσηγάγετο· τινὰς δὲ βιασαμένη σὺν καιρῷ παραχρῆμα πάλιν εὐδοκεῖν ἐποίησεν αὐτῇ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας.

while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it [the Achaian Confederacy] of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position.

This enthusiasm of Polybius underestimates the degree to which member-states retained their own identity (Roy 2003a, 84). Apart from the question of identity, the over-optimistic, if not deliberately misleading, statement of Polybius attributes minimal importance to the fact that the appeal of the new political formation varied and that it was neither universal nor steady. Above all, he does not say how those coerced became reconciled with their membership. Contrary to the smooth incorporation of Sikyon, of the lesser *poleis* of the Argolid, and of Megalopolis, large *poleis* – Argos, Messene, Elis and, above all Sparta – refrained from joining the Achaian Confederacy, for their own reasons and for longer or shorter periods. The Messenians and the Spartans in particular were incorporated violently in the early 2nd century.

The image of foreign policy projected by the Achaian leaders is summarized by Polybius (2.42.3) as follows. First:

...πολεμοῦντες δὲ καὶ καταγωνιζόμενοι συνεχῶς τοὺς ἢ δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν βασιλέων τὰς σφετέρας πατρίδας καταδουλομένους...

...ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities...

This clearly refers to the period before the Kleomenic War when Aratos of Sikyon was unleashing attacks against tyrants whether or not they were supported by Macedon. On the other hand, this Polybian summary crudely ignores the fact that the Achaian Confederacy placed the Macedonian king back in control of the Peloponnese. It also ignores the fact that former tyrants (Aristomachos and Lydiadas) were elected to the Achaian *stratēgia*. Further below Polybius (2.42.5–6) presents a blatantly idealized image of later Achaian policy, that of the 2nd century. The Achaians

πολλοῖς γὰρ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δὲ καὶ καλλίστων Ῥωμαίοις οὐδέποτε τὸ παράπαν ἐπεθύμησαν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων οὐδενὸς ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἐκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελοποννησίων.

though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted in brilliant success, never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty of all states and concord among the Peloponnesians.

Indeed, by inverting these various claims, one could plausibly trace contemporary criticisms which Polybius was attempting to answer. Polybius exaggerates the Achaian part in the Macedonian Wars (Walbank 1957, 234), alludes vaguely to the fact that this 'liberty' was liberty from Macedon, which had been allied to the Achaian Confederacy from 224 to 198, and from the Spartans (Nabis). Above all, Polybius conceals the fact that the *homonoia* in the Peloponnese was translated into forced incorporation of Sparta and Messene and, in fact, was largely illusory.

We cannot know how the Achaian Confederacy would have developed had the Spartans not reclaimed leadership of the Peloponnese under Kleomenes III in the 220s, but this Spartan challenge revealed fundamental weaknesses in the Confederacy and the superficial nature of many loyalties. More than that, the war against Kleomenes generated cruelty on the Achaian part towards rivals of the Confederacy, which is a sign of imprudent and reckless leadership. The Achaian Confederacy only won

the day thanks to an alliance with Macedon. Nevertheless, hostility against Sparta went on and, especially in the 2nd century, this came to be *the* definitive feature of the Achaian Confederacy's Peloponnesian policy. Another Spartan ruler, Nabis, challenged the Achaian supremacy; once more the Achaian Confederacy won the day thanks to an external power (Rome). In other words, the Confederacy was a union that acquired illusory hegemony / supremacy, in reality relying on the power of others.

The institutions of the Achaian Confederacy

Our knowledge of the Achaian Confederacy's institutions is marred by serious gaps and uncertainties. Our main source, Polybius, himself so familiar with Achaian governmental bodies and their workings, saw no need to inform his readers about how these bodies came into being,¹³ their composition or their precise responsibilities – above all, those of the so-called *synodos* (Giovannini 1969, 1). Our intention here is only to present the main features of Achaian federal government and the chief problems for the historian; a full-scale attempt at solving them would require a book in itself.

The main governmental organs of the Achaian Confederacy were a *synodos* (literally: meeting or gathering) of citizens of uncertain composition, which met regularly four times a year, a council (*boulē*) of unknown size,¹⁴ consisting of *poleis* representatives, federal officials, the most important of whom were the 10 *damiorgoi*¹⁵ and the *stratēgoi* – the latter numbering two in the early days of the Confederacy, and one after 255 (Larsen 1968, 217, 220–2).

In addition to the regular *synodoi*, there took place extraordinary meetings of the council or of the assembly, of the assembly and the council together, or of the army or of a body created *ad hoc*. These extraordinary meetings have customarily been called *synklētoi*, although Polybius, who uses the term *the synodos* 14 times, only once employs the term *synklētos*, with regard to an extraordinary meeting at Sikyon in 168 (29.24.6; Giovannini 1969, 3).¹⁶ The term is also recorded once in an inscription from Oropos dating after 154 (*Syll.*³ 675 / **I.Orop.* 307).¹⁷ While until 188 the *synodoi* were only held in the territory of Aigion, the extraordinary meetings could be held anywhere.

The composition and responsibilities of the *synodoi* have been much debated and are still far from agreed by historians.¹⁸ At least until 217, the *synodoi* must have been primary assemblies (Larsen 1955, 78–82), in which the *boulē* and the magistrates were also present; the assemblies must have been competent to decide on all matters. Probably all men of military age participated.¹⁹ However, there is a seemingly insoluble question as to whether there was a law between 220 and 200, which changed the

composition and the responsibilities of the *synodos*, while at the same time providing for the competence of extraordinary meetings. Larsen (1955, 75–105, esp. 86–94; *id.* 1968, 223–9 and 1972, 179–84) argued that, between 217 and 200 at the latest, and in the context of a reorganization of the Confederacy's operation, the *synodoi* changed from primary to representative, consisting only of the *boulē* and being responsible to deal with everyday business. Further, on Larsen's theory, the extraordinary meetings (*synklētoi*) began to be convened without a *probouleusis* from the *boulē* but with a specific subject to debate: alliance, war, or a written request by the Macedonian king, or from the 2nd century, the Roman Senate. The evidence yields few certainties.²⁰ First, at least in the 2nd century, for a *synklētos* to be convened there had to be a specific, single subject to debate (Livy 31.25.9);²¹ the subject had to be debated within three days (Livy 32.22.4), and anyone who wished could propose a decree on the second day (Polyb. 29.24.10; Livy 32.20.1). Furthermore, there was indeed a law providing that an extraordinary meeting could be summoned if there was a written statement by the Roman Senate (Polyb. 22.10.10–12, 12.5–7; Livy 39.33.5–7), and *synklētoi* did decide on matters of war. On the other hand, it is not at all certain that decisions about alliance and war were taken away from the *synodoi* or that the latter were only a restricted body of representatives.²²

In the end, whatever the composition and the competence of the *synodoi*, what counts the most for our purposes here is that *the* most vital issues for the survival of the Achaian federal state, that is issues of foreign policy, were decided (largely?) by a primary assembly. It was surely sensible and practical to put such questions to all citizens, since it was they who might be called to arms as a result. Without the citizens' being asked directly there would always be a risk that a decision of an assembly of representatives would be overturned. And at least in this respect Polybius (2.38.6) was right in arguing about the democratic nature of the Achaian Confederacy.²³ Another democratic feature underlined by Polybius (2.42.3) is the ἰσότης καὶ παρρησία ('equality and freedom of speech'), translated into the right of anyone who wished to propose a decree (at least in a *synklētos*).²⁴

The meeting place of the *synodos* was initially the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios outside Aigion but at some point it moved to the *polis* of Aigion itself (Paus. 7.7.2), thus giving the meetings a more political character.²⁵ Notably, Aigion lost its privilege in 188, following a proposal of Philopoimen. It was decided then that the *synodoi* would be held at different *poleis* (Livy 38.30.2).²⁶ This decision must not have gone down well with the citizens of Aigion (Errington 1969, 138–9), the ancestral capital of the Achaian Confederacy, and it reflects how much the Achaian Confederacy

had come not to be strictly Achaian. The change mirrored the expanded character of the Confederacy, and can be partly explained by the need to give access to the assembly to as many people as possible (Musti 1967, 199). No rotation system seems to have been involved in the subsequent *synodoi*. For instance, in 183/2 two consecutive *synodoi* were held in Megalopolis (Polyb. 23.16.12–13; Roy 2003a, 87). As a whole, Megalopolis and Corinth seem to ‘have had a goodly share of the meetings’ (Larsen 1972, 183).²⁷

The problem of participation in the *synodoi* is again relevant. If only representatives participated, then location did not matter so much, since it would have been the duty of these people to travel. In this case, the representatives would possibly be paid, as may have been the case with the members of the *boulē* for their participation in the *synodoi* (Polyb. 22.7.3).²⁸ But if the *synodoi* were primary assemblies, then location mattered more, e.g. Polyb. 38.12.5: in 146 the crowds of artisans and common people in Corinth were for war against Sparta and hustled the Roman legates out of the meeting. It is easy to imagine that large numbers of Peloponnesians living away from the meeting place would often abstain from a *synodos*. Distance could also be a problem for attendance at a *synklētos* but less so since the matters discussed concerned major issues of foreign policy and therefore participation must have been massive.

It seems that at least in the 2nd century voting was carried out by *poleis* in the *synklētoi* (Livy 32.23.1, 38.32.1) and probably also in the *synodoi* (Aymard 1938a, 386–90). The citizens of each *polis* must have first decided on the issue among themselves. In the case of the *synklētoi* and of the *synodoi* if the latter were primary assemblies – the aim must have been to prevent the hosting *polis* from having the majority of votes.²⁹ On the other hand, if the *synodoi* were representative assemblies, then it is quite possible that the number of votes possessed by each *polis* was proportionate to its size, as was the case with the *nomographoi* (legislative officials).³⁰ In any case, the local crowds could influence the votes, especially in case of severe disagreement. Voters would have thought twice before provoking the crowd of the hosting *polis* (Aymard 1938a, 149). Thus, location of either a *synodos* or a *synklētos* could play a significant role.

The most important federal office was the *stratēgia*. Two *stratēgoi* were elected annually by a *synodos* on a rotation system until 255, when Margos of Keryneia introduced a change from two to a single *stratēgos* elected among all members, imitating Aitolian practice of the time and probably also the Arkadian practice of the 4th century (Polyb. 2.43.1–2; Strabo 8.7.3).³¹ The *stratēgos* continued to be elected by a *synodos* (Polyb. 38.15.1; Giovannini 1969, 9). The *stratēgia* could not be held in consecutive years but

re-election was allowed. Our information is such that we cannot tell whether the change from two to one *stratēgos* brought about or intensified competition between *poleis*-members, especially after the Achaian Confederacy had ceased being predominantly Achaian. Two non-Achaians have the lion's share of the *stratēgiai* and of influence: the Sikyonian Aratos and the Megalopolitan Philopoimen. Other than that, the expansion of the Confederacy is not reflected in the *stratēgia* since the office was mostly held by citizens of the initial nucleus of the Confederacy, i.e. Tritaia, Dyme, Pharai and Patrai but not Aigion.³²

There is some indication that election of a *stratēgos* could be subject to manipulation, as in 218/7, when, according to Polybius (4.82.6–8) the Macedonian royal official Apelles had Eperatos of Pharai elected. Polybius may exaggerate the influence of Apelles but manipulation of the elections is not unthinkable. The question is also interwoven with the notorious problem of composition of the *synodoi*. If the *synodoi* had at some point come to consist of representatives, then manipulation would seemingly have been easier. The fewer the participants of the *synodoi* the easier it would be to canvass; bribery would also be easier. On the other hand, masses of people can also be influenced by the leading citizens of their own states and then vote accordingly – and this holds for all the meetings not just the electoral ones. However, there are only two relevant texts: Polybius 10.22.9 and, especially, Plutarch, *Phil.* 21.1. Polybius comments that the *hipparchoi* who wish to become *stratēgoi* ‘canvass the soldiers and secure their future support’.³³ The ‘soldiers’ might refer to young men of their own class but the support may concern either a restricted or a full citizen assembly.³⁴ More to the point, Plutarch records that after Philopoimen's death in summer 182, while he was *stratēgos*, all citizens capable of bearing arms along with the *probouloi* assembled at Megalopolis and elected Lykortas to the *stratēgia*. The evidence appears clear-cut but the exceptional circumstances of Lykortas' election do not allow certainty.³⁵

The organization of the Achaian Confederacy gave ample room to its leading *stratēgoi* to exercise their ambitions, even though it was constitutionally prohibited to hold office in two consecutive years. This prohibition shows that members of the Achaian Confederacy wished to curtail individual power. On the other hand, re-election did allow individuals to create their support group and acquire power in the long run. Literary sources, especially Polybius and Plutarch, present events as the work of leading individuals, not of assemblies, which is understandable when we consider that both were active in an era of larger-than-life individuals. Polybius, in particular, could have been influenced by the state of affairs in 2nd century Rome, where individuals held a most prominent

role. In any case, it is a question how far individual agendas of the *stratēgoi* were dictated by their own *poleis* (Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 544). For instance, Aristainos of Dyme, as the *stratēgos* for 198/7, advocated alliance with Rome, contrary to the view of his fellow Dymaians (Livy 32.19.5–23.3). The case of Diophanes and Philopoimen, both Megalopolitans, raises a related, acute question, namely how far individual policies aimed *primarily* at personal glorification. Both Diophanes and Philopoimen wished to keep Sparta in the Achaian Confederacy but they clearly had different views of how to go about it and, especially, both wished to be credited with unification of the Peloponnese (Plut. *Phil.* 16.1–4; Paus. 8.51.1–2; see pp.345, 350, 353–4, 357).

The incorporation of Sikyon, Corinth, and the *poleis* of the Argolic Akte into the Achaian Confederacy (251–243)

The Achaian Confederacy was revived in 281/0, in the last year of the 124th Olympiad (Polyb. 2.41.11–12; see p.116). We hear nothing of military activities but the Achaians presumably took advantage of the continuous problems in Macedon, even after the accession of Antigonos Gonatas in 277. Security vis-à-vis Macedon must have been a major aim of the unification. However, not all Achaians saw things that way from the start, and we cannot know how far the delay in the unification of all Achaian *poleis* was the result of strict Macedonian control or whether this delay was also the result of inter-state enmity, caused by different attitudes towards Macedon, brewing from the late 4th century (see pp.95–6). At the beginning, the Confederacy was not a very spectacular body, consisting solely of Dyme, Patrai (western Achaia), Tritaia, Pharai (inland Achaia). Whether they were fully united by *sympoliteia* or, more loosely, by *isopoliteia* is unclear.³⁶ In the mid-270s Aigion, Boura and Keryneia (central Achaia) joined in. The former was rid of its Macedonian garrison – the only Macedonian garrison attested with certainty in an Achaian *polis* in the early 3rd century – while in the two latter places tyranny was abolished. The tyrant of Boura was put to death but Iseas of Keryneia laid down his rule voluntarily, thus setting a precedent for treatment of other tyrants who later had their *poleis* enrolled into the Achaian Confederacy. Later in the 270s the Confederacy was consolidated by the admission of Pellene (in 274), Aigeira and Leontion.³⁷ Aigion functioned as the capital, i.e. the administrative centre, of the Confederacy (Larsen 1968, 239–40).³⁸

For three decades, until 251, the Achaian Confederacy remained within the limits of its ancient union, without any signs of a wish for expansion. Then it started expanding under the leadership of the ‘outsider’ Aratos of Sikyon who enrolled his native *polis* into the Confederacy, and in 243 he

achieved what had been unthinkable for nearly a century, namely the eviction of the Macedonian garrison from Akrokorinthos. Plutarch asserts in the *Kleomenes* (3.4) that Aratos wished, *from the beginning*, to unite the Peloponnesians because this was the only way for them to remain inviolate:

ὁ γὰρ Ἄρατος ἰσχύων μέγιστον ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐβούλετο μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοῦτο τῶν πολλῶν στρατηγιῶν αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς μακρᾶς πολιτείας ἦν τέλος, ἡγουμένῳ μόνῳς ἂν οὕτως ἀνεπιχειρήτους ἔσεσθαι τοῖς ἐκτὸς πολέμοις.

For Aratos, the most powerful man among the Achaïans, was from the outset desirous of bringing all the Peloponnesians into one confederation, and this was the end pursued by him through his many generalships and his long political career, since he was of the opinion that in this way alone would they be safe from the attacks of their enemies without.

However, unification is one thing, expansion is another; in fact the latter may be a means to the former. As we shall see, the Achaian Confederacy achieved expansion but not real unification. It is questionable whether Aratos aimed at expansion and unification of the *entire* Peloponnese, and that before 222. In fact, it is questionable whether he aimed at it at all: Sparta does not seem to have been included in his plans, as we shall see below. On the other hand, Aratos did aim at expansion over a large part of the Peloponnese. Since his main targets in the 240s were *poleis* controlled or somehow associated with the Antigonids (Corinth, Athens, and Argos), it seems that expansion was at least initially a product of defensive needs. But expansion due to defensive considerations also signals the beginning of an imperial plan that develops progressively and according to circumstances.

In May 251³⁹ the young Aratos – a member of the upper class – liberated his hometown from the last of a series of tyrants, Nikokles. Whether this action was also directed against Macedon is quite dubious since the political affinities of Nikokles are uncertain, and Aratos had family connections with Gonatas.⁴⁰ However, shortly afterwards Aratos incorporated Sikyon into the Achaian Confederacy (Plut. *Arat.* 5–9; Polyb. 2.43.2–3). Thus Sikyon became the first non-Achaian and the first Dorian member in the 3rd century – the Aitolian Kalydon (in south-western Aitolia, by the river Euenos and across the Gulf from Patrai) had been another non-Achaian member before 389 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1).⁴¹ With hindsight, this incorporation is viewed as a turning point in the history of the Confederacy and the Peloponnese as a whole. At the time, however, this appeared only a minor event in Peloponnesian history (Paschidis 2008a, 234).

Polybius has very little to say about the period prior to the clash of the

Achaian Confederacy with Kleomenes III of Sparta in the 220s. Our information largely derives from Plutarch's *Aratos* in which the author has made extensive use of Aratos' own *Memoirs* covering more than thirty books.⁴² It appears that the liberation of Sikyon was the doing of a small group of exiles gathered in Argos,⁴³ as well as of a small number of armed men – mercenaries? – provided by Aratos' friends there.

Aratos had been sent to Argos as a child after a *stasis* in which his father Kleinias had been killed. Thereafter, he lived there until the age of twenty among the guest-friends of his father (Plut. *Arat.* 3.1). Apparently, the tyrant of Argos (either Aristippos I or Aristomachos I)⁴⁴ was not on co-operative terms with the ruler of Sikyon, otherwise he would not have allowed Aratos, and other Sikyonian exiles, to live freely in Argos – though relations between the two rulers need not have been hostile. And at least in Aratos' case, relations between members of the two *poleis*' elites appear to have been of major importance, equally or more important than relations between the rulers of the *poleis*.

Aratos and his small force sneaked into Sikyon one night and captured Nikokles' bodyguards. The Sikyonians themselves had no idea about the whole enterprise (although Nikokles had sent his spies to Argos: Plut. *Arat.* 4.2). Only after a herald had been sent by Aratos to urge them to secure their freedom, did they join the invaders in setting the tyrant's palace on fire (Plut. *Arat.* 8.5–9.1; Paus. 2.8.3). Eventually, Nikokles escaped and Sikyon was liberated without bloodshed.

The incorporation of Sikyon (Plut. *Arat.* 9.4–6; Polyb. 2.43.3; Paus. 2.8.3–4), and Sikyonian politics as a whole in this period, are presented by our sources solely as the work of Aratos, although the only official capacity recorded for him prior to 245/4 (when he was elected *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy) is that of the αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτῆς καὶ κύριος ὅλως ἐπὶ τὰς φηγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας – plenipotentiary arbiter for the settlement of the exiles' financial affairs.⁴⁵ We are not informed as to which body elected him to this office but it postdated the incorporation of Sikyon into the Achaian Confederacy. However, this office empowered Aratos to choose a further fifteen Sikyonians to share the task (Plut. *Arat.* 14.2: προσκατέλεξεν). It seems clear enough from his restoration of some 600 exiles that Aratos did not assume tyrannical power (Griffin 1982, 81).⁴⁶ He was the driving force of Sikyonian foreign policy but his activities must have been authorized by a civic body – whether this was an assembly or a council – possibly the same body that appointed him αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτῆς.

According to Plutarch (*Arat.* 9.5–6), the incorporation of Sikyon was a result of the need to protect it both from internal upheaval and from Gonatas' aggression – by making it part of a larger, politically stable

group.⁴⁷ We may doubt whether the Macedonian king was ill-disposed towards Sikyon and Aratos at the time but we should take Plutarch at his word when he refers to the internal problems of Sikyon. The fact that the Confederacy was politically insignificant – Plutarch does emphasize its unimportance at the time – and thus that Sikyon would not run any risk of being oppressed by it, would have only made it more attractive to the Sikyonians. Polybius (2.43.3) adopts a more idealized perspective viewing the incorporation as the result of Aratos' admiration for the Achaian polity: προσέειπε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν, ἀρχῆθεν εὐθὺς ἐραστής γενόμενος τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτῶν ('having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaian polity, made his own city its member'). These two views are not necessarily incompatible but the more pragmatic version of Plutarch is preferable – notably, he too indulges in praise of the Achaian polity but this praise is not associated with Aratos' decision. As Walbank (1933, 33) remarked: '– love of freedom, love of Federalism, hatred of tyranny – tend to evaporate under a close examination.'

What could have been the Achaians' motives for admitting Sikyon? This is a question which our sources do not address. Urban (1979, 35–6) observes that to the Achaians the admission of Sikyon was probably a risk, because of all its internal problems and because it might provoke Gonatas. Whether or how much Gonatas would have cared is unclear, and the Achaians themselves would not have had a way of predicting his reactions.⁴⁸ On the other hand, again according to Urban, Sikyon could function as a buffer state against possible Macedonian aggression.⁴⁹ The scenario seems plausible. To this it can be added that Sikyon was a much bigger *polis* than each and every Achaian *polis*,⁵⁰ also well-reputed for its artists at the time (Plut. *Arat.* 13.1–2; Orsi 2000, 203–4) – while no Achaian *polis* had any significant reputation of any kind. In other words, prestige could have been an additional motive. And it has to be recalled that we know next to nothing about the policies of leading individuals in the Achaian *poleis*. We may suggest that the expansion of the neighbouring Aitolian Confederacy, in precisely the same period, would have been an inspiration or an incentive. It would have shown to the Achaians, and to Aratos in particular, that a confederacy beyond ethnic affiliations was possible. At the same time, the growing Aitolian power might have appeared threatening enough to make Aratos, the Sikyonians, and the Achaians think that they had to expand in order to protect themselves.

We have no information as to the procedure of the incorporation but it appears unlikely that Aratos would have achieved it without a decision of the Sikyonian assembly or of a council, even if this body was simply

confirming an already-taken decision. We can reconstruct part of the procedure as follows: Aratos perhaps proposed the incorporation first to other leading Sikyonians and then submitted his proposal to the Sikyonian assembly or council; following its approval, he submitted it to either the assembly or the council or the magistrates of the Achaian Confederacy.

As for external relations forged by Aratos in the 240s we can be certain that at some point between 251 and 245 he secured the huge sum of 150 talents (40 immediately and the rest in instalments) as a gift from the king of Egypt, either Ptolemy II or Ptolemy III (Plut. *Arat.* 12–14).⁵¹ Aratos used this money to settle the problem of the exiles, in the aforementioned capacity of αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτής. This gift was clearly a strategic commitment on both sides, and the bond between the Achaian Confederacy and Egypt proved long-lasting (more than twenty years). The king of Egypt clearly wanted Aratos to be in his debt and to employ the Confederacy as a means of curtailing Macedonian power. The interests of the Achaian Confederacy and the Ptolemies coincided and thus we cannot say that the Ptolemies directly dictated the foreign policy of the Achaian Confederacy. Still, acceptance of the Ptolemaic money by Aratos amounted to admission of a serious deficit of the expanded Confederacy from the beginning of its existence. It was accepted that expansion went hand in hand with external help and, at least theoretically, with a degree of control by an external power.⁵² A few years later, shortly after the capture of Akrokorinthos in 243, Ptolemy III was proclaimed *hēgemōn* of the Achaian Confederacy (Plut. *Arat.* 24.4) – an even clearer admission of deficit (see p.164).

As a whole, our information on relations between Aratos and Antigonos Gonatas is uncertain at best, marred by the attempt of Aratos in his *Memoirs* to present himself as a constant opponent of the Macedonian king, which before 243 he was not. Whether Gonatas offered Aratos a gift of 25 talents is a vexed problem, but it seems likely that he did.⁵³ In any case, either shortly after the Ptolemaic gift or more likely after the death of Alexandros, governor of Akrokorinthos, in either late 246 or early 245 (Plut. *Arat.* 17), the king of Macedon probably attempted to create trouble between the Achaian Confederacy and Egypt by soliciting Aratos' favour and declaring in public that the latter had gone over to his side (Plut. *Arat.* 15) – in this attempt he failed.⁵⁴

Aratos' and the Confederacy's relationship with Alexandros, who revolted against Gonatas probably in 249,⁵⁵ is also marred with uncertainty. According to Plutarch (*Arat.* 18.1–2) Aratos first attempted to capture Akrokorinthos 'while Alexandros was still alive', which could mean either before or, more likely, after his revolt.⁵⁶ However, later on Aratos formed an anti-Gonatas alliance with Alexandros.

Aratos assumed the *stratēgia* – the most important office of the Achaian Confederacy – for the first time in 245/4. Thereafter, he was elected *stratēgos* nearly every other year until his death in 213/2 (Plut. *Arat.* 24.4). His first term of office did not start well. He led a plundering expedition against the Aitolian territories of Lokris and Kalydon (Plut. *Arat.* 16.1). Next, Aratos urged the Boiotians to turn against the Aitolians. This policy shows the influence exercised on Achaian affairs by the policies of the Aitolian Confederacy, and it resulted in a Boiotian defeat at Chaironeia and probably in an *isopoliteia* between the Boiotians and the Aitolian Confederacy (Polyb. 20.4.4–5.1; Plut. *Arat.* 16.1). The Achaian Confederacy, however, took no part in the battle.⁵⁷ The motives and the target of Aratos' activities remain obscure.⁵⁸

Whatever Aratos' motives, at least the attack on Kalydon was aligned with the old Achaian interest in the area. In other words, at least on a symbolic level, Aratos now operated as a citizen of an Achaian *polis* and the attack – whether intentionally or not – could very well have served as a signal to his new compatriots that he shared their traditional interests (Grainger 1999, 150–1). On the other hand, this attack ran against the friendly relations developed between the Aitolian Confederacy and certain Achaian *poleis* in the second quarter of the 3rd century.⁵⁹

From the summer of 243 onwards Aratos progressively turned the Confederacy into a power to be reckoned with. The major turning point for the expansion of the Achaian Confederacy and the liberation of the eastern Peloponnese from Macedon was the sensational capture of Akrokorinthos (Plut. *Arat.* 18–24; Polyb. 2.43.4–5, 50.9). Following the death of Alexandros in late 246/early 245 Gonatas had recovered Akrokorinthos, and thus Macedonian power appeared restored and menacing again. How far Aratos' move equally resulted from the need to strengthen the Confederacy in view of the expanding influence of the Aitolians over the western Peloponnese is an open question.⁶⁰ In any case, the capture of Akrokorinthos does signal the beginning of an Achaian aggressive policy towards Macedon and towards those states more or less under Antigonid influence or control and refusing to join the Achaian Confederacy. The problem is, as so often in history, that we cannot tell where defensive considerations stop and ambition and aggression begin.

Akrokorinthos was captured by Aratos – during his second *stratēgia* in 243/2 – with a select force of 700 men, and help from within via bribery (Plut. *Arat.* 18–22). According to Plutarch (*Arat.* 22.6) it was only in the final stage that the Corinthians took an active part in the expulsion of the garrison. This information could be an attempt on Plutarch's part to conceal that a substantial part of the Corinthians might not have objected

to control by the Antigonids.⁶¹ However, Akrokorinthos became now the joint possession of the Achaian Confederacy and Corinth. Aratos solemnly returned the keys of the city gates to the Corinthians (Plut. *Arat.* 23.4),⁶² but an Achaian garrison consisting of 400 hoplites and 50 watch-dogs (along with their keepers) was installed on Akrokorinthos (Plut. *Arat.* 24.1). We observe again the familiar paradox: in order to remain free (from Macedon) the Corinthians had to accept the presence of a foreign garrison. However, at least some of them welcomed their liberation from the Macedonian garrison and the installation of a Peloponnesian garrison: Aratos and other liberators were honoured with statues at Corinth (Plut. *Arat.* 45.3), quite appropriately, since the liberation was tantamount to refounding a *polis*. These other liberators are not identified by name but it is legitimate to suggest that at least some of them were Corinthians.⁶³

Plutarch (*Arat.* 19.1, 22.2) underlines that Aratos' fellow-citizens, as well as his army, had no idea of his plans, which was surely sensible if he wanted his plan to succeed. Presumably, very few people in the entire Confederacy would have known. On the other hand, the fact that this action was unauthorized – no matter if this was a necessity – shows how the entire Confederacy was, or could become, subject to the plans, ambitions and power of its elected *stratēgos*.

As a result of the capture of Akrokorinthos, Corinth, Troizen, Epidauros and Megara joined the Achaian Confederacy, seemingly without pressure, but we have to bear in mind that our sources simply mention their incorporation in passing; there has survived no record of discussion in the respective assemblies, which would allow us to assess public sentiment (Plut. *Arat.* 23.4, 24; Polyb. 2.43.4–5; Paus. 2.8.5). Thus, we cannot tell which were the specific reasons that led each *polis* to join the Confederacy. At least for those Corinthians truly welcoming Aratos, the primary reason was obviously to be protected from Macedon and to become masters of their own *polis* again. Still, neither in Corinth's case nor in the cases of Troizen and Epidauros, can we know how far fear of Aratos' ambitions and aggression or a genuine belief in the advantages of a Confederacy were also at play. We know hardly anything about the constitution of Troizen and Epidauros at the time except that they were not ruled by tyrants. Troizen in fact was in the Ptolemaic sphere of influence (see p.33). Such an attachment would have only made incorporation easier given the close relations between Aratos, the Confederacy and the Ptolemies. At least for Troizen, then, joining in the Achaian Confederacy would have created an additional shield.

To sum up: probably in the case of Troizen and Epidauros *imminent* danger coming from Macedon was not *the* predominant factor. Still, these

were very uncertain times and therefore being part of a larger unit provided protection. Most probably the citizens of Troizen and Epidaurios realized what Aratos himself (and others) had realized, i.e. that weak *poleis* could only be saved by mutual support and pursuing common interests: ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἀσθενεῖς ἰδίᾳ τὰς πόλεις ὑπαρχούσας σῶζεσθαι δι' ἀλλήλων, ὥσπερ ἐνδεδεμένας τῷ κοινῷ συμφέροντι (Plut. *Arat.* 24.5: 'For he considered that the Greek states being weak individually would be preserved by mutual support when once they had been bound as it were by the common interest'). But, with hindsight it is clear that whatever faith all three Peloponnesian *poleis* had in the Confederacy as an institution in the late 240s, this paled into insignificance when Kleomenes III of Sparta emerged forcefully and very few of the member-states of the Achaian Confederacy resisted him.

As to the actual terms of the incorporation into the Confederacy, there is epigraphic evidence⁶⁴ relating to Epidaurios (*LAEpid* 25).⁶⁵ Epidaurios is to remain autonomous, ungarrisoned, and will retain its ancestral constitution (l. 4).⁶⁶ It is legitimate to assume that the same terms applied to Troizen. As we shall see below, the enrolment in the Achaian Confederacy certainly proved beneficial to the Epidaurians.

The success of Aratos and the Achaian Confederacy can hardly be overstated. Polybius (2.43.4) writes that by liberating Corinth, Aratos liberated the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a great fear: μέγαλον μὲν ἀπέλυσε φόβου τοὺς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατοικοῦντας. This, however, needs some qualification. On a practical level, the Macedonian garrison imposed more fear upon Corinth and its immediate neighbours than upon the more remote Peloponnesians. On the other hand, the very existence of the garrison did symbolize Macedonian control over a large part of the Peloponnese.

The territory of the Achaian Confederacy now reached (approximately) 5,500 km² or 40 km width and 200 km length on the northern coast of the Peloponnese, i.e. more than half the territory that Sparta had commanded in its heyday (see p.65).⁶⁷ A political union of marginal importance (up to that moment) had achieved a major victory over Macedon and now controlled the Saronic Gulf and the entrance to the Peloponnese (Will 1979, 331). Yet, it was a victory achieved by treachery over a weak garrison (Urban 1979, 50), not by superiority in arms.

Antigonos Gonatas was very old – indeed there is no record of him mounting a counter-assault against Akrokorinthos. But he did form an agreement with the Aitolians, which according to Polybius (2.43.9–10) aimed at partitioning the Achaian Confederacy (Walbank 1988, 311). Furthermore, the Aitolians had developed strong bonds with the Eleans, the Phigaleians and the Messenians (see pp.136 n.86, 279, 288–9).

Therefore additional support for the newly-expanded Achaian Confederacy was deemed necessary. Either shortly before or after 243 the Achaian Confederacy formed an alliance with Sparta⁶⁸ but much more substantial support was found in Ptolemy III Euergetes who was proclaimed *hēgemōn* of the Achaian Confederacy, in peace and war, on land and sea (Plut. *Arat.* 24.4). The very title attributed to Ptolemy III – the same as the one attributed to Philip II – indicates that military operations, whether defensive or offensive, were envisaged for the future, for which Ptolemy's help was considered essential.⁶⁹ This gesture must have been intended to show friends and foes alike that the Achaian Confederacy enjoyed the protection of a superior power. Support in money must have been expected and perhaps also in troops. On the other hand, the appointment of an external power in charge of military operations is also a sign of how unaccustomed and unprepared to play a leading role in international politics the Achaian Confederacy was.⁷⁰ The role assigned to Ptolemy III is to a certain extent a forerunner of the hegemonic role of Antigonos III Doson in the Hellenic Alliance of 224 (Urban 1979, 53)⁷¹ of which the Achaian Confederacy was a member. Two decades after the proclamation of Ptolemy III, the Achaian Confederacy proved undoubtedly inferior in military terms to the Spartan king Kleomenes III.

The arbitration between Corinth and Epidauros

The incorporation of Corinth and Epidauros presented the Achaian Confederacy with an immediate problem, and at the same time an opportunity to show that it could be beneficial to its members by procuring peaceful co-existence. The problem concerned friction over land and boundaries between Epidauros and Corinth.⁷² It was solved by submission for arbitration by a third party, in which procedure the Achaian Confederacy played a significant role.

Interstate arbitration went back to the Archaic period but it became a well established practice of autonomous Greek *poleis* in the Hellenistic era.⁷³ Until the end of the 4th century foreign judges were largely dispatched to solve internal problems within a *polis* but from the late 4th century onwards the institution started spreading to disputes between *poleis* (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 139). As to the Hellenistic Peloponnese, interstate arbitration becomes an established practice precisely after the first stage of the Achaian Confederacy's expansion in the late 240s. From the 3rd century Peloponnese, five inscriptions recording arbitration are known to us, in which the Achaian Confederacy or some of its members were involved, one way or the other.⁷⁴ Two of them are too fragmentary to allow us any views as to either their precise date or the identity of *all* the parties

involved.⁷⁵ The other three inscriptions involve cities in the Argolid submitting to arbitration in the second half of the 3rd century – in a period of c. twenty years or less. Argos was involved in arbitration with Kleonai (see pp.432–3) while Epidauros was a litigant party in two cases. In fact, Epidauros got involved in arbitration three times in all, in a period of some seventy years: first with Corinth, then with Methana/Arsinoe, and, finally, with Hermione in the early second century (see p.426).

We do not know how far back the dispute between Epidauros and Corinth went (or that of Epidauros with Arsinoe and Hermione) but it must have existed in the period of Macedonian rule over Corinth, since the arbitration took place soon after Epidauros and Corinth joined the Achaian Confederacy. The absence of evidence for arbitration prior to the admission of Corinth and Epidauros to the Achaian Confederacy can be interpreted as unwillingness of either one or both parties to have their problem solved by arbitration.

The inscription recording the admission of Epidauros appears to refer to problems between Epidauros and Corinth (ll. 17–19). Reference is made to something that the Corinthians possess, possibly territory, and to objections of the Epidaurians. Next, mention is made of the Achaians who act perhaps as intermediaries, perhaps suggesting or imposing arbitration.⁷⁶

In any case, arbitration between Corinth and Epidauros eventually took place when Aigialeus was *stratēgos* of the Achaians, that is, between 242/1 and 238/7 (the last year available for Aigialeus' *stratēgia*).⁷⁷ According to the surviving inscription (*IG* IV².1.71),⁷⁸ a hundred and fifty one (151) Megarians⁷⁹ – also members of the Confederacy – adjudicated the case, according to a decree of the Achaians, and decided that the land should belong to the Epidaurians.

ἐπὶ στραταγ[οῦ τῶν] Ἀχαιῶν Αἰγιαλεῦς, ἐν δ' Ἐπιδαύρῳ ἐπ' ἱερεῦς | τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ Διονυσίου, κατὰ τὰδε ἔκριναν τοὶ Μεγαρεῖς τοῖς | [Ἐπ]ιδανρίοις καὶ Κορινθίοις περὶ τὰς χώρας ἃς ἀμφέλλεγον καὶ | [πε]ρὶ τοῦ Σελλάντος καὶ τοῦ Σπυραίου κατὰ τὸν αἶνον τὸν τῶν Ἀ | [χαι]ῶν δικαστήριον ἀποστείλαντες ἄνδρας ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα | [ἐν]α καὶ ἐπελθόντων ἐπ' αὐτὰν τὰν χώραν τῶν δικαστῶν καὶ κρινάν | [τω]ν Ἐπιδαυρίων εἶμεν τὰν χώραν.

When Aegialeus was general of [the] Achaeans, and Dionysius priest of Asclepius at Epidaurus, the following verdict was given by the Megarians for the Epidaurians and the Corinthians over the disputed land, the Sellas⁸⁰ and the Spiraion, when in accordance with the resolution of the Achaeans they sent a panel of 151 judges; and when the judges came on the spot and judged that the land belonged to the Epidaurians... (trans. by Austin 2006, no. 156, at p.283).

The Achaian Confederacy intervened by assigning Megarian judges to the case but it is not clear whether this was simply a *post facto* approval of a decision already taken by the *poleis* involved or whether Achaian authorities had taken the initiative to propose Megarian judges – the latter seems more likely.⁸¹ More crucially, however, we cannot tell what had happened before the assignment of the Megarians: whether the Achaian Confederacy imposed arbitration on the two parties or whether both agreed to resort to arbitration and then turned to the Confederacy (Austin 2006, 284, n.1) or whether one of the contestants asked for the Confederacy's intervention and then the other party agreed. In the latter case, either of the contestants could have taken the initiative: the Epidaurians hoping to have their claims validated by a court or the Corinthians hoping to put an end to their problems, whatever the decision was. That this was their primary concern is shown by the fact that they did not object to the court's decision. For either of the contestants, the Achaian Confederacy represented a powerful, Peloponnesian authority to register their claims or their complaints with and guarantee the execution of a court's decision.

The judges decided in favour of Epidauros (l. 7) but the Corinthians disagreed with the details of the demarcation, *not with the decision itself*: ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων [ων τ]ῷ τερμονισμῷ (ll. 7–8). The Achaian Confederacy intervened for a second time issuing a decree according to which the Megarians had to send a second, much smaller delegation consisting of thirty-one men⁸² who had also formed part of the first delegation (l. 85: *termastēres*). Probably, the Corinthians turned to the Confederacy asking for a second delegation of arbiters and the Confederacy yielded to the Corinthian's wish (Magnetto 1997, 219). The thirty-one judges defined boundaries employing approximately twenty landmarks.⁸³ This indicates that the initial demarcation was not as precise as the Corinthians wished it to be. This insistence on detailed delimitation shows that they wanted the matter settled for good, any ambiguity cleared, so that Epidauros would have no cause to lay claims to Corinthian territory in the future.

Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 120–8) has shown that there was no unified procedure established by the Achaian Confederacy to deal with individual disputes and that member-states were not legally obliged to submit to arbitration. But there must have been at least an expectation on the part of the Confederacy's authorities that member-states would settle their differences upon their admission (Ager 1996, 116–17). An explanation for the direct involvement of the Achaian Confederacy in the Corinthian-Epidaurian dispute may well be precisely the novelty of the situation, i.e. the all-too-sudden considerable expansion of the Confederacy. Thus

the magistrates and the assembly, being inexperienced, were eager to assert their authority and secure stability in their newly-acquired territories. If they did not, there was a real risk that their prestige and authority would dwindle. Either the Epidaurians or the Corinthians might think that there was no point in being part of the Confederacy. And this could lead to exploitation of the situation by Macedon. Corinth and especially Akrokorinthos were strategically precious to the Confederacy, more than Epidauros, hence the authorization of the detailed demarcation.

Another sign of lack of experience in the Achaian Confederacy is the very choice of Megarian judges (if indeed the Confederacy was responsible for the choice). Coming from a neighbouring *polis*, they were familiar with the region.⁸⁴ Furthermore, from the 4th century onwards the Megarians had constantly tried to maintain neutrality or at least a passive attitude both vis-à-vis their neighbours as well as with distant powers.⁸⁵ On the other hand, Dixon (2000, 42–3 and n.18) calls attention to the fact that this is the only known case in which the arbiter shared boundaries with one of the disputants, thus indirectly pointing to the possibility that the Megarians might not have been impartial towards the Corinthians or that it could be easily thought so. That there is no trace of protest by the Corinthians about the choice of the arbiter may indicate that they did not think that the Megarians had a hidden agenda. Nevertheless, it was a rather amateurish and dangerous choice, no matter if it solved the problem, and one that was probably not repeated.

The dispute involved land on the border of south-eastern Korinthia and northern Epidauria, overlooking the Saronic Gulf, including the Sellas and the Spiraion, probably a river and the modern bay of Korphos respectively. Spiraion/Korphos was the most privileged harbour between Epidauros and Kenchreai on the Saronic Gulf, offering easy access inland (Wiseman 1978, 134–40).⁸⁶ The disputed area extended north of the Korphos Bay (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 23–4). It used to be thought that the disputed land was suitable only for grazing,⁸⁷ but recently Dixon (2000, 60–70 and 2005, 138–42), based on an extensive topographical survey, argued that south-eastern Korinthia was much wealthier than previously thought. By the Megarian decision Epidaurian territory expanded to the north at the expense of Corinth.⁸⁸ The Epidauria acquired one more excellent harbour on the Saronic Gulf, in addition to the one the *polis* of Epidauros already possessed.

Another dimension of the Epidauros-Corinth conflict involves their status as hosts of major festivals. It was in the interest of both Corinth and Epidauros to settle the problem peacefully, not least for the sake of their respective festivals. The Isthmia were celebrated by Corinth nine days before the Epidaurian Asklepieia. Tomlinson (1983, 16) observes that

‘it was an obvious economy if those who had attended the Isthmia could immediately afterwards move further south to attend the Asklepieia which were celebrated every five years, probably from late April to early May...’ Therefore, it was in the interest of both *poleis* to settle their dispute so that they could secure safe travel for (more) visitors and athletes. It may be coincidental but the Epidaurians and the Corinthians settled their differences right at the time of the inauguration of the Asklepieia on Kos, i.e. when the Epidaurian Asklepieia were faced with serious competition from a festival whose founders were determined to make it great.

Some years after the successful arbitration with Corinth, the Epidaurians were involved in yet another conflict and yet another arbitration, this time with Methana/Arsinoe, a Ptolemaic base (on the peninsula at the entrance of the Saronic Gulf; Paus. 2.34.1) and not a member of the Achaian Confederacy (Walbank 1957, 218). The relevant inscription (*IG IV².1.72*)⁸⁹ is fragmentary and thus plenty of questions remain unanswered. First, we cannot tell which *polis* challenged the other’s rights. The Achaian Confederacy was certainly involved since the document is dated by the Achaian *stratēgos*. This arbitration is much more the business of the entire Achaian Confederacy than was the Corinth-Epidauros one, since at least three *poleis* sent judges, and at least one of them was not a neighbour of the litigants.⁹⁰ The Achaian Pellene and Aigion or Aigeira,⁹¹ as well as the Arkadian Thelphousa are recorded on the stone but only the names of fourteen judges from Thelphousa survive (on face B of the *stèle*).⁹² Whether the cities concerned or the Achaian Confederacy officials (or the assembly) were ultimately responsible for the choice of the judges’ provenance and number, their diverse origins and their high number must be at least partly related to the fact that Arsinoe was a Ptolemaic possession: it was a way to ensure impartial judgement for the non-member Arsinoe (Magnetto 1997, 260) and not provoke Ptolemy’s discontent. As to the date, the *terminus post quem* is 236 while the *terminus ante* is probably 227 or 225⁹³ – respectively, the dates of Thelphousa’s enrolment in the Achaian Confederacy and of its capture by Kleomenes III (Walbank 1957, 257; see pp.178, 247).

The area in dispute is uncertain because Epidauros and Arsinoe, being separated by Troizenia, did not share a common border.⁹⁴ So either Epidauros had expanded into Troizenian territory, thereby bordering Arsinoe, or Arsinoe had territory on the coast between Epidauros and Troizen (a *Peraia*: Robert 1960, 159 and n.2–160) – in the latter case, Troizen would have lost territory.⁹⁵ In any case, since the stone was found in the Epidaurian Asklepieion we can surmise either that the Epidaurians won or that the judges decided for common exploitation of the disputed land.

Dixon (2000, 266) has suggested that territorial aggrandizement 'was one of the motivating factors for non-Achaian cities' to join the Achaian Confederacy. Given the paucity of evidence, we cannot say whether territorial expansion was a main motivation of the Epidaurians for their joining the Achaian Confederacy but it certainly was the outcome.

Argos and the Achaian Confederacy

Aratos continued to be the driving force of Achaian foreign policy in the late 240s–230s. Probably peace was established with Macedon and the Aitolian Confederacy in 241/0 (Plut. *Arat.* 33.1), following the Aitolian plundering of Pellene and an Achaian victory over the Aitolians.⁹⁶ For the Achaian Confederacy in particular, this peace was a necessity resulting from its inability to confront both powers at once. On the other hand, it allowed Aratos freedom to disturb peace within the Peloponnese by attempting to incorporate Argos.

Peace with Macedon did not last long, and this was largely due to change in the alignment of powers in the north. In 239 Antigonos Gonatas died, as did, at about the same time, king Alexandros of Epeiros. The Aitolians took the opportunity to invade western Akarnania which was part of the Epirote kingdom. Macedon and Epeiros formed a marital alliance much to the dismay of the Aitolians: Phthia of Epeiros married Demetrios II, son and successor of Antigonos Gonatas. In the same period, the Aitolians and the Achaians, having come to share an anti-Macedonian stance, turned their peace-settlement into an alliance⁹⁷ – a major change in Achaian foreign policy – which officially lasted until 220 (Plut. *Arat.* 33.1; Polyb 2.44.1). Larsen (1975, 171) calls it 'the most hopeful alignment of Hellenistic times' but this is a thought often put forward by ancient historians in despair at the particularism of the ancient Greek *poleis* and confederacies, which did not allow them to unite and face Rome. But unity at the expense of hegemonic power was not an ancient ideal. The Aitolians were already a major power and the Achaians were on their way up. The creation of a larger unit consisting of both Confederacies would have been translated into loss of power and prestige for either one of them. Thus, we should prefer the more restrained view of Scholten (2000, 140) who argues that this alliance signalled 'the replacement of independent *poleis* by regional *Koina* as centres of political activity and particularly as foci of opposition to Macedonian domination'.

This alliance was perhaps more to the advantage of the Achaian Confederacy because, as Larsen (1975, 164) pointed out, Aitolia was more of a power in the Peloponnese at the time, exercising influence or control over the western part of the Peloponnese. Via the alliance, apart from

acquiring a shield against Macedon, the Achaians also made sure that the Aitolians would not attempt to expand over their own sphere of control. However, this alliance officially involved the Achaian Confederacy in the so-called Demetrian War against Macedon and the Epeirotes, from 239 to 229.⁹⁸ In the course of this war Aratos continued, much more aggressively, his attacks on Argos. It was in this decade that the Achaian Confederacy acquired Kleonai, Heraia, Megalopolis and Orchomenos, while after the end of the war Argos finally joined in along with Hermione and Phleious as well as Aigina. In 229, the Achaian Confederacy came to comprise 12,500 km² (Walbank 1933, 72), more than the Sparta of old.

* * *

After the admission of Corinth, Troizen and Epidauros, Aratos embarked upon a struggle to make the Confederacy into an even more formidable unit, capable of keeping Macedon away from the Peloponnese for good. To this end, he attempted to bring over to the Confederacy the most important neighbouring *poleis* under Macedonian control or influence: Athens and Argos respectively. He failed with Athens repeatedly⁹⁹ (Plut. *Arat.* 24.3, 33.2) while it took him more than ten years to bring over Argos.

It is notable that, with one exception, no substantial Achaian army is recorded as involved in Aratos' repeated attacks on Argos (but there is vague reference to many open and secret attacks: Plut. *Arat.* 27.1). This does not mean that the Confederacy as a whole opposed his plans; quite the contrary, since Aratos was elected *stratēgos* almost every time he had the right to be a candidate for the *stratēgia*. But it does mean that individual member states would rather have the gains without the trouble, the expansion without the war.

Argos became the most coveted *polis* in the Peloponnese for Aratos but the Argives proved less than willing to join the Achaian Confederacy. They only joined in 229 after repeated attacks and following the death of the Macedonian king Demetrios II. Aratos presented his attacks on Argos as a result of his general hatred for tyrants – in Argos' case, first Aristomachos I and then his son Aristippos II. Liberation of the Argives could be presented as the appropriate return of the favour they had done Aratos by providing him with refuge as a child (Plut. *Arat.* 25.1–2). But as *apologia* such claims have not persuaded scholars.¹⁰⁰ For one thing, Aratos had found refuge in Argos while a tyrant was ruling there. Secondly, there is no record of Aratos attacking other, smaller Peloponnesian *poleis* ruled by tyrants in the same period (although Plutarch in *Aratos* 26.3 calls him an enemy of all tyrants). Irrespective of the degree of Macedonian influence

or control exercised over Argive tyrants, Argos was too important to be left out, if Aratos was trying to create a buffer zone around the Confederacy (Urban 1979, 61). Whether Aratos had at the time a more long-term and ambitious plan to unify the entire Peloponnese is impossible to tell. Besides, we cannot know whether at *any* point in his career he had such a plan – did he have any plans for Sparta for instance?

Another question is whether Aratos, who had probably been inspired by the expansion of the Aitolian Confederacy, could have imitated the latter also by employing an alternative, more flexible approach to expansion: namely to try to forge bonds of *isopoliteia* with Argos, either from the very beginning or at least after it had become clear that the Argives would not be lured into the Achaian Confederacy. Aratos and the Achaian Confederacy showed no signs of having thought of such diplomacy. They had had little time to acquire skills in something that the Aitolians had learnt over the years.

At first Aratos planned to have Aristomachos (I) of Argos murdered and to this end he employed treachery. However, his plans failed due to his Argive collaborators' falling out (Plut. *Arat.* 25.2–3). Shortly afterwards, Aristomachos was murdered by his own slaves¹⁰¹ and was succeeded by Aristippos (II). Probably in 240, Aratos led a force against Argos. If we are to believe Plutarch, who certainly tends to overestimate the role of his hero(es), the whole enterprise seems to have been the result of a spontaneous decision of Aratos, as soon as Aristippos came to power. It is possible that Plutarch exaggerates the spontaneous character of the action of his hero. But if he does not, then Aratos acted without official authorization and, consequently, we could conclude that the force was inadequately prepared: ὅσοι δὴ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ παρόντες ἔτυχον, τοὺτους ἀναλαβὼν ὁ Ἀρατος ἐβοήθει (Plut. *Arat.* 25.4: 'Aratos at once took all the Achaians of military age who were at hand and went swiftly to the aid of the city.'). Plutarch states that Aratos' force was Achaian but exactly what he means by 'Achaian' is quite uncertain. It is rather too much to believe that, for example, Troizenians or Dymaians who happened to be in Sikyon accepted, *ad hoc*, to take arms against Argos. Thus, we should rather think that Aratos had a stand-by force, consisting of his personal supporters. It is unclear to what extent this force comprised Sikyonians, citizens of member states or mercenaries or all of the above.

However, Aratos' hope was that the Argives would be all-too-relieved and welcoming – or so we are told. But this may reflect an exculpatory claim by Aratos after the event, in order to exonerate himself from the crime of a totally unprovoked attack in peacetime. If indeed Aratos expected Argive support for his plan, then he was guilty of gross

miscalculation. Plutarch provides us with little information concerning Argive reaction during the assault and its aftermath. He notes that not a single Argive came over to Aratos' side, because 'they had been used to being slaves willingly' (*Arat.* 25.5: διὰ συνήθειαν ἐθελοδούλως ἐχόντων). But it is possible that this slavery was not so cumbersome to the majority of the Argives, at least not so cumbersome as to collaborate with a foreigner attacking their territory. Plutarch leads us to assume that Argive unwillingness was the reason that Aratos' campaign evidently failed but he leaves us in the dark as to what form this unwillingness took. Did the Argives remain passive, either due to indifference or to weakness? Or did they take arms against Aratos? Either interpretation could partly explain Aratos' failure.¹⁰²

Later on, in 235, during yet another unsuccessful attack by Aratos, the Argives are reported to have maintained an impressively passive attitude while battle went on between Aratos' troops and (presumably) the tyrant's mercenaries (referred to in *Plut. Arat.* 26.4). Plutarch (*Arat.* 27.2) likens them to mere spectators of the Nemean Games, supporting neither of the combatants:

οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι, καθάπερ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας τῆς μάχης οὔσης, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Νεμείων βραβεύοντες, ἴσοι καὶ δίκαιοι θεαταὶ καθήντο τῶν γινομένων, πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντες.

But the Argives, as though it were not a battle to secure their freedom, but a contest in the Nemean Games of which they were the judges, sat as just and impartial spectators of what was going on, without lifting a finger.

Probably in association with this event Polybius (2.59.8–9 with Walbank 1957, 266) reports that Aratos had been promised help by certain Argives who, intimidated by the tyrant, did not make a single move when the time came. These would-be collaborators should most probably be identified with the eighty put to death by the next tyrant, Aristomachos (II).

This Argive impartiality or passivity is consistent with their policy of abstaining from armed conflict, visible in the late 4th and the early 3rd centuries. A different but not incompatible perspective is offered by Walbank (1933, 61) who suggests that the Argives would not have wished to join a historically insignificant political union. In fact, the Argives, having been enemies of Sparta, had never been part of a Peloponnesian union; their refusal to participate in the Achaian Confederacy fits into a long-standing political pattern.

To return to the attack of c.240: the second notable piece of information provided by Plutarch concerns relations between Aratos, the Confederacy, the Argives, and Mantinea. Aristippos (II) of Argos brought charges

against the entire Confederacy for violation of the peace¹⁰³ ‘before a Mantinean court, and, in the absence of Aratos, Aristippos as plaintiff won his case and was awarded damages to the amount of 30 minas’ or half a talent, a trifling sum in the circumstances (Plut. *Arat.* 25.5–6: καὶ δίκην ἔσχον ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ Μαντινεύσιν, ἣν Ἀράτου μὴ παρόντος Ἀρίστιππος εἶλε διώκων, καὶ μνῶν ἐτιμήθη τριάκοντα).¹⁰⁴

Plutarch simply records the beginning and the end of the procedure leaving much obscure. First of all, was this procedure an arbitration, i.e. had the two parties agreed to go to court and choose a third party as arbiter?¹⁰⁵ There is not the slightest hint that the Achaian Confederacy had agreed to go to court or that it had agreed on the identity of the judge; Aristippos is simply recorded as having brought charges. But given the narrative’s brevity, this is hardly a safe argument *ex silentio*. On the other hand, even if we are not dealing with arbitration, this does not necessarily mean that no Achaian was sent to represent the Confederacy. Although there is no mention of Achaian representatives, it is instructive that Plutarch underlines solely Aratos’ absence which could be taken to mean not only that Aratos should have been present, being the person responsible for the situation, but also that, by contrast, other Achaians were there.¹⁰⁶ As to why the Achaians might have agreed to be tried, internal opposition to Aratos’ campaign against Argos might be an explanation.¹⁰⁷

Magnetto (1997, 227–8 and n.7), assuming that this incident was indeed an arbitration and citing similar cases of absence of the defendant, argues that the failure of Aratos to appear constituted a legal pretext for Mantinea to decide in favour of the prosecutor. This is certainly a plausible argument but the phrase ‘Ἀράτου μὴ παρόντος’ might be translated as ‘without Aratos’ presence’ or ‘while Aratos was not present’, not necessarily as ‘because Aratos was not present’. Another problem is whether the nominal fine was imposed upon Aratos or the Confederacy as a whole. On this point, Larsen (1968, 310) and Ager (1996, 119) are probably right in thinking that the fine was imposed on the Achaians as a whole. Plutarch (*Arat.* 25.5), immediately before his report of the prosecution by Aristippos, states that Aratos withdrew from Argos, ‘having involved the Achaians in the charge of going to war in time of peace’ (ἐγκλημα κατεσκευακὼς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλεμον ἐξενηνοχόσι). Therefore, since the Achaians as a whole were brought to trial, the Achaians as a whole must have been condemned.¹⁰⁸

The Mantinean attitude is worth a comment here. The fact that Mantinea was chosen to provide judges shows that it was not a member of the Achaian Confederacy (Walbank 1957, 242; Will 1979, 337). We cannot know the circumstances under which the Mantineans agreed to play the role of the judge or the arbiter, i.e. whether they were willing to play a part

in regulation of affairs between two states, or if they were somehow obliged to accept. However, they found themselves in a delicate position. The fine was nominal, but can we see this as an affront to Argos?¹⁰⁹ The penal aspect in itself should not be underestimated. A fine is always a fine. However minimal, by imposing it, the Mantinean judges declared Aristippos and Argos to be in the right and the Achaian Confederacy and Aratos in the wrong.¹¹⁰ Essentially, the Mantineans took the ‘middle road’, trying not to displease excessively either of the two opponents, but if there is a sympathy here, it is for Argos, not for the Achaian Confederacy. And as it turned out later, this ‘middle-road’ did not ingratiate the Mantineans with Aratos (see pp.246–7).

This procedure, whatever its precise nature, did not actually aim at establishing peace, only at giving satisfaction to the injured party and, therefore, it is no surprise that hostilities went on between the Argives and the Achaian Confederacy or, to put it on the leadership level, between Aratos and the tyrant of Argos – first Aristippos (II) and, after his death, Aristomachos (II). Two battles (in two consecutive days) against Aristippos are recorded in some detail by Plutarch (*Arat.* 28.1–3) but he gives no evidence as to the number and the nature of the troops on either side – only that the second time Aristippos’ troops were much more numerous. In both cases Aratos demonstrated his inability to face an opponent on an open battlefield, and at this point we hear for the first time of protests against his inadequacy (Orsi 2000, 213).

The one notable success of Aratos against Argos was the incorporation of Kleonai in 235 (Plut. *Arat.* 28.3–4),¹¹¹ which ‘brought him to the very edge of the Argive plain’ (Walbank 1933, 61). It is unclear whether Kleonai was captured by diplomacy, treachery or in an open battle (Urban 1979, 71), but given Aratos’ very poor record in victories in open battles, most probably Plutarch (or rather Aratos in his *Memoirs*) would not have failed to record it had such a victory occurred. Plutarch actually states that Aratos, ‘making up for his previous failure, brought over Kleonai with his communication skills and experience in political affairs’: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῇ περὶ τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ πολιτείαν ἐμπειρία καὶ χάριτι τὴν διαμαρτίαν ταύτην ἀναμαχόμενος, προσηγάγετο τὰς Κλεωνᾶς. The use of the verb προσηγάγετο (= added, brought over) is an additional indication that the incorporation was smooth, the result of diplomacy – though perhaps under threat. This in turns shows that the citizens of Kleonai, or at least the majority of their elite, were not very happy living as a dependent *kōmē* of Argos, albeit a privileged one. Notably, the mass of the citizens hardly appear as taking a part in their ‘liberation’.

Aratos celebrated the Nemeia at Kleonai, possibly with only a very poor

turnout of spectators (see p.432). Thus, Aratos' action, while representing an offence to Argos, at the same time miscarried and was turned into a blow to the prestige of the Achaian Confederacy. Even more notably, Aratos openly violated the sacred truce before the games, selling into slavery those who were on their way to compete in the *Argive* Nemeia. Plutarch justifies this as a result of Aratos' extreme hatred for the tyrants, as if the Nemeia were the tyrants' personal property. The truth is that this was a sacrilegious, savage act of revenge and it was not the last one committed by Aratos against opponents who defied either him or the Achaian Confederacy as a whole.¹¹²

Aristippos (II) was slain shortly afterwards, during an attempt to recapture Kleonai. So far this is the only case in which we read of an Achaian army (στρατιά) assembled by public proclamation to attack Argos. The tyrant's death availed the Confederacy little since Aristomachos (II)¹¹³ succeeded smoothly, with the support of Demetrios II of Macedon (Plut. *Arat.* 29.1–4).

On the basis of Polybius (2.44.3–4), it appears that the death of Demetrios II in 229 was a most fortunate event for the Achaian Confederacy. Elimination of his financial support, combined with either threats or offers of gifts and honours by Aratos, led to the abdication of the remaining tyrants in the Argolid – Aristomachos (II) of Argos, Xenon of Hermione and Kleonymos of Phleious. In doing so, they imitated Lydiadas of Megalopolis and most probably Nearchos of Orchomenos who had abdicated in c.235, while Demetrios II was still alive. Plutarch (*Arat.* 34.5 and 35.3) gives a slightly different version: Hermione joined first (along with Aigina) while Argos and Phleious joined a little later. Whether this was done out of fear of isolation, fear of Argos or, conversely, on the basis of political co-operation between the two tyrants of Argos and Phleious, is unclear. This was the second time that the two *poleis* were united by means of an external agent, the first such agent being Demetrios Poliorketes and his Hellenic League of 302. A long time had passed since the moment in the early 4th century, when the Argives had been keen to conquer Phleious but both *poleis* had sworn to the peace of 365 with the Thebans (see p.7).

Given Aratos' past failures with Argos as well as the prominent position of Aristomachos, the former tyrant, in the Confederacy after his city's admission, one might guess that threats applied more to Xenon and Kleonymos while persuasion by means of gifts and honours applied to Aristomachos. The latter asked for and received 50 talents to pay his mercenaries (Plut. *Arat.* 35.2). Like Lydiadas of Megalopolis, he was elected *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy. It is quite possible, though a

speculation, that both he and Lydiadas had agreed with Aratos that the latter would not object to their standing as candidates for the *stratēgia*. It is also highly likely that, again like Lydiadas, Aristomachos was motivated by the prospect of acquiring a prominent position in a much bigger political entity than Argos (Larsen 1968, 312) – and this is proved by the fact that he went for the *stratēgia* as soon as he could.

The case of Argos affords an excellent example of admission into the Confederacy providing the scope for personal antagonism and the saving of prestige. It also affords evidence as to amicable relations between the Megalopolitan and the Argive rulers. Plutarch (*Arat.* 35.2–3) presents a nice little story of intrigue. Both Aratos and Lydiadas wanted Argos to be enrolled into the Confederacy but each wanted to present the admission as his own doing – at least this is what Plutarch wants us to understand. Lydiadas, being *stratēgos*, first denounced Aratos to Aristomachos for his harbouring ill-feelings towards tyrants and then he presented Aristomachos to the Achaian assembly. Initially Aratos and the Achaians dismissed him along with the Argive envoys but when Aratos next assumed the *stratēgia* he talked the Achaian assembly into accepting Aristomachos and the Argives.¹¹⁴ This might not be the whole story. For instance, we do not know whether Aratos had other reasons not to want Argos in the Confederacy any longer. Walbank (1933, 71) believes that Aratos' reason for having Aristomachos rejected was his wish to avoid the creation of a block pushing for war against Sparta. We know that, a couple of years later, at the beginning of the War of Kleomenes, Aristomachos was all for battle against Kleomenes (see p.231). Can we ascribe to him anti-Spartan plans before the enrolment of Argos in the Confederacy? It is quite possible. If so, it is also possible that he made his plans known. And, as we shall see, Aratos was not particularly keen on having the Achaian Confederacy crossing swords with the Spartans. We also do not know whether or how much pressure was exercised on Aratos by member-states to have Argos enrolled, after the initial rejection. Aristomachos' subsequent election to the *stratēgia* of the Achaian Confederacy shows that, indeed, he had followers among member-states.

Aristomachos was elected *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy a year after the admission of Argos but, as it turned out a few years later, he and the Argives were far from whole-heartedly devoted to the Confederacy.

As a whole, Plutarch and Polybius present the enrolment of new member-states as the work of individuals. Such is the case with Megalopolis and its tyrant Lydiadas. This might very well reflect reality but it is rather hard to believe that in no *polis* did the people or some kind of civic body have a say. There is indeed 3rd-century evidence for decisions of an

assembly (mostly honorific decrees) in most of the cities which joined the Achaian Confederacy.¹¹⁵ As for the tyrants, we cannot know whether they simply announced their decision to the people or if they put the matter to the vote. And even in the latter case, we cannot know how free any such voting would have been.

Arkadian *poleis* become members of the Achaian Confederacy: the willingness of the Megalopolitans, the reluctance of others

If the expansion of the Achaian Confederacy to the *poleis* of the Argolic Akte and the attacks on Argos (and Athens) in the late 240s and the 230s were primarily dictated by defensive considerations, the expansion into Arkadia in the 230s could be a clearer sign of hegemonic ambitions, although defensive considerations vis-à-vis the Aitolian Confederacy were also in play.

Apart from the acquisition of Kleonai, the other and far more notable adhesion in the 230s, one with far-reaching consequences for the Achaian Confederacy, was the incorporation of Megalopolis, also in 235.

Following the ascent of Aristomachos (II) as a tyrant in Argos, Aratos turned his attention to Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis (Plut. *Arat.* 30.1–2). We do not know whether Lydiadas enjoyed Macedonian support, in which case the plans of Aratos could be equally seen as defensive, but it does seem that Achaian interest in Arkadia has a more pronounced expansionist character, when we take into account that, before Megalopolis, most probably Heraia, Kleitor and Thelphousa had passed into Achaian hands – Heraia certainly by force.

Before Aratos had time to employ his usual plots, Lydiadas laid down his rule and had Megalopolis admitted into the Confederacy. The incorporation is presented solely as his doing. There is no information as to whether any Megalopolitan body – an assembly or a council – had any say in the matter. But if Lydiadas presented the matter to the assembly of the people, he would not have had much difficulty in persuading them. It is indicative of the Megalopolitans' bond with their rulers and the influence exercised by the latter, that Lydiadas and his father Eudamos were posthumously awarded heroic honours – in mid-3rd century and after 227 respectively (see p.222).

As to Lydiadas' motives, Plutarch (*Arat.* 30.2–5), combining practical considerations and high ideals, states that they consisted of healthy jealousy for the Confederacy's progress, fear of Aratos' plans, as well as a wish to be rid of the burden of tyrannical rule and become a benefactor of his *polis*. It is difficult to tell whether Lydiadas was afraid only of Achaian ambition or whether we should also view the Aitolians as agents of pressure on him,

since they already exercised influence on Elis, Phigaleia and Messenia. Therefore, the Aitolians, too, must have appeared menacing to the Megalopolitans. The problem is also associated with the problem of the allegiances of the various Arkadian *poleis* before 235. Walbank (1933, 58, 62; 1984, 446; 1988, 330) argues that Lydiadas must have felt more threatened after Heraia, and presumably Kleitor and Thelphousa, had been captured by the Achaian Confederacy in 236 (in order to get to Heraia, one had to occupy Kleitor and Thelphousa: see Maps 1 and 2) and even more so after the death of Aristippos II of Argos.¹¹⁶

Wherever the pressure came from, the Achaian Confederacy would be attractive to Lydiadas because it afforded him the opportunity to enhance his prestige, authority and military power beyond the boundaries of his own *polis* via the Achaian *stratēgia*. This he evidently coveted; witness his election to the post in the very next year after the admission of Megalopolis. On the other hand, should he attach Megalopolis to the *Aitolian* Confederacy by means of *isopoliteia* (as probably happened with the eastern Arkadian *poleis*), there would be no possibility of his being elected *stratēgos* of the Aitolian Confederacy, i.e. he would have remained a local ruler.

With the enrolment of Megalopolis, the Achaian Confederacy not only grew in size but it also acquired an ambitious leader. For the first time Aratos had serious competition.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Lydiadas had his own, anti-Spartan agenda, not necessarily compatible with the agenda of the Sikyonian Aratos. Later on, in the 2nd century, Megalopolitan politicians progressively acquired a most prominent role in Achaian policies which came to be identified with policies of Megalopolis (O’Neil 1984–86, 33–6).

Walbank (1988, 330–1), emphasizes that ‘in the long run, however, the accession of Megalopolis to the Achaean League was to do more harm to the Achaeans than to the Macedonians. For along with Megalopolis the League now inherited a tradition of hostility towards Sparta, which was to be one factor – another was the accession in the same year, 235, of a young and ambitious king, Cleomenes III, to the Agiad throne at Sparta – which would soon set Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy on a collision course; and this in turn would provide Macedonia with an unforeseen opportunity to regain its foothold in the Peloponnese’.¹¹⁸ Walbank’s important argument deserves to be qualified: the enrolment of the Megalopolitans actually proved beneficial to the Macedonians in the War of Kleomenes (see pp.233–6).

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The date(s) and the circumstances in which other Arkadian *poleis* joined the Achaian Confederacy are a problem due to paucity of information. The overall impression is that the Arkadian *poleis* were not very eager to get incorporated into the Achaian Confederacy.

Kynaitha, right on the threshold of ancient Achaia (near modern Kalavryta; Nielsen 2004a, 516), was perhaps the first Arkadian *polis* to attract Achaian attention, in the late 240s. Kynaitha was tormented by *stasis* in the 240s and down to 220, incessantly as it appears (Polyb. 4.17.4–18.1–5). Party struggle accompanied by massacres, exiles, seizure of property and redistribution of land¹¹⁹ was its main problem but it is unclear whether it was bound up with dispute over foreign policy. We cannot tell how far attitudes to the Aitolian and the Achaian Confederacies had divided the people. Kynaitha's strategic location¹²⁰ might very well have made it a bone of contention between the two Confederacies, but we only know that Aratos failed to capture it by treachery (Polyb. 9.17), probably in 241/0 (Walbank 1936, 68–71). It is not clear from Polybius' narrative (4.17.4–10) whether the rival groups in Kynaitha were divided into pro-Aitolians and pro-Achaians *from the beginning* of the long period of strife. However, Aratos' attempt indicates that there was a group then favouring the Achaian Confederacy (Scholten 2000, 119), no matter if the attempt failed. On the other hand, we cannot safely conclude that there was also a pro-Aitolian group in the late 240s-early 230s.¹²¹ It is also uncertain whether Kynaitha was captured by Aratos shortly after his first attempt, as Walbank believes.¹²² However, sometime before 220, Kynaitha was divided into pro-Achaians and pro-Aitolians. In the context of 220 Polybius refers to pro-Achaians who had previously gained the upper hand and to their rivals who had been re-admitted into the city and betrayed it to the Aitolians (in 220). While under a pro-Achaian regime Kynaitha had a garrison and a *stratēgos* from Achaia (ἐξ Ἀχαΐας). Furthermore, the Kynaithans asked the Achaian Confederacy for permission in order to receive the exiles back (βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις). These pieces of information indicate a very close connection with the Achaian Confederacy but it is not quite certain that Kynaitha was a member of that Confederacy. If so, then it was not much of an asset, given that Polybius reports enduring and savage internal strife which went down to 220 (Polyb. 4.19.4–7). In any case, this strife must have been one of the reasons that the Eleans rejected Kynaitha as a gift offered by the Aitolians (see pp.294–5).

It is worth noting that because of their bloody strife the Kynaithans had ended up isolated from the other Arkadians (Polyb. 4.21.7–12).¹²³ Arkadian unanimity was manifested against them, after a great massacre at Kynaitha dating before the depopulation of Mantinea in 223.

The Kynaithans sent an embassy to Sparta and, along the way, the ambassadors were evicted from every single Arkadian *polis* they entered; the Mantineans even performed purification rites. This embassy to Sparta indicates some sort of previous contact or even friendly relations between the two but we cannot tell whether attitudes to Sparta (also) caused factionalism.¹²⁴

As to the other Arkadian *poleis* and their relations with the Achaian Confederacy, Polyainos (*Stratagems* 2.36) reports that Heraia was conquered by Dioitas, the Achaian *stratēgos*. There has also survived the federal decree regulating the admission of Orchomenos into the Achaian Confederacy (see below). Plutarch, in a fleeting reference (*Arat.* 34.5) states that most Arkadian *poleis* were also part of the Achaian Confederacy upon the death of Demetrios II in 229, i.e. they had probably joined *before* Aigina and Hermione.¹²⁵ No other Arkadian *polis* is reported, by name, in literary sources to have come over to the Achaians in the 230s or earlier, including important *poleis* such as Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenos (we read about them in the context of 229). There is, however, epigraphic evidence showing that Orchomenos was enrolled after Megalopolis. In the context of the Kleomenic War, Polybius (2.46.2–4, 57.1) indicates that Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenos had been first on the Achaian, and later on the Aitolian, side before the outbreak of the war.

First Heraia: Walbank's view that it was captured in 236 has generally gained acceptance.¹²⁶ Walbank also points out that in order for the Achaians to get to Heraia, Kleitor and Thelphousa must have been in their hands already (Maps 1 & 2).¹²⁷ At least in the case of Heraia we can talk of Achaian aggression. As mentioned above, our only source for the capture of Heraia is Polyainos, *Stratagems* 2.36. According to Polyainos, the Heraians were not willing to be incorporated into the Achaian Confederacy but they were not so strong as to fight against what they thought was a much stronger army. Dioitas had to bribe his way into the city, presumably because of its impressive fortifications,¹²⁸ but there his small force met with resistance and he was forced to employ a trick: he ordered trumpets to sound from many places. Thus the Heraians were deceived into believing that Dioitas' army was much more numerous and, abandoning any thought of fight, fled their city; on the next day, they surrendered.

The case of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* – Mantinea, Orchomenos and Tegea – is the most intriguing. It appears that they, along with Kaphyai,¹²⁹ had similar political history in the decade preceding the Kleomenic War. Within a few years they transferred their allegiance from the Achaians to the Aitolians, and then allied themselves with the Spartans. They entered the Achaian Confederacy at some point between 240 and 229, perhaps all

four of them together, roughly at the time that Megalopolis was admitted in 235.¹³⁰ We know that at least Mantinea was not a member in 240 when it adjudicated the case of Aristippos (II) against the Achaians. The reasons for their joining the Achaian Confederacy are not clear but, given their subsequent history, we can rule out faith in, or sympathy with, the Confederacy. Their enrolment can be viewed more as the result of fear of Achaian expansion, either before or, perhaps more likely, after the incorporation of Megalopolis.

Evidence of Achaian aggression as well as an indication of some kind of connection between Sparta and certain Arkadian *poleis* is found in Plutarch (*Kleom.* 3.5), who states that the Peloponnesians shared Aratos' plans for a unified Peloponnese, with the exception of the Lakedaimonians, the Eleans and those Arkadians who were favourably disposed towards the Spartans (ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Ἀρκάδων προσεῖχον). Actually, those not in favour of the Achaian Confederacy were far too many to be dismissed. Immediately below, Plutarch records that Aratos started harassing the Arkadians, plundering especially the territories of the Arkadian *poleis* 'neighbouring to the Achaians', as soon as the Agiad king Leonidas II was dead and Kleomenes III ascended the throne, in 235 – a significant timing.¹³¹ The Arkadians who still remained outside the Achaian Confederacy could be either some of the northern ones (e.g. Kynaitha, Kleitor, Thelphousa, Stymphalos, Heraia) or of the eastern (Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Kaphyai) or, more likely, a combination of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* and some of the northern. Marasco (1980b, 118–19 and 1981, 118, 294, 379–80) argues that Plutarch refers to the eastern Arkadian *poleis*, since the northern ones would not have had much to gain from an alliance with Sparta. The argument is reasonable, but we should probably include some of the northern Arkadians since Plutarch refers to both those Arkadians generally harassed by Aratos and more specifically to those sharing borders with the Achaians and plundered (παρηνώχλει τοῖς Ἀρκάσι καὶ περιέκοπτεν αὐτῶν μάλιστα τοὺς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὁμοροῦντας...). Furthermore, it is not certain that, at this particular juncture, the 'ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Ἀρκάδων προσεῖχον' should be understood to mean an alliance, as Marasco believes, rather than a friendly disposition.¹³² Certainly, however, there is a pattern of common action, on the Spartan side, in the political and military history of the eastern Arkadian *poleis*. Walbank (1957, 243) draws attention to the fact that these four *poleis* had acted together a few decades earlier, in the Chremonidean War. And we can add that their history of joint action went further back to the time of Agis III's War. Indeed, all eastern Arkadians, later on, took sides with Kleomenes of Sparta, against the Achaian Confederacy.

However, Marasco (1980b, 118–19) must be right in arguing that the

eastern Arkadians were forced to join the Achaian Confederacy; he acutely notes the silence of Polybius as to how their incorporation came about. Marasco also argues that the eastern Arkadians, especially the Mantineans, would not have joined the Achaian Confederacy once the Megalopolitans had entered it, and therefore must have been admitted before. The argument is plausible, but Megalopolis would have probably inspired even more fear after its admission into the Achaian Confederacy and, therefore, Mantinea and the other eastern Arkadian *poleis* could have entered the Achaian Confederacy, after Megalopolis, as a means of self-protection.

In the context of 229/8 Polybius (2.46.2–3) reports that Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenos were not only allied but also συμπολιτευομένας to the Aitolians; the meaning of the term συμπολιτευομένας is uncertain:

...Τεγέαν, Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχομένον, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευομένας τότε πόλεις...

In another passage (2.57.1) Polybius explicitly states that Mantinea first abandoned on its own initiative the Achaian Confederacy, then joined the Aitolians, and finally Kleomenes:

Μαντινεῖς τοίνυν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐγκαταλιπόντες τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν ἐθελοντὴν Αἰτωλοῖς ἐνεχείρισαν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κλεομένει.

Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaian League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aitolians and then of Kleomenes.

On the basis of their previous common foreign policy we can surmise that the same pattern applies to the other eastern Arkadian *poleis* as well.

To return to the eastern Arkadian – Achaian relations: the term ‘συμπολιτευομένας’ is quite perplexing – note that the verb forms are employed more loosely than the noun *sympoliteia*.¹³³ Polybius uses this participle on four other occasions (4.3.6; 18.3.12; 18.38.6; 21.30.8). In two of these cases he clearly means membership in a confederacy (18.38.6, 21.30.8). Additionally, Polybius employs the verb *sympoliteuomai* in the imperfect tense three times (2.43.1, 23.4.4 and 23.18.2) and the infinitive *sympoliteuesthai* once (22.8.9), again clearly meaning ‘confederacy’. Six out of these nine cases concern the Achaian Confederacy. Another two concern the Aitolian Confederacy, and again there is no doubt as to the meaning of the *sympoliteu-*. The problem emerges with regard to the overseas allies of the Aitolian Confederacy: the eastern Arkadians, Phigaleia (Polyb. 2.46.2; 4.3.6), and the Kians. Walbank (1957, 243) draws attention to the fact that Polybius describes the Lysimacheians, the Kalchedonians and the Kians as

allies of the Aitolians in 15.23.8 while in 18.3.12 he describes the Kians as μετ' Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτευομένου. The common element in all the above-mentioned cases is shared foreign policy. This is what counts for Polybius, and thus he is using terms loosely where the Aitolian Confederacy is concerned.¹³⁴ Notably, he uses the term *isopoliteia* only once (16.26.9), in the case of the Athenians conferring *isopoliteia* upon the Rhodians.

However, in the case of the eastern Arkadians Polybius is probably using the term συμπολιτευομένης in the more limited sense of *isopoliteia*, not *sympoliteia*. As Larsen (1966, 52–5) vividly states: 'To combine full membership and alliance would be like making the state of New York an ally of the United States' (at p.52). Tegean and Orchomenian friendly relations with the Aitolians are attested in inscriptions, unfortunately not precisely dated. We note the *proxenia* awarded to the Aitolian Damatrios by the Tegeans (*IG* V.2.10 / *IPArk* 36b = ll. 3–8). *Proxenia* was granted by the Orchomenians to four Aitolians, on a single occasion.¹³⁵

The date and, especially, the circumstances under which the eastern Arkadians joined the Aitolian Confederacy are problematic: was it a result of their own initiative, with or without Achaian consent, was it the result of Aitolian pressure or was it the result of an Achaian offer to the Aitolians to compensate for their losses in Central Greece?¹³⁶ The latter theory seems rather far-fetched, since such an offer would be tantamount to voluntarily reducing considerably the size of the Achaian Confederacy. Along these lines, it is possible that the Aitolians would have exercised some kind of pressure on the Achaians in order to take the eastern Arkadians into their sphere of influence.

The problem with the latter two theories is that they leave the eastern Arkadians out of the picture as if they had no say in matters that concerned them directly. This would only be the case later, when they were faced with the superior force of Macedon (at the end of the War of Kleomenes). Events are viewed as the work of the greater powers, and we have no information as to what went on within these cities, in their respective assemblies first and foremost. Yet, at least in this particular case, we should primarily view these Arkadian *poleis* as active agents, not as passive objects of transaction between two Confederacies or between a Confederacy and a king. Polybius indicates as much when he insists that the Mantineans abandoned the Achaian Confederacy on their own initiative (although, admittedly, this might be part of an attempt to justify Achaia's savage destruction of Mantinea in 223). The above-mentioned Tegean and Orchomenian proxeny decrees hardly testify to Arkadian reluctance. Moreover, in order to become allies of the Aitolian Confederacy, or to agree to *isopoliteia*, these Arkadian *poleis* did not have to abandon the Achaian

Confederacy,¹³⁷ all the more so since the Aitolian and the Achaian Confederacies were officially allied until 220. In any case, the shift of allegiance must have been on their own initiative, a result of a wish to be part of the Achaians no longer. The Achaians would not have reacted against this move probably because they could not afford to challenge the Aitolians. Moreover, in order to bring them back, the Achaians would have had to engage in full-scale war, something that they were not accustomed to doing and it was not feasible to do in the middle of the Demetrian War (which started in 239).

It is possible to see a combination of motives behind the action of the eastern Arkadian *poleis*. The Achaian defeat at Phylakia (located between Tegea and Sparta), by Bithys, general of Demetrios II, in c. 233/2, and the ensuing turmoil in the area, could very well have alarmed the eastern Arkadians as to the Achaian ability to defend them and made them turn to the Aitolians for assistance.¹³⁸

Other factors could have been at work. De Sanctis (1894, 392) argued that the reason for the shift of the eastern Arkadians to the Aitolians should be sought in the rivalry between Tegea and Mantinea on the one hand, and Megalopolis on the other and, more specifically, in the increasing influence of Lydiadas and Megalopolis in the Achaian Confederacy. Along this line of interpretation Walbank suggested that the eastern Arkadians might have only joined the Achaian Confederacy out of fear.¹³⁹ Although there is no tangible evidence, the fact that Megalopolitan policies had been at variance with the policies of the eastern Arkadians in the 4th and the 3rd centuries adds some support to this argument.

The federal decree regulating the enrolment of Orchomenos in the Achaian Confederacy, shortly after the admission of Megalopolis,¹⁴⁰ may also support De Sanctis' view, as to the relations between Orchomenos and the Achaian Confederacy, as well as between Orchomenos, Megalopolis and Methydrion (*IPArk* 16).¹⁴¹

This decree represents a means of establishing peace between individual members of the Confederacy (Ager 1996, 131) but we should also view it as the first instance of Megalopolis' taking advantage of the Confederacy's institutions to further and impose its own policy – in this case, settle its scores with at least part of the Methydrieis. As we shall see, towards the end the decree reads as very 'Megalopolitan'.

The upper part has been lost and the first three surviving lines are too fragmentary. In the next ten lines reference is made to a penalty of a huge sum of 30 talents, to be deposited in the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios, in case a magistrate or private citizen puts to the vote a proposal contrary to the decree; the *stratēgos* of the Confederacy can bring charges incurring the

death penalty (Thür and Tauber, *IPArk*, pp.154, 157); the Orchomenian archons and the Achaian officials (the *damiorgoi*, the *stratēgos*, the *hipparchos* and the *nauparchos*) are to take the oath.

None of those who have acquired land or a house in Orchomenos, after the Orchomenians (?) have become Achaians,¹⁴² will have the right to alienate it before twenty years have passed (ll. 11–13): τῶν δὲ λαβόντων ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ κλᾶρον ἢ οἰκίαν, ἀφ’ οὗ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγένοντο, μὴ ἐξέστω μηθεὶ ἀπαλλοτριῶ | [σα] ἐτέων εἴκοσι. It emerges, then, that citizens of other *poleis*-members of the Confederacy have already acquired land and house in Orchomenian territory (note the participle λαβόντων in the past tense). The question is how and why. The fact that the Achaian Confederacy imposes terms of ownership shows that these people were settlers, dispatched by the Confederacy. That they have to keep their land on Orchomenian territory for twenty years shows that the Achaian officials wish to establish a kernel of non-Orchomenians loyal to the Confederacy (Mackil 2013, 466). In turn, this shows that the loyalty of the Orchomenians, or at least part of them, was considered shaky. Rizakis (2008b, 280, n.56) argues that the settlers were installed in Orchomenos to guarantee their adhesion to the Confederacy and compares their case with the Achaian settlers who were dispatched to Mantinea in the early stages of the Kleomenic War (Polyb. 2.58.1–3; see p.219).¹⁴³ If so, we have here an indication of membership under coercion and a very good reason for the subsequent anti-Achaian policy of the Orchomenians.

In these lines the decree is evidence of double citizenship in the Achaian Confederacy. First of all, it is interesting to find the term ‘become Achaian’ (ll. 12, 13, 16; Rizakis 2008b, 275 and n.13) instead of ‘acquire Achaian citizenship’ or ‘become an Achaian citizen’. Notably, the same expression is used both by Polybius (2.38.1–2) of members of the Achaian Confederacy and by Plutarch (*Arat.* 23.4) about the Corinthians: Aratos συνέπεισε τοὺς Κορινθίους Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι (‘Aratos persuaded the Corinthians to become Achaians’). This coincidence, and the fact that both Plutarch and Polybius draw extensively on Aratos’ *Memoirs*, suggest that the formulation in the decree for Orchomenos was originally a formulation of Aratos. This is a term simultaneously more vague and more telling than ‘become citizen’. It does not mean that the Orchomenians, or the citizens of any other *polis*, had to dispense with their own citizenship.¹⁴⁴ It means that the Achaian one must override it – at least in the eyes of Achaian authorities.

The next two clauses of the decree deal with two very different problems. The first one involves a certain Nearchos and his sons and unknown crimes of the former. The Confederacy cancels any charges pending against him and his son before Orchomenos joined the Achaian

Confederacy and stipulates a penalty of 1,000 *drachmai* against anyone failing to comply (ll. 13–16). This Nearchos most probably should be identified with the out-going tyrant of Orchomenos.¹⁴⁵ It is noteworthy that the Confederacy sees to the former tyrant's safety, thus rendering it virtually certain that a 'gentlemen's agreement' was lying behind Nearchos' abdication and his subsequent lenient treatment. Similarly, other Peloponnesian tyrants joined the Confederacy after abdicating and none was faced with repercussions. On the other hand, it is also possible that this clause was a compromise between the Achaian Confederacy and a large part of the Orchomenians who were well-disposed towards Nearchos. However, he lapsed into obscurity. It is possible that he remained in Orchomenos (Larsen 1968, 310) whence the elaborate precautions for his safety, which can also be viewed as imposing an obligatory peace on Orchomenos.

The second clause (ll. 18–21) concerns a Megalopolitan claim over money deriving from the pledge of a Methydrian statue:

περ[ι] | | δὲ τὰς Νί[κ]ας τὰς χρυσέ[α]ς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀπλοσμίου, ἃν καταθέντες
ἐνέχυρα οἱ Μεθυ[δρι]||[εἰς οἱ μετοικη]σαντες εἰ[ς] τὸ Ὀρχομενὸν διείλοντο τὸ
ἀργύριον καὶ τινες αὐτῶν ἀπὴν[εγ]||[καν εἰς Μεθύδρ]ι[ο]ν, ἔαμ μὴ ἀποδιδῶντι
τὸ ἀργύριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, καθὼς ἐξ[ε]||[χώρησεν ἅ πό]λεις τῶν
Ὀρχομενίων, ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια.

Concerning the gold [statue of Nike] from the sanctuary of Zeus Hoplosmuis which the [Methydrians who moved] to Orchomenus offered as security, subsequently sharing out the money (raised), and which some of them [brought back / to Methydrium], if they do not repay the monetary value to the Megalopolitans, as [conceded by the city] of Orchomenus, let the culprits be liable to prosecution (trans. by Austin 2006, no. 68, at pp.145–6 and n.4).

It seems probable that the Methydrieis had been faced with problems that led some of them to move to Orchomenos. Other than that, there arises a series of rather unanswerable, interlocking questions, which, nevertheless need to be posed. First, who pledged the statue: the Methydrieis as a whole or only those who moved to Orchomenos? The structure of the (restored) phrase seems to point to the second answer. And whoever the authors of the act were, why had they been in need to pledge the statue? And what is the status of Methydrium at the time of the inscription? According to Hiller von Gaertringen's generally accepted reconstruction of events (*Syll.*³ 490, n.9), the Methydrieis pledged the statue being in need of money after a bid for independence from Megalopolis; they were defeated and the leaders of the rebellion fled to Orchomenos with the money.¹⁴⁶ It is surely a plausible theory but the participle μετοικη]σαντες is too neutral to allow us

to conclude that they were exiles and enemies of Megalopolis. Whoever pledged the statue, we still have to ask where they pledged the statue or to whom. If we accept that only the *metoikēsantes* pledged it, then did they do so at Orchomenos? (so Mackil 2013, 466). The question would then be how they acquired it. But in this case, and especially if Methydrion is part of Megalopolis, it is puzzling that the Megalopolitans do not appear to ask for the return of the statue. It could be that the statue is already back at Methydrion or that it had always remained there. But if Methydrion is not part of Megalopolis, why do the Megalopolitans claim money deriving from a Methydrion statue? A perhaps wild guess is that the Methydrionians had pledged the statue to the Megalopolitans for a reason other than rebellion. Finally, which money did the Megalopolitans ask for? That of the Methydrionians still residing in Orchomenos, that of those who returned, or both? To answer that we should need to be certain of Methydrion's status. The last option presupposes that the Megalopolitans do not control Methydrion. In the second case, we should think that the Orchomenians had conceded the return of the money in the process of an arbitration between the Megalopolitans and the Methydrionians. The first option indicates that the Megalopolitans control Methydrion.

The Megalopolitan claim is part of an old and complicated story between Methydrion and Megalopolis. Before the *synoikismos* of Megalopolis, Methydrion had been one of the dependent communities of Orchomenos; later on it may have been incorporated into Megalopolis but in 274 it appears acting as an independent *polis*. In the present decree the status of Methydrion is uncertain but the Megalopolitans do have an axe to grind. A few years later, in 228/7, Kleomenes seized Methydrion (Plut. *Kleom.* 4.4) but again its status is unclear. Was it an independent community hostile to Kleomenes or was it part of Megalopolis and hostile to him on that account? Given that in the previous year Kleomenes had captured the Athenaeion in the Belminatis, the capture of Methydrion looks like a follow-up action against Megalopolis. In the context of 219 Polybios (4.10.10) calls Methydrion part of the Megalopolitans but it appears independent shortly after 207 (see p.29).

If Methydrion is independent at the time of the decree, then at some point between c.234 and 219 it became once more part of Megalopolis. And it would be most interesting if this had happened closer to 234 than to 219: in the first case it would be through aggression, direct or latent, on the part of the Megalopolitans; in the second it could be through a gift of Antigonos III Doson after his victory over Kleomenes in 222.

We also observe here the persistence of the bond between Orchomenos and Methydrion. And in this case, how should we view the subsequent

decision of the Orchomenians in favour of Megalopolitan claims? How eager would the Orchomenians have been to make a decision against their old friends?

A possible reconstruction of the procedure could be the following: the Megalopolitans submitted their case to the Achaian federal authorities and the latter in turn asked the Orchomenians to decide on the matter. The latter agreed that the money should be returned to Megalopolis. Following the decision of the Orchomenians, the Achaians ruled that those refusing to comply would be liable to prosecution.¹⁴⁷ What we do not know is whether pressure was exercised on the Orchomenians to decide in favour of the Megalopolitan claim. This possibility should not be excluded, especially in view of the firm way in which the Achaian Confederacy imposed its terms about Nearchos.

Ager (1996, 131) thinks that possibility of future arbitration between Megalopolis and Orchomenos is indicated in ll.20–1 (ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιούντας τὰ δίκαια). Magnetto (1997, 218), more accurately, views the clause as a preliminary regulation of a potentially dangerous situation. Certainly, a threat of prosecution is directed against the Methydrieis and probably also the Orchomenians, if they fail to help the Megalopolitans get the money.

Orchomenos did not stay long in the Achaian Confederacy. And in this inscription, we may have the seeds of discontent against Megalopolis and the Confederacy as a whole. We do not know whether the other eastern Arkadians had tangible reasons to be displeased after their admission. In the end, what we do know is that Orchomenos, Mantinea and Tegea went on pursuing the pro-Spartan policy they had pursued in the past.

Notes

¹ Larsen 1968, 303–4. Mackil (2013, 1 and n.3) notes that 183 out of the 456 (40%) *poleis* of mainland Greece and the Peloponnese belonged to a *Koinon*; see also Beck and Funke 2015, 3. On ancient discourses on federalism see Bearzot 2015, 504–11; Beck and Funke 2015, 4–5 with n. 8. See also Beck 2001, 356–8 and *id.* 2003, 187–8. Lehmann (2001, 46–61) argues that Polybius engages in a theoretical discussion by challenging Aristotle's view that tribal states were merely symmachies (*Pol.* 1261a.24–9) and by comparing the structure of the Achaian Confederacy to that of a *polis*; in Lehmann's view, the description of the Achaian constitution was in the now largely lost book 24.

² Walbank 1981, 141–2, 152–3; Funke 1994, 126–8 with notes; Beck and Funke 2015, 27.

³ See Beck 2001, 370–1, for the lack of a 'legal definition of the status of autonomy of poleis in a federal state' in Xenophon's time – and, we can add, in later times as well; see also Beck 2003, 183–4.

⁴ Polyb. 4.25.7; Larsen 1968, 239. Double citizenship was central to the first Achaian Confederacy as well: Morgan and Hall 2004, 474.

⁵ In the 330s the Aitolians completed the occupation of the northern coast of the Corinthian Gulf, while in the early 3rd century they acquired Delphi. Following their victory over the invading Gauls in 279, they progressively annexed most of Central Greece by means of treaties of *sympoliteia* with bordering states; they also concluded treaties of *isopoliteia* with states away from Aitolia (including the Aegean and Asia Minor); see Larsen 1968, 195–208; Antonetti 1994, 132–3; Fossey 1996; Scholten 2000, 59–95, 105–23, 240–52 and *id.* 2003, 146–8; Antonetti and Cavalli 2012; Funke 2015, 103–5. Grainger (1999, 245) rightly points out the difference in the way of expansion, but he rather overemphasizes the violence exercised by the Achaian Confederacy and its ‘distressing tendency to favour deals with tyrants’, at the same time downplaying the possibility of violence on the Aitolian part by stating that the Achaian methods were ‘presumably distasteful’ to the Aitolians.

⁶ Gawantka (1975, 81–91) argues that *isopoliteia* agreements were not established with a view to *sympoliteia* (= political union), pointing out that, in the case of bilateral awards of *isopoliteia*, no common citizenship or common institutions were established. On the other hand, Buraselis (2003a, 45), more accurately, calls the *isopoliteia* ‘a sort of prospective *sympoliteia*’.

⁷ Beck 1997, 59, 63 and *id.* 2001, 370. See also Rizakis 2015, 122.

⁸ Polyb. 2.38.1, 4: Πρώτον δέ, πῶς ἐπεκράτησε καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὄνομα κατὰ πάντων Πελοποννησίων, οὐκ ἄχρηστον μαθεῖν... πῶς οὖν καὶ διὰ τί νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν οὗτοί τε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἅμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν μετεilhφότες (‘In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaians... How is it, then, that both these two peoples [the Arkadians and the Lakonians] and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaians, but even their name?’).

⁹ Polybius even employs the term ‘Achaion ethnos’, e.g. in 2.12.4, 43.7, 44.1, to denote the expanded form of the Achaian Confederacy; see Lévy (1990, 21 and n.28) on the 139 occurrences of *ethnos* in Polybius.

¹⁰ Lévy 1990, 26 and n.55. Rzepka (2002, 243) rightly points out that in Polybius *sympoliteia* is a narrower term than *politeia*, denoting among other things ‘co-citizenship’.

¹¹ See Giovannini (1971, 14–24, 31, 74–81), arguing correctly that terms such as *koinon*, *ethnos*, or *sympoliteia* had no legal meaning but going rather too far by denying that there were federal states; see the review by Ehrenberg 1974; also the refutation of Giovannini’s thesis by Walbank 1976–77, esp. 34–50; O’Neil 1980, 47–8.

¹² See Doukellis (2004b, 102–4) emphasizing that Polybius presents an ideal for every confederacy, not just the Achaian.

¹³ Mackil (2013, 328) notes the lack of ‘clear accounts of the pressures, opportunities, discourses, and conflicts that contributed to the establishment of formal institutions by individual actors...’

¹⁴ See Larsen 1968, 225–6, on the size of the Achaian *boulē*: our sources do not record numbers but by comparison with other contemporary confederacies, we can surmise that it must have amounted to at least a few hundred and that the number of representatives was proportionate to the population of each member-state; see also Larsen 1955, 95–6 and Rizakis 2015, 127.

¹⁵ See Veligianni-Terzi 1977, 103–7, for a survey of their role and responsibilities; *ibid.*, 63–85, for the boards of *damiorgoi* in various Peloponnesian *poleis*. See Rizakis 2015, 130–1 on the role of the federal *damiorgoi* particularly in the administration of justice.

¹⁶ See Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 100–8 (based on Larsen 1955, 165–88), for a list and brief discussion of all meetings. Ghinati (1960, 361–2) enumerates 22 certain *synklētoi* while Rhodes with Lewis has c. 25.

¹⁷ Larsen 1968, 223; Giovannini 1969, 4.

¹⁸ See Larsen 1972, 178, n.1 and esp. Aymard 1938a, 381–3, nn.4, 5, 7, for the bibliography before the Second World War, including Walbank 1933, 27–8: the dominant view then was that the *synodoi* were assemblies of representatives/ meetings of the *boulē* while *synklētoi* were extraordinary meetings of the primary assembly.

¹⁹ Giovannini 1969, 9, 16; Walbank 1979, 407–8 and 1984, 245; O’Neil 1980, 42–4, on evidence for the 2nd century.

²⁰ As Larsen (1972, 178) has underlined, all stages of interpretation draw heavily on Polyb. 29.23–5, on a *synodos* at Corinth and a *synklētos* at Sikyon in 168.

²¹ Livy 32.19.3–23 on the *synklētos* at Sikyon in 198, in which envoys from the Romans, Attalos of Pergamon, the Rhodians and the Athenians appeared to ask the Achaian Confederacy to abandon its alliance with Macedon; Macedonian envoys were also present. On the first day, the envoys addressed the assembly, and this took till sunset; on the second day a herald called for anyone who wished to propose a decree. Larsen (1968, 228–9) takes this to mean ‘without a *probouleuma*’, and that this was the norm with the *synklētoi*. But as Walbank (1970, 131) observed, there is no evidence of the *boulē* acting as a probouleutic body. Admittedly, this is an argument *ex silentio*. Alternatively, in this case members of the *boulē* might simply not have been able to reach a unanimous proposal / *probouleuma*: Livy stresses that the Achaians were quite perplexed and as things turned out there was strong disagreement among Achaian authorities.

²² Aymard 1938a (esp. 78–83, 141–62) argued that both the *synodoi* and the *synklētoi* were primary assemblies but that the *synodoi de facto* tended to attract mainly the ruling classes thus approximating the *boulē* in composition. Although the basis of this argument is the improbable view that Polybius uses the word *boulē* loosely in the meaning of ‘deliberating assembly’ (at pp.155–6), his distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* participation is certainly plausible. Bingen (1954b, 402–7, no.18 = *SEG* 14.375) published an inscription of the late 4th / early 3rd century, in which the *boulē* of the Achaians is clearly recorded. However, Aymard (1938a, 415–21) was the first to show that the rule delegating responsibility for certain matters to extraordinary meetings was first applied shortly before 200.

In 1969 Giovannini provoked a most lively debate, rightly rejecting the view that Polybius’ use of the terms *ekklesiā* and *boulē* is loose and careless (at pp.2, 14–16), and arguing vigorously for the democratic nature of the Confederacy’s bodies, i.e. that both the *synodos* and the *synklētoi* were primary assemblies (esp. pp. 10–12, 16); also that both, not just the *synklētoi*, could decide on matters of alliance and war. Giovannini (at p. 7) insists that *synklētos* is a technical term but it denotes a body of which neither the composition nor the responsibilities are precisely defined by Achaian laws; *synklētoi* existed but not *the synklētos*. In the light of Giovannini’s article Walbank progressively changed his mind as to the composition of the *synodoi*. In 1970 he still found Larsen’s

theories the most convincing (see Walbank 1957, 219–20) but admitted that ‘no theory yet put forward solves every difficulty to everyone’s satisfaction’, especially with regard to the composition of the *synodos*; see esp. p.143 for a summary of his criticism of Giovannini’s views. However, by 1979 (406–14) Walbank, ‘encouraged by discussion with G. T. Griffith’, had come ‘nearer’ to Giovannini’s view that the *synodos* was after all a primary assembly and that all men of military age were entitled to attend primary assemblies; see also Walbank 1984a, 245–6. A year later O’Neil (1980, 42–5) also argued that all citizens of military age were entitled to attend the *synodos*. Similarly, Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 106 and Champion 2004, 204–5; for a criticism of Larsen’s views (of 1955) see also Musti 1967, 195–8. On the other hand, Lehmann (1983, 249–61; 2001, 70–81) adheres to Larsen’s view. Funke (1994, 130–1 and n.7) also follows Larsen. Roy (2003a, 84–5) neatly summarizes the doxography, stressing the Confederacy’s adaptability. Rizakis 2003, 97–9, leaves the matter open but in 2015, 123–5, he tends to accept Larsen’s view; Tuci (2003, 68–71 and n.72 with bibliography) leaves the matter open.

²³ Musti (1967, 198) observes that a primary assembly is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the qualification of a regime as democratic.

²⁴ See Welwei (1966, 283–4) on the ἰσηγορία καὶ παρρησία preventing democracy from becoming an ochlocracy; the ‘true democracy’ in Polyb. 2.38.6 should be taken to mean that no individual held monarchic rule. Musti (1967, 161) notes that the ἰσηγορία καὶ παρρησία in Polybius were not confined to democratic regimes; for instance, they also characterized the attitude of the Macedonians towards their king (Polyb. 5.27.6).

²⁵ On the progressive domination, at regional level, of Zeus Homarios – the god who protects and assembles – see Rizakis 2013, 11–13 and *id.* 2015, 119–20. On the choice of Aigion, being half way between Dyme and Pellene, see Moggi and Osanna 2000, 236–7.

²⁶ Aymard 1938a, 294–300; Larsen 1955 174, 230 and 1968, 217. Badian and Errington (1965, esp. the synopsis at p.17) argue that Philipoimen had the meeting place of the *synodos* altered at a *synklētos* at Argos, *before* the programmed *synodos* at Aigion; see also Errington 1969, 138–40.

²⁷ See Errington (1969, 139) on the meeting places of the 17 recorded *synodoi* after the reform of 188: 4 were held at Megalopolis, 3 at Corinth, 2 at Aigion, 1 at Sikyon, while the remaining seven were held at unknown cities. Skalet (1928, 89) observes that from 218 onwards 6 sessions, 4 of them *synklētoi*, took place at Sikyon, all but one in the 2nd century: in 218 (Polyb. 5.1.9 = *synklētos*), 198 (Livy 32.19–23 = *synklētos*), 192 (Livy 35.25 = *synklētos*), 183 (Polyb. 25.1.5), 170 (Polyb. 28.11.9), 168 (Polyb. 29.24.6).

²⁸ See Walbank 1979, 187–8 with bibliography.

²⁹ Aymard 1938a, 149; Ghinati 1960, 361; O’Neil 1980, 46–7; Lehmann 1983, 257–8 and n.51; Beck and Funke 2015, 15.

³⁰ Two lists of *nomographoi* have come down to us, one from Epidauros and another from Aigion. In the former (*IG* IV².1.73), which lists 24 *nomographoi* from 17 cities and dates after 228 (after the admission of Argos), Argos and Megalopolis have three representatives each, Sikyon, Aigion and Dyme two each, while the remaining twelve seats are distributed among twelve cities. Lehmann (1983, 247–51 and 2001, 82–9) sees three categories of member-states (large, medium and small) and argues that a

rotation system was applied on both the small and the great cities. According to Gschnitzer (1985, 105–7, 111–16), who also argues strongly in favour of proportionate representation in the Epidaurios list, the member-states are presented in geographical order and are divided into four categories: those which sent three, two, one delegate, respectively, and those which sent a common delegate by rotation; the rotation system was not applied to major cities. Therefore, on the basis of certain striking absences, Gschnitzer dates the list between 210 and 207 (the loss of Aigina and the reconquest of Tegea by the Achaian Confederacy respectively). The list (law?) from Aigion dates between 191 (incorporation of Sparta) and 182 (re-incorporation of Messene) and its surviving part records 21 *nomographoi* from 16 cities of Arkadia, Messenia and Lakonia; the *nomographoi* probably amounted to 40–45: see *ed. pr. Rizakis 2008a, 168–70, no.116, with photo, pl. XXVI (= *SEG* 58.417) / Mackil 2013, 475–7, no.44 (employing Rizakis 2008a, no.116). Rizakis 2003, 101–7, reviews the arguments for the Epidaurios list and argues for proportionate representation of three categories of cities in the Aigion list as well; see also Rizakis 2015, 126.

³¹ Walbank 1933, 27; Dušanić 1970, 342.

³² See Errington 1969, Appendix 2B, 248–65 and Table II, 300–1, for a list of the *stratēgoi* between 211/0 and 179/8. See O’Neil 1984–86, 33–6, on the Megalopolitan politicians, and 36–7, on those originating from Achaia proper; list at pp. 55–7.

³³ οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ὀρεγόμενοι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξεριθεύονται τοὺς νέους καὶ παρασκευάζουσιν εὐνοὺς συναγωνιστὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον. On ‘τοὺς νέους’ meaning soldiers see Walbank 1967, 225.

³⁴ Aymard 1938a, 210–11; Walbank 1967, 225.

³⁵ Aymard 1938a, 212–13 and n.5, 234; Musti 1967, 197.

³⁶ Rizakis 2008b, 275, n.14 with bibliography.

³⁷ Leontion and Keryneia might have originally been hill fortresses: Anderson 1954, 73; Rizakis 1995, 307. Notably, Leontion had been refounded as an autonomous *polis* by Antigonos Gonatas (it was probably dependent of Rhypes in the Classical era: Rizakis 1995, 308 and n.3), and this might very well explain the delay in its incorporation. It is quite dubious whether Olenos still existed in 280 – its territory was at some point absorbed by Dyme: see Baladié 1980, 305 and Rizakis 1995, 160, 262, 302, 305; on all three *poleis*, see also Morgan and Hall 2004, 482–3.

³⁸ See in general Walbank 1933, 26–7; 1957, 233–5; 1988, 249–50, 299 and n.5; Larsen 1968, 216; Urban 1979, 5–10; Rizakis 1995, 259–62. It is unclear when exactly Aigeira was admitted into the Achaian Confederacy but its admittance might postdate Pyrrhos’ campaign in the Peloponnese: Rizakis 2008a, 226, 258. In Urban’s plausible view (1979, 9), Macedonian backing from Corinth for the authorities in Aigeira and Pellene would have caused their delayed admission.

³⁹ See Paschidis 2008a, 233, n.3 with bibliography on the date of Sikyon’s liberation. According to Pompeius Trogus, *Prolegomena* 26, the revolt of Alexandros, the Macedonian governor of Corinth, preceded the liberation of Sikyon. In this case, we could argue that Aratos took advantage of the ensuing turmoil. Will (1979, 317–18), accepting Trogus’ testimony, dates the revolt in 253/2, a dating no longer accepted, except by Orsi 1987, 104–6 and Scholten 2000, 85–6, 256–8. Urban (1979, 13, 15–17) and following him Walbank (1984a, 247 and 1988, 301), date the revolt of Alexandros ‘probably in 249’; also Habicht 1997, 162–3 and Errington 2008, 92; Dixon (2014, 92–5) adduces the evidence of *AB* 82, an epigram of Poseidippos of Pella for a victory

of Berenike II (wife of Ptolemy III Euergetes) at the Isthmia of 248; Paschidis 2008a, 216, n.2, reviews scholarship on this perhaps insoluble problem.

⁴⁰ Walbank 1933, 29–35 and 1988, 296–300; Will 1979, 319; Urban 1979, 16–19, 33–4; Griffin 1982, 80–1; Paschidis 2008a, 233–4; Lolos 2011, 74–5. Plutarch (*Arat.* 4.2–3) reports that Aratos had asked for the help of both Antigonos Gonatas and Ptolemy II, on the basis of their relations of *xenia* with his father Kleinias; only Gonatas gave an affirmative answer. We have no concrete information as to whether he backed up his promise in action. However, C. Chrysaphis has persuasively argued that Aratos probably had at least the benevolent neutrality, if not the financial support, of Gonatas (‘Garrisons and “Tyrants”’: preliminary remarks on the Antigonid rule in the Peloponnese’, *The Hellenistic Peloponnese: New Perspectives*, International Ph.D and Early Career Researchers Conference, School of Archaeology and Ancient History, University of Leicester, May 6th, 2016).

⁴¹ Morgan and Hall 2004, 474; Larsen 1955, 75 and 1968, 9, 306.

⁴² See Walbank 1933, 3–17, on the sources for the second half of the 3rd century; at pp.18–19 for other sources used in Plutarch’s *Aratos*: Deinias of Argos, Phylarchos and Polybius; see also Urban 1979, 14–15.

⁴³ The Megalopolitan Ekdelos (?), an Academician, was included among Aratos’ associates (Plut. *Arat.* 5.1 and *Phil.* 1.2; cf. Paus. 8.49.2). It is not certain that ‘Ekdelos’ was in fact his name: Polybius 10.22.2 calls him Ekdemos. On his name and career see Walbank 1933, 32–3; *id.* 1988, 298 and n.6, 300; Will 1979, 245; Orsi 2000, 198. Along with Demophanes he liberated his native city from the tyrant Aristodemos (Polyb. 10.22.3). Stavrianopoulou (2002, 142–3) ingeniously suggests that this ‘Ekdelos’ could in fact be identified with Eudamos, father of Lydiadas, who was awarded posthumous heroic honours.

⁴⁴ See the different views of Urban (1979, 20–1, 45) and Paschidis 2008a, 215, n.4.

⁴⁵ He had also served in the cavalry, but not as an officer: Plut. *Arat.* 11.1.

⁴⁶ Strabo 8.6.25 illustrates the ambiguity of Aratos’ status: Ἀχαιῶν ἦρξε παρ’ ἐκόντων λαβὼν τὴν ἐξουσίαν (‘Aratos ruled over the Achaians, who voluntarily invested him with power’). See also Larsen 1966, 45, who argues that the fact that Aratos had initially contemplated receiving help from Antigonos Gonatas indicates that he was willing to rule with the king’s support.

⁴⁷ Walbank (1984a, 244) notes that it is not recorded ‘how far it was the return of the exiles which led Aratus to take this step’.

⁴⁸ Will (1979, 332) argues that the incorporation would have certainly mattered to Gonatas after the financial help received by Aratos from Egypt.

⁴⁹ Urban suggests tentatively that the Achaians might have participated in the liberation of Sikyon.

⁵⁰ See Beloch 1922, 276, 279, for the size and the free population of Sikyon (in the 5th and the 4th century): c.360–400 km², 7,000 citizens and c. 20,000 free inhabitants; also Legon 2004, 468–9. See Morgan and Hall 2004, *passim* and Hansen 2004, 71, for the size of the Achaian *poleis*: between 25–100 km², with the exception of Pellene (100–500 km²); Dyme, Leontion, Patrai, Pharai, Tritaia: size unknown.

⁵¹ Paschidis 2008a, 234–5 and Appendix 5, 523–32.

⁵² Cuniberti (2008, 72) calls this ‘hegemonia non soltanto locale, ma anche di secondo livello’ (‘not only a local hegemony but also a second rate one’).

⁵³ Plutarch (*Arat.* 11.2) records that Aratos secured a gift of 25 talents ‘from the

king', before his trip to Egypt, which he used mainly to ransom prisoners. The identity of this king is uncertain. Holleaux (1906, 475–8, esp. 477) argued that it was Gonatas, because he was the last king mentioned before the phrase in question and also because Plutarch's phrasing with regard to Ptolemy's gift of 150 talents does not show any trace of a previous gift. His view is accepted by e.g., Skalet 1928, 84, Walbank 1933, 35 and Will 1979, 321; also Paschidis 2008a, 234. Urban 1979, 25–9, remains hesitant. On the other hand, Walbank 1988, 300, believes that the king was more likely Ptolemy.

As regards the identity of the prisoners, Scholten (2000, 258) suggests that they might have been caught during Aratos' first attack on Akrokorinthos (Plut. *Arat.* 18.1–2); cf. however Orsi 1987, 120, who suggests that these prisoners might have been in the hands of the Aitolians (caught during an attack of theirs while Nikokles was in power).

⁵⁴ Urban (1979, 29–33), Orsi (1987, 108–12), Walbank (1988, 305, 306 and n.1) and Paschidis (2008a, 525) date Gonatas' overtures to Aratos shortly after his recovery of Akrokorinthos and Corinth from his nephew Alexandros.

⁵⁵ See this chapter, n.39.

⁵⁶ Walbank 1933, 35, 37, favours the aftermath of the revolt presupposing that Aratos was working for Gonatas – the temporal qualification does seem to indicate that Aratos' assaults took place near the end of Alexandros' life and rule (in 245). Whether this was done at the instigation of Gonatas is another matter. On the other hand, Walbank 1988, 301–2, places the assault nearer the beginning of Alexandros' rule, before his revolt, and argues that Aratos might be acting in the interests of Ptolemy II; Urban (1979, 37–8 and n.158) believes that the attack took place before the revolt. In any case, note the well-founded scepticism expressed by Paschidis 2008a, 234, as to the various alliances assumed for this period without concrete evidence.

⁵⁷ Polybius indicates that Aratos gathered an army but did not set out; his version seems preferable to that of Plutarch (*Arat.* 16.1) who reports that Aratos had gathered an army amounting to 10,000 men (most probably an exaggerated number: Urban 1979, 46); see Walbank 1979, 68.

⁵⁸ There are far too many questions: Was Aratos acting on his own initiative and in the interests of the Achaians alone or was he co-operating with Alexandros? But Alexandros might have been dead already. In this case, did Aratos co-operate with his widow Nikaia who had been left in charge of Corinth? Was Aratos also aiming indirectly at Antigonos Gonatas? What was the Aitolian attitude towards the Achaian Confederacy? We know that the Aitolians had been spreading their influence or control over the western Peloponnese but we have no information as to direct aggression against the Achaian Confederacy prior to 241. Urban (1979, 46–8) sets the campaign of Aratos in the wider framework of Antigonos' struggle to recapture Akrokorinthos, for which purpose he co-operated with the Aitolians against the Achaian Confederacy; furthermore, Urban suggests that Aratos aimed at diverting Aitolian attention away from Boiotia. Orsi (1987, 111) believes that Aratos aimed at both the Aitolian Confederacy and Gonatas; Will (1979, 329) views Aratos' actions as being directed against the Aitolians alone; similarly Walbank (1988, 304), who *contra* Urban observes that it was Aratos who wished for war between the Boiotians and the Aitolians, and that Boiotian adherence to the Aitolian Confederacy would have hardly served Antigonos' plan to recapture Akrokorinthos. Grainger (1999, 150) argues that Aratos planned to 'pre-empt Antigonos' move south by establishing Achaian power

in central Greece in his place.’ Scholten (2000, 118–20) views the activities of Aratos as an answer to Aitolian spread of influence in the western Peloponnese.

⁵⁹ Achaians had been recipients of honours from the Aitolian Confederacy, in the second quarter of the 3rd century (mainly from Pellene, Aigion, Patrai and Dyme); their number drops later (3 honorands between 250–210, 2 between 210–190 and 2 in the 180s): see Fossey 1996, 159–60; Mack 2015, 289–91, Table 1, 1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.6, 1.8.4.

⁶⁰ Walbank 1988, 308; Will 1979, 330; Scholten 2000, 116–23, on Aitolian activities in the Peloponnese in the early 240s; Grainger 1999, 157–64.

⁶¹ Dixon (2014, 76–83, 111–32, 136–8) argues that ‘a symbiotic relationship’ had developed over the years between the Corinthians and the Antigonids, and that Antigonid control had procured material benefits for Corinth, especially via the construction or refurbishment of public buildings (e.g. the South Stoa, the walls, and the sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia) and of a fleet of 500 ships.

⁶² Plutarch (*Arat.* 23.4) emphasizes that they had not been in control of their own gates ever since the time of Philip II. See Dixon 2014, 143–5 on the symbolisms of this gesture.

⁶³ Urban (1979, 51) thinks that the Corinthians provided no help, but the reference to statues of liberators is an indication that at least some Corinthians wished to be rid of the Antigonid garrison and might very well have participated in Aratos’ attack.

⁶⁴ Polybius (2.41.12) reports that no *stêlē* was erected for the refoundation of the Confederacy by Dyme, Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia in 280. On the other hand, he records (23.18.1 and 24.2.1–3) that an inscription was set up recording the incorporation of Sparta and provision was made for another *stêlē* concerning Messene; an inscription regulating the admission of Orchomenos has survived; see Dixon 2000, 36.

⁶⁵ *IG* IV².1.70 with Mitsos 1937 = *SEG* 11.401 + *IG* IV².1.59 / *SV* A III, 489 [*IG* IV².1.70+Mitsos 1937]. For *IG* IV².1.70 see the edition by Mitsos 1937, who showed that it is directly related to the admission of Epidauros into the Achaian Confederacy; Peek (*LAEpid* 25) added *IG* IV².59 (= ll. 27–41) to *IG* IV² 70. Dixon (2000, 34) suggests caution with regard to some of his restorations; see *ibid.* 31–3, for his own reading of *IG* IV².1.70 and *IG* IV².1.59. See also Ager 1996, no. 38.I [*SV* A III, 489] / Magnetto 1997, no.36.I (ll.1–24 of *LAEpid* 25) / Mackil 2013, 459–61, no.37 (employing *LAEpid* 25).

⁶⁶ *LAEpid* 25, ll. 2–4: ρίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐψαφίσ[θ]α[ι] κα] | θὰ ποτήλθον ποτὶ τὰν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σῖννοδον αὐτόνομοι ὄν] | τες καὶ ἀφρούρατοι καὶ πολιτεῖαι [χ]ρῶμ[ε]νοι τῇ πατρίῳ ἄνευ ὅ] |

⁶⁷ Walbank 1988, 310, following Beloch 1925, 621, n.3; Urban 1979, 60, without counting in the Megarian territory.

⁶⁸ Walbank 1988, 311 and n.6, 312. Marasco (1981, 301–2), taking into account the alliance between Sparta and Egypt in the Chremonidean War, in which the Achaians had also participated, supposes that this Achaian-Spartan alliance was encouraged by the king of Egypt.

⁶⁹ Urban 1979, 52–4; Will 1979, 331–3.

⁷⁰ As Buraselis (2003a, 48) observes, this titular appointment showed the Confederacy’s limitations.

⁷¹ Urban emphasizes the military aspect of Ptolemy III’s role; see also Orsi 2000, 210.

⁷² This was a widespread problem in the Greek world. In Rousset’s calculations

(1994, 89–90) c. 240 inscriptions of varied nature relate to frontiers; 160 of these constitute the core of the evidence (decrees, treaties, agreements, letters by kings and emperors, *senatus consulta*, arbitrations, delimitations); 77 of these include delimitation of frontiers. Overall, the 2nd century is particularly rich providing us with 72 texts while 32 are dated to the 3rd century; the 1st century offers us only 3 texts.

⁷³ For the Archaic and the Classical periods see Piccirilli 1973 who lists 61 historical cases (starting from c. 740) plus 19 mythical ones. Robert (1973, 770) distinguishes between disputes occurring *within a polis* and settled either by a court like the Athenian Heliiaia or by a small group of foreign *judges*, and disputes *between poleis* and settled by foreign *arbiters*. Inscriptions recording interstate arbitration most often employ the term *dikastai* = judges. The term *kritai* is also frequently used by the sources. There appear also other terms like *gaidikai* (appearing in two inscriptions), *horothetai* (attested once), *termastai* or *termastēres* (twice), *dastēres* (once) but their scarcity shows that they do not denote specialists; see Rousset and Katzourou 1992, 206–8 and nn. 45–54, for relevant inscriptions; also Rousset 1994, 103–5.

⁷⁴ See Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 161, for a table of the 12 cases in which the Achaian Confederacy was involved in the the 3rd and 2nd centuries (plus the dubious cases at pp.110–16, nos. a–e); to these there is now added Themelis 2008, a series of arbitrations between Messene and Megalopolis (see pp.364–6).

⁷⁵ In one of these two cases, the inscription was found NW of Aigion, which suggests that it was set up at the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios: *Rizakis 2008a, 178–81, no.121 / ed. pr. Bingen 1953, 616–28, no.1 = *SEG* 13.278; see also Ager 1996, no.36 / Magnetto 1997, no.33 / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.1 / Mackil 2013, 458–9, no.36 (employing Rizakis 2008a, no.121). See also Robert, J. & L. 1955, 220, no.115. The location of the stone as well as the fact that the Achaian *polis* of Dyme sent judges indicates that the Achaian Confederacy was probably involved. The litigants, though, seem to have come from areas outside Achaia proper (Bingen [at p.620] suggests Lakonia, Messenia or Elis). Perhaps more than one hundred judges, from at least three *poleis*, were dispatched. In the other arbitration, the Achaian *polis* of Boura was either a litigant or provided at least thirty judges; the other contestant could be either an Achaian or an Arkadian neighbouring *polis* (**IPArk* 22 / ed. pr. Robert 1936, 46–50, no.41 / Woodhead in *SEG* 11.1122 / Ager 1996, no.18 [employing *SEG* 11.1122] / Magnetto 1997, no.64 [*IPArk* 22] / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.2 [*IPArk* 22] / Rizakis 1995, no.696 [Robert 1936]).

Even more problematic is the case of *IvO* 51, dating to the 3rd century (in two fragments, the first now lost, the second barely legible) in which Dyme was somehow involved. Tod (1913, no.LXXX) included it among arbitrations within the Achaian Confederacy. There are some indications of arbitration: the reference to [κρ]ιταί in l. 13, the fact that a *stēlē* was set up in the international sanctuary of Olympia, and the list of names in frg.b, ll.7–10, which might belong to representatives of cities, Dyme being one of them (Magnetto 1997, no. 67, at p.399. Ager 1996, Appendix, no.31 is rather negative).

⁷⁶ Ager 1996, 116; Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 17–18. Magnetto (1997, 217) observes that the use of η in l.8 indicates two possible solutions to the problem.

Different restorations have been suggested for the relevant lines (17–19), the most reliable being those of Mitsos and Dixon, and the boldest being those of Peek, *LAEpid* 25:

⁸⁶ In the late 5th century, Speiraion was a deserted part of Corinth's territory: Thuc. 8.10.3; Daverio Rocchi 1988, 157–8. See Dixon 2000, 54–60 and Magnetto 1997, 218–19 and 223, nn. 28–33, for a discussion of views on the Corinthian-Epidaurian boundaries.

⁸⁷ Wiseman 1978, 138; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 95; Osborne 1987, 164.

⁸⁸ In the Classical era Corinth's territory comprised c. 900 km², almost twice the size of Epidauria which covered 473 km²: Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 18; Piérart 2004a, 606 and Legon 2004, 466; see Wiseman 1979, 439–46, on the Korinthia.

⁸⁹ See also Bingen 1953, 624–5: edition of face B; Ager 1996, no.46 (face A and ll.1–2 of face B) / Magnetto 1997, no.42 / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.5 (face A and l.1 of face B) / Rizakis 1995, no.695 (face A) / Mackil 2013, 466–8, no.40 / Dixon 2000, 177–86 (suggests new readings) / *LAEpid* 27 (corrections in ll.13, 16, 17).

⁹⁰ Bingen (1953, 625) notes that the restoration [πόλεις] ἑνδεκα προβληθ[εῖσαι] ('eleven [cities] were put forward'), on face A, l.7 is uncertain; also Robertson 1976, 266, n.29. Ager (1996, 136, n.3) suggests plausibly that 'perhaps the names of eleven cities were put forward and a selection (of three?) was made among them'.

⁹¹ Rizakis (1995, no. 695, at p.376) restores Αἰγίρα on face A, l.8.

⁹² If indeed eleven *poleis* sent judges, then the panel would consist of at least 165 judges: Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 40.

⁹³ Dixon (2003, 82–4) opts for a date between 236 and 228; Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 35–8) prefers a date between 229 and 227.

⁹⁴ Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 38; Dixon 2000, 192–3.

⁹⁵ If Epidaurios had expanded into Troizenian territory, then there might have been an Epidaurian-Troizenian dispute of which we are not informed: Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 38–9.

Arsinoe was involved in another, long-standing dispute with Troizen. It was adjudicated by envoys of the king of Egypt, probably Ptolemy VI, sometime during his reign, i.e. between 181/0 and before 146 (Carusi 2005, 126–36 with bibliography). Provisions were made for exploitation of common land and resources (stone, timber, saltpans and tuna fisheries) as well as for compensation for property (including slaves) previously seized by the Troizenians as reprisal. Furthermore, the Ptolemaic emissaries resolved for mutual rights of intermarriage and the right to acquire land and house. Following the reconciliation, three Athenian judges were to confirm the agreement (an ἐπικροῖς: see Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 106–7, 159) and see to the publication of three copies: in the sanctuary of Poseidon in Kalaureia, in the Epidaurian Asklepieion and on the Athenian Akropolis.

Two inscriptions have survived; from the Epidaurian Asklepieion:

IG IV².1.76+77 / *LAEpid* 31 = new readings in ll.30–46 (Peek joined *IG* IV².1.76 and 77; that the two inscriptions belonged together was first suggested by L. Robert 1960, 159, n.2); Ager 1996, no.138 (= *IG* IV².1.76+ *LAEpid* 31+ *IG* IV².1.77 restored from the Troizenian *IG* IV 752); Harter-Uibopuu 1997, no.12; new edition and detailed commentary by Carusi 2005, 89–114 (= *SEG* 55.425).

From Troizen: *IG* IV 752; new edition by Carusi 2005, 84–9, 114–23 (= *SEG* 55.418) who argues (at pp.123–5) that the Troizen inscription was not a copy of the Epidaurian text but was designed for internal use.

For the right of reprisals, see in general Gauthier 1972, 210–19; see also Bravo

1980, 745–6, 805–6, 865–8, who, however, treats *IG* IV².1.76 and *IG* IV².1.77 as recording two different arbitrations. This is also the case with Foxhall, Gill and Forbes 1997, 269–72, nos. 9 and 10. See Dixon 2000, 193–238, for both inscriptions and detailed commentary, focusing on the relations of the Achaian Confederacy with the Ptolemies; *id.* 2003, 85–6. On the tuna fisheries of the Hermionis see Baladié 1980, 214–18.

⁹⁶ Plut. *Arat.* 31–2 and *Agis* 13.4–15; Will 1979, 336; Walbank 1988, 313; Urban 1979, 59–60; Grainger 1999, 154–5; Scholten 2000, 132–44; Rizakis 1995, 250–1, for a discussion of the bibliography. See also Orsi 2000, 218–19, on other versions of Pellene’s liberation.

⁹⁷ Walbank (1988, 324) notes that no source informs us as to which alliance came first.

⁹⁸ Little is known about the Demetrian War. It seriously weakened Antigonid power, despite the fact that Boiotia joined Macedon; the Epirote royal family became extinct and was replaced by a federation which joined the Aitolian Confederacy in c. 233; Akarnania also became independent; towards the end of the war the Achaians and the Aitolians tried unsuccessfully to help the Epeirote against the Illyrian tribe of Ardiaioi – the only securely attested military co-operation between Achaians and Aitolians (Larsen 1975, 165–6); after Demetrios’ death the Athenians bribed the Macedonian garrison out of the Peiraieus. See Walbank 1933, 57; 1984, 446–53 and 1988, 322–36; Will 1979, 344–57; Scholten 2000, 144–62; Errington 2008, 94–5; Holton 2012.

⁹⁹ Urban (1979, 52–3) views Aratos’ attacks on Athens as serving primarily the interests of Ptolemy III. See also Habicht 1997, 163–6.

¹⁰⁰ Walbank 1933, 56; Tomlinson 1972, 156–7; Urban 1979, 61.

¹⁰¹ We are not told whether Aratos had anything to do with it (Tomlinson 1972, 157) – possibly not, otherwise Plutarch would have reported it, as he reported Aratos’ attempt to have Aristomachos murdered.

¹⁰² There is no indication in Plutarch that Aristippos II had prohibited possession of swords, as his predecessor had done (Plut. *Arat.* 25.2).

¹⁰³ Buraselis (2013, 177, n.32) raises two questions: why did Aristippos not try to attack Aratos’ force and what was it that encouraged him to take the Achaians to court? Buraselis argues that Aratos might have attacked Argos during the *ekecheiria* of the Nemean Games of 241 – something that he would have very conveniently concealed in his *Memoirs*.

¹⁰⁴ The plural ἄρχων has ‘the Achaians’ as its subject while the ἐπιμύθη has Aristippos.

¹⁰⁵ Ager (1996, no.39) and Magnetto (1997, no.37) include it in arbitrations while Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 112–14, no.13d), more cautiously, includes it in the dubious cases. Magnetto (1997, 227, 229 and nn.12–13) argues that the peace of 241/0 might have included a generic clause providing for future need for arbitration, in case of violation of the peace; also Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 113.

¹⁰⁶ Ager (1996, 119) believes that probably no Achaian representatives were present and that there had been no *ad hoc* agreement between Argos and the Achaian Confederacy to choose Mantinea as an arbiter. She argues that the Mantinean tribunal and its decision would have been out of place unless there was a past agreement between Argos and the Achaian confederacy to resort to arbitration if need arose; and perhaps Mantinea had also been specified as the arbitrating *polis*. Whether or not

Achaian representatives were present, nothing in Plutarch's narrative about Achaian-Argive relations warrants a hypothesis of a past agreement to submit to arbitration.

¹⁰⁷ Golan (1973, 69, n.24) notes that the whole procedure would have been impossible without strong opposition to Aratos by other Achaian leaders.

¹⁰⁸ *Contra* Tod 1913, 59; Walbank 1933, 56 (he changes his mind in 1988, 313); Magnetto 1997, 227; Orsi (2000, 212) thinks that Aratos was fined because he attacked without having declared war officially.

¹⁰⁹ Ager (1996, 119) associates the alleged offence against Argos with the subsequent admission of Mantinea into the Achaian Confederacy. Raeder (1912, 79) thought that the fine was nominal because the peace was only broken to overthrow a tyrant; his view is endorsed by Mandel (1979, 298–9) and Larsen (1966, 44–5) who thinks that 'the offense was so flagrant that a condemnation could not be avoided'. Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 113–14) argues that imposition of a penalty might have been provided for in the peace treaty of 241/0 but it was left to the judge(s) to decide how severe it would be; either this, or Aristippos only asked for Aratos' public humiliation.

¹¹⁰ Urban (1979, 81) believes that this decision shows that Mantinea was on good terms with Argos.

¹¹¹ On Kleonai see Ch. 2, p.65 and n.73.

¹¹² Buraselis (2013, 176, 179) notes that Nemea held a special place in Aratos' memory since it was there, in 251, that he had informed his small force that they were going to overthrow Nikokles of Sikyon; on the other hand, the Argive Nemeia also 'symbolized the Argive connection with Macedonia'.

¹¹³ The brother of Aristippos II according to Paschidis 2008a, 220.

¹¹⁴ Tomlinson 1972, 158; Orsi 2000, 224–5.

¹¹⁵ See Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 68–71, 73–8, 89–; also below, Ch. 9, Tables 8–16; see Paschidis 2008a, 218, n.1 for Argive decrees under the tyrants.

¹¹⁶ See Orsi 2000, 215–16, for a summary of the generally unfavourable conditions for Lydiadas; see also Scholten 2000, 157–8, who thinks that the Megalopolitans were pro-Macedonian. It is true that Megalopolis had a long history of friendly relations with Macedon but there is no evidence of Lydiadas being supported by the Macedonian king. There is equally no tangible evidence for Scholten's view (not an implausible one) that the Aitolians might have supported this Achaian effort because Megalopolis represented a 'threat to their Peloponnesian clients'.

Urban (1979, 75–85) argues that the Aitolians had stretched their zone of influence to both northern and eastern Arkadia by 241 and, therefore, pressure from Aitolia was a major factor. Against this, Walbank 1980, 200, objects that in this case Lydiadas and Megalopolis, having no common frontier with the Achaian Confederacy, should have turned to the Aitolian Confederacy and not to the Achaian.

¹¹⁷ Walbank (1933, 63) observes that with the exception of Dioitas, no other *stratēgos*' name has come down to us from the early years of the Achaian Confederacy.

¹¹⁸ See also Walbank 1933, 63–4.

¹¹⁹ Walbank (1957, 464) views the party strife in Kynaitha as a result of the appeal of the reforms of Kleomenes; *contra* Urban (1979, 176–7) rightly in our view points out that Polybius (4.17.4) refers to *old* (ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων) and *incessant* (ἀκαταπαύστοις) strife and that therefore this cannot be associated with the short period in which Kleomenes carried out his reforms.

¹²⁰ Scholten (2000, 119–20) argues that Aitolian occupation of Kynaitha would

have blocked Achaian access to Elis and would have also provided a basis for raids against Achaia.

¹²¹ See the review of Scholten 2000 by Champion 2000.

¹²² Walbank (1936, 68–71 and 1967, 142–3) suggests that Kynaitha was captured by the Aitolians and handed over to Elis in the mid-240s, along with Psophis, in order to thrust a wedge along the southern frontier of Achaia; furthermore, he argues that Aratos made his first attempt only after he had secured the Spartan alliance and then he captured Kynaitha a few months after the Aitolian plundering of Pellene, that is before May 240. Urban (1979, 177) argues that such an event is unattested for c.240 and does not fit in the context of the Achaian-Aitolian alliance in the 230s; instead, he suggests that Kynaitha probably came into Achaian hands at the very end of the Demetrian War. The objection – not a decisive one – to this is that the Kynaithans might have switched allegiance voluntarily, after a change of regime, as Walbank 1936, 70 indicates: see Scholten 2000, 157–8 and n.107.

¹²³ Polybius attributes Kynaithan savage behaviour to their neglect of music; see Walbank 1957, 465–9; also Roy 2011, 76, on the Arkadian musical tradition.

¹²⁴ Walbank (1957, 469) believes that a pro-Spartan group came to power in Kynaitha after the great massacre described by Polybius (4.21.8) and, furthermore, that this embassy should be dated after Kynaitha's capture by Aratos and before the admission of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* into the Achaian Confederacy, because in this case the Kynaithans would not have been allowed to send envoys to Sparta openly through the territories of the eastern Arkadians.

¹²⁵ Plut. *Arat.* 34.5: προσεχώρησαν δ' εὐθὺς Αἰγινῆται καὶ Ἑρμιονεῖς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἣ τε πλείστη τῆς Ἀρκαδίας αὐτοῖς συνετέλει. Note the difference between the aorist tense προσεχώρησαν (at that point) and the imperfect συνετέλει (was *already* part); the Loeb edition translates the συνετέλει as 'joined'.

¹²⁶ Walbank 1984b, 446 and 1988, 330. Marasco 1980b, 114–15, on the strategic location of Heraia: one road led to Samikon in Triphylia and another to Alipheira; Scholten 2000, 157, n.106; Dioitas' *stratēgia* cannot be dated after 236 since all *stratēgoi* of the Achaian Confederacy are known for the next twenty years. On the other hand, Urban (1979, 75, 115) doubts whether Polyainos reports accurately the office of Dioitas and argues that the capture of Heraia could thus be downdated to the 220s. But this is to question the validity of sources where it is unwarranted, all the more so since in Urban's perspective Dioitas would have been a mere officer in the 220s and there is no trace of a capture of Heraia in this well-documented period: see Walbank 1980, 199; also Briscoe 1981a, 89.

¹²⁷ Heraia was on the right bank of the Alpheios, 15 stades east of the river Ladon; Thelphousa was located c. 16 km north of Heraia, on the left bank of the Ladon; Paus. 8.26.1–3; Walbank 1957, 257.

¹²⁸ See Nielsen 2004a, 513–14 with references.

¹²⁹ Neighbour of Orchomenos; see Jost 1998, 204.

¹³⁰ Walbank 1957, 242–3 and 1988, 331; Larsen 1968, 310 and *id.* 1975, 161; Marasco 1980b, 116–17; Scholten 2000, 158–9. Another hypothesis, advanced by Will (1979, 321, 337) and more vigorously by Urban (1979, 78–85), is that they joined the Aitolian Confederacy in 241/0 and only became Achaian in the final stages of the Kleomenic War (with the exception of Orchomenos which remained in Macedonian hands). But this is tantamount to discarding Polybius' evidence altogether, which is

part of the wholesale rejection by Urban of evidence regarding Heraia as well as Orchomenos (see this chapter, nn. 126, 140). It is true that it is only with regard to Mantinea that Polybius (2.57.1) reports specifically that it was first on the Achaian, then on the Aitolian and finally on Kleomenes' side. But there is also evidence for Orchomenos that it had been Achaian prior to the War of Kleomenes. According to Polybius (4.6.5), after his victory over Kleomenes in the battle of Sellasia in 222, Antigonos III Doson did not restore Orchomenos to the Achaian Confederacy (he had captured it during the war): Ὀρχομενὸν δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἔλὼν οὐκ ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἀλλὰ σφετερισάμενος κατέειχε. The use of the verb ἀποκατέστησε indicates that Orchomenos had been part of the Achaian Confederacy before the war (Walbank 1940, 17, n.2). To the latter point Urban (at p.84) objects that Livy (32.5.4) employs *redderent*, translating the 'ἀποκαθιστάναι' of Polybius, for Philip V handing over Triphylia to the Achaian Confederacy, while Triphylia had not been part of Achaia. But Livy could very well have used this verb for the sake of brevity, instead of distinguishing between the status of Triphylia and that of Orchomenos and Heraia. And as Walbank (1980, 199) observed, this is no reason to deny the 'ἀποκατέστησε' of Polybius its full value. All in all, our evidence consists of bits and pieces but taken together they point to the enrolment of the eastern Arkadians prior to their forming an alliance with Aitolia; at the most we could be in doubt about Tegea.

¹³¹ Bernini (1978, 40–1) notes that the association between Aratos' aggression and Leonidas' death is an indication that the latter had kept Sparta at a respectable military level, capable of defending its Arkadian friends.

¹³² Marasco (1981, 379) thinks that the fact that Leonidas II sought refuge in Tegea when he went into exile in 242/1 proves the alliance between Sparta and Tegea, which is a rather shaky argument. At the most we could say that Leonidas enjoyed friendly relations with certain members of the Tegean elite.

¹³³ See this chapter, p.149 and nn.10–11.

¹³⁴ Walbank 1984b, 451 and 1988, 331; Scholten 2000, 161; Rzepka (2002, 240–3) also believes that Polybius employs *sympoliteia* loosely, perhaps because he did not see any difference with *isopoliteia*.

¹³⁵ ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 454–7, no.2 + corrections in ll. 1, 2 by Plassart 1915, 127. In l. 6 Moretti (1983, 51–2 = *SEG* 33.317) restores [μηνὸς] Δαμ[ατρίω, ἐπὶ] instead of δαμ[ιοργῶι ?]. Walbank (1957, 242) observes that Tegean proxeny decrees (*IG* V.2.10–15) show Aitolian influence in the magistrates and in their phraseology.

¹³⁶ Tarn 1928, 747; followed by Walbank 1933, 67 and 1957, 242; also Marasco 1980b, 122 and 1981, 119.

¹³⁷ Ancient Greek states could even be part of conflicting alliances: in the Peloponnese, the most notable case is that of the Mantineans, the Megalopolitans, the Argives and the Messenians and their alliances with both Philip II and Athens in the late 340s (see pp.53–5 and Bauslaugh 1991, 232; also Doukellis 2004b, 106, with bibliography).

¹³⁸ On the battle of Phylakia providing the context see Larsen (1966, 51–6 and 1975, 161) who, however, sees the Arkadians as passive (he uses the terms 'transfer' or 'transferred', e.g. at p.52; also in 1968, 313) and argues that the Achaians may have aimed at securing Aitolian help to co-defend these cities against Macedon. See also Scholten 2000, 159–61, who thinks that in the aftermath of these actions, the eastern Arkadians *chose* to ally themselves with the Aitolians. See also Plut. *Arat.* 34.2; Walbank 1933, 64–5; 1984b, 450 and 1988, 331–2.

¹³⁹ Walbank (1984b, 451 and 1988, 331) also suggests that they might have wished to leave the Achaians out of sympathy for Sparta but they preferred to minimize the offence to the Achaians and the ensuing danger by establishing a treaty of *isopoliteia* with the Aitolian Confederacy.

¹⁴⁰ The incorporation of Orchomenos is usually dated c.234, after the incorporation of Megalopolis; *contra* Urban 1979, 84–5, dates it c.200, observing that, apart from Lydiadas, no other Arkadian tyrant is reported (by either Plutarch or Polybius) to have abdicated in the 230s while tyrants from the Argolid are mentioned by name. Objections have been raised to this view, primarily by Walbank 1980, 199–200: what role would Nearchos have had in c. 200? In other words, a tyranny in Orchomenos in c.200 would have been quite an oddity in the Peloponnese. The silence of Polybius on Orchomenos' incorporation could be explained by the fact that its membership was of short duration. Thür and Taeuber (*IPArk*, p.153) accept the date in the 230s but do not completely exclude a later date.

¹⁴¹ *IGV.2.344 / Syll.³ 490 / SV4 III*, 499. Thür and Taeuber rightly restore δαμοργοί instead of σύνεδροι in *IPArk* 16, l.6. See also Ager 1996, no.43; brief commentary by Rizakis 1995, no.599.

¹⁴² The syntax is unclear, i.e. whether the subject of ἐγένοντο is those who have received land or house after having become Achaians or if it is the Orchomenians after having become Achaians. It is probably the Orchomenians (so in the translation of Bagnall and Derow 2004, no.30; also Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, p.155) because otherwise, apart from those citizens of member states of the Achaian Confederacy who received land and house *after* the Orchomenians became Achaians, we would have to include also those who had been awarded land or house by the Orchomenians, on their own accord, *before* the Orchomenians joined the Achaian Confederacy; thus the Achaian authorities, having nothing to do with these awards, would appear to order people concerning what to do with their award.

¹⁴³ See also Roy 1999b, 342. Mackil (2013, 465–6), agrees with the comparison but objects that the Mantineans themselves had asked for the settlers and that therefore we should not necessarily think that the Orchomenians were forced to accept the settlers. However, she does not take account of the fact that the Mantineans were deeply divided and that, therefore, the request came from those in power at that particular moment (see p.219).

¹⁴⁴ Double ethnics are recorded in lists of Panathenaic victors of the early 2nd century: *IG II² 2314*, ll. 27, 59, 95 and *IG II² 2315*, l. 18; see Tracy and Habicht 1991, 218–222, 231. On the other hand, no double ethnics are recorded for Olympic victors, only their city of origin. Perhaps, the victors thought it was more necessary to advertise their double identity outside the Peloponnese.

¹⁴⁵ Walbank, (1988, 321) observes that we do not know what Nearchos' attitude towards Macedon was.

¹⁴⁶ See also the translation by Thür and Taeuber (*IPArk*, pp.155–6) and in *SV4 III*, 499; Mackil 2013, 462–6, no.39. On the other hand, Bagnall and Derow (2004, 63, no. 30) take as the subject of καταθέντες the Methydrieis as a whole and translate as follows: 'Concerning [the] golden (statue of) Victory from (the sanctuary of) Zeus Hoplosmios, which the Methydrians deposited as security for the money which the Methydrians [who] moved to Orchomenos then divided up among themselves, and which some of them (subsequently) [brought back to Methydria]: if they do not

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return the money to the Megalopolitans, even as [the] city of the Orchomenians has [granted], those who do not act justly are to be liable to prosecution.’

Mackil (2013, 466) thinks that the statue was pledged as security on an internal loan advanced from the citizens of Methydriion themselves and that the *metoikēsanτες* were some of the lenders and perhaps the leaders of the revolt. Further, she suggests that the Megalopolitans asked ‘for the money or the statue’ but the stone only refers to ἀργύριον. In Nielsen’s (2002, 451–2) very cautiously expressed view, the Megalopolitans must have *at some point* controlled Methydriion, but we cannot tell how long before the decree.

I owe special thanks to Sophia Aneziri and J. Trappes-Lomax for discussing with me this inscription.

¹⁴⁷ Ager (1996, 131) thinks that the Confederacy ruled and the Orchomenians agreed but in the text we read first καθὼς ἐξ[ε] | [χώρα]σεν ἅ πόλεις τῶν Ὀρχομενίων (ll. 20–1) and only after that about the liability to prosecution imposed by the Achaian Confederacy.

See Walbank 1957, 220 with references, on the Achaian federal assembly acting as a court of justice; also Rizakis 2015, 128–9; see Nielsen 2002, 449–53 and 2004a, 523, on Methydriion.

‘THE SPARTANS WEREN’T TO BE LED AND
ORDERED AROUND’:¹ THE PELOPONNESIAN
POLEIS BETWEEN THE ACHAIAN
CONFEDERACY AND KLEOMENES III

An overview of the War of Kleomenes

Relations between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta had started very much in keeping with the tradition of cordial Spartan-Achaian relations, as demonstrated in the War of Agis III, probably in the expedition of Areus in 280, and in the Chremonidean War. In the late 240s, while Agis IV was king of Sparta, the Achaian Confederacy was allied with the Spartans against the Aitolians (see pp.164, 205–6). The alliance went cold in 241, when Aratos, after having asked help from the Spartans against the Aitolians who threatened to invade the Peloponnese from the Megarid, dismissed the Spartan army which had arrived at the Isthmos (Plut. *Agis* 15). This dismissal has been seen as the result of fear of Spartan military resurgence combined with fear that Agis’ planned social reforms would spread in the Peloponnese.² But as Urban (1979, 56) has crucially emphasized, Aratos dismissed the entire allied army, not just the Spartan contingent. In this perspective, we should see in Aratos’ action first and foremost unwillingness on his part to give battle and a truly gross miscalculation of Aitolian intentions.³ As Plutarch (*Agis* 15.2) notes, Aratos wrote in his *Memoirs* that he considered battle useless, since most of the crops had been harvested (of course he had not expected the sudden Aitolian attack on Pellene). On the other hand, we should not exclude the possibility that Aratos was alarmed by the Spartan military resurgence. Plutarch (*Agis* 14.2–3) insists on the impression made by Agis’ army on the Peloponnesians:

καὶ θέαμα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἦσαν, ἀβλαβῶς καὶ πράως καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἀψοφητὶ διαπορευόμενοι τὴν Πελοπόννησον, ὥστε θαυμάζειν καὶ διαλογίζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οἷος ἦν ἄρα κόσμος Λακωνικοῦ στρατεύματος Ἀγησίλαον ἔχοντος ἢ Λύσανδρον ἐκείνον ἢ Λεωνίδα τὸν παλαιὸν ἡγούμενον, ὅπου πρὸς μειράκιον ὀλίγου δεῖν νεώτατον ἀπάντων αἰδῶς τοσαύτη καὶ φόβος ἐστὶ τῶν στρατευομένων.

And they were a spectacle to the cities as they marched through the Peloponnese without doing any injury, without rudeness, and almost without noise, so that the other Greeks were amazed and asked themselves what must have been the discipline of a Spartan army under the command of Agesilaos, or Lysander, or Leonidas of old, since towards a stripling who was almost the youngest of the whole army so great reverence and fear were felt by his soldiers.

Excessive praise of the Spartan army is almost certainly the work of Phylarchos, the admirer of Sparta (Marasco 1981, 303).⁴ Little more than twenty years had elapsed after the campaigns of king Areus during the Chremonidean War. Quite a few Peloponnesians who had taken part in that war would have been still alive. On the other hand, twenty years was rather a long time. Therefore, one way or the other, to a greater or lesser extent, the Peloponnesians must have been impressed by the Spartan comeback, all the more so since this campaign to the Isthmos in order to prevent an invasion would have evoked – and most probably was intended to do so – the role of the Spartans as protectors of the Peloponnese.⁵

Relations between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta as well as the nature of warfare changed dramatically a few years after the accession to the throne of Kleomenes III in 235.

Up till 228, the Achaian Confederacy had been conducting rather small or medium scale operations against its rivals without having officially declared war. In the eastern Peloponnese there had been Aratos' attacks on Sikyon, Akrokorinthos and Argos, which involved mostly a limited number of troops and only one or two battles on open ground. On the other hand, certain areas (especially temples) of the Peloponnese had suffered Aitolian plundering in the mid to late 240s: the Achaian Pellene, the Argive Heraion, the temple of Poseidon at Mantinea, even Lakonia as far as Tainaron – the latter was an exceptionally serious expedition.⁶ Needless to say, in these cases too we are dealing with undeclared war.

In late 229 or early 228 war was solemnly declared.⁷ During a probably extraordinary meeting of the assembly,⁸ the Achaian Confederacy⁹ declared war against Kleomenes III and the Spartans, when Aratos was *stratēgos* for the 9th time. Polybios (2.46.5–6) firmly states that the Achaian Confederacy only decided to go to war *after* the fortification of the Athenaion on the Megalopolitan frontier by Kleomenes.¹⁰ The Athenaion commanded one of the entrances to Lakonia and was a bone of contention and, according to Plutarch, or perhaps Phylarchos' biased wording (*Kleom.* 4.1), subject of litigation between the Spartans and the Megalopolitans.¹¹ Thus, 'the quarrel between Sparta and Megalopolis grew into a war, which bears for history the name of Kleomenes' (Oliva 1971, 234).¹²

Following Aratos’ advice, the Achaian authorities had previously acquiesced in the alliance of Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenos with Sparta (Polyb. 2.46.2–3), deciding not to go onto the offensive against Sparta or any other state – πολέμου μὲν πρὸς μηδένα κατάρχειν (Polyb. 2.46.4).¹³ It is notable that the Achaian Confederacy does not appear averse to war in general; only to starting a war.

This decision was taken despite the fact that with these alliances Kleomenes had acquired a ‘corridor’ between Megalopolis and Argos that divided Achaian territory south of the mountains of Achaia almost in two.¹⁴ However, the very fact that Kleomenes had taken steps to secure the allegiance of these Arkadian *poleis* (one way or another) shows that he did have plans to exercise pressure on Megalopolis and to bring the whole of Arkadia under his sphere of influence (or control).¹⁵

Shortly before the official declaration of war, Aratos applied his usual surprise tactics, combined with help promised from within, against Tegea and Orchomenos, but failed (Plut. *Kleom.* 4.1–2). By attempting to bring these *poleis* back into the Confederacy he obviously aimed at reducing Kleomenes’ sphere of influence and support. Beyond that, we cannot tell whether Aratos made one last attempt to keep warfare within the limits of Arkadia and to avoid a full-scale war against Sparta, or whether he saw that war was imminent and unavoidable, after Kleomenes’ capture and fortification of the Athenaion, and tried to reinforce the Confederacy accordingly.¹⁶ However, the Achaian Confederacy could not ignore the attack on the territory of a *polis*-member, especially given the considerable prestige and influence of the Megalopolitan Lydiadas (proved by his repeated *stratēgiai*).¹⁷ In Polybius’ Megalopolitan perspective, this was a defensive and therefore justified war for the Achaian Confederacy and, conversely, an outright aggression on Kleomenes’ part.

The War of Kleomenes provided the battleground on which different attitudes to warfare clashed. On the one hand, there was Aratos with his well-deserved reputation for avoiding open battle but also an ability to obtain military success by surprise attacks employing only a small force. On the other, we have Kleomenes, combining skills in open combat as well as in surprise attacks. For the Achaian Confederacy the war was a crucial test: the new Peloponnesian power against the traditional leader of the Peloponnese. How would leaders of the Confederacy cope with the challenge by a Spartan king and an able military commander? Could the Achaian Confederacy mobilize a formidable army? We have very little information on army figures, for either side – in fact, the only reliable figures we possess concern the final battle (at Sellasia). Other than that, we have unreliable numbers for the beginning of the war or vague

references to the composition of the armies (such as ‘in full force’ for the Achaian at the battle of Hekatombaion) or the losses (see Table 1 below). However, it is generally acknowledged that the Achaian Confederacy fared very badly in the war. In fact, it was nearly ruined and was only rescued by an alliance with Macedon in 224. There can hardly be any better proof of its military inferiority.

How did old friends and foes of Sparta react? Where did Kleomenes direct his attacks? What exactly was the nature of Spartan ambitions? Did these involve a restoration of the Peloponnesian League? The Spartans did seek leadership of the Peloponnese, but how did they set about achieving it? By sheer force, or in a more flexible manner, more adapted to the reality of the era?

The War of Kleomenes showed the strong appeal of Sparta as well as the unattractiveness and limitations of Achaian military power. In fact, this appeal of Sparta was not something new in the 3rd century. There had been the precedents of Areus’ campaign in 280 and especially the Chremonidean War in the 260s. And much as in the Chremonidean War, the eastern Arkadians and the Eleans were on the Spartan side. The Eleans, however, appear only twice in this war, as the objects of an attack by Aratos and as recipients of Lasion as a gift by Kleomenes in autumn 226 (Plut. *Kleom.* 14.2).¹⁸ Whether they expressed gratitude by sending troops to Kleomenes’ campaign of 225 is not known, but it remains a possibility. It is also a possibility that the Eleans participated in the battle of Sellasia.

Until autumn 226 the battleground was Arkadia – largely the eastern Arkadian *poleis*¹⁹ – the place where in Daubies’ words (1973, 149) ‘two imperialisms’, one from the north and one from the south, clashed. Daubies (1973, 149) also argued that it was inevitable that the Achaians and the Spartans would clash in Arkadia, this being the only direction to which both could spread. This should be slightly modified: ‘this is where the two imperialisms would clash, if Kleomenes chose to expand to Arkadia’. Theoretically, Kleomenes could have chosen the Spartan enemy *par excellence*, i.e. Messenia, but he did not. In fact, the Messenians as a whole only got involved in the war by providing refuge to the Megalopolitans who deserted their *polis* after its sack by Kleomenes in 223, and there were no repercussions (see pp.227–8). As McCaslin (1985–86 [1989], 86) has remarked, Kleomenes had decided to make do without the Messenian *klēroi*. Certainly, we do not know whether Kleomenes had plans for Messenia or what he would ultimately have done, had he not been defeated in 222. Still it is worth emphasizing that Kleomenes broke with the past in this respect too, not only in his social reforms.

At this point, the history of relations between Sparta on the one hand, and Messenia and Megalopolis on the other, needs to be summarized. The

Spartans had been aggressive towards Megalopolis in the 350s and towards Messenia after the Peace of Philokrates in 346. After that date, the first and last recorded hostilities between Sparta and Messenia had occurred probably in the early 270s (see pp.135–7), while more recently it was Megalopolis that had suffered a Spartan attack – in c. 262 under king Akrotatos (see p.138). Whether there had been another attack on Megalopolis in 241 under Agis IV is quite dubious.²⁰ On the other hand, relations with the Messenians had taken a remarkable, if only temporary, turn during the invasion of Pyrrhos when the Messenians (or part of them) had provided help to the Spartans. And we have to recall Polybius’ observation (4.32.2–4), that the Messenians were ‘never whole-heartedly enemies of the Lakedaimonians or friends with the Arkadians’.

It would have required a vast effort on Kleomenes’ part to reconquer Messenia – especially if he did not control the Dentheliatis on Taygetos (see p.136). On the other hand, it was easier for Kleomenes to push towards Arkadia because he had gained the support of numerous Arkadians already before the war. He benefited from the renewal of the old friendship between Sparta and the eastern Arkadians, most recently manifested in the Chremonidean War. In other words, Kleomenes pursued a pragmatic policy of expansion, and possibly one based initially on defensive considerations.

* * *

Relations between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy will be treated by region. Therefore, it is useful to present here the main events of the Kleomonic War (followed by a table), with the emphasis on events from 226 onwards.

As mentioned above, Arkadia was the battleground until autumn 226. In 228/7 Aratos seized Kaphyai and, in reply, Kleomenes seized Methydrion. In 227 the Achaian troops were defeated twice: on Mt. Lykaion and at Ladokeia. Additionally, Kleomenes captured Alea and Heraia. On the other hand, the Achaians succeeded in getting back Mantinea and laid siege to Orchomenos.

Kleomenes’ social and military reforms in late 227 reinforced his army and led to further military successes. He cancelled debts, redistributed civic land into 4,000 equal *klēroi*, of which c. 1,400 were allotted to *perioikoi*. Thus, these people acquired the status of citizens and hoplites. Furthermore, Kleomenes restored the *agōgē* and introduced the Macedonian *sarissa*.²¹ The *total* number of Spartan citizen-hoplites, on the eve of the battle of

Sellasia, came to comprise c. 5,000 men,²² plus an equal or higher number of *perioikoi*. Kleomenes' army was further increased by mercenaries thanks to the financial support of Ptolemy III Euergetes, probably from the winter of 226/5 (Polyb. 2.51.2; Plut. *Kleom.* 22.3–4). Ptolemy III, the formerly proclaimed *hégēmōn* of the Achaian Confederacy, presumably decided that the Spartan king was a more reliable rival of Macedon (Walbank 1988, 347 and n.9). It is uncertain whether this aid went on until Sellasia or whether it ceased as soon as Doson descended to the Peloponnese (Paschidis 2008a, 260, 261 & n.1).

Kleomenes' political and social reforms had a tremendous impact on the Spartan class structure. The most profound political changes were the abolition of the Ephorate, the removal of the right of *probouleusis* from the *Gerousia* and the appointment of his brother Eukleidas as fellow king (Paus. 2.9.1) – the latter effectively meant the end of the Agiad-Eurypontid diarchy.²³ The end of dual kingship eventually produced a formidable ruler, the so-called tyrant Nabis, who in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries upset the *status quo* in the Peloponnese.

In summer 226 Kleomenes turned his attention to the northern Peloponnese and in autumn 226 achieved a major victory at Hekatombaion near the Achaian Dyme, thus spreading the war outside Arkadia and giving it a totally new dimension (Urban 1979, 142). A truce was agreed in late 226. Talks about conferring leadership upon Kleomenes started and went on until early summer 225 (Plut. *Arat.* 39.1–3 and *Kleom.* 15, 17). The negotiations collapsed and the war spread to the Argolid and Achaia proper. Next, Kleomenes acquired Pellene, Pheneos, and the *poleis* of the Akte. Most notably, the Argives and the Corinthians changed sides.

This is how the astonishing Achaian alliance with Antigonos III of Macedon came about in spring 224, after a great deal of pondering on the Achaian side – negotiations had first taken place in late 227/early 226 on Achaian initiative (Polyb. 2.51.5–7; Plut. *Arat.* 42.2–3 and *Kleom.* 16.2–5). Nearly twenty years after they had lost control over the Peloponnese to the Achaian Confederacy, the Macedonians were asked to come back. In asking help from an external power, the Achaians followed a time-honoured Greek policy (Briscoe 1978, 147) but the Macedonians were not just any external power. In spite of all the ups and downs of Macedonian rule, they had exercised influence or control over a large part of the Peloponnese for more than a hundred years. Doson now received Akrokorinthos back, in exchange for his help (Plut. *Arat.* 42.2–3, 44.3 and *Kleom.* 20.4; Polyb. 2.54.1). Surely, this was a bitter moment for the Achaian Confederacy and for Aratos in particular who had evicted the

Macedonians from Akrokorinthos. At the same time the surrender of Akrokorinthos was an unmistakable proof of the Achaians' fear of Kleomenes and Sparta.

Subsequently, Doson attended the federal *synodos* at Aigion where he was proclaimed *bēgemōn* of 'all the allies' (Polyb. 2.54.4). Doson had already established bilateral alliances with certain federal states to further Macedonian power, and the Achaian Confederacy was added to it.²⁴ That the Hellenic Alliance was not founded to fight against Sparta is shown by the fact that the allies only provided troops in 222 (Scherberich 2009, 76). Doson's Hellenic Alliance consisted of confederacies, not *poleis*, it was 'a League of Leagues' (Tarn 1928, 759): Achaians, Boiotians, Phokians, Akarnanians, Epeirotes, Thessalians, Euboeans and the Opuntian Lokrians.²⁵ The new organization is referred to by Polybius (4.9.2, 24.5, 24.6, 29.7, 55.2) as *Koinē Symmachia* but it is uncertain whether this was its official name (Scherberich 2009, 13, 177–9).

Polybius does not record clearly either the aims or the structure of the Hellenic Alliance but the Macedonian king had a pivotal role (Scherberich 2009, 179–81). No new member could be admitted and no war could be declared without the consent of the allies.²⁶ The central provision was probably for mutual assistance in case of threat against the entire Alliance (Errington 1990, 182).²⁷

In 223 Kleomenes sacked an almost empty Megalopolis but Doson had previously recaptured the Arkadian *poleis* while the Argives had returned to the Achaian Confederacy. The rival armies met in summer 222, at Sellasia,²⁸ the nearest perioikic community to Sparta.²⁹

Between the Achaian Confederacy and Macedon, the latter provided by far the larger number of troops (18,000 infantry and 600 cavalry). More than 10,000 Peloponnesian troops took the field: 4,000 infantry plus 300 cavalry were levied by the Achaian Confederacy, while Kleomenes' army, totalling c. 20,000, included 6,000 'Lakedaimonians' (Plut. *Kleom.* 28.5) – Spartans and probably 2,000 freed helots³⁰ – and c. 7,000 *perioikoi* and allies. In such a major battle the *perioikoi* would have probably numbered at least as many as the Spartans, i.e. c. 4,000 or more.³¹ The allies are not identified: they could be Peloponnesians, they could be Cretans or a combination of both.³² In the former case we could assume that Sparta retained its allure attracting citizens from *poleis* belonging to the Achaian Confederacy (and the Hellenic Alliance), who openly defied it.

The battle of Sellasia was the most important battle fought on Peloponnesian soil after the battle of Megalopolis which had terminated the War of Agis. Up till then Doson had systematically avoided risking an

open battle, hoping to wear his rival out. Kleomenes, at first (at the Isthmos: Polyb. 2.52.9) had also avoided battle but in early 222 he had ravaged the Argolid, demonstrating power and at the same time challenging, unsuccessfully, the Macedonian king to give battle and settle the issue *outside* Lakonia (Plut. *Kleom.* 25.4–26.1). Following the ravaging of the Argolid, Kleomenes returned to Lakonia. We cannot know whether Kleomenes had a long-term plan or whether he was simply waiting for Doson to leave the Peloponnese and then see what to do next – the latter seems more likely. However, Doson took the initiative and invaded Lakonia, thus leaving no choice to Kleomenes other than to defend the passes to Sparta, placing himself at Sellasia – and this he did so well that Doson had to wait for several days carefully inspecting the grounds (Polyb. 2.65.11–66.1–4). The two kings finally agreed to give battle (Polyb. 2.66.4). Despite his prejudice against Kleomenes, Polybius (2.66.4) explicitly states that the two rulers were equally formidable military commanders. The crucial engagement between the two kings and their troops was a close-run thing (Polyb. 2.69.8–11) before Sparta was finally defeated by Macedon once more.³³ The losses of the defeated were severe but perhaps not as severe as Plutarch reports (*Kleom.* 28.5), according to whom 6,000 ‘Lakedaimonians’ perished, save 200; and in any case the number most probably should be taken to refer to the casualties *in total*.³⁴

Kleomenes fled to Egypt where he committed suicide in spring 219 (following an abortive attempt to overthrow Ptolemy IV), but as things turned out he was not the last Spartan ruler to challenge and intimidate the Achaian Confederacy.

Table 1: Main Events, 229–222³⁵

Achaian <i>Stratēgos</i> Year ³⁶ / <i>Stratēgos</i>	Events	Army Figures
229/8 Aratos (9 th <i>stratēgia</i>)	Argos, Phleious, Hermione join the Achaian Confederacy. Kaphyai, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Tegea go over to Sparta.	
Summer 229	Kleomenes III takes the Athenaion (part of Megalopolis). Unsuccessful night attack of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos.	
Autumn 229 or early 228	The Achaian Confederacy declares war on Sparta.	
228	Aratos seizes Kaphyai.	
228/7 Aristomachos	Kleomenes seizes Methydrion; plunders the Argolid.	

	Aratos persuades Aristomachos not to give battle at Pallantion.	Achaians: 20,000 foot (?) ³⁷ + 1,000 horse (?); Spartans: 5,000.
227/6 Aratos (10 th)	Aratos attacks Elis.	
	Spartan victory over an Achaian army on Mt. Lykaion.	Significant Achaian losses.
Spring 227	Aratos captures Mantinea, installs 300 Achaians and a garrison of 200 – besieges Orchomenos.	
	Unsuccessful Spartan attack on the walls of Megalopolis; Spartan victory at Ladokeia, Lydiadas dies in the battle.	Light infantry and cavalry in the Achaian army; Tarentines and Cretans in the Spartan army.
	Kleomenes captures Alea and Heraia; introduces food into the besieged Orchomenos.	
Late 227	Kleomenes’ social and military reforms – enlargement of the Spartan army, introduction of the <i>sarissa</i> .	
Late 227/early 226 ³⁸	Megalopolitan envoys to Antigonos III Doson.	
Jan./Feb. 226	Achaian victory over the Spartans (under Megistonous) at Orchomenos; failure to capture Orchomenos.	300 dead on the Spartan side.
Early 226	Kleomenes raids Megalopolitan territory.	
226/5 Hyperbatos	The Mantineans return to Kleomenes’ side. Kleomenes invades northwestern Achaia.	
Autumn 226	Spartan victory at the battle of Hekatombaion. Kleomenes seizes Lasion and gives it to Elis.	The Achaians in full force; great losses.
Late 226	Truce; negotiations about hegemony between Kleomenes and the Achaian Confederacy.	
Winter 226/5 ³⁹	Ptolemy III starts subsidizing Kleomenes.	
225/4 Timoxenos Early 225	Achaian embassy to Doson (Aratos the younger is one of the envoys). ⁴⁰	
Early summer 225	Collapse of the conference on hegemony.	
Summer 225	Kleomenes takes Pellene, Pheneos, Kaphyai.	

Aratos, <i>stratēgos autokratōr</i>	Aratos executes Sikyonian supporters of Kleomenes; fails to do the same at Corinth.	
	The Argives side with Kleomenes.	
	Kleomenes takes Phleious, Kleonai, Hermione, Troizen, Epidauros, Corinth (not Akrokorinthos).	
Early 224	Aratos besieged in Sikyon for 3 months.	
April 224	Alliance of the Achaian Confederacy with Doson.	
224/3 Aratos, <i>stratēgos autokratōr</i> (11th)⁴¹		
Mid-summer 224?	The Argives abandon Kleomenes.	
	Doson garrisons Akrokorinthos.	
	The Argives return to the Achaian Confederacy.	
	Doson captures the fortresses in the Aigyitis and the Belminatis and hands them over to Megalopolis.	
Autumn 224	Aristomachos of Argos is executed by the Achaians and the Macedonians.	
Late 224	Foundation of the Hellenic Alliance; Doson is elected <i>hēgemōn</i> .	
223/2 Unknown⁴²		
May 223	Kleomenes attacks Megalopolis, unsuccessfully.	
Late spring – autumn 223	Doson captures Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraia and Thelphousa; installs a garrison at Orchomenos (and Heraia?). Depopulation of Mantinea; renamed as Antigoneia.	
Autumn 223	Kleomenes sacks Megalopolis.	
Feb./March 222 ⁴³	Kleomenes plunders the Argolid.	
222/1 Aratos (12th)	Ptolemy III withdraws his support to Kleomenes.	
July 222	Battle of Sellasia; victory of the Hellenic Alliance; Kleomenes flees to Egypt.	Allied army: c.28,000 infantry + 1,200 cavalry. ⁴⁴ 4,300 Achaian infantry (1,000 Megalopolitans ⁴⁵) + 300 cavalry. Spartan army: c. 20,000 total. 6,000 'Lakedaimonians'; c.7,000 <i>perioikoi</i> and allies; c. 6,000 mercenaries; c. 1,000 cavalry.

The eastern Arkadians

The War of Kleomenes and the leading role of Sparta essentially represented the last chance of the eastern Arkadian *poleis*, without their being aware of it, to pursue an independent policy and play an active part in events. It is the last time that we witness Arkadian solidarity, once again demonstrated vis-à-vis Sparta. After this war, certain western Arkadian *poleis*/regions and Orchomenos appear as gifts of the Macedonian king Philip V to the Achaian Confederacy (see pp.295–8, 320).

Polybius (2.55.8–9) emphasizes that Kleomenes never found ‘a single supporter to share in his hopes or a single traitor’ in Megalopolis and Stymphalos – and them alone: ...παρὰ μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίοις μηδέποτε δυνηθῆναι μῆθ’ αἰρετιστὴν καὶ κοινωνὸν τῶν ἰδίων ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι. In Kleitor only the non-native Thearkes, the son of a foreign soldier, ‘smuggled in’ from Orchomenos (γενέσθαι δ’ ὑποβολιμαῖον ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ τῶν ἐπηλύδων τινὸς στρατιωτῶν), was a partisan of Kleomenes. Polybius’ insistence might be quite suspect, even about Megalopolis and Stymphalos, and a result of his hostility towards mercenaries (Musti 1967, 205–7), but it is the implicit admission by Polybius that is most interesting: Kleomenes had partisans in all the other Arkadian *poleis*. As to Kleitor in particular, this vague report of Polybius could be construed to mean that Thearkes arranged for the betrayal of the *polis* to Kleomenes – whether this is true we cannot tell (Urban 1979, 175). With regard to Megalopolis, as we shall see further below, things were not as clear cut as Polybius wishes us to believe, himself a Megalopolitan writing long after the Kleomenic War.

It is important to note that none of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* supported Kleomenes from the hope that he would carry out social reforms. As Urban (1979, 168–9) has cogently pointed out, all of them supported Kleomenes *before* his reforms in Sparta. Moreover, it is unlikely that Polybius would have failed to inform us – given his hostility to social revolutions as a whole – had Kleomenes actually carried out or encouraged any social reforms in the eastern Arkadian *poleis*, or elsewhere. In the end, we do not know whether Kleomenes ever had any intention of exporting his revolutionary programme.

As mentioned above, in 229/8 Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenos were on Kleomenes’ side. Polybius (2.46.2–3) accuses the Aitolians of acting in concordance with the Spartans and out of envy for the Achaian Confederacy:

συμβουλευομένους δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ φθονοῦντας τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε Κλεομένους πεπραξικοπηκότος αὐτοὺς καὶ παρηρημένον Τεγέαν, Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχομενόν, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευόμενας τότε πόλεις, οὐχ οἷον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῷ τὴν παράληψιν...

they were so much of one mind with the Lakedaimonians and so jealous of the Achaïans that when Kleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos, cities which were not only allies of the Aetolians, but also had bonds of *isopoliteia* (?)⁴⁶ with them, they not only showed no resentment, but actually set their seal to his occupation.

Fine (1940, 132–5, 144–5) has shown that there had never existed an alliance between Sparta and the Aitolian Confederacy, and Larsen (1966, esp. 45–8, 50, 54, 56) elaborating on this theory has shown that the Aitolians simply remained neutral.⁴⁷ But neutrality was inadmissible. Polybius employs the participle *πεπραξικοπηκότος*, which implies ‘seizure by surprise or treachery’ (Larsen 1966, 54), to denote how Kleomenes (allegedly) broke faith with the Aitolians and acquired these *poleis*’ allegiance. The participle could also be a deliberately misleading term of Polybius to make readers believe that the eastern Arkadians came over to Kleomenes’ side against their will or, at least, that they had no say in this.⁴⁸ In another passage, Polybius (2.57.1), rather inconsistently, states that the Mantineans went over to Kleomenes of their own free will. In the end, we need not see all three Arkadian *poleis* acting for entirely similar reasons but their subsequent conduct during the war shows that the prevailing attitude was pro-Spartan, although there are signs of serious internal discord in Mantinea.

Overall, before the beginning of the war, defensive considerations must have been very important to the Arkadians, in addition to their bonds of *isopoliteia* with the Aitolian Confederacy. It also seems unlikely that these *poleis* would have officially cancelled their bonds with the Aitolian Confederacy since this would have been an unnecessary provocation. Polybius implies that the alliance between the Arkadians and the Aitolians ceased to exist once Kleomenes had snatched them away, but if he misleads us as to Arkadian attitudes towards the Spartan king, then he probably misleads us as to Arkadian-Aitolian relations too.

A wider problem concerns the nature of the alliance of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* to Sparta. Did they have the obligation to provide troops to Sparta from the beginning? We read about Kleomenes’ efforts to increase Spartan manpower by means of his social reforms, about his mercenaries but not of Arkadians providing him with troops. Plutarch (*Kleom.* 26.4) underlines that the Spartan king drew his resources from a single *polis* but this could very well be Phylarchos’ (Plutarch’s source) way of magnifying the king’s prowess. And in any case, this is the kind of information that would not interest Phylarchos. It might interest Polybius but perhaps it would be too embarrassing for him to demonstrate, in numbers, the support for Kleomenes. And whether or not the Arkadians were explicitly

obliged to provide troops to Sparta from the beginning, did they or could they during the war?

It is reasonable to suggest that Kleomenes' army was reinforced significantly by the Arkadians. On the basis of Forsén's (2000) calculations of overall population numbers, the largest number of troops may well have been provided by Tegea which remained on the side of Kleomenes until 223 and might have had a population even twice as large as the population of Mantinea. A minimum of 16,000–20,000 for Tegea and a maximum of 14,000–18,000 for Mantinea is estimated, without counting slaves or metics; the total population of Orchomenos is estimated at a minimum of 6,000–8,000. On the basis of Herodotus (9.28.3–4) regarding the battle of Plataia in 479, the Tegean male population of hoplite status aged between 20 and 49 is estimated at 1,875, the total population of hoplite status at 4,464 and the total male, citizen population at 8,928. The corresponding figures for Orchomenos are estimated at 750, 1786 and 3,572 respectively. As to Mantinea, we largely rely on Diodorus (12.78.4) and Lysias (*Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens* [34].7). Diodorus reports that in 418 the Argives received from the Mantineans a little less than 3,000 soldiers. Lysias reports that in 403 the Mantineans were resisting Sparta although they were not even 3,000 strong. It is possible that the 'less than 3,000' refers to the total male population of Mantinea capable of military service, between 18–49 years of age.⁴⁹ Needless to say, these figures are only a rough guide, since demographic data could very well have changed significantly more than two centuries later. Furthermore, if indeed the eastern Arkadians sent troops to Kleomenes' army, it is highly unlikely that they would have dispatched their full levies, thus leaving their respective homelands unprotected.

However, we are informed of Orchomenian soldiers of unspecified number helping Kleomenes but only very late in the war, in summer 223 (Polyb. 2.54.10). All the eastern Arkadians could have contributed to the battles of Mt. Lykaion (in 227) and Hekatombaion (in 226) while the Orchomenians, being under siege, would have probably been absent from Ladokeia (in 227). It is not very likely that Kleomenes' unidentified allies in the battle of Sellasia would have included Arkadian contingents: Orchomenos had a Macedonian garrison, possibly Heraia as well, and Mantinea had been depopulated (see pp.246–7). On the other hand, we cannot exclude the (slight) possibility that Arkadians would have joined Kleomenes' army *individually*.

To sum up: If there was any significant Peloponnesian contribution to the Spartan army at any stage of the war, it must have come from the Arkadians. Kleomenes had impressive gains in 225 – Pellene, Kaphyai,

Pheneos, Argos, the Akte *poleis* and Corinth – but the formation of the Achaian alliance with Antigonos Doson and Doson's arrival in 224 led these areas back to the Achaian Confederacy, before Kleomenes had a chance to use troops from them in a campaign.

* * *

Shortly after the declaration of war, Aratos seized Kaphyai (Plut. *Kleom.* 4.4).⁵⁰ We hear next of Kaphyai in 225/4, when it was captured by Kleomenes in the course of his sweeping campaign in the northern Peloponnese (Polyb. 2.52.1) – we do not know whether this was done by force or voluntarily. Responding to Aratos' success, Kleomenes captured Methydriion which was important strategically since from there one could easily get to Orchomenos.⁵¹

Aratos' 10th *stratēgia* in 227/6 started with a failure on Mt. Lykaion (Plut. *Kleom.* 5.1; Polyb. 2.51.3) but he went on to capture Mantinea by treachery (πραξικοπήσαντος: Polyb. 2.57.3) in spring 227.⁵² Mantinea was probably re-incorporated in the Achaian Confederacy.⁵³

In this context Polybius (2.57.2) offers an intriguing piece of information on the relationship of the Mantineans with Sparta. He describes them as μετέχοντες τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας. In the immediately preceding paragraph Polybius states that the Mantineans had deserted τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν, which means membership in the Achaian Confederacy consisting, *among other things*, of double citizenship. So, is Polybius actually reporting that the Mantineans acquired Spartan citizenship? (so the Loeb translation)⁵⁴ Or is he using the term in its wider sense to denote 'belonging to a political entity'?⁵⁵ There is no way of telling for certain, although Polybius only rarely employs the term *politeia* strictly in the sense of citizenship (Lévy 1990, 16–17). If the *politeia* has here the sense of citizenship (as well), then we are dealing with a *unique* case in our record of Spartan foreign policy, i.e. *en masse* award of *politeia* or perhaps more likely *isopoliteia*, i.e. potential grant of citizenship, to be implemented if a Mantinean moved to Sparta (or if the Mantineans moved *en masse*). Such an award could be a Spartan attempt to secure the loyalty of the Mantineans and guarantee them a refuge should the Achaians attack. On the other hand, this award would have been much easier *after* Kleomenes' reforms, in particular after the enfranchisement of the *perioikoi*, after the Spartans had got used to the idea of massive enfranchisement of non-Spartans and *after* the Mantineans had returned to Kleomenes' side in 226. Overall, the expression is best understood as indicating the common political front established by the Spartans and the Mantineans and, in any case, it makes Kleomenes look even more menacing.

However, it appears that there was no unanimity among the Mantineans as to the policy to be pursued towards Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy. According to Polybius (2.57.5–58.1), following the capture of their city by Aratos, the Mantineans were impressed by his clement behaviour and there was a reversal of feeling (2.57.6: παραντίκα πάντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐγένοντο γνώμης). In any case, subsequently they asked for an Achaian garrison because they feared discord and intrigues by the Aitolians and the Spartans. Given the subsequent change in Mantinean policy, we can legitimately suspect that Polybius is grossly misleading us when he suggests that the Mantineans as a whole changed their attitude. It is much more sensible to believe that those who asked for a garrison were not only pro-Achaian but also hostile to Sparta and had gained the upper hand *for the moment*. However, the Achaians sent a garrison of 200 mercenaries (μισθοφόρους) and 300 settlers chosen by lot, thus intervening in Mantinean society and enlarging the pro-Achaian group within Mantineia (Polyb. 2.58.2–3; Paus. 8.28.7; Walbank 1957, 263). Plutarch (*Arat.* 36.2), vaguely writes that Aratos gave citizenship to the metics. These metics could be the already existing resident aliens or the Achaian settlers or both. Given that Polybius clearly distinguishes between the garrison and the settlers, it would make sense if the latter were installed with certain rights in Mantineia, pretty much as cleruchs; otherwise, the distinction is pointless. It is also not inconceivable that Aratos would have interfered even more drastically in Mantinean society by awarding citizenship to the pre-existing metics, with the same purpose, i.e. that of enhancing support for the Achaian Confederacy.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, Achaian hold over Mantineia was of short duration. Shortly before Kleomenes’ victory at Hekatombaion in autumn 226, the Mantineans invited in the Spartans. Plutarch (*Kleom.* 14.1) reports that together they expelled the Achaian garrison, Kleomenes restored the laws and the constitution and returned to Tegea on the same day (αὐθημερόν). Plutarch thus indicates that the king had every faith that the Mantineans would remain loyal. Notably, there is no mention of a Spartan garrison, no indication of a return to old Spartan practice. Kleomenes appears to have nothing to do, at least not directly, with subsequent events in Mantineia but possibly he had indicated to the Mantineans the way to proceed – hence the absence of a Spartan garrison. Polybius (2.58.4–7) writes that the Mantineans executed those sent by the Achaians to live in Mantineia – τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διατρίβοντας – wishing to give Kleomenes a guarantee of their good faith. Polybius’ language is too elaborate to mean simply ‘garrison’ or something similar. And it does make sense that the Mantineans would have executed those who had been installed in their society. Whether the garrison left unscathed is an open question.⁵⁷

However, for this action and for their previous shifts of allegiance the Mantineans paid dearly a few years later, in 223.⁵⁸

The allegiance of Mantinea could have served multiple purposes. Marasco (1981, 466) emphasizes that Kleomenes aimed at encouraging other member states of the Achaian Confederacy to revolt. For Walbank (1933, 89), strategic considerations and recruitment of soldiers were of primary importance. We do not read about Mantineans participating in the next campaign of Kleomenes but it is quite possible that they did.

Orchomenos' location in the heart of Arkadia, commanding one of the main entrances into the Peloponnesian plains, inevitably made it a coveted target. Unlike Mantinea and perhaps Tegea, in Orchomenos' case there is no trace of dissension as to the policy to be pursued. We have to remember that Orchomenos, unlike the other two *poleis*, had always been loyal to Sparta. First, it came under siege by Aratos in spring 227 (during his 10th *stratēgia*). The siege was difficult since the city was not easily approached by siege engines. It was situated on a hill rising to more than 900m and enclosed by a circuit wall 2.3 km long, with very steep slopes outside the wall in the north-eastern, north and north-western sectors.⁵⁹ We have no information as to the siege itself, for example as to the number of troops employed or the tactics applied, but given Orchomenos' strategic location in the Peloponnese we would expect the Achaians to have dedicated considerable energy to the siege. However, the Orchomenians stood out with the help of Kleomenes who introduced grain into the city during his campaign of 227 (Plut. *Kleom.* 7.3). This in itself shows that the Achaian siege was not the most rigorous a *polis* could suffer.

During the same campaign, Kleomenes captured Heraia and Alea (east of Megalopolis, in the highlands southeast of Stymphalos), seemingly without the Achaians trying to obstruct him.⁶⁰ No information is available as to the attitudes of these *poleis*.

In January/February 226 Aratos fought a victorious battle at Orchomenos against Megistonous, Kleomenes' uncle, whom he captured. Three hundred men in Megistonous' army were killed but there is no mention of Orchomenians participating in the fight (Plut. *Arat.* 38.1). However, Aratos failed to capture the city. It seems that the siege was abandoned at some point after this battle since when we next hear about the Orchomenians, it is in 223 when they offer help to Kleomenes against Doson. They would not have been able to stand out for three years unless the siege had degenerated into mere harassment.

The role of Megalopolis

The embassy to Doson

The Megalopolitans gave an unimpressive military performance during the war – save for the very end, the battle of Sellasia, where Philopoimen laid the foundations of his future career.

Already before the war, Plutarch presents the former tyrant of Megalopolis, Lydiadas, as the primary advocate of war against Sparta and Aratos as constantly avoiding it. In the *Aratos* (30.3–4) he records that Lydiadas, motivated by sheer ambition, was pressing for a campaign against the Spartans during his first *stratēgia*, in 234/3, to which Aratos objected. We do not know, however, whether Lydiadas had any specific reason to be worried: whether, for instance, the Spartans under Kleomenes had already started harassing the Belminatis (formerly Lakonian territory).⁶¹ Plutarch also reports that Lydiadas often mounted (unspecified) accusations against Aratos who, however, was able to confront him successfully. Yet, for a while Aratos and Lydiadas held the *stratēgia* alternatively. Thus, one wonders who elected them each time and for which reasons, and how many and how loyal their supporters were. Gruen's observation (1984, 496) on the 'typical Achaean practice of rotating rival leaders in the highest office' is relevant here. Thus, Lydiadas' presence served to diminish Aratos' power.

Lydiadas accused Aratos of persuading Aristomachos not to engage in battle with Kleomenes in the area of Pallantion (see p.231), and went for the *stratēgia*, but Aratos won the office in 227/6 (Plut. *Arat.* 35.5). This is an indication that Lydiadas' pressure for an aggressive policy against Sparta did not meet with approval among member-states (Gruen 1972, 615).

Kleomenes attacked Megalopolis for the first time in 227, without much success (Plut. *Kleom.* 6.2); he had previously taken the fortress of Leuktra (in north-western Lakonia, to the east of the city; Shipley 2004b, 575). Near the gates of Megalopolis, at Ladokeia, Lydiadas, probably as *hipparchos* (Orsi 2000, 232), pressed for battle but Aratos, being *stratēgos*, refused to succumb to his pressure, mainly because the Achaian army was inferior in numbers to the Spartan (Plut. *Arat.* 36.3). No numbers are given but both light infantry and cavalry were present. We are also ignorant of the precise origins of these troops. On the other hand, the Spartan army included Tarentines (light cavalry) and Cretan mercenaries.⁶² However, Lydiadas ignored Aratos and charged with the cavalry against the Spartan right wing but he made the fatal mistake of getting into an area full of trees and trenches. There he fell easy prey to Kleomenes and was killed (Polyb. 2.51.3; Plut. *Kleom.* 6.3–4 and *Arat.* 37.1–3; Paus. 8.27.15). His death was honourable but also the result of 'impetuosity' (Walbank 1988, 345; Marasco 1981, 407). Lydiadas was all too ambitious against the Spartans

and when the time came, he proved to have more audacity than strategic sense. Essentially, it was he who was responsible for the Achaian defeat; at least this once we can acquit Aratos of cowardly behaviour. On the other hand, the Megalopolitans honoured Lydiadas, posthumously, with heroic honours. And they were not the only ones to honour him. Plutarch (*Kleom.* 6.4) records that Kleomenes himself covered Lydiadas' body with a purple cloak, put a crown on his head and sent his corpse to the gates of Megalopolis. In other words, he treated him like a king. Marasco (1981, 409–10) argues that this gesture aimed at placing Aratos in an even more difficult position and, furthermore, at propounding the monarchic ideal to counter the anti-tyrannical propaganda of Aratos. This could very well have been the effect of Kleomenes' behaviour, but Kleomenes' motives might have been more closely associated with the Megalopolitans. Offering royal treatment to Lydiadas' body was a means of self-praise for Kleomenes: by displaying the value of the defeated, he added to his own victory. Furthermore, this gesture could very well have been intended by Kleomenes to impress the Megalopolitans and win their favour.

For the Megalopolitans themselves Lydiadas' death had deprived them of a leader in a war that might have been crucial for their existence but it was also an opportunity to acquire a hero or rather yet another hero, from the same family. Stavrianopoulou (2002, 120–2 = *SEG* 52.447–449) publishes two decrees awarding posthumous, heroic honours to Lydiadas and his father Eudamos. The decrees are inscribed on parts of an exedra that must have supported at least six equestrian statues. Also part of the monument is a dedicatory inscription for Eudamos and another for Lydiadas. With regard to the honours for Eudamos, Stavrianopoulou (at pp.134–43) argues that they could have been the result of his liberating Megalopolis from the tyrant Aristodemos in the mid-3rd century. That the honours for Eudamos were to be proclaimed in an *Agōn* established by the *Hellēnes* (ll. 20–1)⁶³ only shows how much the family of Lydiadas in particular and the Megalopolitans as a whole wished to acquire a place in Greek history by turning a local hero into one of major importance, and a local event into a Panhellenic one. Turning Lydiadas, a leader fallen in war against Sparta, into a hero was the Megalopolitan way of minimizing his defeat and of making up for his loss, on a symbolic level.

To return to Kleomenes and the Megalopolitans: it is notable that he did not attempt to capture Megalopolis after his victory, probably for a number of reasons. He had his hands full politically in Sparta, the walls of Megalopolis might necessitate a lengthy siege; he did not have Mantinean and Orchomenian support and therefore his army would be liable to an attack, should he stay for much longer in the region.

The aftermath of the battle of Ladokeia bears testimony to a radical loss of popularity for Aratos. The cavalry, trying to return to its ranks, threw the rest of the army into disarray. The 'Achaians' laid the blame at Aratos' door, accusing him of betraying Lydiadas. Subsequently, an Achaian assembly (Plut. *Arat.* 37.3: a *synodos*)⁶⁴ at Aigion decided that they would stop funding Aratos' mercenaries and, if he wanted to wage war, he should do it with his own money (Plut. *Arat.* 37.3). One wonders who exactly these 'Achaians' were; supporters of Lydiadas (Walbank 1984b, 458) easily come to mind, but others might have been equally disappointed at Aratos' military performance. This was a curious decision but it was not implemented. It did show that part of the Achaian Confederacy, at least momentarily, yearned for peace (Urban 1979, 138–9). That Aratos fell out of favour is indicated by the fact that he was not a candidate for the *stratēgia* of 225/4, the first time that he was not a candidate when he was formally allowed to be.

Following Lydiadas' death, the Megalopolitans played a crucial and ambivalent role in the war. Polybius (2.47.1–51.1) and Plutarch (*Arat.* 38.7–8) report a highly problematic event which was not recorded in Aratos' *Memoirs*. According to the more detailed narrative of Polybius – who might be basing himself both on Phylarchos and on information provided by his own family⁶⁵ – after Kleomenes' social reforms and military successes, and fearing Aitolian hostile action, in late 227 or early 226, Aratos (in his 10th *stratēgia*) decided to enter into secret contact with Antigonos III Doson, of Macedon. The (alleged) reasons for the secrecy were that he wished to prevent Kleomenes and the Aitolians from getting to Doson first, and not to demoralize the Achaians (2.47.3–9). Thus, Aratos decided that the Megalopolitans, being in dire straits through Kleomenes' assaults as well as on amicable terms with the Macedonian royal house, would be most suitable envoys (Polyb. 2.48.1–3). He instructed his guest-friends Nikophanes and Kerkidas⁶⁶ to send an embassy to the Achaians asking permission to send an embassy to Doson; the two were appointed, by the Megalopolitans, as envoys to the Achaians (to the federal officials alone?)⁶⁷ and the latter approved of the mission to the Macedonian king (Polyb. 2.48.4–7). In their conference with the king the envoys made a summary presentation of Megalopolis' situation and, according to Aratos' instructions, they explained to Doson, at length, the danger to the Achaian Confederacy, Greece as a whole and especially to Macedon, if Kleomenes and the Aitolians ever joined forces (Polyb. 2.48.8–49.5). The envoys ended by stating that if the Aitolians remained inactive, then the Achaians would continue the war alone. If not, then they were urging Doson 'to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but

come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while it was still possible to save them.' (Polyb. 2.49.8).⁶⁸ Furthermore, the king should not concern himself with terms of the alliance since Aratos would arrange for terms favourable to both parties; Aratos would also indicate when exactly Doson's help would be required: ὁμοίως δ' ἔφασαν καὶ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς βοηθείας αὐτὸν ὑποδείξειν (Polyb. 2.49.6–10). The king was convinced and wrote a letter to the Megalopolitans stating that he would offer his help if the Achaians so wished.⁶⁹ Nikophanes and Kerkidas presented the letter to the Megalopolitans, assuring them of the king's good will. They were again dispatched to the Achaians to obtain approval of a formal invitation to Doson to take over things as soon as possible (Polyb. 2.50.1–4): [The Megalopolitans] παρακαλεῖν ἐπισπάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγχειρίζειν αὐτῷ. First, Nikophanes informed Aratos privately. The latter was very pleased to know that the king shared his views and also pleased that the Megalopolitans had readily agreed to approach Doson through the Achaians. He hoped that there would arise no need for help, but should this happen, he wished for the appeal for help to come from all the Achaians, not from him alone. Aratos was afraid that, if the king took over, defeated Kleomenes and acted against the Confederacy's interests, then the people would blame him, given the damage he had inflicted upon the Macedonian royal house by his capture of Akrokorinthos (Polyb. 2.50.5–10). Finally, the Megalopolitan envoys presented Antigonos' letter to the Achaian *synodos*, asking them to call for him as soon as possible. The *synodos* was favourably disposed but Aratos, while appearing pleased with the king's letter, argued that they should rely on their own forces and call the king only if the worst came to the worst; his proposal was approved (Polyb. 2.50.10–51.1).

What are we to make of Polybius' narrative? There are two opposite ways of viewing the reported actions of Aratos and the Megalopolitan envoys: either as preparing the way to salvation from Spartan and Aitolian dominance or as preparing the way to subordination to Macedon.⁷⁰ The latter is certainly not what Polybius wants us to see.

The bare facts are the three Megalopolitan missions: one to an unspecified Achaian body, the second one to Doson; the third to the Achaian *synodos*; finally, there is also the official letter from Doson to Megalopolis.

Aratos is presented as the master-mind of the approach to Antigonos III, on the basis of his fear of the Aitolians and of their possible joint action with the Spartans. More than that, Aratos and the Megalopolitans actually appear as dictating their own terms to the king. On the other hand, the Megalopolitans are presented as willingly and faithfully executing Aratos' plan. The role of Aratos has been much discussed but it cannot be

disbelieved.⁷¹ On the other hand, the Megalopolitan part is well worth emphasizing.

Polybius (2.50.6) notes how pleased Aratos had been that the Megalopolitans were willing to approach Doson *through* the Achaians: τὸ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας προθύμους εἶναι διὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φέρειν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον τὰ πράγματα. The words διὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν seem of particular importance here. This information might point to the exact opposite, namely that the Megalopolitans had decided to approach Doson anyway, without asking Achaian permission first, i.e. effectively breaking away from the Confederacy. And they would have a fair excuse for this, given that the Confederacy had not offered them much protection against Kleomenes. If we accept that the Megalopolitans were ready to take the initiative and act on their own, then we can suggest that Aratos was informed about their plans and tried to prevent them from breaking away from the Confederacy.⁷² And it is not difficult to imagine that the Megalopolitans might have threatened to abandon the Confederacy – something that Polybius would not record but may be inferred.

Although the role of the Megalopolitans is presented as subordinate, they nonetheless have a considerable share in the rapprochement with Macedon. Polybius (2.48.8) carefully notes that the envoys did not insist upon details of the situation of their own *polis*. Thus, the Megalopolitans are presented in a most favourable light, caring above all for the common good. And the emphasis on such ideal conduct might very well indicate the opposite, especially given the dire position of Megalopolis at the time. The Megalopolitan request to the *synodos* to entrust affairs to Doson as soon as possible is both intriguing and revealing of the urgency of their situation as well as of their lack of loyalty to the Achaian leadership or even to the Confederacy as an institution. Not only did they ask for Antigonos’ help; they also asked to entrust the king with full authority over affairs; in other words, they asked to appoint Doson *bēgemōn*.

The report of what the envoys said to Doson constitutes unreliable information to a large extent. Could they have referred to the Aitolian danger? Or is this a construction of Polybius? Notably, in 2.49.6–8, he presents the alliance between the Spartans and the Aitolians only as a possibility (Scholten 2000, 184). It has been well argued that there was no Aitolian danger⁷³ but we can still wonder whether the people of the time, and Aratos in particular, knew it for a fact.⁷⁴

However, it is highly likely that the Megalopolitans would have employed as arguments the ancestral good relations between Megalopolis and the Macedonian kings – Kerkidas’ in particular went back to the time of Philip II (see p.52) – aiming at securing primarily help for their own *polis*.⁷⁵

On the other hand, it is hardly likely that the envoys would have been so arrogant as to tell Doson to wait for Aratos' 'instructions'.⁷⁶ This looks very much like a fabrication of Polybius designed to present Aratos as being in control of the situation.

Why did Doson not offer his help to the entire Achaian Confederacy right there and then?⁷⁷ An answer to this could be that Doson did not intend to be burdened with yet another military engagement at the time, and furthermore, that he only aimed at a peaceful assumption of hegemony, hence the stipulation for an official Achaian petition. As to Aratos, he could be exploring Antigonos' intentions, at the same time being of two minds, pretty much as he was going to be later on, after Kleomenes' successes in 225. He might even have thought that Doson would intervene anyway and attempted to ingratiate himself with the king in advance.

Kleomenes' sack of Megalopolis

It took Kleomenes a long time before he made a decisive attempt on Megalopolis, and this only after Doson had assumed hegemony of the Achaian Confederacy. In the meantime, he attacked the Megalopolis in early 226.⁷⁸ He did not aim at capturing it, only to demonstrate power. Probably, Kleomenes did not wish to remove a large part of his army from Sparta while his reforms had not yet taken root. He laid the countryside waste, collected a large booty and, to advertise his own prowess and to spite the Megalopolitans, he built a theatre (presumably a temporary construction) and organized a theatrical contest (Plut. *Kleom.* 12.1–3). Warfare was clearly reduced to mockery of the opponent.⁷⁹

After this Kleomenes attacked Megalopolis again only in 223 – twice. His first attack with only a small force, in late May, was unsuccessful due to miscalculation of the time of sunrise.⁸⁰ Kleomenes made his attempt during the night and with the help of 'those who were entrusted with guarding the walls near the so-called Pholeos' (Polyb. 9.18.1–4).⁸¹ Thus, the Polybian image of unanimous Megalopolitan hostility against Kleomenes is seriously undermined.⁸² However, five months later (Walbank 1957, 258), after Doson had conquered the northern and eastern Arkadian *poleis*, Kleomenes sacked Megalopolis. A desire to boost his soldiers' morale, to avert attack against Lakonia (Marasco 1981, 527), and also to offset Doson's success in Arkadia earlier on – all may have played a part.

Polybius (2.55.1–3) gives three reasons for Kleomenes' success. First, he notes that the walls were too big for the size of the *polis*; in other words, there were not enough men to defend them. Polybius considers it most important that numerous Megalopolitans of military age had perished at the battles of Mt. Lykaion and Ladokeia. Secondly, Kleomenes' soldiers

were quite numerous. Thirdly, the Megalopolitans had left the *polis* unguarded, presumably relying too much on Doso for their defence (see also Plut. *Kleom.* 23.3–4). What Polybius does not say is that the Megalopolitans did not make much of an effort.

This is one of the two cases in which Messenians were involved in the war, but it appears that Messenian collective memory produced a different, much more glorious version of events. Pausanias (4.29.9), probably misguided by the Messenians, reports that the latter fought at Sellasia in 222.⁸³ Not only that, but even more important, he states that the Messenians took part in the subsequent invasion of Lakonia and thus, most unexpectedly, they captured Sparta along with 'Aratos and the Achaians' (καὶ τὴν Σπάρτην Ἀράτῳ καὶ Ἀχαιοῖς συγκαθεῖλον). The Macedonians who performed the act are completely ignored; the deed appears solely Peloponnesian, which is a far cry from the truth (Plut. *Kleom.* 30.1).

To return to the War of Kleomenes: according to Polybius (2.55.3–4), Kleomenes employed Messenian exiles, of unknown number, residing in Megalopolis to get into the city secretly, during the night. Previously (in 224), Kleomenes had employed the services of the Messenian Tritymallos to negotiate with Aratos. It has been argued that the exiles belonged to the lower strata of Messenian society and were attracted by Kleomenes' reforms (Roebuck 1941, 69–70), but this view, though reasonable, is also problematic. For one thing, why would the Megalopolitans have accepted supporters of Kleomenes? (Roebuck 1941, 70, n.16). Would it not be simpler to argue that Kleomenes bribed the Messenian exiles? In any case we have to note that hostility between Sparta and Messenia was not absolute.⁸⁴

Polybius proudly states that Kleomenes almost met with disaster when he first got into the city, due to the hearty resistance of the Megalopolitans. This is a gross exaggeration. Polybius (2.55.6–7) writes, vaguely, that Kleomenes drove the Megalopolitans away. In his more detailed description in the *Kleomenes* (24.1–2) Plutarch writes that, as soon as Kleomenes' invasion became known, some fled the city instantly, with their families (presumably before Kleomenes had occupied the entire city), and the rest covered their escape; no more than 1,000 Megalopolitans remained in the city.⁸⁵ In his polemic against Phylarchos, Polybius (2.61.9) – apparently admitting the truth of Phylarchos' general account – presents the abandonment of their homeland as evidence of noble conduct on the part of the Megalopolitans. The truth is that they could not face Kleomenes.

The fact that the Megalopolitan refugees were well received at Messene (Polyb. 2.61.4–5) shows that the two *poleis* were on good terms, even though Messenian exiles had found refuge in Megalopolis. Kleomenes'

subsequent conduct is interesting, and shows that traditional animosity counted less than pragmatic policy. First, he did not attack Messene. It is quite possible that he did not hold the Dentheliatis, which means that he would have needed to spend time, money and men in order to get through to Messenia – something that he could not afford to do under the circumstances.⁸⁶ But, whatever the status of the Dentheliatis, Kleomenes wished to settle the issue via diplomacy and not arms.

Further evidence of traditional animosity yielding to pragmatism is the fact that Kleomenes did not proceed to sack or plunder Megalopolis *immediately* after its capture. He wished for its alliance, which is very different. This is perhaps unexpected in a Spartan king but it is in keeping with the practices of other kings of the time who preferred to secure the allegiance of a *polis* rather than go straight for the jugular. Instead of destroying an old enemy, Kleomenes probably very much preferred to employ the Megalopolitans in his army, and not just to make a demonstration of power.⁸⁷ With Doson in the Peloponnese, he was neither interested in, nor capable of, holding by force an empty city. Nevertheless, this Spartan success served to show that Megalopolis was *megalē* only in name and in size. It also showed both the Macedonians and the Achaians that Kleomenes had to be dealt with once and for all.⁸⁸

Pragmatism, which could be associated with serious internal discord,⁸⁹ was also demonstrated by certain leading Megalopolitans, namely Lysandridas and Thearidas, the latter probably being Polybius' grandfather (Marasco 1981, 539). Naturally enough, Polybius, being firmly anti-Spartan, remains silent. Lysandridas and Thearidas were among those Megalopolitans captured by Kleomenes. In fact, Plutarch (*Kleom.* 24.3–4) presents Lysandridas as indirectly proposing to Kleomenes an alliance with Megalopolis. He urged him 'not to destroy so great a city but, instead, to fill it with loyal friends and allies by restoring the city to its people and becoming the saviour of so numerous a *dēmos*':

λέγω καὶ συμβουλεύω, μὴ διαφθεῖραι πόλιν τηλικαύτην, ἀλλ' ἐμπλῆσαι φίλων καὶ συμμάχων πιστῶν καὶ βεβαίων, ἀποδόντα Μεγαλοπολίταις τὴν πατρίδα καὶ σωτῆρα δήμου τοσούτου γενόμενον.

The king found this hard to believe but agreed stating 'νικάτω δὲ τὸ πρὸς δόξαν αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ λυσιτελὲς παρ' ἡμῖν.' ('Let what makes for glory always carry the day with us, rather than what brings gain.')

Thus, glory is identified with the salvation of a *polis*, which very much befits a king in this period. On the other hand, pure utilitarianism is implicitly identified with devastation. The juxtaposition between glorious and utilitarian acts is very interesting, all the more so because glory is

associated with diplomacy and alliance, i.e. pragmatism or far-sighted utilitarianism in this case, not with attack of limited value on a traditional enemy. The whole passage strongly reminds us of the refusal of the Spartans to destroy Athens in 404, against the demands of the Corinthians and the Thebans (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19–20; Plut. *Lys.* 15). True, Plutarch, the moralist, is preaching Greek solidarity under Roman rule. The Megalopolitans or Kleomenes might not have expressed themselves in such grand words, but, still, the essence of the passage should not be rejected.⁹⁰ We should accept that Kleomenes did not think that it was in his best interest to destroy Megalopolis. However, in the long run, should this alliance between Sparta and Megalopolis take place, it would have probably entailed an attack on the Achaian Confederacy.⁹¹

Kleomenes dispatched Lysandridas and Thearidas to Messene to offer the Megalopolitans restoration of their city as well as friendship and alliance, provided that they abandon the Achaian Confederacy. It was in the course of these negotiations that Philopoimen started making a name for himself, by persuading his fellow Megalopolitans not to accept Kleomenes' terms (Plut. *Kleom.* 24.5 and *Phil.* 5).⁹² Errington (1969, 19) rightly argues that Philopoimen's reaction was the result of the knowledge that Doson's help was imminent. It was sensible of Philopoimen, and any other Megalopolitan, to be suspicious of Kleomenes' intentions. But if we are to believe Plutarch, most Megalopolitans did not initially share Philopoimen's stern attitude and were ready to accept Kleomenes' offers.

Following the refusal of the Megalopolitans to side with Kleomenes, the latter indulged himself in destroying buildings. In addition he was able to carry to Lakonia spoils worth up to 300 talents.⁹³ Polybius writes that the disaster was such that there was hardly any hope that Megalopolis could be synoecized again: οὕτως αὐτὴν πικρῶς διέφθειρεν καὶ δυσμενῶς ὥστε μὴδ' ἐλπίζειν μηδὲνα διότι δύναται ἂν συνοικισθῆναι πάλιν. Polybius exaggerates but it is possible that Kleomenes' sack led to the defection of certain *kōmai* (see p.28). This destruction is what we would have expected from a Spartan king but we should pay more attention to strategic considerations of the moment: the minimization of threat to Lakonia (Marasco 1981, 546).

The Achaian Confederacy shaken to its core:⁹⁴ the case of the northeastern Peloponnesian states

The Argives between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta

In autumn 226 Kleomenes achieved a major victory over the Confederacy's army at Hekatombaion near the Achaian Dyme (Polyb. 2.51.3–4). Truce and negotiations for hegemony followed (in two stages: in late 226 and in early summer 225) but they broke down and thereafter the very existence

of the Achaian Confederacy was at stake. In fact, it practically returned to its limits of c.250 (Scherberich 2009, 71). The war, now officially declared by Kleomenes, spread to the northeastern Peloponnese. It appears that, despite the breakdown of the negotiations for the assumption of hegemony by Kleomenes, most member states *de facto* accepted him as *hegemôn*, especially after the authorities of the Achaian Confederacy decided to send an embassy to Doson.

Plutarch's (*Kleom.* 17.3) overall explanation for Kleomenes' success is that the masses were expecting cancellation of debts and redistribution of the land; the ruling authorities were displeased at Aratos, and some were outraged at the latter for bringing the Macedonians back into the Peloponnese. It is very difficult to discern which of these motives apply to each *polis* or which carried the greatest weight, since our information mainly concerns Sikyon, Argos and Corinth.

Polybius (2.52.1–2) reports in a very summary manner that Kleomenes, 'without facing any obstacles, took either by persuasion or by threat of force' Kaphyai, Pellene, Pheneos and the fortress of Penteleion, Argos, Phleious, Kleonai, Epidauros, Hermione, Troizen,⁹⁵ and, last, Corinth: ἀδεῶς ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ὅς μὲν πείθων αἷς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνατεινόμενος. The order in which Plutarch presents Kleomenes' ways of success is perhaps significant: persuasion comes first, threat comes second. Furthermore, Kleomenes did not have to use force; just the threat of it was enough. Plutarch (*Arat.* 39.3–4) adds some interesting details: the Achaian garrison commander at Pellene fled;⁹⁶ Kleomenes almost succeeded in capturing Sikyon with the help of traitors, and Phleious received a Spartan garrison. This garrison is the only hint at resistance to Kleomenes.

We could view the attitude of the above-mentioned *poleis* as mere passivity or, in the case of the Argolid *poleis*, as imitation of Argive policy,⁹⁷ but even so there is no sign of deep loyalty to the Achaian Confederacy. Moreover, if any of these places had resisted, Polybius would not have failed to sing its praises.

Pellene is worth a note here. In the 5th and the early 4th century – even after Leuktra – it had been steadfastly well-disposed towards Sparta. It had not participated in the war of Agis III but this was most probably because it was then ruled by the pro-Macedonian tyrant Chairon (see p.70). In 241 it had been briefly captured by the Aitolians. The fact that there was an Achaian garrison there in 225 could very well be due to its strategic location⁹⁸ but it could also be an indication that Pellene was a pretty shaky member of the Achaian Confederacy, ready to change sides. It is possible that Kleomenes received help from traitors (Urban 1979, 183–4) or that the Pellenaian themselves evicted the garrison, thus taking their revenge on

the Achaians for leaving them at the mercy of the Aitolians in 241 (Tarn 1928, 757).⁹⁹

* * *

Kleomenes’ main objectives were Corinth and Argos, not the Achaian *poleis*. It is also possible that he expected resistance in Achaia and thus headed for places where he would be more welcome. Or, he preferred to acquire more important allies, in terms of both location and population. Argos represents the most interesting case of change of allegiance and the hardest to explain.

At the beginning of the war Aristomachos of Argos is presented by Plutarch (*Arat.* 35.4) as harbouring the same hostility towards Sparta as Lydiadas, calling for an invasion of Lakonia during his first *stratēgia* in 228/7 (he was elected after the declaration of war). This was a justified demand on his part, given that Kleomenes had got alarmingly near Argos following his alliance with the eastern Arkadian *poleis*, and also that he had shortly before overrun the Argolid (Plut. *Kleom.* 4.4). Once again Aratos is presented as the voice of reason, advising Aristomachos to ignore Kleomenes’ impertinence. Aratos did take part in the campaign but persuaded Aristomachos not to give battle against Kleomenes in the area of Pallantion (Plut. *Arat.* 35.5 and *Kleom.* 4.4–5). Scholarly comments usually focus on Aratos’ lack of enthusiasm for battle. But we should pay equal attention to the fact that Aristomachos was persuaded. In other words, at the end of the day he was more like Aratos and less like Lydiadas.¹⁰⁰ We hear no more of Argive initiative against Sparta, perhaps because Aristomachos did not assume the *stratēgia* again.

In 225, the Argives went over to Kleomenes’ side. Most of our information derives from Plutarch’s *Kleomenes* while there is hardly anything in the *Aratos*, or in Polybius, about how this came about.

In July 225, Kleomenes took advantage of the sacred truce for the Nemeia to bring his army near the walls in the night and capture the Aspis, a fortified area overlooking the theatre (Plut. *Kleom.* 17.4–5). Urban (1979, 185) may very well be right thinking that treason was at work. However, the Argives were so terrified that they did not react; they surrendered twenty hostages, received a garrison and became allies of Kleomenes whom they accepted as *hēgemōn*. Plutarch (*Kleom.* 18.1) underlines that this was an impressive Spartan achievement, since ‘not even the Spartan kings of the past had succeeded in bringing Argos firmly over to the Spartan side (προσαγαγέσθαι), in spite of their numerous efforts’:

Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς δόξαν αὐτῷ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπήρχεν. οὔτε γὰρ οἱ
πάλοι βασιλεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι προσαναγέσθαι τὸ
Ἄργος βεβαίως ἠδυνήθησαν...

But are we talking about capture or about voluntary shift of allegiance and alliance? Plutarch, in *Kleom.* 19.1, writes ‘ἐαλωκότος δ’ Ἄργους’ (‘Argos was captured’) while in *Arat.* 39.4 he writes in a summary manner ‘εὐθὺς Ἀργεῖοι προσεχώρησαν αὐτῷ’ (‘the Argives immediately came over to him’). When he states that the Argives were horrified or when he compares Kleomenes’ achievement with the failure of Pyrrhos (*Kleom.* 18.1–2) he certainly speaks in terms of conquest. But could it be that the Argives simply remained inactive or passive, as they had done in the past, because they were either too scared to resist or else they were too glad to change their allegiance. And in any case, Phylarchos would not have missed the opportunity to magnify his hero’s achievement.

When we examine the aftermath it becomes clear that Kleomenes either had from the beginning, or subsequently acquired, supporters in Argos, but their number and identity is a puzzle. Was it the Argive elite that was on his side, the people, or both or part of both? The twenty hostages surrendered to Kleomenes show that at least part of the elite was against him. On the other hand, Polybius (2.60.6) clearly states that Aristomachos changed sides, i.e. he makes the defection a decision of an individual. The assassination of Aristomachos and his followers later on shows that the role of elite members was instrumental in the change of Argive allegiance, whether through hope of personal gain (Tomlinson 1972, 160) or through fear. Additionally, Plutarch refers to traitors (*Arat.* 44.3).¹⁰¹ There still remains the problem of the common people’s attitude towards Kleomenes.

Possibly in mid-summer 224,¹⁰² while Kleomenes’ army was at the Isthmos facing Doson’s army, the Argive Aristoteles, a friend of Aratos, staged a coup. In Plutarch, (*Arat.* 44.3 and *Kleom.* 20.3), the restoration of Argos to the Achaian Confederacy is presented largely as the work of Aristoteles and the Argive citizens – the definite article is employed – while Achaian help appears to be of secondary importance. On the other hand, in Polybius (2.53.3), the return of Argos is presented as the work of Aristoteles and, *mainly*, of Achaian troops. Polybius does not refer to any Argive supporters of Aristoteles but clearly he must have had some since the Achaian troops arrived *after* the coup.

More precisely, according to Plutarch’s *Aratos* (44.2–3), Aristoteles sent Aratos a secret message stating that he would bring Argos over, if Aratos sent him troops. The latter received 1,500 men from Antigonos – quite a significant force – and sailed from the Isthmos to Epidaurus but the Argives revolted before his arrival and forced Kleomenes’ garrison

(or supporters?) (τοῖς τοῦ Κλεομένου) to take refuge on the akropolis (...οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι προεξαναστάντες ἐπέθεντο τοῖς τοῦ Κλεομένου καὶ κατέκλεισαν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν...). In the *Kleomenes* (20.4) Plutarch writes that Aristoteles did not wait for Aratos but took ‘the citizens’ with him and attacked those who guarded the akropolis; following that, Timoxenos¹⁰³ arrived from Sikyon with Achaian troops to offer help:

ὁ δ’ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐκείνον οὐ περιέμενεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πολίτας παραλαβὼν προσεμάχετο τοῖς φρουροῦσι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· καὶ παρὴν αὐτῷ Τιμόξενος μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ Σικυῶνος βοηθῶν.

On the other hand, according to Polybius (2.53.1, 2–3) the role of the Achaian troops was much more significant than the one presented by Plutarch, since it was they who captured the city of Argos by surprise:¹⁰⁴

οἱ δ’ Ἀχαιοί...ἀλλ’ ἅμα τῷ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἐπαναστήναι τοῖς Κλεομενισταῖς βοηθήσαντες καὶ παρεισπεσόντες μετὰ Τιμοξένου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ κατέλαβον τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν.

...but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Kleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their *stratēgos*, Timoxenos, they captured the city of Argos.

While Plutarch’s narrative leads us to think that Aristotle and the Argives attacked only the garrison installed by Kleomenes (*Kleom.* 17.3), Polybius’ narrative (2.53.2) is more intriguing and revealing: he refers to τοῖς Κλεομενισταῖς. This expression is much too abnormal to mean just a garrison and we should probably understand it to mean ‘partisans of Kleomenes’, a group wider than a garrison, i.e. Argives who were Kleomenes’ supporters. Polybius would not have been willing to admit Kleomenes’ popularity among the Argives and resorts to this vague expression.

So there were two opposing groups of Argive citizens but their respective numbers are impossible to estimate. Combining Polybius and Plutarch’s *Aratos*, it seems probable that Aristoteles had no intention of revolting before the Achaians arrived but his plans became known and *stasis* erupted. And if he only intended to revolt with Achaian help, then he is unlikely to have enjoyed massive support; or he feared that the Argives would not be able to face Kleomenes’ soldiers.

Plutarch presents the Argives as following Aristoteles *en masse* because, as he states in the *Kleomenes* (20.3), the Spartan king had failed to cancel debts.¹⁰⁵ Polybius records nothing of the kind. Walbank (1933, 97 and n.1) observes that the ‘more far-sighted of the Argives’ would have realized that Kleomenes would not export his reforms to the old rivals of Sparta. Furthermore, if Polybius is right, the fact that substantial Achaian help was

needed might indicate that the supporters of Kleomenes were quite numerous, perhaps more numerous than their opponents. It is equally probable that Achaian help was deemed necessary to repel a Spartan counterattack. Upon hearing that Argos had been captured, Kleomenes left his position at the Isthmos, rushed back to Argos and temporarily regained part of the city. It is only at this point that Polybius presents the Argives fighting along with the Achaians, out of remorse (ἐκ μεταμελείας: 2.53.6). First of all, this implies either that the Argives had previously taken sides with Kleomenes or at least that they had not helped the Achaians. Secondly, if they did fight, *en masse*, against Kleomenes, they must have done it out of fear of what would happen next, given that Doson was already in the Peloponnese.

Doson, having regained Akrokorinthos, made a short stop at Argos, praised the Argives and put matters in the city in order: ἐπαινέσας δὲ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους καὶ καταστησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν (Polyb. 2.54.2). The praise of the Argives was presumably due to their fighting off Kleomenes, although we cannot know how massive their participation was. The establishment of order should probably be understood to mean that he reassured the Argives of his good-will and possibly he did not allow the Achaians to plunder the city. It was probably then that he restored the statues of the Argive tyrants (Plut. *Arat.* 45.3; Orsi 2000, 243, 246). Doson's behaviour shows that he had no interest in settling scores with the Argives as a whole or perpetuating a feud, especially when he needed to rush off to strip Kleomenes of his much more constant supporters – the Arkadians. His attendance at the Nemeia following his victory at Sellasia (Polyb. 2.70.4–5) shows the special value he attributed to Argos, the alleged birthplace of the Argead dynasty to whose throne the Antigonids wished to appear as the rightful heirs.

Later on, in February / March 222, while Doson with a few mercenaries had chosen Argos as his winter quarters, the Argives faced plundering of the Argolid by Kleomenes (Polyb. 2.64.1–5; Plut. *Kleom.* 25.4–5).¹⁰⁶ They did not seem to be able or willing to face the Spartan army, which conforms with the overall picture we have of them as reluctant to engage in fighting. Doson refused to give battle. The reaction of the Argives is intriguing from the perspective of attitudes to both the Spartan and the Macedonian kings. According to Polybius (2.64.4) they kept accusing Doson (καταμέμφεσθαι), while according to Plutarch's more explicit or more prejudiced report (*Kleom.* 25.5), they urged him either to give battle or yield the hegemony to his betters: μάχεσθαι κελεύοντες ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἐξίστασθαι τῆς ἡγεμονίας.¹⁰⁷ Both authors are agreed that the Argives were outraged at Doson. Implicitly they are also agreed that to the Argives Kleomenes was preferable to Doson, simply because he appeared more successful.

Of all the Argives, it was the former tyrant Aristomachos and his followers who paid the price for their support of Kleomenes. Our sources are not clear but Aratos may have been more involved than Doson in Aristomachos' brutal death.¹⁰⁸ Polybius (2.59.1, 60.8) writes that Aristomachos was caught by Antigonos and the Achaians and led to Kenchreai where he was racked to death and then thrown into the sea by 'those in charge of Kenchreai', while Plutarch (*Arat.* 44.4) does not mention who Aristomachos' captors were. He reports that Aratos¹⁰⁹ was reproached for allowing him to be tortured and then thrown into the sea – it is unclear whether Doson was still present. Polybius (2.59.2–60) transmits Phylarchos' gruesome report of the events, casting only a slight doubt on their veracity. Surely, such a report suited his views on punishment of traitors to the Achaian Confederacy. The very fact that Polybius insists on showing that Aristomachos deserved punishment, primarily for having been a tyrant but also for betrayal of the Achaian Confederacy (2.59.5–60.6), shows that Phylarchos' report and appraisal of events was accurate. It is interesting that Polybius appears slightly less interested in Aristomachos' betrayal and more in his being a tyrant. Not everybody shared his hatred of tyrants, as is shown by the fact that Phylarchos thought that Aristomachos' descent from tyrants was a praiseworthy fact (Polyb. 2.59.5). What Polybius (2.60.5) very conveniently forgets is that Aristomachos' previous status had not prevented him from being elected *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy (Walbank 1957, 265–6).

However, the Macedonians are not to be exonerated. The officers at Kenchreai who threw Aristomachos' body into the sea could very well have been Macedonians (Dixon 2014, 160). Furthermore, in Polybius 5.16.6 (referring to 218) Aratos accuses the royal official Leontios and those with him of perpetrating a massacre at Argos at an uncertain date (Le Bohec 1993, 376). This massacre which is not mentioned elsewhere (Walbank 1967, 552) probably involved Aristomachos' followers and it contrasts sharply with Doson's image of clemency towards the Argives.

At any rate, the contrast between Doson's treatment of Argos as a whole and the Achaian treatment of Aristomachos shows how much Achaian leadership lacked an essential feature for those who wished to lead a heterogeneous entity in those times, namely flexibility towards those either not fully committed or objecting to being part of the entity.

To conclude: Argos' shift of allegiance does not appear to have been much of a conquest. There was support for Kleomenes both from leaders and citizens, so the least we could say is that sympathies were divided. A series of factors could have brought about this policy. First of all, the Argives for a long time had resisted becoming part of the Achaian

Confederacy. Secondly, Kleomenes was getting too close, and thus 'being Achaians' was now dangerous for the Argives. On the other hand, a voluntary change of sides might even be profitable, both for the people and part of the leading citizens. The former tyrant Aristomachos most probably played a crucial part in negotiations with Kleomenes, hence his subsequent execution. It is perhaps significant that Aristomachos only held the *stratēgia* once (in 228/7) while he technically had the chance to be a candidate again in 226/5. It is possible either that for some reason he had become unpopular among member-states of the Achaian Confederacy or that he was somehow prevented; this could have caused a grudge in Aristomachos and the Argives. As to the Argives' return to the Achaian Confederacy, the cause should be sought primarily in unwillingness to engage in fighting against Macedon. And they could expect to be forgiven for participating in a Confederacy that had been hostile to Macedon since they had never taken part in Aratos' earlier anti-Macedonian policy.

In any case, the Argive turn to Sparta, despite its short duration, is important. And we have to recall that this was not the first instance of co-operation between the two *poleis*. There had been the precedent of Spartan help to Argos at the time of Pyrrhos' invasion. Much more important developments were yet to come: in 197, Argos was offered as a gift by Philip V to Nabis of Sparta, and this was the first and the only time in history that Argos became part of Sparta (see pp.337–9).

Sikyon and Corinth

In the context of summer 225 Plutarch writes that the *poleis* were in upheaval because of people who wanted to stir up revolt (τῶν νεωτεριζόντων; *Arat.* 39.4) and that in Sikyon and Corinth there were many who were openly negotiating with Kleomenes, in order to promote their personal interests against the common good (*Arat.* 40.1). Plutarch or rather Aratos conceals the obvious: those stirring revolt, especially those in Corinth, had no wish whatsoever to find themselves under Macedonian control even if they did not have absolute faith in Kleomenes. Plutarch most probably alludes to members of the upper classes, when he writes about men greedy to promote their personal interests (Urban 1979, 182), but at least in Corinth the masses were also in favour of Kleomenes. As in Agis III's War and in the Chremonidean War, Sparta formed again a powerful image as protectress of the Peloponnese against Macedon.

In Sikyon, things had become rough for the Achaian Confederacy. As mentioned above (Plut. *Arat.* 39.3), Kleomenes nearly succeeded in having the city betrayed to him. More than its strategic usefulness, it was perhaps its symbolic value that mattered to Kleomenes (Urban 1979, 182),

it being the birthplace of Aratos. Following Kleomenes' failure and departure, upheaval went on. Aratos, invested with full power, probably in judicial matters (Walbank 1957, 252), enforced order by putting to death the Sikyonian supporters of Kleomenes.¹¹⁰ This act represents 'startling evidence of the length to which the federal government would go at least in the case of war' (Larsen 1968, 318). And this was not the last manifestation of brutality on Aratos' part.¹¹¹

In Corinth, the news about the embassy to Pella and the negotiations for Akrokorinthos produced hostility against the Achaian Confederacy and Aratos in particular. Plutarch (*Arat.* 40.2) notes that the Corinthian populace was 'already disaffected and ill at ease under the Achaian administration'.¹¹² Nevertheless, the Corinthians did not rise to evict the garrison. But when Aratos came to Corinth, attempting to put to death the agitators, he nearly lost his life. There is a discrepancy between the *Aratos* (40.2–3) and the *Kleomenes* (19.1–2). In the former the Corinthians call Aratos to the sanctuary of Apollo, planning either to have him murdered or captured. In the latter, Aratos calls the Corinthians to the *Bouleutērion* and there they get so agitated that Aratos is forced to escape (Orsi 2000, 238). In other words, the first version presents a pre-meditated, sacrilegious attempt at murder, not a very glorious substitute for a massive, armed uprising but one that indicates Corinthian belief that this was all that it took to be freed – apart from Spartan leadership. Aratos emerges equally important in the second version where Kleomenes blames the Corinthians for letting him go.

The Corinthians, encouraged by the news of Argos' secession, ordered the Achaians to evacuate the city and took the initiative to invite in Kleomenes (Plut. *Kleom.* 19.2; Polyb. 2.52.3).¹¹³ The Achaian garrison, however, remained on Akrokorinthos, and Kleomenes had to build a palisade around it (Plut. *Arat.* 41.4 and *Kleom.* 19.3). Plutarch records Aratos' ironic remark that the Corinthians were so eager to get to Kleomenes that their horses were damaged in the process. Incidentally, this remark shows that both people who could afford a horse, i.e. the upper strata of Corinthian society, or part of it, and the populace supported the Spartan king. Even if they were not whole-heartedly supporters of Kleomenes they were at least against the Achaian Confederacy.¹¹⁴ In addition to the resentment felt for being handed over to the Macedonians, Dixon (2014, 148–9, 151–6, 161) presents other possible causes of Corinthian grievance: low prestige indicated by the fact that no Corinthian appears to have been elected as *stratēgos*; the loss of territory to Epidauros; the repeated movements of Achaian troops in the Korinthia on their way to Attike and the ensuing upheaval in the late 240s; the possibility that Aratos had allowed the Korinthia to be plundered by the Aitolians in 241.

Polybius (2.52.3–4) presents the Corinthians as themselves being responsible for their being handed over to the Macedonians. While the Achaians had hesitated to hand over Corinth without the consent of the Corinthians (Polyb. 2.51.3–5), the news about Corinth’s change of side gave Aratos and the Achaians the ἀφορμή καὶ πρόφασιν εὐλογος (‘impulse and rational excuse’, Polyb. 2.52.3–4) to offer Akrokorinthos to Doson and cement the alliance.¹¹⁵ Plutarch (*Arat.* 45.1), presumably based on Phylarchos, reports that accusations were hurled against Aratos of treating Corinth as a gift, as if it were some average village: ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνῳ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπέφερον, οἷον ὅτε τὴν μὲν Κορινθίων πόλιν Ἀντιγόνῳ δωρεὰν ἔδωκαν ὥσπερ κώμην τὴν τυχοῦσαν. Phylarchos is biased but the accusations surely had a basis. As we shall see further below, Corinth would again be treated as a gift, in the course of the Second Macedonian War, first by the Romans and later by Philip V, who both promised to return it to the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 32.19.4; 32.35.11). Eventually, the Romans turned Corinth (but not Akrokorinthos) over to the Achaian Confederacy in 196 (Polyb. 18.45.12, 47.10; Livy 33.31.11, 34.9), shortly before Flamininus’ declaration of freedom for the Greeks at the Isthmian Games (Polyb. 18.46.5–12; Livy 33.32.4–10; Plut. *Flam.* 10–12). It took another two years before the Romans restored Akrokorinthos to the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 34.49. 4–5, 50.7–8).

The return of the Corinthians to the side of the Spartans, their formerly traditional allies, for the first time since the early 4th century is worth stressing. Nevertheless, once Doson and his army arrived to get Akrokorinthos, the rapprochement between Sparta and Corinth was ended. The Argives returned to the Achaian Confederacy, and consequently Kleomenes left Akrokorinthos, fearing that he would be prevented from returning to Sparta. The fortress and the city fell into Doson’s hands (Plut. *Arat.* 44.3–4 and *Kleom.* 21.3–4). Relations between the Corinthians and the Achaian Confederacy were damaged to the point of the former considering, in 198, ‘continuation of Antigonid control vastly preferable’ (Livy 32.23.3–13; Dixon 2014, 161, 175–6, 180–1). In the same period the Argives also advertised their preference for Philip V over Rome and the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 32.22.7–9, 25.3–4). In the long run it became crystal clear how far the Achaian Confederacy had failed to integrate two of the biggest cities in the Peloponnese.

Kleomenes nearly achieves hegemony

Plutarch (*Kleom.* 4.5) records that, following his success at Pallantion in 227, Kleomenes used to remind his fellow Spartans of an ancient king (the allusion is to Agis II) who used to say that the Spartans only ask *where*

the enemies are, not how many. Obviously, this was a propagandistic remark (Marasco 1981, 392), aiming at presenting Kleomenes as on a par with the kings of another, much more glorious, era for the Spartans.

Marasco (1981, 126) actually places the start of Kleomenes' hegemonic ambitions after the victory at Hekatombaion, and in this he may very well be right. Till then, Kleomenes had concentrated his efforts in the neighbouring region of Arkadia, which could be seen partly as an attempt to create a buffer zone between Lakonia and the Achaian Confederacy. Striking at the heart of the Achaian Confederacy was a different story.

Truce was agreed in late 226, after the battle in Hekatombaion, and negotiations started between the two sides. In the *Aratos* (39.1–3) Plutarch conflates the two sets of negotiations into one. In late 226, the Achaians invited Kleomenes to come to Argos at once and assume the hegemony: ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ καλοῦντες. However, Aratos undermined this plan, by sending an embassy demanding that Kleomenes come escorted only by 300 men; as a sign of good will, the Achaians would offer him hostages. Kleomenes angrily refused and sent a herald to Aigion to declare war. In this narrative Aratos' demand sounds rational and therefore Kleomenes' reaction appears rather unreasonable.¹¹⁶ Surely, Kleomenes must have realized that to enter Argos (the *Kleomenes* has the meeting at Lerna) with his entire army would have appeared quite menacing. Equally, 300 men may have seemed risky.

In the *Kleomenes* (15.2 and 17.2) Plutarch offers a different, more detailed, account of the aftermath of Hekatombaion. The Achaians sent an embassy, presumably to discuss the end of the war. Kleomenes initially considered imposing moderate terms upon the Achaians. However, still according to Plutarch, he changed his mind and asked for the leadership (αὐτῷ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν) offering the return of captives and strongholds. Following this, the Achaians invited him to come to Lerna where the next assembly would be held.¹¹⁷ It looks as if the meeting between the Achaian envoys and Kleomenes was exploratory. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the hegemony issue was first discussed during the Achaian embassy. It is also possible that (some of?) the Achaian envoys themselves suggested, unofficially, to Kleomenes that he would be welcome as a leader.

However, Kleomenes suddenly had a severe hemorrhage, he could not speak, the conference was postponed and he returned to Sparta having released the most eminent Achaian captives, surely a sign of good will. And it is possible that the Achaians similarly demonstrated good will by liberating Megistonous.¹¹⁸ Marasco (1981, 472–3) thinks that Kleomenes could have employed a herald if he had wanted to; instead he tried to gain time by taking advantage of internal dissension in the Achaian Confederacy.

No matter how strange this illness looks, the moment was perhaps as good as any. It was the *καιρός* for striking a deal, while the impression of massive defeat was still fresh in Achaian minds. But if Kleomenes could not speak at full volume, would not this have been humiliating for someone who claimed leadership of the Peloponnese? Therefore, it seems unlikely that Kleomenes would have deliberately contrived the interruption of negotiations.

According to Plutarch (*Kleom.* 16.1–3, 5 and 17.2), obviously echoing Phylarchos, Kleomenes' illness ruined Greece because it gave the time to Aratos to try to change the minds of his fellow Achaians and, when this failed, to resume negotiations with Antigonos Doson (see this chapter n.40). Plutarch has jealousy as Aratos' primary motivation and in this he is most probably right – Kleomenes had certainly outdone both him and the Achaians on the battlefield. Moreover, it is hardly likely that the Spartan king would stand as a candidate for election to the annual *stratēgia*. He would have assumed the role of permanent *hēgemōn*, and in a Confederacy led by the Spartan king, Aratos would be reduced to a simple member of the Sikyonian elite (Marasco 1981, 471). The other explanation Plutarch offers is that Aratos was accusing Kleomenes over his 'abolition of wealth and rectification of poverty': καὶ τὸ δεινότατον ὧν κατηγορεῖ Κλεομένους, ἀναίρεσιν πλούτου καὶ πενίας ἐπανόρθωσιν. Macedonian control of the Peloponnese was preferable to these 'evils'. Plutarch, perhaps following Phylarchos, is here ironic. The πενίας ἐπανόρθωσιν, in particular, is clearly positive, an expression denoting cancellation of debts and land redistribution that would be used by those pressing for them, not those opposing them. Aratos might very well have been afraid of Kleomenes' social reforms spreading, but Kleomenes had been successful without exporting his programme.

In spring 225 Aratos declined to stand for the *stratēgia*, and Timoxenos was elected. The rumour was that, because Kleomenes had inflicted serious defeat upon the Achaian Confederacy, Aratos was not willing to assume responsibility by confronting him 'although it had been well, even if the people were unwilling, to remain at their head and save them' (Plut. *Arat.* 38.3–4). The 'even if the people were unwilling (καὶ ἀκόντων)' is an indication that the members of the Achaian Confederacy wanted neither to be led nor saved by Aratos.

It took quite a while for negotiations with Kleomenes to resume. In the meantime, both Aratos and Kleomenes must have been engaged in unofficial negotiations with members of the elite of the Achaian Confederacy. The fact that no extraordinary meeting of the Achaian assembly was called (at least none that we know of) shows that the initial decision to come to terms with Kleomenes must have been made in the

heat of the moment and many Achaians, especially those in the leading ranks, must have been ambivalent, as shown by the failure of the next conference (Plut. *Kleom.* 17).

In early summer 225 Kleomenes set out for Argos where an Achaian assembly would be held.¹¹⁹ Plutarch (*Kleom.* 17.1) writes that those assembled hoped that there would be an agreement (διάλυσις) but this does not mean that they were all of one mind as to how exactly this would come about. Nevertheless, the wish for peace is notable (Scherberich 2009, 64).

Aratos, however, demanded that Kleomenes either enter Argos alone after receiving 300 hostages or that he only go as far as Kyllarabion (the *gymnasion* outside Argos). Kleomenes was outraged. Aratos is commonly blamed for deliberately causing the negotiations to collapse, but fear that Kleomenes would conquer Argos must have also been on Aratos’ mind (Walbank 1933, 93–4). We also have to take into account that in sending this message to Kleomenes he must have had some kind of authorization, i.e. others must have agreed with him. Nevertheless, the offer of hostages was meaningless if Kleomenes was to get into Argos alone. If he accepted this condition he would be inviting an attempt at assassination, no matter if there were a truce. Aratos’ previous attempts at having Aristomachos (I) of Argos assassinated, as well as his treatment of the Mantineans and the dissident Sikyonians, showed that summary execution or murder was not beyond him. There was also a serious element of propaganda. Should Kleomenes enter alone, it might look very much as if he put himself at the mercy of Aratos and the Confederacy (Marasco 1981, 486).

Kleomenes was evidently prepared for collapse of the negotiations and ready to resume hostilities on the spot. Hence, he had an army with him and sent a herald immediately to Aigion to declare war, which was the diplomatically correct thing to do since Aigion was the capital of the Confederacy (Orsi 2000, 237). This, however, does not have to mean that he was insincere; he was perhaps only cautious.

The sweeping success of Kleomenes that followed the abortive conference shows that member states had lost faith in Aratos’ leadership and in a political union that did not include Sparta. The members of the Achaian Confederacy still wanted to partake in a hegemonic union, which would restore the Peloponnese to its leading role. Thus, they ‘saw justice in the demands of the Lakedaimonians, who were seeking to restore the Peloponnese to its ancestral good order’: καὶ δικάϊαν ἐποιούντο τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς τὸ πάτριον σχῆμα κοσμοῦντων τὴν Πελοπόννησον (Plut. *Kleom.* 16.2–3, writing about the atmosphere before the second conference). Being forced to accept Macedon, they clearly preferred Sparta, the Peloponnesian power to the foreign one, the Peloponnesian leader instead

of an outsider. Furthermore, with the Macedonians in the lead, there would hardly be room for any Peloponnesian state to have a leading role.

After the Corinthians had come over to his side, Kleomenes showed that he still preferred to be proclaimed *bēgemōn* of the Achaian Confederacy without pushing armed conflict to the limit. First of all, he did not allow the house of Aratos in Corinth to be plundered (Plut. *Arat.* 41.2 and *Kleom.* 19.3). He made two attempts to negotiate with Aratos.¹²⁰ The first time (while he was still at Argos) he asked for the surrender of Akrokorinthos in exchange for a large sum of money. Later on he sent a message to Aratos proposing that the Achaians and the Spartans should jointly garrison the Akrokorinthos. He also promised to Aratos that he would give him 12 talents, twice the amount the latter used to receive from Ptolemy III (Plut. *Arat.* 41.3–4 and *Kleom.* 19.4).¹²¹ Kleomenes thus appears to be willing to concede to the Achaian Confederacy part of the traditional Spartan role of protector of the Peloponnese.

The first time Kleomenes was asking control of the entrance to the Peloponnese for himself alone, the second time he was calling for joint control, and this when he had stripped the Achaian Confederacy of most of its non-Achaian possessions (the eastern Arkadians, Argos and the *poleis* of the Akte were in his hands). Fear of Doson's arrival must have played a large part but this does not necessarily mean that Kleomenes was dishonest.

Following the alliance with Doson, accusations were made against Aratos that if he was incapable of saving the Achaian Confederacy, then he should have yielded to Kleomenes, a true descendant of Herakles, and not allow the Peloponnese to become barbarous again under Macedonian garrisons (Plut. *Arat.* 38.4–6):

εἰ δ' ἀπεγνώκει τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, εἴξει τῷ Κλεομένει, καὶ μὴ πάλιν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐβαρβαρῶσαι φρουραῖς Μακεδόνων... εἰ δὲ Κλεομένης ἦν λεγέσθω γὰρ οὕτως παράνομος καὶ τυραννικός, ἀλλ' Ἡρακλεΐδαι πατέρες αὐτῷ καὶ Σπάρτη πατρίς, ἥς τὸν ἀφανέστατον ἦν ἄξιον ἀντὶ τοῦ πρώτου Μακεδόνων ἡγεμόνα ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν τινι λόγῳ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν τιθεμένους εὐγένειαν. καίτοι Κλεομένης ἦτοι τὴν ἀρχὴν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὥς πολλὰ ποιήσων ἀγαθὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀντὶ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἐκείνης· Ἀντίγονος δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν αὐτοκράτωρ ἡγεμὼν ἀναγορευθεὶς, οὐχ ὑπήκουσε πρὶν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῷ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ὁμολογηθῆναι τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον.

If he despaired of the government and power of the Achaians, he ought to have yielded to Kleomenes, and not to have made the Peloponnese utterly barbarous again under Macedonian garrisons... And if Kleomenes was, let it be said, lawless and tyrant-like, still, Herakleidai were his ancestors, and

Sparta was his native land, the meanest citizen of which was more worthy than the foremost Macedonian to be made their leader by those who had any regard for Greek nobility of birth. And yet Kleomenes was asking the Achaians for the office, with the promise that he would confer many benefits upon their cities in return for that honour and its title, whereas Antigonos, although he was proclaimed leader with full powers by land and sea, would not accept the office until Akrokorinthos had been promised him as the pay for his leadership.

The reference to Kleomenes' Heraklid descent (also in Plut. *Kleom.* 16.4) is an indirect attack on those members of the Achaian Confederacy who called him a tyrant (Orsi 2000, 234–5). It is also an attack on the Antigonids who boasted their alleged bonds with the Argead kings, allegedly descendants of Herakles.¹²² The Macedonians are also accused of barbarism, a charge also made implicitly against Antigonos Gonatas who, without being named, had been assimilated to the Persians, some forty years earlier, on the eve of the Chremonidean War (in the Chremonides decree: *IG* II² 686/687, ll. 8–15).

Both Macedon and Sparta had an ambivalent hegemonic past in the Peloponnese. Sparta had a much longer history of firm hegemony over the Peloponnesians while Macedon's was much shorter and much less stable. Part of our problem is to understand how collective memory operated, in terms of the recent or the more remote past? How many Peloponnesians in the 220s would have had a lively idea of the oppressive Sparta of the decades before Leuktra? The more recent past (the Chremonidean War) was in favour of Sparta and Spartan leadership, at least as far as most Arkadians and even the Achaians were concerned, no matter if the Spartans had failed against Macedon. The very fact that the Spartans had failed as leaders in the fairly recent past, and yet a large number of Peloponnesian *poleis* still preferred them, is indicative of how much firm leadership had been missed.

And how would the Peloponnesians have remembered Macedon? The Achaian *poleis* had experienced the dismemberment of their Confederacy because of the Macedonians (see p.23). Pellene in particular had a pro-Spartan distant past and more recently had been left by Aratos to the mercy of the Aitolians. For the Argives Macedonian hegemony had been quite beneficial, but they preferred to be isolated rather than be part of the Achaian Confederacy. The Corinthians had the experience of a Macedonian garrison for nearly a hundred years and of an Achaian one for almost twenty. Thanks to Aratos they had enjoyed liberty from Macedon for nearly twenty years and now, again thanks to Aratos and the Megalopolitans, the Macedonians were back. Thus, it is not much wonder

that these various states would have preferred Sparta to Macedon and, on an individual level, Kleomenes to Doson or to Aratos for that matter.

Plutarch (*Arat.* 38.5) states that another reason for preferring Kleomenes was that he had not asked anything in return for his acclamation as *bēgemōn*, at the same time promising benefits for the Peloponnesians. We may doubt Kleomenes' sincerity or we may question the precise nature of the benefits, but Doson certainly offered his help for a very high price. At least the Peloponnesians could give Kleomenes the benefit of the doubt.

Walbank (1933, 112) thinks that it was for the best that the Spartans did not achieve hegemony: 'it [the victory of the Hellenic Alliance] signified the success of the new movement towards freedom and unity over the particularist imperialism of Sparta'. Much more recently Piper (1986, 58) lays emphasis on the differences between Sparta and the other *poleis* of the Achaian Confederacy, which in her view rendered federalism unacceptable to the Spartans:

Cleomenes represented the old ideal of the polis, Aratus the new federal state. Federalism was unacceptable to Sparta, because she differed too much from the cities already absorbed by the League. She had a national government based on a long and revered tradition; she was threatened by no immediate enemy and had been able to resist any who did invade her territory; she was greater than any League city; her traditions were wholly inconsistent with mere membership in any confederation.

The truth is that we do not know what sort of hegemony Sparta would have established under Kleomenes, had Antigonos Doson not intervened. Our views are heavily influenced by the Spartan past. We do not know whether federalism was totally unacceptable to Kleomenes. Kleomenes was far from a typical Spartan king, and his Sparta was much weaker than 5th-century Sparta, which at least means that Kleomenes had to proceed much more carefully. An indication of a different approach to hegemony (if we take Plutarch at his word) is the alliance he established with the Argives. The garrison could be a sign of the old disease but it was probably more a result of the need for protection against Achaian attack.¹²³ There had also been signs of change in the past: in the alliance under the leadership of Areus in the Chremonidean War, the allies were named individually and, further back, in Areus' campaign there was no sign of coercion.

It is indeed highly unlikely, if not unimaginable, that Kleomenes, a king who had effectively abolished the dual kingship, would aim at the *stratēgia* as Lydiadas or Aristomachos had.¹²⁴ But there were recent models to follow, other than the Peloponnesian League. Kleomenes could have found one in a Macedonian organization, either the League of Philip II or that of Demetrios Poliorketes.¹²⁵ Tarn (1928, 755), perhaps unaware of the

importance of his observation, wrote: 'and he was dreaming...of the hegemony of the Peloponneses, perhaps of Greece, and of playing Alexander in a new League of Corinth.'

Both Aratos and Kleomenes had realized that there was no room for a small state in their time, whether a *polis* or a confederacy. And Aratos chose as ally the one whom he thought to be the lesser evil, perhaps mainly for himself: 'expelling Satan by using Beelzebub' (Shimron 1972, 49). Will (1979, 398) acutely underlines that in the end neither Kleomenes nor the Achaian Confederacy achieved hegemony in the Peloponneses. The Achaian Confederacy re-acquired most of its territories, but not Corinth and Akrokorinthos, Orchomenos and probably Heraia, and this was a proof that it had lost control.

The new geopolitical map of the Peloponneses

Doson's gifts before and after Sellasia

From spring to autumn 223, Doson stripped Kleomenes of his Arkadian allies. Polybius focuses on the successful results of Doson's campaign without paying much attention to the Peloponnesian *poleis*. It does emerge, however, that the Tegeans, the Mantineans and the Orchomenians had no wish whatsoever to abandon Kleomenes. The first two succumbed after a siege, Orchomenos after a surprise attack. It is also clear that these *poleis* did not have much of a chance when faced with a superior army and superior expertise in siege techniques.

Tegea, which seems to have been left to its own devices by the Achaians (after the attack of 228), was the first to succumb, after a brief siege (Polyb. 2.54.6–8). It is possible that a Macedonian garrison was installed (Walbank 1957, 257). Polybius (2.70.4–5) writes that after the battle of Sellasia, Doson restored the constitution of Tegea, but there is no mention of a prior change of constitution. We are allowed to suspect that there had been dissension and change of regime in Tegea before its alliance with Kleomenes. Anyway, we hear again of Tegea in summer 218 when the Spartan king Lykourgos captured the town but failed to capture the akropolis and withdrew; in 207 Tegea was briefly in the hands of the Spartan tyrant Machanidas (Polyb. 5.17.1–2; 11.11.2; see p.331).

The Orchomenians, true to their strong traditional bonds with Sparta, went onto the offensive sending a contingent to help Kleomenes who was being harassed by Doson on the Lakonian frontier. This campaign reduced the defensive capacity of the city, and Doson was provided with the opportunity to capture Orchomenos after a surprise attack and install a garrison (Polyb. 2.54.9–11; 4.6.5–6). Plutarch (*Arat.* 45.1) writes that the Achaians allowed Doson to install a garrison but certainly they were in no

position to allow or disallow him anything. After the war Orchomenos remained a garrisoned Macedonian possession; a Macedonian arsenal was also kept there. The city was restored to the Achaian Confederacy, along with Heraia, in the winter of 199/8 by Philip V (Livy 32.5.4–5; Triphylia was given then to the Achaian Confederacy while Alipheira was restored to Megalopolis).

Mantineia succumbed next, following a brief siege (Polyb. 2.54.11–12). Its fate was brutal. Polybius is rather vague as to who was responsible – Aratos, Doson or both – whereas Plutarch (*Arat.* 45.4), clearly blames the Achaians and, by implication, Aratos: ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ Μαντίνειαν οὐχ Ἑλληνικῶς διωκῆσθαι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς (‘it was also thought that the treatment of Mantinea by the Achaians was not in accord with the Greek spirit’). Since this passage obviously derives from Phylarchos, an enemy of both Aratos and the Macedonians, we would have expected him not to spare Doson, had he been actively involved in the city’s destruction.

Another problem is that Plutarch’s *Aratos* and Polybius are not quite in agreement as to what exactly the punishment of the population consisted of. According to Plutarch (*Arat.* 45.4–5), Aratos had the most illustrious citizens executed, while the rest of the population was enslaved (some men were sent to Macedon in chains). On the other hand, Polybius (2.58.12) claims that Mantinea was plundered while free men and women were sold into slavery.¹²⁶ Plutarch is to be preferred here: it was common practice that the most illustrious citizens would have been executed to ensure that there would be no future upheaval.

Polybius goes to great lengths to justify Aratos’ treatment of Mantinea, as he does concerning the brutal execution of Aristomachos in autumn 224. This alone shows that there was a moral problem, that this treatment of a Greek *polis* by Greeks was not bound to be received as a justified act of war; instead it would be seen as non-Greek, i.e. barbaric (οὐχ Ἑλληνικῶς; Plut. *Arat.* 45.4).

Polybius engages in a sharp criticism of Phylarchos’ melodramatic presentation of events (2.56) but he does not deny the bare facts. He accuses Phylarchos of accumulating lies, and of ignorance, but he does not state explicitly what these lies were (2.58.13). It seems that in Polybius’ mind the lies and the ignorance consist of accusing the Achaians of cruelty (ὠμότης; 2.58.14). For, he argues, if this was the cause of Achaian behaviour, they would have treated the Tegeans in the same way.

Polybius, essentially applying the same principle of vengeance or, in his view, of deserved punishment as in the case of the Argive Aristomachos, argues that the Mantineans deserved what they got and even that they should have had a worse fate (2.57–58; esp. 2.58.12). They had changed

allegiance once too often, they were treated with clemency by Aratos, despite their fault (ἁμαρτίαν; at 2.57.3), they themselves had asked for a garrison to protect them from discord but in return they invited the Spartans and had the garrison massacred. We can add another 'crime' of the Mantineans at the expense of the Achaians: their decision in favour of Aristippos in c.240 (McCaslin 1985–86 [1989], 85; see pp.173–4).¹²⁷

The destruction of Mantinea would have made the Confederacy extremely unpopular.¹²⁸ And for this the Achaian leaders might not have cared much, given the support they had from Macedon. But the fact remains that pure revenge and lack of magnanimity for the defeated constitute evidence of poor statesmanship, and this at a time when kings were very careful in their treatment of the Greek *poleis*.¹²⁹ In other words, Achaian leadership remained in a sense backward, employing practices of the Peloponnesian War.

Antigonos Doson awarded Mantinean territory to the Achaian Confederacy as a gift. It was decided to install settlers, Aratos acted as *oikistēs* and passed a decree according to which Mantinea was to be renamed Antigoneia (Plut. *Arat.* 45.6).¹³⁰ Calling it Antigoneia served two purposes: it was a means of flattering the Macedonian king while evading responsibility among the Greeks.

Once again Mantinea suffered a *dioikismos*, as in the early 4th century, but this time there was no reversal of fortune. The obvious irony is that once again the Spartans were involved, but this time they were not the perpetrators of the act. It was the alliance with them that was the cause of Mantinea's depopulation.

Heraia was captured by Kleomenes in 227, before his reforms (Plut. *Kleom.* 7.3). Thelphousa was captured shortly afterwards or in 225 (Walbank 1957, 257). In 223, having seen what happened to the larger Arkadian *poleis*, these two *poleis* surrendered to Doson of their own accord (Polyb. 2.54.13), presumably because they considered any resistance futile. For the Heraians in particular the fact that they had sustained a siege earlier, in 236, would have gone a long way towards determining their decision.¹³¹ Probably, as in the case of Orchomenos, a Macedonian garrison was installed in Heraia, to be withdrawn by Philip V in the winter of 199/8 (Livy 32.5.4).¹³² Like Orchomenos, Heraia was treated as a gift.

As under Philip II, the rivals of Sparta – Megalopolis, Messenia and possibly Argos – benefited at the expense of Sparta.

Having regained possession of Akrokorinthos in spring 224, Antigonos Doson proceeded into Arkadia, captured the forts previously held by Kleomenes in the Aigyti and the Belminatis – Leuktra and Athenaiion respectively – and handed them over to Megalopolis (Polyb. 2.54.2–3;

Walbank 1957, 255). The fact that Doson by-passed the other Arkadian *poleis* and went straight for districts disputed between Megalopolis and Sparta shows that the former's long-lasting bonds with Macedon and the contact of 227/6 were considered important by Doson (Larsen 1968, 321).

It is possible that possession of the Aigyitis and the (eastern?) Skiritis was awarded (or reconfirmed) to the Megalopolitans (see pp.367–9), by a tribunal established or authorized by Doson – probably these territories had previously been captured by Kleomenes. In *Syll.*³ 665 (*IvO* 47), dating either to the late 160s or c.180,¹³³ five judges adjudicate the case of disputed territory between Sparta and Megalopolis and of a fine imposed upon the Spartans (ll. 1–18). It is recorded that the judges aim at maintaining the validity of previous judicial decisions by the *Hellēnes* and *symmachoi*. Immediately afterwards reference is made to a *kerisis* (adjudication) between the Spartans and the Megalopolitans (ll. 19–24):

...αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς] Ἑλλασιν καὶ συμμάχοις γεγενημέναι πρότερον [κ]ρίσεις
βέβαιαι] καὶ ἀκίρατοι δ[ι]αμένωντι εἰς τὸ[ν] | αἰὶ χρόνον κα[ὶ] αἱ στάλαι καὶ
τ[ὰ] ὅρια τὰ τεθέ[ν]τα ὑπὲρ τῶν κρισ[ί]ωμ μὲνη κύρια δι' ὅλου καὶ μηδὲν
αὐτῶν ἧ] ἰσχυρότερον, γεγεν[ημέ]νας καὶ πρότε[ρο]ν κρίσιος
Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Λακεδ[αιμο]νόις | [ὑπὲρ] ταύ[τας] τῆς χώρας, ὑπὲρ ἧς
[νῦν] διαφέρονται, c.14 |

and so that the previous arbitrations among the Greeks and the(?) allies remain valid and inviolable for all time in their entirety and that the *stelai* and the borders erected by reason of the arbitrations remain valid and that nothing carry more weight than they; and an arbitration having taken place previously between the Megalopolitans and the Lak[edaimo]nians] for the same region for which [they are now disputing —————]

There follow six fragmentary lines referring to the Megalopolitans, an election of judges by the allies to decide whether the Skiritis belonged to the Megalopolitans or to the Lakedaimonians (ll.25–33); the Aigyitis is presented as part of the Skiritis (l. 32). The judges, numbering 101, decided that the Aigyitis and the Skiritis had been Arkadian since the partitioning of the Peloponnese by the Herakleidai (ll.34–6). Most importantly, Spartans were present when the judges took their oath, i.e. they had agreed to submit to arbitration (ll.36–8):

[οἱ ὑπὸ τῶ]ν συμμάχων αἶρε[θέν]τες κριταῖ |] |
ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιτρε[ψάντων, εἰ δοκεῖ τὰ]ν Σκιριτίν
κατεσ[χῆσθαι] ὑπὸ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἐν αἷ καὶ ἡ Αἰγυτί]ς χώρα, ἧ ὑπὸ
Λακεδαι]μονίων, καὶ ὁρισ]μὸς τῆς χώρας ἀπ[ογεγραμμένο]ς, καὶ ὅτι ὡμοσ[] |
] |] ΛΙΤΩΝ ἀριστίνδαν,¹³⁴ καὶ ὅτι ἐκρίν]αν οἱ δικασταὶ [γενέσθαι] |
[τὰν Σκιρ]ίτιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγυτίν Ἀρκ[άδων] ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦς Ἑρακλείδας εἰς
[Π]ελοπόννησον κατελθεῖν, καὶ [ὁ] ὅρκος τὸν ὡμόσαντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἐ[δ]ίκασαν,

τῶν δικασάντων τὰ [δὸνό]ματα, οἳ ἦσαν τῶι πλήθει ἑκατὸν [κα]ὶ εἶς, καὶ οἱ παρόντες Λακεδα[μ]ονίων ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρκου, κτλ. (ll. 30–8; text by Piérart 2001, 31–2).

Judges elected [— by the] allies [—] entrusted by both parties [to decide whether the] Skiritis, in which the territory [of Aigyti] is also located, has been occupied [by the Megalopo]litans or by [the Lakedaimonians; that a delimitation] of the land [was drawn up]; that they swore [—] according to merit; that the judges decided that the [Skir]itis and the Aigyti had been Arkadian ever since the Herakleidai came to the Peloponnese; [the oath] upon which the judges adjudicated the case, and the names of the judges who were a hundred and one, and those Lakedaimonians present at the oath.¹³⁵

The date(s) of the *kriseis*, in l. 19, and of the tribunal of the 101 judges, are both problematic. Who were the *Hellēnes* and *symmachoi*? Were these *kriseis* pronounced on a single occasion or do they allude to more than one instance/period? Were they all pronounced by the 101 judges? Or were the 101 judges involved only in the *krisis* between Sparta and Megalopolis? Furthermore, the passage referring to the Megalopolitans records that the judges were elected by the *symmachoi* (l.30). So is this latter term accurate or was the engraver not very meticulous, and the *symmachoi* alludes to both the *Hellēnes* and allies? In other words, was the *krisis* (l. 23) between the Megalopolitans and the Spartans made by the *symmachoi* or by the *Hellēnes* and *symmachoi* together? In any case, the term *symmachoi* cannot refer to the period after 198 when the *Koinē Symmachia* established by Doson ceased to exist (at that date the Achaian Confederacy took sides with Rome). It has often been argued that the expression ‘the *Hellēnes* and *Symmachoi*’ refers to the League of Corinth and that the tribunal of 101 judges was set up by Philip II.¹³⁶ However, as Griffith (1979, 627–8) observed, the [κ]ρ[ι]σεις allude to all previous judgments and, furthermore, the time of Doson’s Hellenic Alliance was much nearer to the time of the authors of the decree. This is the alliance that would come easily to the minds of the Peloponnesians of the early 2nd century reading on the *stēlē* about *Hellēnes* and *symmachoi*. We can add that the reference to the decision of the 101 judges follows the reference to the *krisis* between Megalopolis and Sparta, and therefore it appears to indicate that they were only involved in this particular *krisis*. Piérart (2001, 28 and n.23 at p.38; 32–3; *id.* 2007, 40–2) observes that the *Hellēnes* and *Symmachoi* is a rather vague expression and that the *Hellēnes* could allude to the League of Corinth while the *Symmachoi* may refer to the Alliance of Doson; also that the presence of Spartan representatives should probably exclude the time of Philip II.¹³⁷ Thus, the major Spartan defeat and the Macedonian re-establishment of

order in 222 is a more likely context than 337 for the tribunal of 101 judges.¹³⁸ No arbitration could have been carried out between Doson's time and the violent (re)incorporation of Sparta into the Achaian Confederacy in 188, since the two parties were at constant war with each other.

As for the territories awarded or reconfirmed after Sellasia, Megalopolis could have got (apart from the Belminatis) either the entire Skiritis or the eastern Skiritis (assuming that the western part continuously belonged to Megalopolis since 337). If indeed the eastern Skiritis had been given to Tegea in 337 (see p.63), then it would make sense to give the entire region to Megalopolis in 222, as a punitive measure against Tegea, for having taken Kleomenes' side, and as a reward for the Megalopolitans for their role in the rapprochement between the Achaian Confederacy and Macedon.

The Messenians probably received the Dentheliatis. The relevant, but not very clear, information derives from a much later source, Tacitus' *Annales* 4.43.1–3,¹³⁹ in which a certain king Antigonos is reported as having given the Dentheliatis to Messene. Scholarly consensus has it that the Antigonos in question is more likely to be Doson than Gonatas, especially considering that the former and not the latter had intervened in the interest of Megalopolis.¹⁴⁰ Tacitus reports that in AD 25 the Messenians and the Spartans presented their claims on the Dentheliatis (more specifically, on the sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis which stood in the area) before the emperor Tiberius who decided in favour of the former. Both sides based their claims on their remote as well as on their recent past. A long series of judicial decisions is reported: by two Macedonian kings – Philip II and an Antigonos; by L. Mummius;¹⁴¹ a Milesian court; Julius Caesar; Mark Antony, and finally Atidius Geminus (praetor of Achaia); only Caesar and Mark Antony had decided in favour of Sparta.¹⁴²

Thus, the award in the 3rd century can either mean that the Spartans occupied the Dentheliatis till the time of the award and Antigonos Doson (?) returned it to the Messenians or that the Messenians had it and Antigonos re-affirmed possession by them (so Shipley 2000a, 386).¹⁴³ Luraghi (2008, 18–19) cautiously favours the view that the Spartans re-conquered the Dentheliatis at some point between 338 and 222 but, nevertheless, observes that the Spartans did not mention any reconquest by them. In our view, it is unlikely that the Spartans would have failed to mention a re-conquest, had it existed.

As to the Argives, they appear to be in possession of the entire Parnon seaboard, down to Zarax,¹⁴⁴ already before the destruction of Mantinea in 223. Scholars agree that this must have been, yet again, a gift by a Macedonian king, either Antigonos Gonatas or Antigonos Doson.

In the Argive honorific decree for Theainetos of Mantinea the secretary of the Council is from Zarax (ed. pr. Charneux, 1958, 7–13, no.II B = *SEG* 17.143 / Perlman 2000, 221, A 15).¹⁴⁵ Therefore, Zarax belonged to Argos before the destruction of Mantinea, and since it was the last community to the south on the Parnon seaboard, the entire seaboard must have belonged to Argos. In Polybius (4.36.4–6 and 5.20.4) Zarax appears among Argive possessions in 219 (when the Spartan king Lykourgos failed to capture it).¹⁴⁶

Bölte (1929, col. 1304) argued that the Argives reoccupied the entire Kynouria as a gift from Antigonos Gonatas for their loyalty during the Chremonidean War.¹⁴⁷ Piérart (1997, 324, 337–8; 2001, 30) finds Bölte's theory plausible but suggests, alternatively, that it might have been Doson who awarded the region to Argos.¹⁴⁸ In the latter case and in the light of the decree for Theainetos, the gift should be dated before the battle of Sellasia. On either view, Kleomenes' defeat would have confirmed possession of the eastern Parnon seaboard by Argos.

From either king's point of view this gift would secure defence of the region which he could not provide. If the giver was Gonatas, then reward for loyalty would have been in play – the Argives had not participated in the Chremonidean War – as well as fear of the Spartans. If, on the other hand, Doson was the giver, loyalty would not be relevant, since Argive policy had been unstable. It would be rather a need to render the Spartans powerless. In this case the Peloponnese would provide its own 'fetters' or, perhaps more accurately, Argos would be the fetter of Sparta.

Spartan relations with the Achaian Confederacy and Macedon

Doson regarded the Peloponnese as a unit to be governed, as Polyperchon and Kassandros had done in the late 4th century. Thus he left Taurion as superintendent of his affairs in the region (Polyb. 4.6.4; Walbank 1957, 454). Clearly, the garrisons on Akrokorinthos and at Orchomenos were not considered sufficient. The behaviour of numerous Peloponnesian *poleis* during the war had been more than alarming and far from a guarantee of disciplined behaviour in the future.

The defeat at Sellasia was not the end of Sparta. Doson, the first enemy ever to enter Sparta, spared the city, out of respect for its fame (Plut. *Kleom.* 30.1; Le Bohec 1993, 448–9). He installed the Boiotian Brachylles as governor and presumably a garrison, which was probably withdrawn before 220 or even before Doson's death in 221 (Polyb. 20.5.12 & 4.22.4; Paschidis 2008a, 263 and n.2). The precise nature of Doson's measures regarding Sparta eludes us. According to Polybius (2.70.1; 4.22.4), Doson restored the ancestral constitution which should be taken to mean that he

restored the Ephorate. On the other hand, the dual kingship was not restored and factionalism broke out in Sparta. Whether Kleomenes' economic reforms were abolished is not clear. Possibly a number of exiles returned but it is doubtful whether all of them regained possession of their estates.¹⁴⁹

There are further uncertainties. What exactly was Sparta's relationship with the Achaian Confederacy and with Macedon? Did Sparta ever become a *full* member of the Hellenic Alliance? Or did it become, and remain, a mere ally? The relevant evidence is provided by Polybius, mainly in book IV, and is set into the preliminary stages of the Social War (220–217). At least we can be fairly certain that there had been two bilateral agreements: between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy, and between Sparta and Macedon.¹⁵⁰

In May 220¹⁵¹ the Messenians asked for Achaian help against the Aitolians and a little later they also asked to join the Hellenic Alliance (Polyb. 4.7.1 and 9.1–2). The Achaians decided to take action against the Aitolians without consulting the king and the rest of the allies – nothing in Polybius suggests that they were obliged to – while a little later they had to refer the matter of Messene's admission to Philip V and the allies (Doson had died in summer 221). The Spartans, along with the Achaians, marched out to Megalopolis, according to the terms of the alliance: *κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐξεληλυθότες* (Polyb. 4.9.6–7). Incidentally, Polybius notes that the Spartans preferred to remain encamped on the borders of Megalopolis, more like spectators. Anyway, Aratos (*stratēgos* for 220/19) dismissed 'the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians' – note the distinction between the two groups. The *symmachia* which Polybius refers to cannot be the Hellenic Alliance since the Alliance declared war only at a later stage.¹⁵² Thus, it has to be an alliance of the Spartans and the Achaian Confederacy, obliging the Spartans to provide for Achaian military needs. In other words, there had been a bilateral agreement after Sellasia between the Spartans and the Achaian Confederacy.

Following a decision of the Achaian *synodos* of late July–August 220,¹⁵³ Aratos sent a message to the member-states to prepare troops while he made separate arrangements with the Spartans and the Messenians to provide troops in order to deal with Aitolian attacks. Nevertheless, the Spartans provided a much smaller force than the one stipulated (2,500 foot and 250 horse; Polyb. 4.15.4–7, 19.10). As in the case of the march to Megalopolis, the Spartans did not appear to be very obedient or controllable but at least at this stage the Achaians were not interested in forcing the issue.

There is also evidence that the Spartans had an alliance with Macedon.

In 220, factionalism had broken out, in the course of which the pro-Macedonian Adeimantos and others were murdered (Polyb. 4.22.10–12). The pro-Aitolian ephors sent messengers to Philip V informing him that they intended to maintain all their obligations and good will to the Macedonians – no reference whatsoever is made to the Hellenic Alliance: ...πρόκειται διατηρεῖν αὐτοῖς πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ φιλόφθονα πρὸς Μακεδόνας (Polyb. 4.23.1–2). Philip asked to be sent envoys ‘of sufficient weight’ (ἄξιόχρεοι). Accordingly, ten envoys were dispatched who promised to ‘observe faithfully the terms of the alliance [τὰ κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν] *with Philip* and be second to none of those who were regarded as his true friends in their devotion to him’ (Polyb. 4.23.6).¹⁵⁴

Following Spartan promises, Philip refused to take the advice of his friends and punish Sparta, on the grounds that

as far as regarded injuries inflicted by the allies on themselves [τὰ μὲν κατ’ ἰδίαν τῶν συμμάχων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήματα], it was not incumbent on him to go beyond correcting and censuring such either by word of mouth or by letter; only injuries inflicted on the whole alliance called for punishment and redress by the joint action of all. As the Lakedaimonians had not committed any manifest offence against the alliance as a whole [μηδὲν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν συμμαχίαν ἐκφανὲς ἡμαρτηκότων], and had engaged to meet faithfully all their obligations to himself, it would not be right to treat them with excessive harshness. (Polyb. 4.24.4–6).¹⁵⁵

Thus, while the Spartans insist on making their promises to Philip and the Macedonians alone, the king appears to refer to the Hellenic Alliance as a whole – the term κοινὴ συμμαχία in Polybius consistently refers to the Hellenic Alliance (Scherberich 2009, 98 and n.82). This passage has been taken to afford the strongest evidence that Sparta was a fully-fledged member of the Hellenic Alliance (see this chapter, n.150). There are two objections to this, admittedly not decisive. First, ‘τῶν συμμάχων’ might refer to the Spartans only as Philip’s own allies. Secondly, Sparta did not have to be a member of the Hellenic Alliance in order to offend part or all of it. However, if we accept that the passage does indicate membership of Sparta in the Hellenic Alliance, it is very interesting that to the Spartans it is only Philip and Macedon that matter.

Following the official declaration of war by the Hellenic Alliance against the Aitolians in September 220 (Polyb. 4.25–6; see p.284), the Spartans initially decided to maintain their alliance with Philip and the Macedonians (Polyb. 4.34.10–11): ἐπέισθησαν τηρεῖν τὴν πρὸς Φίλιππον καὶ Μακεδόνας συμμαχίαν. Again, the Hellenic Alliance does not come into the heated debate. However, following a bloody climax of discord in the winter of 220/19, and with Aitolian instigation, the Spartans forged an alliance with

the Aitolians (Polyb. 4.35–36.1–3). Thus Sparta's bilateral alliances with the Achaian Confederacy and Macedon came to an end (Scherberich 2009, 131).

Ten years later, the Akarnanian Lykiskos tried to persuade the Spartans to abandon the Aitolian alliance and join Philip against the Romans. First, he reminded them of Doson's clemency (Polyb. 9.36.1–4). Immediately afterwards he argued that they should ally themselves with Philip and that it was much worse to ignore 'the treaty inscribed and consecrated on a *stēlē* in the sight of all the Greeks' than 'a private agreement' with the Aitolians.¹⁵⁶ Lykiskos insists that the Spartans should show respect to Philip and the Macedonians to whom they owe even the power to deliberate on the matter of their alliances (Polyb. 9.36.9–10):

καὶ πότερα δεινότερον ἂν ποιήσατε, τὰ κατ' ἰδίαν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ὑμῖν
συγκείμενα δίκαια παριδόντες ἢ τὰ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον ἐν στήλῃ
γεγονότα καὶ καθιερωμένα; πῶς δὲ τούτους ἀθετεῖν εὐλαβεῖσθε, παρ' ὧν
οὐδεμίαν προειλήφατε χάριν, Φίλιππον δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνας οὐκ ἐντρέπεσθε,
δι' οὓς ἔχετε καὶ τοῦ νῦν βουλευέσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν;

Lykiskos draws a distinction between the Spartan-Macedonian agreement, inscribed on a *stēlē* and thus visible to all the Greeks, perhaps in a panhellenic sanctuary, and the private (κατ' ἰδίαν) agreement with the Aitolians. This can be taken to mean that the text of the latter was not recorded on stone. The tenor of the whole passage is that the Spartans had obligations to Philip and the Macedonians alone, not to the Hellenic Alliance (Shimron 1972, 68).

An argument against membership of Sparta in the Hellenic Alliance could be that for both the Achaian Confederacy and Macedon it would not have been a very good idea to force an unwilling Sparta into the Alliance. It would have been the only *polis*-member in an alliance of Confederacies (not that this was prohibited), a defeated enemy and therefore a potential cause of major upheaval. Moreover, it would have been the only member-state with kingship as its constitution. There was no king when Doson entered Sparta but he did not abolish kingship, and Kleomenes could return – at least in theory. How could or would a Macedonian king and a Spartan king co-exist? The leaders of the Achaian Confederacy themselves, Aratos in particular, would perhaps not have wished the Spartans to be members of the Hellenic Alliance on an equal footing with every other member.¹⁵⁷ This might not have counted for much if there were no reasons for Doson to leave Sparta outside the Alliance. The fact that Doson did not restore the traditional diarchy or install a king in Sparta shows that he considered a Spartan king most dangerous and did not exclude the possibility of a Spartan revival.

* * *

The Kleomenic War was the last war the Peloponnesians fought on their own, but even this involved outsiders before its end. Subsequently, the clash between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy was resumed but this was done with the involvement of external powers – Macedon and especially Rome.

Following Sellasia, the Achaian Confederacy appeared to have consolidated its position in more than half of the Peloponnese. But this consolidation was illusory since it had been achieved thanks to the Macedonians. The latter had actually kept in their possession Corinth and Orchomenos, and possibly Heraia. More than that, through the Hellenic Alliance, the Macedonians emerged more powerful than ever before in Peloponnesian and in Greek affairs as a whole, since only Athens, the Aitolian Confederacy, Elis and Messene remained outside the Hellenic Alliance (Larsen 1968, 324).

Notes

¹ C. P. Cavafy, 'In the Year 200 BC', in *Collected Poems*. Translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Edited by George Savidis. Revised Edition. Princeton University Press, 1992; I was reminded of the poem by A. Chaniotis.

² Plut. *Agis* 14; Larsen 1968, 308; Marasco 1981, 303, 308–9; Walbank 1933; 53–4; 1984a, 253–4 and 1988, 312; Will 1979, 335–7. Agis was put to death shortly afterwards by his adversaries: Plut. *Agis* 19. Agis had tried to remedy Spartan *oliganthrōpia* (= small number of *homoioi*); he had cancelled debts but his plan for redistribution of the land into equal allotments was fiercely resisted. See Oliva 1971, 208–29; Shimron 1972, 14–27; Marasco 1981, 91–111, 296–300; Will 1979, 333–5; Walbank 1984a, 252–4; Cartledge 2002b, 41–7.

³ Urban (1979, 55) argues that the Aitolians appeared to be heading to Arkadia. Plut. *Arat.* 31.1–3, focuses on the slander suffered by Aratos as a result of his refusal to engage in battle.

⁴ Gabba (1957, 23 and n.1, 199) argues that the whole campaign is described in such a way as to assimilate Agis with Kleomenes. But Kleomenes was a much more spectacular king.

⁵ Marasco 1981, 312–13; at p.305, Marasco observes that the admiration for the austere Spartan army becomes all the more understandable when we take into account the fact that the Peloponnesians had been used to seeing clashes of mercenaries.

⁶ Plut. *Arat.* 31.1–32.3; Polyb. 9.34.9; 4.34.9 and Plut. *Kleom.* 18.3; Walbank 1988, 312–13; Marasco 1981, 117; Scholten 2000, 117–8, 123–30, 273–4.

⁷ Larsen 1968, 314–15; Walbank 1957, 244; Marasco 1981, 386.

⁸ Aymard 1938a, 70; Walbank 1957, 244; Larsen 1968, 224.

⁹ Polyb. 2.46.4, 6: οὗτός τε καὶ πάντες ὁμοίως οἱ προεστώτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος... τότε δὴ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐκρίναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς ('he [Aratos] and all the leading men of the Achaian Confederacy... then assembled the Achaians and decided, along with the *boulē*...' Against Aymard (1938a, 67–75), Walbank (1957,

244) rightly points out that the *boulē* must be distinguished from the *ekklesia*; also Larsen 1955, 77–9; Giovannini 1969, 14; Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 100.

¹⁰ Plutarch (*Kleom.* 3.4 and 4.1), based on Phylarchos, essentially presents the occupation of the Athenaion as a response to Aratos' plundering the territories of the Arkadian *poleis* 'neighbouring to the Achaians', as soon as king Leonidas II was dead, that is in 235. Marasco (1981, 378–9, 382–4, 657 and n.15) has shown that Plutarch's narrative compresses events.

¹¹ Marasco (1981, 385) notes that the term ἐπίδικον is intended to show Spartan rights over the Belminatis.

¹² In Polybius' view (2.45) the ultimate cause of the war was the envy of the Aitolians towards the Achaians, which had led them to allow the eastern Arkadian *poleis* to become Kleomenes' allies: see Urban 1979, 101. On the other hand, Pédech (1964, 158) observes that neither Aratos (in his *Memoirs*) nor Phylarchos refer to any coalition between Kleomenes and the Aitolians against the Achaians.

¹³ Walbank (1957, 243) dates this decision to summer or autumn 229; he is not certain, though, that such a decision was ever taken.

¹⁴ Larsen 1966, 55; Walbank 1933, 73; Marasco 1981, 119.

¹⁵ Scholten (2003, 153–4) views the alliance with the eastern Arkadians more as a defensive measure.

¹⁶ Gruen (1972, 614) calls this attack 'an abortive and half-hearted attempt'.

¹⁷ See Gruen 1972, 612 and n.9, 613–15, on Aratos' reluctance to force Sparta into the Achaian Confederacy and the change of the Confederacy's policy following the incorporation of Megalopolis. Pédech (1964, 155–7) argues that, according to Phylarchos and Aratos' *Memoirs* (in the *Lives* of Kleomenes and Aratos respectively), Aratos was not systematically hostile towards Sparta prior to Kleomenes' reforms in 227.

¹⁸ In the manuscript we read Λάγγων: see Marasco 1981, 469.

¹⁹ Walbank 1933, 67: 'the military history of the Cleomenean War largely centres on the possession of these four cities' (Orchomenos, Mantinea, Tegea and Kaphyai).

²⁰ Pausanias (8.27.13–14) reports that Agis laid siege to Megalopolis but the north wind broke the siege engine thus preventing him from capturing the city. The problem is that Pausanias' narrative is marred by gross mistakes. He identifies Agis with king Agis IV, who, according to Pausanias, lost Pellene to Aratos and later on was killed at Mantinea (8.10.5–8). There is no record elsewhere of Agis capturing Pellene; and, above all, Agis IV did not die in a battle at Mantinea. However, Marasco (1981, 112–13 and n.181) accepts both pieces of information, dating both the siege of Megalopolis and the battle at Mantinea to 241, after Agis' army had been dismissed by Aratos; he does not discuss the highly problematic nature of Pausanias' information; see Ch. 4, n.93.

²¹ Plut. *Kleom.* 7–11. See Fuks 1962, esp. on the differences between Agis and Kleomenes and *id.* 1974, 73–4; Oliva 1971, 243–6; Shimron 1972, 37–45; Marasco 1981, 412–53; Cartledge 2002b, 49–53; Will 1979, 374–5; Walbank 1984b, 458–9; Piper 1986, 53–6; Hodkinson 2000, 43–64, on Agis and Kleomenes seeking to justify their reforms by presenting them as a restoration of Lykourgos' laws.

²² The 4,000 newly enfranchised by Kleomenes (Plut. *Kleom.* 11.2; Marasco 1981, 451) plus the c.600 who were part of the original citizen body plus the c.500 who had succeeded in the *agōgē* from 227 to 222 (c.100 annually): see Shimron (1972, 152–3) who rightly observes that not all citizens would have been drafted for the battle of Sellasia; see also Ducat 1987, 50–2.

²³ Cartledge 2002b, 47; Richer 1998, 508–18 on Kleomenes III and the Ephors.

²⁴ Le Bohec 1993, 385; Scherberich 2009, 14–17, 76–8.

²⁵ The Euboeans and the (Opuntian) Lokrians appear as allies of Philip V in 207 (Polyb. 11.5.4). On the members see Le Bohec 1993, 379–87, esp. 381 for a tabulation of Polybius' information; Scherberich 2009, 16–57; also Fine 1940, 151–2, n.92.

²⁶ Evidence assembled in *SVF* III, 507; see Polyb. 4.16.5 and Livy 32.5.4 on the obligations to the Macedonian king and the annual renewal of oaths. For a summary presentation see Larsen 1968, 325–6; Walbank 1984b, 468–9. On the structure see Le Bohec 1993, 390–7 and Scherberich 2009, 75, 112, 177–94.

²⁷ See Larsen 1968, 322 and n.2, 325–6, on the Hellenic Alliance as 'an adjunct of Macedonian power politics, and not as a defence of Greek freedom, except incidentally'.

²⁸ For the location of Sellasia and for a review of the relevant bibliography see Pikoulas 2012, 606–13; satellite photo at p.612.

²⁹ Polyb. 2.65–9; Plut. *Kleom.* 28; *id. Phil.* 6 and Paus. 8.49.5–6 (stressing Philopoimen's role; cf. Jost 1998, 280–1); Walbank 1957, 272–87 and 1984b, 471–2 and 1988, 357–61; Shimron 1972, 50–3; Marasco 1981, 569–72; Le Bohec 1993, 410–46; Cartledge 2002b, 56–7.

³⁰ See Polyb. 2.65.6–12, Plut. *Kleom.* 28.4, and Walbank 1988, 359, on the numerical strength of Kleomenes' army (slightly adjusting his view of 1957, 278–9). Probably, the Spartan army of 6,000 included 2,000 liberated helots. The crucial passage is Plut. *Kleom.* 23.1–2: τῶν μὲν εἰλώτων τοὺς πέντε μᾶς Ἀπτικὰς καταβαλόντας ἐλευθέρους ἐποίη καὶ τάλαντα πεντακῶσια συνέλεξε, δισχίλιους δὲ προσκαθοπλίσας Μακεδονικῶς ἀντίταγμα τοῖς παρ' Ἀντιγόνου λευκάσπιον... The first question is whether there is a distinction between the 6,000 helots freed and the 2,000 armed in the Macedonian manner or whether the latter were part of those helots; another problem is whether they were also enfranchised. See Ducat 1987 for a detailed review of the relevant bibliography. On the first problem Urban (1973, esp. 98) argues that the distinction is not between two different groups but between two measures of Kleomenes: the liberation and the military enrolment. Ducat (1987, 49–50) accepts that for Plutarch the 2,000 formed part of the 6,000 but argues that in reality, apart from the 6,000 liberated helots, Kleomenes offered freedom to another 2,000 in return for military service.

³¹ Ducat 1987, 46.

³² Marasco 1981, 560 and Walbank 1984b, 471 think that they were Peloponnesians. On the other hand, Urban (1973, 97–8) argues that these allies could not have been Peloponnesians for a number of reasons: the Argives would not have fought on the side of Kleomenes who had ravaged their countryside just a few months ago (*Kleom.* 26.1), while his followers would have been reduced because of Antigonos' successes and perhaps because of Kleomenes' failure to implement social reform. Urban further suggests that these allies could perhaps be Cretans. To these plausible views, we can object that at least part of the allies could have come from Elis which was not controlled by Doson. It is also not impossible that some could have come from member-states of the Achaian Confederacy who openly defied it (so Marasco above), like the *poleis* of Achaia which did not have a Macedonian garrison. Admittedly, in such a case we should think of a haphazard recruitment of a limited number of troops.

³³ In 8.49.5 Pausanias attributes the leading role in the battle to the Achaians and the Arkadians while only a secondary one to Doson: γενομένης δὲ ἐν Σελλάσιᾳ πρὸς

Chapter 6

Κλεομένην τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μάχης, ἣν Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Ἀρκάδες ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων πασῶν, σὺν δέ σφισι καὶ Ἀντίγονος ἐμαχέσατο....

³⁴ Ducat 1987, 46; Cartledge 2002b, 57.

³⁵ Table of events with acknowledgements to the table in *CAH* VII.1, 1984, 506–9 and *ibid.* (Walbank), 456–9, 461–72; also *id.* 1988, 345–62.

³⁶ The *stratēgoi* of the Achaian Confederacy entered office in May. At some point between 217 and 208, they started entering office in the autumn (see Ch. 7, n.12).

³⁷ The number is most probably a gross exaggeration; still the Achaian troops must have seriously outnumbered the Spartans.

³⁸ See Bickerman 1943, 294–6, who places the return of the embassy in February–March or May 226; see also Gruen 1972, 609, n.1 with bibliography on the date.

³⁹ The date is proposed by Beloch 1925, 709, n.1 and accepted by Walbank 1933, 200–1. See however Scherberich 2009, 66–8, 81–2, who argues that Ptolemy's help for Sparta started only after the conclusion of the Achaian alliance with Doson.

⁴⁰ For the embassy's date see Paschidis 2008a, 239–41, based on Polybius (2.51–52.4), who places it after the defeat at Hekatombaion and Ptolemy's change of allegiance but before Kleomenes' successes in 225; alternatively, but less likely, the embassy can be dated to the late summer of 225 (Walbank 1957, 251). Another embassy followed in spring 224, following the official alliance between the Achaian Confederacy and Doson, under the terms of which Aratos the younger was sent to Doson as a hostage.

⁴¹ See Walbank 1957, 254–5 and Paschidis 2008a, 285 and n.3, on the *stratēgiai* of 225/4 and 224/3.

⁴² Walbank (1933, 173, 209) hesitantly suggests that it could be Timoxenos.

⁴³ For the date see Walbank 1957, 271.

⁴⁴ See Walbank 1957, 273 and Scherberich 2009, 87–90, on Doson's army.

⁴⁵ The Megalopolitans formed a separate contingent because they were armed by Doson: Walbank 1957, 274–5.

⁴⁶ Loeb edition: 'at the time members of their league'.

⁴⁷ See also Walbank 1957, 239; Larsen 1968, 314; Urban 1979, 102–3; Scholten 2000, 185–9, on possible Aitolian grievances.

⁴⁸ Walbank (1984b, 456) raises the possibility that the rapprochement with Kleomenes might have occurred at the request of the Arkadians.

⁴⁹ See Forsén 2000, 36 and n.4, 37–9, 51–3. His calculations of the military potential of the eastern Arkadians are made on Hansen's demographic model (1985, 12; see Ch. 2, n.79); see also Beloch 1922, 269–280, with similar conclusions. See Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 274–9, for a lower estimate of the Mantinean population.

⁵⁰ Larsen (1968, 315) thinks that Aratos took Kaphyai shortly before the official declaration of war.

⁵¹ Marasco 1981, 389. See Pikoulas 1999a, 271–2, 300, on the road from Orchomenos to Methydriion.

⁵² Plutarch (*Arat.* 36.2) says that the attack and the capture came all of a sudden; also *Kleom.* 5.1. Earlier on, shortly before his reforms, Kleomenes had left a large number of his citizen troops encamped outside Mantinea (Plut. *Kleom.* 7.3–4). Apparently, they left after a while.

⁵³ Aratos promised the Mantineans that 'they would be safe' either 'if they pursued the same policy with the Achaians' (translating literally), or 'if they became part of the

Achaian Confederacy': ὑπάρξειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν πολιτευομένοις μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν (Polyb. 2.57.5–6).

⁵⁴ Loeb translation of Polyb. 2.57.2 (by Paton; accepted in the revised edition by Walbank and Habicht): 'They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonos, their city was betrayed to Aratos and forcibly occupied by the Achaians.' McCaslin (1985–86 [1989], 86–8) thinks that if Kleomenes admitted the Mantineans into Spartan citizenship, then he must have done it 'to counteract Aratos' primary constitutional intervention'.

⁵⁵ Lévy 1990, 17: 'il s'agit seulement...d'appartenir à un ensemble politique'.

⁵⁶ Marasco (1981, 467) believes that there is no proof that those 300 sent by the Achaians were colonists; McCaslin (1985–86 [1989], 87) argues that Aratos enfranchised the pre-existing metics.

⁵⁷ Walbank (1957, 264) suggests that the Mantineans executed the settlers but only evicted the garrison.

⁵⁸ Plutarch records that Kleomenes restored the laws and the constitution, which indicates restoration to power of the pro-Spartans.

⁵⁹ Winter 1989, 192–6, 199; Nielsen 2004a, 524.

⁶⁰ See Walbank 1933, 85 and n.2, on Alea instead of Asea (Alsaia in the MS).

⁶¹ Orsi (2000, 216), following Tarn (1928, 746), notes that the moment was well-chosen by Lydiadas since king Leonidas II had died recently and Kleomenes was young.

⁶² See Marasco 1981, 407–8, for a summary of Spartan connections with Crete.

⁶³ Identified by Stavrianopoulou with the Eleutheria of Plataia, in commemoration of the victory over the Persians. On the possible identification of Eudamos with Ekdemos, the liberator of Megalopolis, see Ch.5, n.43.

⁶⁴ Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 100.

⁶⁵ As Polybius himself indicates (2.47.11), Aratos kept his own role secret in his *Memoirs* (Walbank 1957, 247: not the Megalopolitan embassy). Polybius explains this by saying that, in public, Aratos was compelled to speak and act contrary to his real intentions. On the other hand, Plutarch (*Arat.* 38.7–8) explicitly states that Aratos' decision to come into secret contact with Doson is recorded in both Polybius and Phylarchos. Since the two are in agreement (presumably, on the bare facts but not on the interpretation), we must accept their testimony (Gabba 1957, 17–18; Walbank 1984b, 461–2 and 1988, 346–7).

Whether or how Polybius used Phylarchos is another matter. Gabba (1957, 19) believes that Polybius' grandfather Thearidas and his father Lykortas would have probably informed him of the details of the discussion with Antigonos. Similarly Walbank (1933, 12, 191), Pédech (1964, 160) and Urban (1979, 132 and n.148) have argued that this information must derive from Megalopolitan oral tradition. Gruen (1972, 618–19), based on the general reluctance of Polybius to use oral information for events prior to 220, argues that Polybius' source was Phylarchos; Polybius would have taken the facts from Phylarchos and imposed his own view of events. Paschidis (2008a, 242 and n.6) argues that if Polybius used Phylarchos, he must have done so 'along with Aratos and/or local oral tradition' from Megalopolis.

⁶⁶ Kerkidas could have been a descendant of the Kerkidas attacked by Demosthenes as a pro-Macedonian, installed in power by Philip II; Walbank 1957, 247; he was also in command of the Megalopolitan contingent at Sellasia (Polyb.

2.65.3); López Cruces (1995, 6–37) takes the statesman and law-giver as one person but rejects the identification with the poet Kerkidas who attacked the rich in his poems (the identification of the law-giver and the poet first appears in Stephanos Byzantios); Paschidis (2008a, 277–9) also rejects the identification of Kerkidas, the envoy to Doson, with the poet and expresses his doubts as to his identification with the law-giver.

⁶⁷ This is the view of Larsen 1968, 232, based on the speed with which permission appears to have been granted.

⁶⁸ Polyb. 2.49.8: προσέχειν αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἵνα μὴ πρόηται τοὺς καιροὺς, ἔτι δὲ δυναμένοις σφῶζεσθαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπαρκέσει.

⁶⁹ Bikerman (1943, 290–4, 304) observes that Doson offered his help to the Megalopolitans alone, something that would not commit him to war against Kleomenes.

⁷⁰ Bikerman (1943, 303–4) rightly points out that the alliance of 224 belongs to a different historical context. According to Bikerman, Aratos could not have predicted the disintegration of the Confederacy, which is a reasonable insight. The objection is that he could have been very worried about what the future held for the Achaian Confederacy after the defeat at Ladokeia.

⁷¹ Gruen (1972) argues that Aratos was not involved in the Megalopolitan embassy, on the basis, among other things, of his overall anti-Macedonian policy and his hesitation to accept the alliance with Doson. But Aratos could very well have been of two minds. On the other hand, Gruen stresses the Megalopolitan role, rightly in our view; see esp. 625 and n.68. Urban (1979, 119–3) also rejects Aratos' involvement. For a criticism of Urban's view see Briscoe 1981a, 90 and Paschidis 2008a, 242–3. Le Bohec (1993, 365–6) suggests that the Megalopolitans took the initiative to ask for permission to send an embassy to Doson, permission was granted, and Aratos took advantage of the opportunity to have an unofficial contact with Doson.

⁷² Scherberich (2009, 62–3) argues that the acceptance of the Megalopolitan request for an embassy to Doson was a means of appeasement, for fear of a rupture between the city and the Confederacy.

⁷³ Fine 1940, 132–8, 144–5; Daubies 1973, 124–44; Larsen 1966, esp. 45–8, 54–6; Walbank 1984b, 462 and n.42; Briscoe 1978, 152, n.36; Le Bohec 1993, 181–4; see Rizakis 1995, 33 and n.6 for extensive bibliography on the subject.

⁷⁴ Bikerman 1943, 300–1; Shimron 1972, 49.

⁷⁵ Bikerman 1943, 289–90; Walbank 1984b, 462 and n.43.

⁷⁶ Larsen (1966, 47) states that the envoys' request to Doson 'is so fantastic that it is hard to take it seriously or to believe that these arguments were presented to the king'. But cf. Bikerman 1943, 297–8, 304, who accepts the discussion as genuine.

⁷⁷ The question is posed by Urban 1979, 127. An answer is provided by Errington 1990, 179–80: central and western Greece was more important to Doson at the time than the Peloponnese.

⁷⁸ Marasco (1981, 455) raises the possibility that Kleomenes' attack was a response to the Megalopolitan embassy to Doson.

⁷⁹ See Marasco 1981, 456–7, on entertainment in Hellenistic armies.

⁸⁰ Walbank (1933, 106) suggests that the attack on Megalopolis 'was designed both as a blow to Achaean morale, and also as a means of replenishing Cleomenes' purse'.

⁸¹ Polyb. 2.55.5 writes Κωλαίων instead of Φωλεόν; see Walbank 1957, 259 on the correct form of the name.

⁸² Marasco 1981, 532–3; see also Urban 1979, 195.

⁸³ There is no indication that Kleomenes attacked Messenia, and Polybius (4.5.5) insists that the Messenian *chōra* was the only one spared among the Peloponnesian cities during the Kleomenic War: διαμενηκεῖας ἀκεραίου μόνης τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατὰ τὸν Κλεομενικὸν πόλεμον. Pausanias' information is rejected by Roebuck 1941, 70–1, Grandjean 2003, 77 and esp. Luraghi (2008, 258–9, n.34, and 325–6). It is accepted by Fine (1940, 155–6) who underlines that Polybius only states that Messenia was not plundered and further argues that the Messenians received the Dentheliatis as a reward for their participation in this battle; similarly Le Bohec 1993, 414–15. Fine's argument about Messenian participation in the battle does not appear to be very convincing: Polybius' list of participants is very clear and the award of the Dentheliatis to the Messenians might have been simply a punishment for the Spartans. Pausanias most likely reported a version of the Messenian past created by the Messenians themselves; see Pretzler 2005 on Pausanias and his use of oral tradition.

⁸⁴ Walbank (1957, 258) believes that the exiles should be identified with 'the popular democratic party'; Marasco (1981, 538) associates their exile with a pro-Aitolian, as opposed to pro-Achaian, policy.

⁸⁵ Pausanias (4.29.8; 8.27.15–16) writes that Kleomenes attacked Megalopolis while there was truce; more than two thirds of those of military age, along with their families, escaped, while Kleomenes executed those left behind and set the city on fire. Jost (1998, 223, 280–1) states that Pausanias seems to draw on the same sources as Plutarch but Marasco (1981, 524, 536–7) has shown the differences between Paus. 8.27.15 and Plut. *Kleom.* 24.1–2 and has argued more plausibly that Pausanias is using here a source other than Polybius and Phylarchos and even more hostile to Kleomenes than Polybius. However, Pausanias (8.49.4) may have used Plutarch (*Phil.* 5) in his report of Philopoimen's evacuation of Megalopolis. Both Plutarch and Pausanias may have used the lost *Life of Philopoimen* by Polybius (Errington 1969, 232, 238–40). See Bearzot 1992, 158–63, on Pausanias representing Kleomenes as a violator of peace; also Moggi and Osanna 2003, 423–4, on the insistence and repetitiveness of Pausanias, as a result of his strong feelings against Kleomenes.

⁸⁶ Marasco (1981, 539) underlines the 'prudent attitude' of Kleomenes vis-à-vis the Messenians.

⁸⁷ Marasco (1981, 531) believes that Kleomenes aimed at eliminating a dangerous rival as well as at boosting Spartan prestige. The second aim is surely plausible but militarily speaking the Megalopolitans had not achieved much.

⁸⁸ Marasco 1981, 504: 'il più grande successo di Cleomene fu anche la causa della sua rovina' ('the greatest success of Kleomenes was also the cause of his downfall').

⁸⁹ See Urban 1979, 195–200, on discord in Megalopolis, evident especially after the Kleomenic War.

⁹⁰ Errington (1969, 18) believes that the negotiations can be accepted as historical but not the actual conversation.

⁹¹ See Marasco (1981, 540) on the propagandistic value of Kleomenes' clemency, as opposed to Achaian cruelty towards Mantinea.

⁹² See Marasco 1981, 34, on Plutarch's use of the lost Polybian *Life of Philopoimen*; Pelling (2002, 163, n.16) observes that Plutarch is drawing on Phylarchos for the fall of Megalopolis but that he also avoids information rejected by Polybius.

⁹³ Plut. *Kleom.* 25.1; also Polyb. 2.62–3 criticizing Phylarchos for the incredible figure of 6,000 talents; Walbank 1957, 267–9; Marasco 1981, 547–8.

⁹⁴ Aratos ὁρῶντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον κραδαινομένην (Plut. *Arat.* 39.4).

⁹⁵ Plut. *Kleom.* 19.3 has a slightly different sequence: Troizen, Epidaurus, Hermione. See Urban 1979, 192, arguing against it for geographical reasons.

⁹⁶ Plut. *Arat.* 39.3, writes that it was the *stratēgos* who fled Pellene but see Urban 1979, 183, n.327.

⁹⁷ Urban 1979, 189, 192; Walbank 1957, 252.

⁹⁸ It controlled the Arkadian corridor and divided the Achaian territory into two, rendering the transport of military forces very difficult: see Walbank 1933, 96 and Rizakis 1995, 254.

⁹⁹ The Pellenaian could have acted in this way regardless of the reason for which they had been left at the mercy of the Aitolians in 241 (Tarn 1928, 735, thinks that Aratos had then used Pellene as a bait).

¹⁰⁰ Larsen (1968, 315) believes that Aristomachos might have endorsed Aratos' advice bearing in mind the latter's hold on public opinion; in other words, Aristomachos was afraid of what might happen to him if he was defeated in battle.

¹⁰¹ See Marasco (1981, 491) for the evidence pertaining to Aristomachos' role.

¹⁰² See Walbank 1957, 256 for the date.

¹⁰³ Aratos probably retained his position as *stratēgos autokratōr* in 224/3 (see Table 1); Timoxenos probably held a *de facto* command of the Achaian forces; see Walbank 1957, 254–5 and Paschidis 2008a, 285, n.3.

¹⁰⁴ Larsen (1968, 320) suggests that these troops might have been the garrison of Sikyon probably along with other troops mobilized locally.

¹⁰⁵ Urban (1979, 186, 188) observes that this is Plutarch's interpretation.

¹⁰⁶ Plutarch is directly based on Polybius: Walbank 1957, 270–1.

¹⁰⁷ Marasco (1981, 551) argues that the fact that Doson had chosen Argos as his winter quarters, with only a few mercenaries, shows that he had faith in Argive loyalty.

Plutarch (*Kleom.* 26.1–2) reports yet another invasion of the Argolid a little later, after Doson was marching to Tegea, on his way to Lakonia. Walbank (1957, 27) thinks this is a duplicate but Marasco (1981, 555–8) argues for the credibility of the information. It is not impossible that Kleomenes would have tried to divert Doson's attention away from Lakonia but still it would have been too risky to leave Lakonia unprotected.

¹⁰⁸ Larsen (1968, 321) thinks that the execution showed that Doson considered Aristomachos guilty of betrayal.

¹⁰⁹ Aratos had also arrived at Argos where, according to Plutarch (*Arat.* 44.3), the Argives elected him *stratēgos*. See Aymard 1938a, 113–14, n.2, on his eligibility.

¹¹⁰ Plut. *Arat.* 40.2: ἐπὶ τούτους ἐξουσίαν ἀνυπεύθυνον λαβών. It is unclear whether this power was part of his appointment as *stratēgos autokratōr* by an Achaian assembly at Sikyon, which also provided him with a bodyguard; see also this chapter, n.113.

¹¹¹ While negotiations with Doson went on, Kleomenes laid siege to Sikyon: see Plut. *Arat.* 41.4–42.1; Scherberich 2009, 72. In the *Kleomenes* (19.4) Plutarch places the siege after the agreement with Doson.

¹¹² τὸ πλῆθος, ἥδη νοσοῦν καὶ βαρυνόμενον τὴν ὑπὸ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πολιτείαν.

¹¹³ Polybius (2.52.2) writes that this event took place τῷ μὲν Ἀράτῳ στρατηγοῦντι. He was not the *stratēgos* of the Confederacy for the year but was he acting in the capacity of *stratēgos autokratōr*? This appointment, however, according to Plutarch (*Arat.* 41.1–2) took place at Sikyon, after the secession of Corinth. Walbank (1957, 252–3) tentatively

suggests that this appointment might have taken place several months earlier, possibly after the breakdown of the negotiations with Kleomenes; in this case the ἐξουσία ἀντιπεύθυνος should be part of the prerogatives assigned to the *stratēgos autokrator*; also Walbank 1984b, 465 and n.47; see Orsi, 2000, 239, for a review of the relevant bibliography.

¹¹⁴ Urban (1979, 190–1) believes that the leading Corinthians of the time had every reason to resent the return of the Macedonians. We can agree at least as regards those in power after 243.

¹¹⁵ The decision for the alliance was not taken immediately after Corinth's secession. Plutarch (*Arat.* 41.2) records that Aratos first asked Aitolian and Athenian help, which he was denied.

¹¹⁶ Orsi 2000, 236; Marasco 1981, 485–6.

¹¹⁷ Given that this meeting did not take place at Aigion, Aymard 1938a, 310, thinks that it was a *synklētos*, i.e. an extraordinary assembly. Walbank (1933, 91) thinks that Plutarch mistakenly writes Lerna instead of Argos; on the other hand, Marasco (1981, 472) believes – rightly in our view – that the Achaians would not have wished Kleomenes to come with his army into a most important possession of theirs.

¹¹⁸ Marasco 1981, 473–4; Megistionous had been captured in early 226.

¹¹⁹ Aymard (1938a, 311–12) holds that this was an extraordinary meeting (*synklētos*) and Argos was chosen because it was situated far away from Achaia proper.

¹²⁰ Plutarch's *Aratos* presents a more summary version of events than the *Kleomenes*.

¹²¹ Marasco (1981, 519) observes that Kleomenes could hardly have made such a promise, if he hadn't already started receiving subsidy from Ptolemy III.

¹²² Edson 1934, 215–23; Gabba 1957, 51.

¹²³ Marasco (1981, 491–2) focuses on the Spartan garrison at Argos as being reminiscent of old Spartan tactics.

¹²⁴ Will 1979, 344; Oliva 1971, 250–1; Piper 1986, 58.

¹²⁵ Beloch (1925, 623, 705) thought that Kleomenes' hegemony would be comparable to that attributed to Ptolemy III by the Achaian Confederacy, but the latter had largely the role of an absentee sponsor.

¹²⁶ See Ducrey 1999, 137, 253 (with Forsén 2000, 42–3, 51–2 and Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 274–9, on the population of Mantinea; see also above); Walbank (1957, 265) notes that the ἐλευθέρους covers both sexes.

¹²⁷ Walbank 1933, 107; 1957, 260–3; 1984, 470, 473.

¹²⁸ If we are to believe Pausanias (2.9.2 and 3.10.7), the inhabitants of Sellasia were also sold into slavery by the Achaians after the homonymous battle.

¹²⁹ On kings and cities see in general Shipley 2000b, 73–86, 106–7 with bibliography.

¹³⁰ The manuscripts read: τῶν γὰρ Ἀργείων τὴν πόλιν παρ' Ἀντιγόνοιο δωρεὰν λαβόντων καὶ κατοικεῖν ἐγνωκότων, αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς αἰρεθεὶς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὧν ἐψηφίσατο μηκέτι καλεῖν Μαντίνειαν, ἀλλ' Ἀντιγόνοιαν, ὃ καὶ μέχρι νῦν καλεῖται (Plut. *Arat.* 45.6). E. Curtius (268, n.8) corrected the Ἀργείων to Ἀχαιῶν. Gschnitzer (1985, 114–15) reverts to the mss. in order to explain why Mantinea/Antigoneia is absent from the list of *nomographoi* from Epidaurios (*IG* IV².1.73) possibly dating between 210 and 207 – in Gschnitzer's view, Mantinea was represented by the Argives; see Gauthier 1987, 325–6, no.260; in another list of *nomographoi* from Aigion, dating between 191 and 182 (Rizakis 2008a, 168–70, n.116; see Ch. 5, n.30) Antigoneia appears among those cities dispatching one representative. In any case, the Ἀργείων does not fit historical

circumstances. First of all, Doson may very well be benevolent towards the Argives but would he deem it politically wise to extend their territory into Arkadia? He might have given them the entire east Parnon seaboard but this was cutting off Lakonian territory, i.e. the principal enemy. It also does not seem very likely that the Argives, having been awarded the right to install settlers in Mantinea, would have then allowed a non-Argive to become the *oikeistēs*.

¹³¹See Ch. 5, p.180 and n.126.

¹³²According to Livy 28.8.6, in 208 Philip V announced the restoration of Heraia, along with Triphylia, to the Achaian Confederacy and of Alipheira to Megalopolis but it seems that he actually restored them in 198 (Livy 32.5.5). In 196, the Aitolians claimed Heraia but the Romans probably confirmed its possession by the Achaian Confederacy (Polyb. 18.42.7 and 18.47.10 [with a lacuna]; Livy 33.34.9); see Walbank 1940, 17 and n.2, 178 and n.1; *id.* 1957, 257 and 1967, 607–8; Briscoe 1973, 174–5. Aymard (1938b, 25–7, n.5) argues that since Philip did not include Orchomenos in his first declaration and since he was generally reluctant to give away ancestral territories, Heraia must not have been inherited (i.e. garrisoned) by Doson. Instead, Aymard goes on, Heraia must have been captured by the Aitolians during the First Macedonian War (the Aitolians entered the war in 211) and then recaptured by Philip V before 208. There is no trace of such operations in either Polybius or Livy; furthermore, the Aitolian representatives did not lay any claim to Heraia in the peace negotiations of 209 at Aigion (Livy 27.30.10). On the other hand, Walbank's hypothesis that the Aitolians claimed Heraia on the basis of a promise made by Philip in 206 (as part of the peace between Macedon and Aitolia) has also no corresponding trace in the sources; and Polybius (4.6.5) refers to Corinth and Orchomenos as possessions of Antigonos but not to Heraia, as Aymard 1938b, 26, has pointed out. See, however, Larsen 1968, 322 and n.1, who draws attention to Polyb. 4.77.5, 80.15–16: Philip V uses Heraia as his headquarters in 218.

¹³³It is commonly dated shortly after 164 (Dittenberger's view) but Taeuber 2006, 342–4, makes a case for a date in c.180; see pp.368–9.

¹³⁴In ll.33–4 Dittenberger (*IoO* 47) restores ὥμοσαν αἰρήσε[] [σθαί ἐκ πά<v>των, but the αἰρήσεσθαι (= to select, choose) does not make much sense. Thus, I follow Piérart (2001, 32 and n.80 at p. 40) who prefers to leave the lacuna and instead of v>των tentatively restores ΛΙΤΩΝ.

¹³⁵Cf. also the translation by Mackil 2013, 478–9, no.45, based on *Syll.*³ 665. See Chaniotis 2004, 188, 208, n.21 on the κατεσχῆσθαι (ll. 31–2): the judges had to answer who occupied the land when the Herakleidai returned.

¹³⁶Magnetto (1994, 297 and 305–8) develops the theory of a tribunal of 101 judges set up by Philip II. Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 89–91 (no.11), accepts that the [κ]ρ[ι]σῆς belong to the era of Philip II; also Camia 2009, no.2, at p.2; Ager 1996, no.137; Larsen 1944, 160 and n.27.

¹³⁷Piérart (2001, 32–3) also notes that the only occasion in which the Spartans and the Megalopolitans were together in an alliance is the Hellenic Alliance of Doson, but the surviving part of the inscription is not clear as to whether the Spartans were members of the Hellenic Alliance.

¹³⁸The only evidence for a judicial decision by Doson concerns Messene; his award of the Dentheliatis is described as *iudicium* in Tacitus. Polybius records nothing about arbitrations in the aftermath of Sellasia but this is not decisive since Polybius records

arbitration only once in his work whereas the epigraphic record shows that arbitrations were numerous enough in the Peloponnese.

¹³⁹ *Auditae dehinc Lacedaemoniorum et Messeniorum legationes de iure templi Dianae Limnatidis, quod suis a maioribus suaque in terra dicatum Lacedaemonii firmabant annalium memoria vatunq[ue] carminibus, sed Macedonis Philippi cum quo bellassent armis ademptum ac post C. Caesaris et M. Antonii sententia redditum. contra Messenii veterem inter Herculis posteros divisionem Peloponnesi protulere, suoque regi Denthaliatem agrum in quo id delubrum cecisses; monimentaue eius rei sculpta saxis et aere prisco manere. Quod si vatun, annalium ad testimonia vocentur, pluris sibi ac locupletiores esse; neque Philippum potentia sed ex vero statuisse: idem regis Antigoni, idem imperatoris Mummii iudicium; sic Milesios permissa publice arbitrio, postremo Atidium Geminum praetorem Achaiae decrevisse. Ita secundum Messenios datum.*

¹⁴⁰ See Ager 1996, 141 (no.50); Magnetto 1997, 294 (no.48); Camia 2009, 38–9 (no.3).

¹⁴¹ Grandjean (2003, 230) points out that in the inscription recording the Milesian arbitration in c.138 (*IvO* 52 / **Syll.*³ 683 / Ager 1996, no.159 / Camia 2009, no.3; trans. in Burstein 1985, no.80), the Milesians had to decide who controlled the Dentheliatis when Mummius was consul or proconsul (ll. 53–4), i.e. the reference to Mummius merely serves as a chronological indication (see also Tod 1913, 82; Chaniotis 2004, 193); it was the Senate that had decided that the Dentheliatis would remain in the possession of whoever held it in 146, and this was Messene. In turn this means that Messene had not lost the Dentheliatis in 182, following its forced re-incorporation into the Achaian Confederacy. Grandjean's view is accepted by Luraghi (2008, 20–1), who further suggests that the need for arbitration only a few years after 146 was the result of Spartan reoccupation of the area, probably after the Roman legions had left Greece.

¹⁴² Tod 1913, 91; Valmin 1930, 30–1; Grandjean 2003, 248–51.

¹⁴³ See Ch. 4, p.136 and n.80.

¹⁴⁴ See Ch. 2, p.64 and n.69.

¹⁴⁵ Piérart (2001, 30) rightly insists that Theainetos would not have retained his ethnic after the depopulation of Mantinea and its re-foundation and renaming as Antigoneia.

¹⁴⁶ See Shipley 2000a, 378–9, for a brief history of the towns of the Parnon seaboard.

¹⁴⁷ See also Christien 1987, 123–4.

¹⁴⁸ Piérart and Touchais (1996, 65–6) favour the period of the Chremonidean War.

¹⁴⁹ Le Bohec 1993, 450–2; Cartledge 2002b, 57–8; Paschidis 2008a, 263. See in particular the opposing views of Oliva 1971, 263–6 (reforms abolished apart from the cancellation of debts; the wealthy exiles returned) and Shimron 1972, 56–62 (reforms retained); Piper (1986, 72–3) is closer to Shimron (some of the forms were retained: the cancellation of debts, the citizen status of former *periōikoi*, the *klēroi* for the newly enfranchised). One could argue that, after Sellasia, the party loyal to Macedon might have consisted of wealthy exiles who owed their return to Doson (so Oliva). But one can equally argue that this loyalty was generated from a wish to maintain peace, irrespective of political sympathies.

¹⁵⁰ On the probability that Sparta was from the beginning, or became at a later stage, a full member see Walbank 1957, 288, 470; 1984b, 472 and 1988, 362; Cartledge 2002b, 57; Will 1979, 397–401. Larsen (1968, 325 and n.1), Oliva (1971, 264 and n.3), Piper (1986, 75), Le Bohec (1993, 388), Paschidis (2008a, 263 and n.1) and Scherberich

(2009, 97–9) appear certain – on the basis of Polyb. 4.24.4–6. On the other hand, Shimron (1972, 66–8) argues that Sparta was only allied to the Hellenic Alliance, through a treaty with Doson. Tarn (1928, 762) and Walbank (1933, 112 and 1940, 16, n.3) appear more certain that Sparta was allied to the Hellenic Alliance and less so that it was a full member. Bibliography in Scherberich 2009, 97, n.77.

¹⁵¹ On the date see Walbank 1957, 455–6.

¹⁵² Walbank 1957, 457; Scherberich 2009, 100.

¹⁵³ Aymard 1938a, 263–4; Walbank 1957, 461–2.

¹⁵⁴ Polyb. 4.23.6: πάντα δ' ὑπιοχνοῦνται ποιήσιν αὐτοὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὰ κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐν μηδενὶ φανήσεσθαι δεῦτεροι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν τῶν δοκούντων ἀληθινῶν αὐτῷ φίλων ὑπάρχειν.

¹⁵⁵ Polyb. 4.24.4–6: ὁ γὰρ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν κατ' ἰδίαν τῶν συμμάχων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήματα καθέκειν ἔφησεν αὐτῷ μέχρι λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων διορθοῦν καὶ συνεπισημαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ἀνήκοντα συμμαχίαν, ταῦτ' ἔφη μόνον δεῖν κοινῆς ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ διορθώσεως τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ πάντων. Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ μηδὲν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν συμμαχίαν ἐκφανὲς ἡμαρτηκότων, ἐπαγγελλομένων δὲ πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ καλῶς ἔχον εἶναι τὸ βουλευέσθαι τι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀπαραίτητον.

Polybius' suggestion (4.24.3) that Philip's clement treatment of Sparta was the result of Aratos' influence sounds biased. Walbank (1957, 471) suggests that Aratos did not wish either to drive the Spartans into the arms of the Aitolians or to render Megalopolis extremely powerful by annihilating Sparta. This may be, but Aratos did not take the decisions. Scherberich (2009, 122) notes that this assertion of Spartan internal autonomy was a smart political move on Philip's part.

¹⁵⁶ See, however, the Loeb translation of Polyb. 9.36.9 (by Paton, accepted in the revised edition by Walbank and Habicht): 'Now which is the most serious offence, to disregard the private convention you made with the Aetolians or the treaty *made* in the sight of all the Greeks and inscribed on a column and consecrated?'

¹⁵⁷ We cannot know whether Aratos would have preferred to treat the Spartans the way Philopoimen did in 192, as Shimron (1972, 68) thinks. His treatment of Mantinea is an indication but Sparta was no Mantinea. It is also worth noting an observation of Walbank (1940, 31) with regard to the clement treatment of Sparta by Philip V in 220. He attributes this clemency to Aratos, noting that the latter would not wish for annihilation of Sparta because this would lead to Megalopolis' aggrandisement. Although Aratos' influence on Philip is much exaggerated, we should take account of the comment on the latent antagonism between Megalopolis and the rest of the Achaian Confederacy, when thinking of Sparta's treatment after Sellasia.

THE SOCIAL WAR: PHILIP V BEARING GIFTS TO THE ACHAIAAN CONFEDERACY AND RESHAPING INTRA-PELOPONNESIAN RELATIONS

An overview of the role of the Achaian Confederacy in the Social War

Only two years after the battle of Sellasia, the Achaian Confederacy became involved in yet another war – the so-called Social War¹ – this time as part of the Hellenic Alliance, against the Aitolian Confederacy, Elis and Sparta. In September 220, the Hellenic Alliance declared war against the Aitolians following charges made by various members of the Hellenic Alliance (Polyb. 4.25.1–5), including the Messenians who had become part of the Hellenic Alliance since the late summer of 220. Elis and Sparta entered the war in spring 219 as allies of the Aitolian Confederacy.² The sheer vitality of the Spartans who entered a war only three years after their defeat at Sellasia is worth commenting upon, no matter if they did not have a leading role in the war.

Five decades after the Chremonidean War, Elis and Sparta were brought together in a war through the Aitolians, and the Macedonian king – now Philip V (Antigonos Doson, we recall, had died in summer 221) – was again their common enemy. But Elis and Sparta never fought alongside each other. Furthermore, this time the Spartans, far from leading the Greeks towards freedom, furthered the interests of the Aitolians who were charged by the Hellenic Alliance precisely with suppression of freedom (Polyb. 4.25.6–8). Sparta as a whole was only of secondary importance, although Lakonia was plundered by Philip. It is notable, though, that for Polybius Sparta is the Peloponnesian enemy *par excellence*. Most tellingly, he states that the war was conducted against the Aitolians and the Lakedaimonians (4.2.11). His own narrative gives the lie to this statement which was presumably the result of Spartan importance in his own time as well as of the normally subordinate role of Elis in Peloponnesian affairs.

In the Peloponnese the arch-enemy of the Achaian Confederacy and Philip was now the Eleans. Thus, this chapter will focus on Elean hostility towards Achaian *poleis* and, mainly, on how Philip regulated intra-Peloponnesian relations and effectively re-arranged the map of the Peloponnese by

stripping the Eleans of their extensive sphere of possessions or influence and by treating most – n.b. not all – of the newly-won territories as gifts to the Achaian Confederacy. Notably, the gifts were Arkadian territories. This is what the most important Arkadian *poleis* were reduced to after the War of Kleomenes.

The War of Kleomenes had been a Peloponnesian affair, until the army of the Achaian Confederacy proved clearly inferior to the resurgent Spartan power and the Achaians turned to the Macedonian king to reverse the course of events. In the Social War the Achaian Confederacy was again ill-prepared to wage war on its own. Thus, within the Peloponnese the Social War was primarily a war conducted by the Macedonian king who this time had a pivotal role from beginning to end.³ The war had its origins in the Peloponnese (the southwest), the ‘scene of three rival imperialisms’ (Larsen 1968, 327), the Macedonian, the Aitolian, and the Achaian. However, this region was only one of the fronts of the war – the others being central and northwestern Greece. Understandably, for Philip, Macedon and its western frontier took precedence (Larsen 1968, 338).

More than the War of Kleomenes, warfare now consisted of repeated and extensive plundering. As Rostovtzeff (1941, I, 195; III, 1365, n.27) has argued, war was ‘a method not only of settling political questions but also of enriching the victors at the expense of the vanquished’.⁴ In the case of the Social War, warfare was at least a principal means of enrichment. However, money was not the only reason for the raids and for the corresponding absence of major, open battles in this war. Another reason was that traditionally neither the Aitolians nor the Achaians excelled at open battles. The only major battle in the Peloponnese was that of Kaphyai in 220, before the declaration of the war. And in the end no major battle decided the issue; to be exact, the conflict between the two sides remained unresolved.

* * *

Table 2:⁵ Main Events of the Social War (with emphasis on events in the Peloponnese).

Achaian <i>Stratēgos</i> Year/ <i>Stratēgos</i>	Events	Army figures
221/0 Timoxenos		
Summer 221	Death of Antigonos Doson; Philip V on the throne.	
Summer or autumn 221 ⁶	The Aitolian Dorimachos is sent to Phigaleia and plunders Messenia.	

Spring 220?	The Aitolians capture a Macedonian ship; they attack Epeiros and Akarnania.	
Spring 220? ⁷	The Aitolians occupy Klarion (Megalopolitis); Timoxenos and Taurion recapture it.	
Spring (April?) 220	Aitolian invasion of western Achaia; ravaging of Messenia.	
mid-May 220	Complaints against the Aitolians from citizens of Patrai and Pharai during the Achaian <i>synodos</i> ; ⁸ Messenian envoys ask help against the Aitolians – the Achaian Confederacy accepts.	
220/19 Aratos (13 th <i>stratēgia</i>)		
Late May/ early June	Troops of the Achaian Confederacy gather at Megalopolis; the Messenians ask to become members of the Hellenic Alliance; the Achaian magistrates refer the matter to Philip and the other allies.	All citizens of military age; the Spartans encamped on the borders of Megalopolis.
June 220	Defeat of the Achaian Confederacy at the battle of Kaphyai.	Achaians: 3,000 foot + 300 horse ⁹ (the Spartans were dismissed); the Megalopolitans summon their full levy but arrive after the battle. ¹⁰
Late July/ August 220	Philip and the allies accept the Messenians into the alliance.	The Achaian Confederacy decides to levy 5,000 + 500 horse; the Spartans and the Messenians are to send 2,000 foot + 500 horse each.
July/August 220	The Illyrian Skerdilaidas and Demetrios of Pharos raid Pylos. The Aitolians sack Kynaitha but fail to take Kleitor. The Eleans refuse to take possession of Kynaitha. Philip arrives in the Peloponnese. The Spartans promise to uphold their alliance with Macedon.	
Early Sept. 220	Declaration of the Social War by the <i>Synedrion</i> of the Hellenic Alliance.	

Autumn 220/ winter 219	The Messenians refuse to go to war. Turmoil in Sparta.	
Spring 219	The Spartan ephors appoint two kings: Agesipolis and Lykourgos. ¹¹ Spartan alliance with Aitolia.	
Winter or spring 219	The Eleans take sides with the Aitolians.	
Spring 219	Lykourgos attacks the Argolid, seizes Polichna, Prasiai, Leukai and Kyphanta.	
Spring/ summer 219	Philip campaigns in western Aitolia, lays siege to Ambrakos in Akarnania.	
219/8 Aratos the younger		
Spring or early summer 219	The Spartans occupy Athenaiion (in the Megalopolitis).	
Summer 219	The Aitolians raid Aigeira; repulsed.	Less than 1,200 Aitolians.
	The Eleans (?) under Euripidas plunder Dyme, Pharai, Tritaia.	Elean troops (citizens? mercenaries?)
	The <i>hypostratēgos</i> Mikkos of Dyme attacks the retiring Eleans and gets defeated.	Full levies of Dyme, Pharai, Tritaia; 40 foot killed, 200 captured.
	Euripidas takes the Dymaion 'Teichos'.	
	The western Achaian <i>poleis</i> refuse to pay their contributions to the Achaian Confederacy.	Decision of Achaians to hire a mercenary force of 300 foot + 50 horse.
Winter 218	Philip campaigns in the Peloponnese.	200 'Court' cavalry + 2,000 peltasts + 3,000 'Bronze-shielded' infantry + 300 Cretan allies.
	Philip destroys two Elean companies under Euripidas near Stymphalos.	2,300? Eleans + mercenaries + 'brigands'; of these c.1,200 captured, the rest perished.
	Macedonian and Achaian troops conquer Psophis. Philip offers Psophis to the Achaian Confederacy.	Achaian Confederacy: 4,000; the entire allied army = c.10,000. Mercenary force sent by the Eleans to Psophis.

	Philip takes Lasion and offers it to the Achaian Confederacy.	Elean garrison.
	Philip restores Stratos to Thelphousa.	
	Philip plunders Elis.	200 mercenaries under the Elean <i>stratēgos</i> Amphidamos.
	Philip conquers Alipheira. The Phigaleians deliver their city to Philip and accept a garrison. The whole of Triphylia surrenders to Philip who appoints an <i>epimelētēs</i> of the region.	1,000 Eleans + 500 mercenaries + 600 Aitolians + 200 Spartans + Tarentines.
	Cheilon fails to seize power in Sparta, the Spartans abandon Athenaiion.	
Late Feb./ March 218	Philip recovers the Dymaia Teichos and plunders Elis.	Elean garrison.
	The Eleans refuse to come to terms with Philip.	
218/7 Eperatos ¹²		
June/July 218	Financial agreement between Philip and the Achaian Confederacy.	
	The Eleans receive Aitolian reinforcements, Agelaos and Skopas as commanders, and strengthen Kyllene.	
	Philip strengthens Dyme.	2,000 picked Achaian infantry + mercenaries employed by the Achaian Confederacy + a few Cretan mercenaries + Gallic cavalry.
	Philip campaigns to Kephallenia; a Messenian squadron participates. Unfruitful inroad of Lykourgos into Messenia. Lykourgos attacks Tegea.	
	Elean inroad into Dyme; defeat of the Dymaia cavalry.	Eleans and mercenaries?
July/Aug. 218	Philip leads an invasion into Lakonia. The Messenians dispatch a select force but fail to meet the allied army.	Unidentified number of Achaian forces. Sparta: c.4,000.

	Lykourgos attacks the Messenians on the east Parnon seaboard.	1,000 Messenian picked infantry + 200 horse dispatched; a few Spartans + mercenaries.
	Philip raids southern Lakonia and drives Lykourgos away from the Menelaion.	Spartan army: c.2,000 men; ¹³ Philip's army: Macedonian peltasts, mercenaries, Illyrians.
Aug.–Sept. 218	Execution of Macedonian royal officials.	
Winter/spring 218/7	The Eleans and the Aitolians, under Pyrrhias, plunder Dyme, Pharai, Patrai.	Eleans: 1,000 foot + 200 horse + mercenaries; 1,300 Aitolians.
217/6 Aratos (14 th)		
May/June 217	Lykourgos and Pyrrhias invade Messenia; Lykourgos takes Kalamai, Pyrrhias is repulsed at Kyparissia.	
	The Achaian Confederacy decides to maintain a standing army.	3,000 foot + 300 horse (Megalopolis and Argos: 500 foot + 50 horse each) + mercenary force of 8,000 foot + 500 horse.
	Aratos arranges with Taurion and the Messenians to patrol the countryside of Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos; the select force of the Achaian Confederacy is to guard north-western Achaia.	Messenian force of 500 foot + 50 horse.
	Eleans and Aitolians (?) under the Aitolian Euripidas raid Achaia; repulsed by Lykos of Pharai.	2,000 Elean and Aitolian(?) foot + 60 horse; 400 killed, 200 captured. Achaian mercenary force.
	The Aitolians under Euripidas attempt to plunder Tritaia	
	Troops from Dyme, Pharai and Patrai invade Elis and force the Eleans to flight.	Full levies of the Achaian <i>poleis</i> ? ¹⁴ Full Elean levy; 200 captured, 80 dead.
July 217	News of Hannibal's victory at Lake Trasimene arrives at the Nemeia.	
Aug./Sept. 217	Peace of Naupaktos – end of the Social War.	

The Achaian Confederacy's troops only played second fiddle to the Macedonian army (Scholten 2000, 220). Military leadership as well as the rank and file of the Achaian Confederacy proved insignificant or inadequate, even more than in the War of Kleomenes.

Polybius (4.7.6–7) notes that after 222 the Achaians had neglected military matters believing that there would be peace. Elaborating on this, he reports (4.60.2) that ever since the days of the Kleomenic War the Achaians had not paid their mercenaries in full. Thus, a whole year after the start of the Social War, no decent mercenary force could be put together (Polyb. 4.60.2), and, we can add, nor could a decent citizen force. It took the Achaian Confederacy another two years to assemble a select force of citizens and, mainly, mercenaries (in early summer 217). Belief in peace can only be part of the explanation. Money was not a problem, since in summer 218 an extraordinary Achaian assembly (*ekklesia*) at Sikyon voted to pay Philip 50 talents for his first campaign, provide three months' pay for his troops, 10,000 *medimnoi* of corn and 17 talents per month for as long as he stayed in the Peloponnese (Polyb. 5.1.6–12; Walbank 1957, 538–9).¹⁵ Furthermore, the forces of the Confederacy had proved inefficient in the Kleomenic War as well. So we have to look for explanations involving inherent military weaknesses in the member-states as well as in the continuous lack of competent leadership. To put it crudely, the Peloponnesians had not been used to fighting, and troops of the Achaian Confederacy had largely performed poorly in the War of Kleomenes. Polybius (4.8, 10–12) elaborates on Aratos' incompetence in the battle of Kaphyai, charges Aratos the younger (*stratēgos* for 219/8) with lack of daring in the conduct of the war (4.60.2), and is most poisonous when it comes to Eperatos, *stratēgos* for 218/7 (5.1.7, 30.1). Polybius may be exaggerating with regard to Eperatos¹⁶ but the overall picture of inherent weaknesses in the Confederacy is correct. They could be masked insofar as the Confederacy had the backing of the Hellenic Alliance, or more correctly, of Macedonian arms on which it had come to rely (Larsen 1968, 328). The fact that Philip's priority was central and western Greece and Macedon brought the Achaian Confederacy to the verge of yet another breakdown (Walbank 1940, 42). It was especially the original Achaian Confederacy, i.e. Achaia proper, which was abandoned to Aitolian-Elean raids and thus came near secession.

The first failure for the Achaian military apparatus, which became a pattern with far reaching consequences, occurred in spring 220, when an Aitolian force raided western Achaia – Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia (Polyb. 4.6.9). No attempt to patrol Achaia is recorded on this occasion. This negligence was going to be repeated.

In May 220 the Achaian *synodos* decided to send help to the Messenians

against the Aitolians. Yet, Timoxenos, the Achaian *stratēgos* whose office was about to expire, was not in much of a hurry. The decision remained ineffective until Aratos assumed office (five days earlier than his due), obtained a decree and issued specific orders to member-states to dispatch their full levies to Megalopolis (Polyb. 4.7.6–11 and 4.9.1). However, the army was not employed for an attack against the Aitolians. The whole thing looks more like a demonstration of power. From Megalopolis, Aratos sent a message to the Aitolians to evacuate Messenia (Polyb. 4.9.7–10). This they did¹⁷ and then Aratos employed a small part of this army – 3,000 foot and 300 horse – plus the troops of the Macedonian commander Taurion, to attack the Aitolians on their way out of the Peloponnese. This was perhaps an attempt to assert himself, and to intimidate the Aitolians out of the Peloponnese, without inviting in the Macedonians. However, the Aitolians were victorious at Kaphyai (in eastern Arkadia), and Aratos was mainly to blame for the defeat (Polyb. 4.10–12). It was after this battle that it became all too obvious that the Achaian Confederacy was not a match for the Aitolians, at least not in their state of preparation and not under Aratos. The defeat showed that if the Aitolians were to be ousted from the Peloponnese, Philip V and the Alliance as a whole had to be involved. The question of war or peace was now in non-Peloponnesian hands.

In the Achaian *synodos* of late July–August 220 (Walbank 1957, 461–2), in which it was decided to ask the Hellenic Alliance for help, it was also decided to levy (ἐπιλέξαι) 5,000 foot and 500 horse, and to help the Messenians, in case the Aitolians attacked them again; the Messenians and the Spartans were also to contribute to the ‘common needs’; later on, their levies were set at 2,500 foot and 500 horse each (Polyb. 4.15.1–7; Walbank 1940, 27). Walbank (1957, 462) observes that the total was small and that perhaps Aratos was either relying on Philip or he could not raise a larger force. Still, the number of the men to be drafted, excluding the Messenians and the Spartans, was higher than that at the battle of Sellasia (see p.214). However, these troops were nowhere to be seen when shortly afterwards the Aitolians sacked Kynaitha, and attempted to plunder Lousoi and capture Kleitor (Polyb. 4.17–18). Either Aratos had trouble collecting the troops or the Aitolians attacked right at the time of the drafting. We read that the Spartans sent only a nominal force (Polyb. 4.19.10–11) but we are not told where they sent it; neither do we learn where the c.10,000 men were supposed to gather.

During the Aitolian campaigns of summer 219 Achaia proper remained helpless. The first Aitolian target was Aigeira. On the basis of Polybius (4.57.3–58.8) it appears that the Aigeiratsans were ill-prepared for sudden invasion, i.e. they did not seem to have taken the war very seriously, which

is quite surprising given their proximity to Aitolia. The guards of the gate leading to Aigion were constantly drunk; the citadel was not walled. Due to the negligence of the Aigeiratans, the Aitolians (under Alexandros and Dorimachos) got into the city (with the help of an Aitolian deserter). Nevertheless, the Aigeiratans performed surprisingly well and managed to repulse the Aitolian attack on their citadel.

The attack on Aigeira was followed by thorough plundering of Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia by Elean forces under the Aitolian Euripidas (Polyb. 4.59.1–4).¹⁸ Patrai was spared the attack, probably because it lay further apart from the other cities. This time the *hypostratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy, Mikkos of Dyme, did make an effort drafting the full levies of Dymai, Pharai and Tritaia. It is probable that he made use of a subdivision of the Achaian Confederacy for defensive purposes, the *synteleia* of Patrai (Walbank 1957, 623–5; Larsen 1971, 84–5).¹⁹ Nevertheless, he suffered defeat with severe losses. Next, the Eleans occupied the Teichos, a fortress of Dyme on a rocky hill, on the Achaian-Elean frontier, seemingly without any resistance (Polyb. 4.59.4–5). Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia formally requested help from the Achaian *stratēgos*. When he failed to provide a mercenary force, they adopted a common stance withholding their contributions and deciding to hire a mercenary force of 300 foot and 50 horse (Polyb. 4.60.1–6).²⁰ Precisely because of the *synteleia* it was easy for these cities to come to a speedy decision, although there did not exist absolute unanimity within Achaia proper. The *polis* of Patrai did not join them probably because it had not suffered any attacks (Larsen 1971, 84).

The irony is marked enough. These *poleis*, which had formed part of the original Achaian Confederacy, now detached themselves from what the Confederacy had become. Polybius' prevailing concern is that such an attitude could lead to the dissolution of the Confederacy (4.60.6–10; Walbank 1933, 129), and he thus fails to see the strictly Achaian point of view, deliberately ignores the fact that one of the Confederacy's primary aims was protection of its members and prefers to believe that since these *poleis* were the founders of the Confederacy (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, γεγονότας ἀρχηγούς τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συστήματος) they were all the more obliged to show unwavering loyalty.

When Philip finally appeared in the Peloponnese,²¹ in winter 218, the Achaian Confederacy army appeared to fare better. Yet, this is an illusory impression. First of all, it was Philip who ordered the assembling of troops from the Achaian Confederacy; a little over 4,000 soldiers were levied and met him at Kaphyai (Polyb. 4.67.6–9, 68.6–7, 70.1–2). His own forces amounted to nearly 6,000: 2,000 peltasts, 3,000 'bronze-shielded' infantry, 200 'Court' cavalry and 300 Cretan allies (Polyb. 4.67.6). Secondly, although

Achaian troops campaigned with him, they had a very small share in his sweepingly successful campaign against Elis. Psophis was captured by Philip with the Macedonians and the Cretans (Polyb. 4.71.10–72.1). The troops of the Achaian Confederacy must have been mere spectators during the final assault.²² Thereafter, there is no sign of a federal army in the conquest of Lasion (Polyb. 4.73.2), in the plundering of Elis (Polyb. 4.75.4), or in the conquest of Alipheira and Triphylia (Polyb. 4.78.6–9, 79–80.8).

It was Philip with his army who restored the Teichos to Dyme in late February/March 218 (Polyb. 4.83.1–5). From this point onwards the Dymaians started to develop a strong bond with Philip. The latter's good will towards Dyme was expressed, most impressively, in the late 3rd century when he refounded the city, after its destruction by the Romans (in the course of the First Macedonian War; Livy 32.22.10; Paus. 7.17.5). Thus, a few years later, in 198, there was hardly any attachment to the Achaian Confederacy. The Dymaians were wholeheartedly loyal to Philip, refusing to follow the Achaian Confederacy and take sides with Rome, or rather against Philip (Livy 32.22.8–12; see p.319).

To summarize so far: with the exception of the operations at Psophis, either there was no Achaian army or there was one but it made no impact – the latter seems less likely since Polybius consistently refers to Macedonians without mention of Achaians. In short, the Achaian Confederacy played hardly any part in the re-arrangement of intra-Peloponnesian relations.

Achaian troops appear on the scene again in summer 218. But again their impact is minimal. In June/July 218, and on Philip's initiative, 2,000 *epilektoi* of the Achaian Confederacy, plus mercenaries employed by it, a few Cretan mercenaries and Gallic cavalry were dispatched to Dyme (Polyb. 5.3.2). If the 2,000 *epilektoi* did stay there, then they turned out to be pretty useless since shortly afterwards the Eleans raided Dyme and defeated the cavalry that came out to meet them (Polyb. 5.17.3). Later on, in winter/spring 218/7, these *epilektoi* were nowhere to be seen when a force of Elean and Aitolian troops laid waste Dyme, Pharai, Patrai and all the countryside in the direction of Rhion and Aigion (Polyb. 5.30.1–6).²³ Polybius (5.30.1) draws a gloomy picture of very poor leadership on the part of Eperatos: he was held in contempt by mercenaries and citizen troops who as a result had become disobedient, and no preparations had been made. Eperatos might not have had the authority of Aratos, but even the latter had not really achieved much with the forces he had assembled. The truth is that only Philip had the authority to assemble troops by the members of Achaian Confederacy. Once again the Achaian *poleis* refused to pay their contributions, once again there was fear of the Confederacy's dismemberment.

Also in summer 218 Philip led an invasion of Lakonia in which there participated an unknown number of troops provided by the Achaian Confederacy, following a message of the king (Polyb. 5.17.9, 18.2). Walbank (1957, 553) observes that given the very short notice issued by Philip, the Achaian Confederacy authorities could not have assembled a full citizen levy. Presumably the Achaian troops took part in the thorough plundering of southern Lakonia (Polyb. 5.19.5–8) but it was Philip's mercenaries, his peltasts – 'a typical combination of shock troops' (Walbank 1957, 557) – and the Illyrians (probably sent by Philip's ally, Skerdilaidas)²⁴ that drove king Lykourgos and his 2,000 men away from the Menelaion (Polyb. 5.21.1–3, 22.8–23). The phalanx, under Aratos, had remained at Amyklai (Polyb. 5.23.7).

It was only a few months before the end of the war, in summer 217, that Aratos took steps to remedy the all-too-obvious inability of the Achaian Confederacy to deal with the demands of the war. During the *synodos* of late May or early June, he passed a decree stipulating the establishment of a standing citizen army of 3,000 foot and 300 horse. The largest contingents in the citizen army would be provided by the bigger *poleis* of the Confederacy, Megalopolis (equipped by Macedon with brazen shields: χαλκασπίδες) and Argos: 500 foot and 50 horse each. A mercenary force of 8,000 foot and 500 horse would also be maintained. Additionally, three ships would sail off the east coast (Akte) and the Gulf of the Argolid and another three off Patrai and Dyme (Polyb. 5.91.5–8). One cannot fail to notice the numerical preponderance of mercenaries (Scherberich 2009, 148). More than an unwillingness to fight on the part of members of the Achaian Confederacy, we should see here a lack of confidence in their military abilities – one that was eminently justified.

Aratos' next step was to make arrangements with Taurion and the Messenians for the patrolling of the countryside of Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea and Argos, on the Lakonian front; the Messenians and Taurion were to provide 500 foot and 50 horse each (Polyb. 5.92.7–10) – notably, Messene was to provide as many troops as each of Argos and Megalopolis. On the other hand, the Achaian *epilektoi* and mercenaries were to patrol northwestern Achaia. It is probable that Aratos made use of the *synteleia* of Patrai (Walbank 1957, 623–4).

The Achaian Confederacy proved partly effective against an Aitolian-Elean force under Euripidas, which plundered Achaia as far as Aigion right at the time of the Achaian *synodos* (Polyb. 5.94.3). Lykos, the *hypostratēgos*, attacked them as they were retreating towards Leontion,²⁵ killed four hundred and captured another two hundred (Polyb. 5.94.2–6). In fact, the new organization was not yet in place. The newly-established elite force

did not take part in the operations, probably because they had to attend the *synodos*.²⁶ Lykos was not stationed in his *synteleia* (Walbank 1957, 625), and as Aymard (1938a, 89–90, n.1) has argued, he must have been left at Megalopolis waiting for Taurion who, according to Polybius (5.95.5), had failed to protect the designated areas. Thus Aratos with the *epilektoi* (presumably after the *synodos*) had to protect the harvest in the Argolid. Despite the repeated plundering of Achaia proper, protection of the Argive countryside and of Megalopolis was considered more important. At least in the case of the latter, Achaian interest was eminently justified since a serious and (to us) rather obscure dispute was going on at the time, which was eventually resolved by a decree of the Achaian Confederacy (Polyb. 5.93).²⁷

Subsequently, an Aitolian force under Euripidas crossed the Elean border planning to invade Tritaia (c.21–23 km south of Pharai).²⁸ In this case, the *synteleia* of Patrai was apparently put to use. Lykos and Demodokos (the cavalry commander) collected the full levies from Dyme, Patrai and Pharai along with mercenaries, invaded Elis and put the Eleans, who had come out in full force, to flight (Polyb. 5.95.7–10; see also below).

This is the last recorded military action in the Peloponnese. There was no time for Aratos' system to develop fully but the idea was formed that Achaian troops should become more energetic, taking some initiative. A few years later, Philopoimen went one step further creating a formidable citizen force, capable even of offensive action, while Aratos' system was designed to provide defensive action (see p.332).

The road to war: the Messenian role

The unifying role of the Aitolian Confederacy in southwestern Peloponnese

The Aitolian and the Achaian Confederacies had been officially allied since c.240 but after the Demetrian War (239–229), there had been no manifestations of this alliance. Polybius, not without good reason, lays the blame for the war on the Aitolians but the Achaian Confederacy was not blameless either. In Polybius' eyes (4.26.1) the Social War was a just war since the Achaian Confederacy embarked upon it to protect its members, especially Messene, the new-comer. The Achaian Confederacy appears only as reacting to Aitolian assaults (4.3.1–4). This idealized picture of Achaian policy is only part of the story. Being surrounded by members of the Hellenic Alliance, the Aitolians simply could not afford to loosen their grip over the western Peloponnese and hence became aggressive (Fine 1940, 150–3, 156–63). On the other hand, the leaders of the Achaian Confederacy may not have been openly aggressive but they did show an interest in westward expansion.

The Aitolians had been a cause of at least partial unification in the southwestern Peloponnese, at the same time keeping the area detached from the Achaian Confederacy. They had created a sphere of influence or control over Elis, Triphylia (west of Elis proper and north of Messenia, between the rivers Alpheios and Neda), Phigaleia (between Elis and Messenia), Psophis (west of Kleitor, in the region of Azania, between the rivers Erymanthos and Aroanios; Nielsen 2004a, 529), possibly Kynaitha (northern Arkadia, north of Lousoi), and Messenia.

Already in the second quarter of the 3rd century, in the first years of their expansion, the Aitolians had conferred honours upon four Messenians and one Phigaleian, as well as on many other citizens of various Peloponnesian *poleis* (Fossey 1996, 159).²⁹ A couple of decades before the outbreak of the Social War, the Aitolians had acted as mediators of peace between the Phigaleians and the Messenians. According to a decree of the ‘*polis* of the Messenians’ (l.10)³⁰ found in Phigaleia (*Syll.*³ 472),³¹ in the late 240s³² Aitolian πρεσβευταὶ καὶ διαλ[ακταὶ] (ll.1–2: ‘envoys and mediators’)³³ accompanied by Phigaleian envoys, came to Messenia bearing a decree of the Aitolian Confederacy demanding reconciliation (l.5: ἀξιῶντες διαλυθῆμεν) between Messene and Phigaleia. The Messenians showed a conciliatory or obedient disposition and decreed reciprocal *isopoliteia* and *epigamia* between Phigaleia and Messene (ll.10–11). They also provided for a *symbolē* to be defined by both parties (ll.12–13),³⁴ as well as for exploitation of land on their borders (ll.13–16). This is the earliest attestation of the term *isopoliteia* for ‘reciprocal exchange of privileges’ (Larsen 1968, 203).

The role of the Aitolian mediators was fundamental in the conclusion of the treaty (ὁμολογία) between the two *poleis*. At the time of the *isopoliteia* award, the Phigaleians and the Messenians already exploited, *separately*,³⁵ the land on their borders and they were going to do so after the treaty as well (ll.15–16).³⁶ However, some problems must have occurred with regard to this land. The Phigaleians must have asked for Aitolian help (Magnetto 1997, 233), hence the joint embassy. We are not informed as to the actual content of the Aitolian decree but the *isopoliteia* and the *epigamia* (right of intermarriage) could very well have been an idea of both the Aitolians and the Phigaleians (Gauthier 1972, 367), which the Messenians endorsed, whether willingly or not. The fundamental Aitolian role is even more pronounced in ll.19–21: the agreement would remain valid for as long as the Phigaleians observed the *φιλία* with both Messene and the Aitolian Confederacy.³⁷ It is self-evident that any agreement between Messene and Phigaleia would be cancelled if the *philia* between the two ceased to exist. But why should the Messenians provide for cancellation of the treaty if the Phigaleians stopped observing the *philia* with the Aitolians? Was this

provision a Messenian or an Aitolian idea? If the former, then we can be fairly certain that the agreement was imposed on the Messenians. If the latter, then we should agree with Scholten (2000, 121) that the Aitolians wished to gain Messenian favour. Even so, the Messenians would not appear as very enthusiastically interested in maintaining bonds with their neighbour. In either case, far from being a step away from *poleis*' particularism, this agreement would not exist if it did not promote the interests of an outsider, i.e. the Aitolians.

A fragmentary Messenian inscription (*IG V.1.1430 / SGDI 4646) appears to record regulation of boundaries between Messene and Phigaleia, by a small panel of three or five judges (of unknown origin) at an uncertain, later date, after the incorporation of Messene in the Achaian Confederacy in 191.³⁸ If so, it affords evidence that the agreement of c.240 had not solved whatever problems existed between the two states.

In the context of summer 221, Polybius (4.3.6) writes that Phigaleia ἐτύγγανε δὲ τότε συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. The meaning of συμπολιτευομένη is uncertain. It is unclear whether Polybius here uses this term loosely instead of *isopoliteia* or whether the term should be taken to mean that Phigaleia was a member of the Aitolian Confederacy.³⁹ Given the policy the Aitolians had probably followed in the case of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* (see pp.182–3), it is more likely that Polybius here means *isopoliteia*.⁴⁰ Whatever the bond, it must have existed before the Aitolians mediated reconciliation with the Messenians (Gauthier 1972, 366). Again, in his narrative of events of 221 Polybius (4.3.9 and 4.6.11) speaks of an old friendship and alliance between the Messenians and the Aitolians: φίλων ὄντων καὶ συμμάχων and τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς ἐκ παλαιῶν χρόνων πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας.⁴¹ Whether this alliance preceded the *isopoliteia* with the Phigaleians is unclear, but it must have existed by the time of the Aitolian invasion of Lakonia in 240/39⁴² when Messene probably served as the base of operations (Roebuck 1941, 66–68).⁴³ In any case, in the context of late 220 Polybius (4.31.1) describes the relationship between Phigaleia and the Aitolian Confederacy in terms of subordination: ταπτομένης ὑπ' Αἰτωλοῦς.

The reasons that led both the Phigaleians and the Messenians to get into the Aitolian sphere of influence in the 240s are open to discussion. Fear of expanding Aitolian influence in the western Peloponnese in the 240s has been suggested by Roebuck (1941, 67). In such a case, why did the Messenians and the Phigaleians not ask to be admitted to the Achaian Confederacy? The answer may be that the Aitolians were more important than the Achaians in the 240s, having already established a powerful federal state; furthermore, they were already on good terms with the Eleans and

they could use Elis as a base of operations against both Phigaleia and Messenia. Still, instead of, or in addition to fear of the Aitolians we could envisage a genuine wish to secure the alliance of a powerful and *distant*, non-Peloponnesian, neighbour. At least in the case of Messenia, we have to take into account that a policy of rapprochement had already been under way, with *proxenoi* of the Aitolian Confederacy in Messenia already from the second quarter of the 3rd century.⁴⁴ For at least some Messenians then, an alliance with Aitolia would have been the natural development of their friendly relations. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any such bonds with the Achaian Confederacy.

As we shall see below, the Messenians, or at least part of them, were not very keen on being incorporated into the Achaian Confederacy even in 220, when the Aitolians did attack Messenia.

The Messenians as a cause of the Social War

We do not know what happened in Aitolian-Messenian relations between the late 240s and the late 220s but at least the Messenians had shown signs of shaky loyalty to the Aitolians. Polybius (4.5.8) presents the Aitolian Dorimachos as stating that the Messenians had long been promising to join the Hellenic Alliance. Presumably, Dorimachos refers to unofficial negotiations. Technically, there was no problem for the Messenians since the Aitolian and the Achaian Confederacies were still officially allies. On a pragmatic level, though, such negotiations were quite alarming to the Aitolians because they would be translated into further increase of Macedonian power at the expense of the Aitolians.

Whether the initiative came from the Messenians or from the Achaian Confederacy, expansion to the western Peloponnese was an issue for Achaian leaders. Before 220 and perhaps during the Demetrian War (Luraghi 2008, 258), Pylos had become a member of the Achaian Confederacy (Polyb. 4.25.4).⁴⁵ Incidentally, the fact that the Messenians later on repeatedly laid claim to Pylos⁴⁶ shows that the citizens of Pylos had entered the Achaian Confederacy without the consent of Ithome/Messene. One possible reason of disaffection could have been that the Messenian state had failed to protect Pylos from Illyrian pirates.⁴⁷ But we also have to bear in mind that long before 220, in 365, Pylos had to be coerced in order to become part of the Messenian state (see pp.25–6) and, therefore, it is possible that relations between Ithome/Messene and Pylos had not improved much.

In either summer or autumn 221 the Aitolian Dorimachos was sent to Phigaleia on some unidentified public business (Polyb. 4.3.5–6).⁴⁸ Dorimachos claimed that he had come to guard the *polis* and the *chōra* of

the Phigaleians (Polyb. 4.3.7), which, if not just an excuse, indicates that things had become rough between Phigaleia and Messene (Scholten 2000, 203). Polybius, however, states that this was only an excuse for spying on Peloponnesian affairs, which might very well be true without excluding the possibility of trouble between the Phigaleians and the Messenians. Next, Dorimachos sent pirates to plunder Messenia (Polyb. 4.3.5–10).⁴⁹ His aims are not quite clear. Private gain is one obvious goal but it is probable that he also, or primarily, aimed at intimidating the Messenian leaders out of their dealings with the Achaian Confederacy (Luraghi 2008, 257),⁵⁰ of which he must already have been aware (Polyb. 4.5.8; Scholten 2000, 281–2). If this was his plan, then he failed. The ultimate result of this raid, and of the one which followed in spring 220, was that the Messenians were so alarmed as to request help from the Achaian Confederacy, thus abandoning their policy of ‘splendid isolation’ in the Peloponnese (Luraghi 2008, 257).

The situation turned explosive when Dorimachos came to Messene to answer Messenian complaints. According to Polybius (4.3.11–12 and 4.4.2–4) he became abusive, and when the ephors summoned him asking for restitution he warned them that it was the entire Aitolian Confederacy they were facing.

Polybius (4.4.9–5) insists that what followed was the doing of Dorimachos and Skopas, motivated by rage and greed, without any authorization from either the Aitolian assembly or the board of the *apoklētoi*,⁵¹ and while Ariston, the *stratēgos* of the Aitolians, incapacitated by illness, had entrusted military responsibilities to them. If they had no authorization at the beginning, this was not the case later, in the spring campaign of 220, and especially in the case of Messenia.⁵² Privateers captured a Macedonian ship, and assaults were made along the west coast, from Epeiros to the Akarnanian Thyrrheion (Polyb. 4.6.1–3).⁵³ That Messenia was the main target is shown by the fact that Dorimachos and Skopas ferried there a substantial force (Polyb. 4.6.8).⁵⁴ In order to be able to do so, the two men must have acquired authorization. And certainly they worked in co-operation with Ariston (Polyb. 4.6.8, 9.9). Polybius (4.6.12) underlines that the Messenians dared not come out and face the Aitolians. This was also the case during a large part of the ensuing war.

In the Achaian *synodos* of May 220 (Walbank 1957, 455–6), the Messenians asked for Achaian help, but they did not ask *to enter* the Hellenic Alliance. During the same vigorous *synodos*, citizens from Patrai and Pharai expressed complaints against Aitolian depredations (Polyb. 4.7.1–4; the Aitolians had plundered them on their way to Messenia). The *synodos* decided to help the Messenians and that Timoxenos should call the

Achaians to arms; then the levy would decide what to do (Polyb. 4.7.5). This decision is rather strange. It looks as if the *synodos* wanted to appear as protector of the wronged but that its members had not quite made up their minds for war. In any case, Timoxenos delayed, Aratos entered office five days earlier than was his due and sent letters to the member-states to dispatch all men of military age to Megalopolis (Polyb. 4.7.8–11; Plut. *Arat.* 47.2–3). Again, it is rather odd that the Achaian Confederacy troops should assemble in full force just to help the Messenians. Either full scale war with Aitolia was envisaged or Aratos wished to scare the Aitolians out of the Peloponnese by a demonstration of power. It turned out that the former was not the case. Aratos' eagerness to offer his help to the Messenians is an indication that he had already entered into discussions with at least part of their elite⁵⁵ and that he was interested in expanding the Confederacy (Roebuck 1941, 73). The fact that the Messenians asked to become members of the Hellenic Alliance during Aratos' *stratēgia* (Scherberich 2009, 111) increases the likelihood that the Messenians had initially contacted Aratos.

At Megalopolis, Messenian envoys offered to become members of the Hellenic Alliance, to which proposal they received the answer that the Achaian Confederacy had no authority to decide without consultation with Philip and the other allies (Polyb. 4.9.1–4). As to the immediate need for help, Aratos' demand from the envoys to send their sons as hostages to Sparta shows that he did not have much faith in the stability of Messenian policies.⁵⁶ To be exact, Aratos probably feared that the Messenians might come to terms with the Aitolians without Achaian consent (Polyb. 4.9.5–6). The demand shows that the Messenians had become allies of the Achaian Confederacy in the *synodos* of 220 or immediately afterwards (Walbank 1957, 456). Roebuck (1941, 74, n.31) notes that we do not hear of the hostages again but they were probably handed over (Fine 1940, 160). Additionally, Aratos demanded from the Aitolians that they evacuate Messenia and stay away from Achaia. It was during the Aitolian departure that the battle of Kaphyai occurred.

The Achaian *synodos* of late July/August 220⁵⁷ decided to inform Philip and the representatives of the allies of the Aitolian violations of the peace treaty and to ask them to accept the Messenians as members of the Hellenic Alliance (Polyb. 4.15.1–2). The Aitolians promised to remain at peace, at the same time asking for cancellation of the Achaian alliance with the Messenians (Polyb. 4.15.8–9),⁵⁸ possibly in the belief that Philip would not wish to get involved in war (Walbank 1984b, 475). Indeed, Philip and the Epeirots decided to accept the Messenians into the alliance but also decided to remain at peace with the Aitolians.

The decision was soon overturned. During the meeting of the *Synedrion* of the allies at Corinth, alongside the Achaian Confederacy, most of the allies (the Boiotians, the Phokians,⁵⁹ the Akarnanians and the Achaians) presented grievances against the Aitolians (4.25.1–6). Achaian grievances included the occupation of Klarion,⁶⁰ the raids on Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia, an Illyrian raid on Pylos (in association with the Aitolians), the sack of Kynaitha, and an assault against Kleitor (Polyb. 4.16.6–11, 17.3–18.7, 19.2–6). Should Philip fail to offer protection, the entire Hellenic Alliance would collapse. Thus, the allied representatives decided to declare war against the Aitolians (Polyb. 4.25.5–8). Notably, they presented the hostilities as a war of liberation from the Aitolians, and even as a sacred war by promising the Amphiktyones restoration of their rights over Delphi.⁶¹ The decree of the representatives had to be confirmed by the assemblies of each state (4.26.2). The Achaian Confederacy approved of it in their *synodos*. More than that they declared Aitolia ‘a prize of war’ (Polyb. 4.26.7: τὸ λάφυρον ἐπεκίρουσαν κατὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν), that is, ‘its land would be plundered and its people enslaved’ (Walbank 1988, 373). Such a phraseology indicates that emotions were indeed running very high.

Ironically enough, the Messenians participated only in the last year of the war which they had to a great extent triggered. They decided to maintain neutrality for as long as Phigaleia remained allied with the Aitolians (Polyb. 4.31.1).⁶² It is quite possible that there was internal discord going on in Messenia that led to this.⁶³ Polybius (4.31.2–3, 32.1) indeed insists that the decision was not pleasing to the many (οὐδαμῶς εὐδοκούντων τῶν πολλῶν), that it was two ephors and other members of the peace-loving oligarchic elite that forced this decision. Yet, we are entitled to wonder how far Polybius exaggerates as to the pressure exercised or as to the oligarchy being pro-Aitolian; at least one ephor, Skyron, was not (Paschidis 2008a, 272). We recall that the Messenians had allowed their countryside to be ravaged, which is a sign of weakness though not necessarily of discord. Thus, it is equally possible that the majority of the Messenians simply wished to be offered protection, without doing much for it and without exposing themselves to danger. If so, they must have calculated shrewdly that their being a coveted object would protect them from pressure. Their choice naturally attracts the severe criticism of Polybius (4.32) who also writes bearing in mind Messenian policies in the mid-2nd century (see p.378). As Luraghi (2008, 88) has observed, ‘it was difficult for the Messenians to shake off a reputation for cowardice originating from their supposed incapacity to face the Spartans at the time of the wars and thereafter’. One has to admit that this reputation has some justification, at least as regards the late 3rd century.

When Phigaleia passed into Philip's hands (see pp.297–8), the Messenians had no excuse to abstain from war any longer. However, they hardly had an impressive presence in it. Following Philip's orders they sent ships against Kephallenia in summer 218 (Polyb. 5.3.3, 4.4–6).⁶⁴ Roebuck (1941, 78–9) attributes this change of policy to a number of possible internal factors: pressure of public opinion, change of the military situation, a change of personnel in the magistracies.⁶⁵ All these are plausible but perhaps the most compelling reason was fear of repercussions should they defy Philip's order. No such order had been issued at the beginning of the war, probably because Messenian contribution was not deemed so essential while Philip was not operating in southwestern Greece.

Inside the Peloponnese, the Messenians' abandonment of neutrality made them the object of unfruitful attacks by Sparta.

Spartan targets: the east Parnon seaboard and Messenia

The Spartans did not loom large in the war. It was not easy to recover after Sellasia and to find another leader of Kleomenes' magnitude. Numbers were also a problem. During Philip's invasion of Lakonia, in summer 218, Lykourgos could muster more than 2,000 and probably up to c. 4,000 men in all (Polyb. 5.21.1),⁶⁶ a not insignificant force in itself, but much smaller than the army of c.10,000 that the Hellenic Alliance had been able to recruit earlier on (Polyb. 4.67.6, 70.2).

Following long and bloody strife between pro- and anti-Macedonian parties (Polyb. 4.34–35.6),⁶⁷ the Spartan ephors, with Aitolian instigation, appointed two kings – the Agiad Agesipolis (III), still a minor, and the possibly Eurypontid Lykourgos. This followed the death of Kleomenes in Alexandria, in spring 219 (Polyb. 4.35.9–15).⁶⁸ Shortly afterwards the Spartans abandoned their alliance with Macedon and allied themselves with the Aitolian Confederacy (Polyb. 4.36.1–2).⁶⁹

The main targets of the Spartans were two: the east Parnon seaboard, which then belonged to Argos (see pp.250–1), and Messenia. Their gains in the region east of Parnon were significant and, as it turned out, this was the first step towards the temporary unification with Argos later on under Nabis (see pp.337–40). On the other hand, the Spartans achieved nothing in Messenia. Incidentally, the Spartan attacks on Messenia in this war are the first since the 270s (as far as we know).

Shortly after his appointment to the kingship in spring 219, Lykourgos, without having officially declared war (he only did this after his return), suddenly attacked Argolid territory, on the Parnon seaboard, and captured Polichna, Prasiai, Leukai, and Kyphanta (Polyb. 4.36.3–5). Polybius vaguely reports that Lykourgos employed soldiers, probably mercenaries, and some

citizens. The Spartan army had been heavily reduced at Sellasia⁷⁰ but three or four year-classes of young citizens who had succeeded in the *agōgē* would have been added (i.e. c.300–400).⁷¹ Polybius clearly attributes this Spartan success to the fact that the Argives were completely off their guard due to the previous state of affairs, i.e. peace (ἀφυλάκτως διακειμένων εἰς τέλος τῶν Ἀργείων διὰ τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν κατάστασιν). Yet, it had been some months since war had been declared, so one wonders why the Argives had not taken (more?) steps to protect their countryside. The first explanation that comes to mind is that they relied too much on the Macedonians, like everybody else in the Achaian Confederacy. Another explanation is that the Argives thought that the Spartans had been cowed after Sellasia. And if Lykourgos' attack occurred shortly after the conclusion of the Spartan alliance with the Aitolians, then we can perhaps excuse the Argives for their negligence: they had probably not expected the Spartans to act so swiftly. On the other hand, Lykourgos failed to take Glympeis (an inland settlement) and Zarax, the southernmost town on the Parnon seaboard which had a fortified akropolis (Shipley 2004b, 577). It seems plausible that the Argives, after the loss of the northern towns, had the time to put a defensive force together.

There is no indication that the four captured towns were removed from Spartan possession before 195, when the coastal towns became autonomous following the declaration of freedom and autonomy for the Greeks by Titus Flamininus (Livy 34.35 and 35.13.2; see p.322). If so, they were probably recaptured by Nabis in 193 but were lost again in 192 permanently, after Nabis' final defeat (Shipley 2000a, 378–9).

Unsurprisingly, an attack on Megalopolitan territory was on Lykourgos' agenda. On the other hand, this was part of a co-ordinated attack from three sides: the Aitolians raided Aigeira and the Eleans plundered Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia (Scherberich 2009, 136). In early summer 219, while Aratos the younger (*stratēgos* for 219/8) was busy drafting mercenaries (Polyb. 4.37.6–7), Lykourgos took advantage of the situation and laid siege to the Athenaion on the Megalopolitan border with Lakonia (in the Belminatis). He imitated Kleomenes, as Polybius (4.60.3) ironically remarks, by conquering the Athenaion and installing a garrison there, which once again showed that the Achaian Confederacy as a whole and the Megalopolitans in particular could not protect their territory. On the other hand, neither could the Spartans make much use of their new possession. They razed the Athenaion to the ground and left as soon as they were informed of Philip's arrival in the Peloponnese in winter 218 (Polyb. 4.81.11).

As for Messenia, Spartan attacks were rather half-hearted, achieving

nothing. Especially towards the end of the war they primarily furthered Aitolian interests. Messenia does not appear to have been high on the Spartan agenda, unlike perhaps the east Parnon seaboard.

While the Messenian squadron was with Philip at Kephallenia, Lykourgos attacked Messenia. Polybius notes that this attack, in coordination with Dorimachos' attack on Thessaly, aimed at drawing Philip's force away from the siege of Palos (Polyb. 5.5.1–2). In other words, the attack on Messenia did not have much to do with old hostilities or Spartan interests but was dictated by the Aitolians (Walbank 1933, 140). A Messenian embassy under Gorgos arrived at Kephallenia asking for Philip's help which was essential now that the Spartans were at their door; an Akarnanian embassy also arrived with the same purpose (Polyb. 5.5.3–11).⁷² An interesting exchange of views took place. The royal official Leontios was in favour of a positive response while Aratos argued that Philip should attack Aitolia. Both were strategically sound views, no matter if Polybius, highly biased (Walbank 1957, 541), interprets Leontios' answer as part of a malevolent plan to have Philip stuck in Messenia while the Aitolians would plunder Thessaly and Epeiros.⁷³ On the other hand, Aratos' view, though sound from a wider perspective, would not have ingratiated him much with the Messenians. His proposal was accepted by Philip but the Achaian *stratēgos* Eperatos did receive orders from Philip to help the Messenians. Furthermore, Larsen (1968, 348), may well have been right in suggesting that behind Aratos' proposal lay his fear of Philip's increased power in the Peloponnese. To put it more crudely, Aratos might not have wished the Messenians to owe their salvation to the Macedonian king. This partial rejection of their request signalled a crack in Achaian-Messenian relations culminating in the Messenians' leaving the Hellenic Alliance in c.214/3.⁷⁴ However, Lykourgos achieved hardly anything for Sparta at Messenia (Polyb. 5.17.1), which means that either Eperatos or the Messenians themselves repulsed him (Roebuck 1941, 79).⁷⁵

The next episode between the Spartans and the Messenians occurred shortly afterwards, and it briefly elated Lykourgos' spirits. Following Philip's orders, the Messenians dispatched a select force of 2,000 foot and 200 horse to help Philip in his invasion of Lakonia but they missed the appointment at Tegea (Polyb. 5.20.1). Their delay is perhaps understandable given Philip's short notice (Polyb. 5.17.8; Larsen 1968, 350) but their subsequent conduct can only be explained by their lack of military experience and their fear of the Spartans. They decided to join Philip in Lakonia, marching via Argive territory, and encamped near Glympeis, on the border of the Argolid with Lakonia, taking hardly any precaution. Thus, they practically invited an attack from Lykourgos who came out with the

mercenaries and a few Spartans. The Messenians simply rushed inside the walls as soon as they saw the enemy (Polyb. 5.20.3–9). On the other hand, the Spartans themselves showed no intention of pursuing their attack beyond looting the Messenian baggage, presumably because they were in a hurry to get back to Lakonia to repulse Philip's imminent attack. For the Spartans this victory was only a demonstration of power over their old enemy. It was important insofar as it balanced their previous failure in Messenia but no more than that.

The final and more serious episode of this otherwise inconsequential clash was played out a year later, in Messenia, when Lykourgos and the Aitolian Pyrrhias led a joint invasion. The latter had only a very small force with him and was repulsed at Kyparissia by the inhabitants alone (Roebuck 1941, 80), while Lykourgos succeeded in taking Kalamai employing treachery (Polyb. 5.92.4). This might be an indication that there was a pro-Spartan group in Kalamai (Pozzi 1970, 405, n.132) or, more simply, that there was a group holding a grudge against Messene. However, Lykourgos retreated when he realized that the Aitolian forces had been repulsed (Polyb. 5.92.1–6). It is not clear what became of Kalamai after the end of the war (Luraghi 2008, 259–60).⁷⁶

The Elean role in the war

Elean-Aitolian raids into Achaia proper

The Eleans had last taken part in hostilities in the 260s, in the Chremonidean War, on Sparta's side. They had been benevolent towards Kleomenes, but there is no direct evidence that they had taken an active part in the war.⁷⁷ In the Social War, after Messenian defection, Elis was essential to Aitolian operations, and therefore it could not be allowed to remain neutral. Following their alliance with Sparta, the Aitolians had to talk the Eleans into taking up arms against the Hellenic Alliance, employing similar arguments to those used in Sparta (Polyb. 4.36.6).⁷⁸ Now, one of the arguments used to persuade the Spartans was that this would stop factionalism (Polyb. 4.36.2: φιλονεικίαν), which indicates that some Eleans were not in favour of the war. As it turned out, the latter were right, since this war deprived them of the extensive influence, or control, they had acquired over Arkadian regions in the previous decades.

When the Social War started (in 220), the Eleans had a long-standing bond with their alleged kinsmen (Paus. 5.1.3–8),⁷⁹ the Aitolians – they were benevolently disposed and allied to them, as Polybius reports (4.5.4: εὐνοίας καὶ συμμαχίας). In the 3rd century, the first manifestation of Aitolian influence on Elean affairs had been the eviction of the tyrant Aristotimos in the late 270s.⁸⁰ Judging by the fact that the Aitolians had to talk the Eleans into

taking part in the Social War, we are led to think that this alliance did not entail obligations for the Eleans. We cannot tell whether there was also an *isopoliteia* agreement between the two states.⁸¹ Interestingly enough, the Eleans do not appear among the recipients of honours from the Aitolians.⁸² During the war, the alliance took the form of the Aitolians' sending military commanders and troops to the Eleans to raid Achaia proper and to help them maintain their hold over Arkadian regions. Notably, the Aitolians avoided dispatching large military forces to the Peloponnese (Scholten 2000, 218–19).

Elis appears as serving the Aitolian cause but in fact the opposite is also the case. As much as the Aitolians were using Elis,⁸³ the Eleans were also using Aitolian military expertise to protect themselves as well as to further their territorial ambitions. That the Aitolians were at their service is nicely illustrated by the fact that the Eleans were displeased at the Aitolian commander Pyrrhias and asked for a replacement (Polyb. 5.94.2), which was granted. The Eleans lacked neither manpower nor ambition. They mainly lacked leadership. We read of only one Elean *stratēgos*, Amphidamos, and he was in command of a small mercenary force.

While raiding Achaia proper certainly served Aitolian interests in the war, it also served Elean interests, the attacks on Dyme in particular.⁸⁴ Dyme (modern Katō Achaia) lay on the western border between Achaia and Elis, near the coast, essentially being a barrier between Aitolia and Elis.⁸⁵ Aitolian command gave the Eleans the opportunity to take over, albeit temporarily, Dymaia territory, i.e. the fortress called Teichos, on the Achaian-Elean frontier,⁸⁶ which was allegedly built by Herakles during his war against the Eleans (Polyb. 4.59.4).⁸⁷

As a whole, Aitolian-Elean attacks against Achaia proper aimed at amassing booty. It is possible that they also aimed at provoking disaffection against the Achaian Confederacy, which in fact happened.

In summer 219 troops of Elis, under the command of the Aitolian Euripidas, plundered the territories of Dyme, Pharaia and Tritaia. Polybius (4.59) does not record either the composition of the force or the number of soldiers who could be either citizens or mercenaries in the service of Elis – it appears that the Aitolians only dispatched a commander. However, the Dymaians, the Pharaians and the Tritaians responded with a full-levy attack, under the command of Mikkos, in which they were defeated. Shortly afterwards, Euripidas occupied the Teichos. Again, we are not informed as to the composition of the troops but an Elean garrison was installed there (Polyb. 4.83.3). One way or the other, the Eleans had gained a foothold on the territory of Dyme.

The garrison fled almost in a flash when, in late February/early March

218, Philip V appeared (after having deprived the Eleans of their influence or control over Arkadian regions). He recovered the Teichos and restored it to Dyme (Polyb. 4.83.1–5).⁸⁸

This was not the end of misfortunes for Dyme and the other Achaian *poleis*. In summer 218, the Eleans made another attempt on Dyme and achieved a victory over the cavalry that came out to repulse them. Polybius (5.17.3) employs the expression οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Ἠλίδος ('those from the city of Elis'), which seems not to mean Elean citizens, or at least not citizens alone. Aitolian mercenaries, previously dispatched to Elis under Agelaos and Skopas (Polyb. 5.3.1), probably participated in this expedition (Walbank 1957, 553). However, there is no mention of either an Elean or an Aitolian commander.

In the winter or spring of 218/7, a force of c.1,300 Aitolians along with 1,200 Eleans (1,000 foot + 200 horse), under the Aitolian Pyrrhias, plundered the territories of Dyme and Pharai and all the country in the direction of Rhion and Aigion (Polyb. 5.30.2–4). A few months later, 'the Eleans, being displeased with Pyrrhias, hurriedly brought back from the Aitolians Euripidas as their *stratēgos*' (οἱ δ' Ἠλεῖοι, δυσαρεστούμενοι τῷ Πυρρίᾳ, πάλιν ἐπεσπᾶσαντο στρατηγὸν παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν Εὐριπίδαν). As stated above, this is an indication that the Aitolians were serving the Eleans as much as they were served by them. Polybius (5.94.2) does not record the cause of Elean displeasure. It could be that Pyrrhias had fallen out with the Eleans or it could be that the Eleans expected more from Pyrrhias than routine plundering. The very fact that they insisted on the dispatch of another commander, indicates that they were perhaps the instigators of the next expedition against Achaia. In May/June 217, a force of 2,000 infantry and 60 horse, under Euripidas' command, plundered eastern Achaia as far as Aigion. Admittedly, they do not appear to have had a pitched battle in mind, but perhaps it was not offered to them by the Achaians. Upon their retreat they were attacked by a mercenary force led by the Achaian *hypostratēgos* Lykos who managed to kill 400 men and capture another 200 (Polyb. 5.94.3–6). Polybius does not record the precise composition of the army, i.e. whether they were Aitolians or Eleans or mercenaries or a combination of the three. Pyrrhias' force of 1,300 Aitolians, or part of it, may have remained in place, and later on Euripidas set out to plunder Tritaia with an Aitolian force (Polyb. 5.95.6). However, Polybius does record by name eight distinguished Eleans among the captives. Again, their participation serves as an indication that the Eleans had decided to take up more responsibilities. Admittedly, though, we do not know the extent of participation of the Elean elite in the previous raids.

Elean military incompetence became even more manifest when soon

afterwards Lykos, with the full levies of Dyme, Patrai and Pharai, invaded Elis, forcing the Eleans to draft their full levy, for the first time in this war, to defend the countryside (Polyb. 5.95.6–11). The Eleans took to flight when the enemy's heavy infantry (lying in ambush) charged them. The Achaian army killed c.200, captured 80 and retreated with booty. Obviously, the Achaian forces too were, or felt themselves, unable to resolve the issue with the Eleans and the Aitolians in an open battle.

A piece of information provided by Pausanias regarding Elean-Achaian relations may belong to the period of the Social War. Pausanias (6.15.2) states that the Achaians (*sic*) dedicated at Olympia a statue of the Elean Pantarkes who was also an Olympic victor, possibly in 228 (see p.408). Pantarkes procured peace between the Eleans and the Achaians and the release of those who had been captured, on both sides. Given that there were numerous captives on either side in the Social War, it is likely that Pantarkes' services are associated with it, probably offered after its end (Moretti 1957, 140).⁸⁹ Whether or not he was already an Olympic victor, he was certainly a member of the wealthy Elean elite since he was victorious in horse racing. If he had already been victorious at Olympia, he would have had the authority necessary to impose peace. That the Achaians honoured Pantarkes with a statue is indicative of the dire straits they had come into during the war.⁹⁰ We may wonder whether it was the Achaian Confederacy that honoured Pantarkes or only the *poleis* of Achaia proper.

Elean expansion into Arkadia and its curtailment by Philip V – Arkadian regions treated as gifts

By the second half of the 3rd century, the Elean territory had expanded to include Triphylia (along the Ionian Sea, between Elis and Messenia), Alipheira (on the border of Triphylia and Arkadia, south of the Alpheios valley) and Lasion (on the north-eastern border of Elis with Arkadia). These were Arkadian territories and peoples that wished to think of themselves as Arkadian (see p.14). The Eleans operated along traditional lines of policy, maintaining their old claim on Triphylia and Lasion. Their expansion was achieved, at least partly, via gifts. As in 420 (Thuc. 5.31.1–43.1, 47–50), when they stood up to the Spartans, seceding from the Peloponnesian League, the Eleans in the 3rd century withstood greater powers while they had little ability to fight. In c. 400 the Spartans had curtailed Elean expansion.⁹¹ In the 3rd century, the Spartans, far from being hostile to the Eleans, contributed to Elean strength, as we shall see below.

The Elean claim to Triphylia – and Lasion – can be traced back to the 4th century. It had even led to a war against the Arkadian Confederacy in 365. The Achaian Confederacy in its strictly Achaian form had been on

the Elean side in that war (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.17–20).⁹² In the late 3rd century the old feud with the Arkadians was transformed into a feud with the expanded Achaian Confederacy.

Pausanias carries a report of a conflict between the Eleans and the Arkadians. Based on hearsay (λέγουσιν), Pausanias (6.16.8) records that the Elean Olympic victor Pyttalos acted as a judge when the Eleans challenged the Arkadians on boundaries. Assuming that the conflict did take place, Piccirilli (1972, 480–2) argues that it should be dated to the end of the 4th or the early 3rd century since Pyttalos was an Olympic victor while still a *pais*. Piccirilli also observes that the judge belongs to one of the conflicting parties but argues that an Olympic victor's judgement was invested with divine authority and therefore acceptable by all.⁹³ On the other hand, it is rather more likely that Pyttalos did not act as a judge but as an Elean representative who played a most influential role, precisely because of his Olympic glory. It should not be difficult for Elean imagination to make him a judge. As to the identity of the Arkadians, it could be any *polis*⁹⁴ and we should not exclude the Triphylians, given the subsequent annexation of Triphylia by Elis. And in the end, whoever the Arkadians were, what Pausanias seems to show is that the Eleans had been pushing for more land.

Triphylia was annexed to Elis (Polyb. 4.77.8–10) in the late 250s–240s (Scholten 2000, 261), a few years before the Elean acquisition of Alipheira. It is uncertain whether Triphylia was annexed by force of Elean (citizen or mercenary) arms or as a gift by the Aitolians when the latter were operating in northwestern Arkadia in the 240s. The fact that during the Social War the Eleans constantly turned to the Aitolians for leadership renders the second hypothesis slightly more plausible.⁹⁵ According to Pausanias (5.6.1), at an unknown date a certain Aitolian by the name of Polysperchon used Samikon, one of the Triphylian communities, as a bulwark (ἐπιτείχισμα) against the Arkadians.⁹⁶ The problem is that Polybius (4.77.10) does not refer to any Aitolian involvement. Instead he employs the participle ἐπικρατήσαντες, i.e. literally 'having prevailed over', which indicates Elean force of arms as well as resistance on the part of the Triphylians. The solution is possibly somewhere in the middle, as Scholten (2000, 120–2) has tentatively suggested: Elean troops conquered Triphylia but under an Aitolian commander.⁹⁷ And if citizens were not employed, the state of Elis surely had the means to hire mercenaries.

A few years after the annexation of Triphylia, the Eleans were given Alipheira by Lydiadas of Megalopolis (Polyb. 4.77.10), between c.245 and 235 (between Lydiadas' rise to power and prior to the admission of Megalopolis into the Achaian Confederacy). Later on, in autumn 226,

Lasion was offered to the Eleans by Kleomenes. This combination of benefactors, who were hostile to each other, shows the extent to which the Eleans, or perhaps more accurately the Elean leadership, had maintained a balanced policy towards neighbours who were not on the best of terms.

Everything is unclear about the change of Alipheira's status. Did either the Alipheirans or the Megalopolitans as a whole have a say in this and what were Lydiadas' reasons? Polybius writes that 'while he was a tyrant he gave Alipheira to the Eleans in return for some private services': κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρὸς τινὰς ἰδίας πράξεις ἀλλαγὴν δόντος. It has been suggested that the Eleans must have helped Lydiadas *assume* power,⁹⁸ but the κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ('during his tyranny') indicates that the Eleans may have helped Lydiadas *maintain* his power. Given their wealth, the Eleans could have offered financial help to Lydiadas, to hire mercenaries for instance.⁹⁹ It is not very likely that Polybius would record that his all-too-good Lydiadas owed his power to enemies of the Achaian Confederacy. And if internal discord went on in Alipheira after the 270s (see p.134), Lydiadas might not have been unhappy to part with it.

Another interesting aspect of this transaction is the very fact that Lydiadas was in a position to dispense with a constituent community of Megalopolis. There is no information as to the opinion of the Megalopolitans. Things would have been facilitated if Alipheira was not part of that city from the beginning or if it was not continuously part of it (see pp.29–30). In any case, by doing so, Lydiadas foreshadows Philopoimen's action some decades later, in the early 2nd century, when he had certain communities detached from Megalopolis, possibly including Alipheira (see pp.363–4).

A fragmentary inscription of unclear content and uncertain origin (now lost) shows that Elis did have problems with Alipheira (*IPArk* 25).¹⁰⁰ Robertson (1976, 260–2) on the basis of dialect forms has persuasively argued that the decree is Elean, either regulating matters within Alipheira or problems of the latter with a neighbour.¹⁰¹ The citizens of Alipheira are to take an oath of obedience to the terms of a settlement imposed by a court of an unidentified city (ll.3–5, 13–15). Whatever the problem was, the Eleans were clearly interested in maintaining peace in their state, something particularly important for a state that hosted Panhellenic games.

The gift of Lasion by Kleomenes (Plut. *Kleom.* 14.2) fits into the context of long-standing friendly Spartan-Elean relations. Once upon a time, until c. 400, Lasion was an Elean perioikic community and later a member of the Arkadian Confederacy, recaptured by Elis in 365 and again recaptured by the Arkadians (Roy 2004, 499). Kleomenes' gesture could very well have aimed at securing Elean military help (Walbank 1933, 81), for which help,

however, there is no direct evidence. It is not impossible that Kleomenes received Elean troops at the battle of Sellasia but Polybius very vaguely refers to allies.¹⁰² According to Marasco (1981, 469), Kleomenes might also have a wider propagandistic aim, i.e. to show that he did not intend to revert to old practices of territorial aggrandisement. More than that, Kleomenes, by restoring Lasion to Elis, offered a reversal of Sparta's old image and role in Elis: in 400, Sparta had made the perioikic communities of Elis, including Lasion, independent (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23–5). Now, Kleomenes was restoring part of Elis' ancestral territories. Furthermore, it seems that Lasion remained in Elean hands after the battle of Sellasia since it was captured by Philip in winter 218.

Elis also had a political bond with Psophis, possibly going back to the 240s (Scholten 2000, 263). Polybius (4.70.4) underlines that Psophis had been Arkadian (Azanian) but then (in 218) it was somehow politically attached to Elis (μεθ' ὧν συνέβαινε τότε πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτήν). We can only speculate as to what this means exactly and how it had come about. At least, it does not seem to indicate annexation; Polybius would not have failed to mention such a thing. The nearest parallel to the phrase above in Polybius concerns the Megarians and the Achaian Confederacy, and in their case it clearly denotes membership in the Confederacy (20.6.8): Μεγαρεῖς γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐπολιτεύοντο μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Another parallel, also denoting membership, concerns the Mantineans and the Achaian Confederacy: πολιτευομένοις μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν (Polyb. 2.57.6). In the case of Elis and Psophis the safest conclusion is that they pursued the same policies, i.e. they were allied. Perhaps Polybius also means *isopoliteia*, as in the case of the eastern Arkadian *poleis* (2.46.2; see pp.182–3).¹⁰³ And, again as in the case of the latter, what matters to Polybius is the common foreign policy.

In summer 220, shortly before the declaration of the Social War, the Eleans set a limit to their expansion by prudently refusing to receive Kynaitha as a gift from the Aitolians (Polyb. 4.19.4–5). At some point prior to 220 a pro-Achaian party had gained the upper hand and had installed a garrison and an Achaian military commander in charge of the city (στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ Ἀχαιῶν) (see p.179). The Aitolians were let inside the city by former exiles. Incidentally, the reconciliation between the conflicting parties had come about with the blessing of the Achaian Confederacy, which desired to appear as peace-maker.

Kynaitha was unwelcome to the Eleans for all sorts of reasons. It was too far away from Elis to be defended, and, perhaps most importantly, it was tormented by civil strife (Polyb. 4.17.4–18.1–5). Furthermore, its acceptance could very well involve the Eleans in war against the Achaian

Confederacy (Scherberich 2009, 118). The Aitolians decided to keep Kynaitha for themselves, appointing Euripidas as a *stratēgos*. However, upon hearing about the advent of a Macedonian force they burnt the city down.

In his sweeping campaign in the Peloponnese, in winter 218, Philip V, leading an army of c. 6,000 soldiers (Polyb. 4.67.6: 2,000 peltasts, 3,000 'bronze-shielded' infantry, 200 'Court' cavalry and 300 Cretans). He thereby reshaped Elean-Arkadian relations as well as relations of the Achaian Confederacy with Arkadian communities by reducing the Elean territory to its limits prior to the mid-3rd century. His attacks were directed against the southern and western part of Elis which threatened Arkadia (Walbank 1933, 133).

An Elean force consisting of two companies faced the Macedonians by accident, near Stymphalos (Walbank 1957, 523). The performance of the Eleans was very poor. Their Aitolian commander had deserted them but at first they kept their ranks, thinking that the force approaching them was Megalopolitan (because of their bronze shields). However, as soon as they realized that the force was Macedonian they simply took to flight, 1,200 men were captured and the rest were killed (Polyb. 4.68–69).¹⁰⁴ We note here that the Megalopolitan Polybius, significantly because against his bias, indirectly admits that the Megalopolitans provoked no fear in their enemies.

Following his victory at Stymphalos Philip proceeded to besiege Psophis, on the western border of Arkadia (4.70–1), between the rivers Erymanthos and Aroanios. It was an unusually well-fortified city, perfectly suitable both for the defence of Arkadia as well as for operations against Elis (Polyb. 4.71.2; Nielsen 2004, 529). Polybius (4.71.6–7) reports that initially there were suspicions of betrayal but nothing of the kind ensued. If this can be taken at face value, then we should conclude that the citizens of Psophis, on the whole, were not displeased with the union with the Eleans. However, the inhabitants of Psophis and the mercenaries employed by the Eleans resisted only for a short while (Polyb. 4.71.7–12, 72.2). A familiar picture of lack of preparation emerges (Polyb. 4.71.10–11, 72.2), perhaps because the Psophidians relied too much on their fortifications. Philip with the Macedonians and the Cretans captured the city while the inhabitants and the mercenaries took refuge in the citadel. Not long afterwards they surrendered, having secured the life and freedom of the besieged (Polyb. 4.72.3–4).

With Psophis there starts Philip's practice of treating Peloponnesian *poleis* as gifts to the Achaian Confederacy, much in the tradition of earlier Macedonian kings. According to Polybius (4.72.5–6), Philip presented this as the result of sincere interest in the welfare of the Achaian Confederacy

but we are allowed to think that by this gift Philip transferred responsibility for a strategic location. How important Psophis was to the war, and how unreliable, is shown by the fact that a garrison was installed on the akropolis with its own, Sikyonian, commander, while another commander, Pythias of Pellene, was installed in charge of the entire *polis*.

Next, it was the turn of Lasion on the eastern border of Elis and on the upper stream of the river Ladon¹⁰⁵ to be treated as a gift by Philip to the Achaian Confederacy. In fact, as mentioned above, Lasion was treated as a gift for the second time in five years. The Elean garrison made the whole thing quite easy by abandoning the town as soon as they heard the news about Psophis (Polyb. 4.73.1–2). The (unlocated) fortress of Stratos, which was also an Elean possession, was restored to Thelphousa (Polyb. 4.73.3).¹⁰⁶

Elis itself was heavily plundered by Philip and his troops (Polyb. 4.73.5–6 and 75.1–6). A large number of slaves and farm-stock were caught at Thalamai (unlocated: Walbank 1957, 527) where they had taken refuge. Philip's raid was far more profitable than the Aitolian raids on Achaian *poleis*.¹⁰⁷ It was as fruitful as the huge plundering of Elis by the Spartans and their allies in c. 400, for which Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.26–7) writes that it was like a harvest for the Peloponnese (ὥσπερ ἐπισιτισμὸς). The only indication of an Elean attempt to defend the countryside is the 200 mercenaries who nevertheless themselves also abandoned the countryside and were captured by Philip. This is the first and the only time we read about an Elean *stratēgos* – Amphidamos, who was also captured. It is notable that he only commanded a small mercenary force.¹⁰⁸

Philip's next target was Triphylia. The Eleans asked help from the Aitolians who dispatched only 600 Aitolians under Phillidas. They were joined by 1,000 Elean soldiers, plus 500 mercenaries and an unidentified number of Tarentine mercenaries (Polyb. 4.77.1–7). The small number of Elean troops is rather surprising given that Elean supremacy in part of the southwestern Peloponnese was at stake. Once again, however, the command belonged to an Aitolian who decided that the Elean force should defend Lepreon, the most important Triphylian community (Polyb. 4.78.1).

Before conquering Triphylia, Philip captured Alipheira which lay c.10 km south of Heraia 'on a hill defended on all sides by precipices' (Polyb. 4.78.3).¹⁰⁹ It took the Macedonians just one morning to capture the city (Polyb. 4.78.6–13). Philip kept Alipheira and restored it to Megalopolis in the winter of 199/8 (Livy 32.5.4–5) but a few years later (after 194/3), Alipheira appears as an independent *polis*, involved in an arbitration with the Triphylian Lepreon (*IPArk* 26).

Following the fall of Alipheira, all the communities comprising Triphylia surrendered to Philip, one after the other, in just six days (Polyb. 4.80.15).

On the basis of Polybius (4.79.1–2) it emerges that these communities ‘were not united among themselves’ since ‘they took counsel for themselves and for their own communities’ (ἐβουλευόντο περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πατρίδων; trans. by Nielsen 1997, 131) and they sent separate embassies to surrender to Philip (Polyb. 4.79.4). Having been left without Aitolian or Elean protection, Typaneai and Hypana were the first to surrender. Lepreon was the next target.

Lepreon was the most important Elean possession outside Elis, but as it turned out the citizens of Lepreon did not wish to be Eleans, at least not if this resulted in a Macedonian attack. Hence, 1,000 Eleans, 600 Aitolians, c.400 brigands, 500 mercenaries and 200 Spartans gathered there (Polyb. 4.80.4; Walbank 1957, 533). The Lepreatans took arms against the Elean-Aitolian force, occupied part of the city and demanded the evacuation of their city and citadel. Their initiative was seemingly praiseworthy, given the presence of a large number of troops, but they played it safe, knowing that the Macedonians were near (Polyb. 4.80.3). And indeed the Elean-Aitolian forces abandoned Lepreon as soon as they heard about Philip’s approach. Instead of resisting, the Lepreatans sent envoys handing over their city to Philip (Polyb. 4.80.7: τὸ πλῆθος ἐγχειρίζον), presumably seeing him as a protector against future Elean or Aitolian attack.

The arbitration between Lepreon and the Arkadian Alipheira after 194/3¹¹⁰ (*IPArk* 26),¹¹¹ possibly involving dispute about pastoral land on Mt. Minthe¹¹² (Map 1), shows that the Lepreatans considered themselves as Arkadians, since they agreed to be judged by Arkadian judges (at least 21 and perhaps twice as many).¹¹³

However, after the surrender of Lepreon the other Triphylian communities followed suit. The capture of Triphylia was very important strategically because the Aitolians could no longer reach Phigaleia, Messene and Sparta, through Elis (Larsen 1968, 343). Clearly, Philip did not trust the Achaian Confederacy troops to capture Triphylia. As in the case of Alipheira, Philip kept Triphylia, appointing as commander (*epimelētēs*) the Akarnanian Ladikos (Polyb. 4.80.15–16; Walbank 1988, 377).

Upon hearing the news of the surrender of Typaneai (one of the Triphylian communities), the Phigaleians took the initiative. They took up arms and forced the Aitolian garrison to agree to leave the city. Subsequently, they delivered their city to Philip. According to Polybius (4.79.5), the Phigaleians’ action shows that they were displeased with the Aitolian alliance. He may be right, or his prejudice against the Aitolians may have got the better of him. In any case, the Phigaleians evidently had no wish whatsoever to suffer a Macedonian attack for the sake of their Aitolian alliance. Polybius does not inform us as to what was the fate of

Phigaleia afterwards but since it does not feature among the territories promised later by Philip to the Achaian Confederacy, it was probably given to the Confederacy now.¹¹⁴

Having stripped Elis of its Arkadian possessions as well as of the Dymaian Teichos, Philip sent Amphidamos to the Eleans proposing peace on very favourable terms (neither garrison nor tribute would be imposed). The offer was rejected (Polyb. 4.84.4–7). It may be that the Eleans could not make peace without Aitolian consent (Rice 1975, 31) but it was certainly not unreasonable on the Eleans' part to prefer the hitherto beneficial Aitolian alliance to the alliance with the Macedonian king. Additionally, the Aitolians were alarmingly near while the Macedonians were not constantly present (Walbank 1988, 377). The chances were that the alliance with the Macedonians would be translated into subordination. However, the courtier Apelles charged Aratos with undermining the negotiations. According to Apelles, Amphidamos, the Elean *stratēgos*, had informed him that Aratos had secretly advised that it was against the best interests of the Peloponnesians to have the Eleans allied with Philip (Polyb. 4.84.8–85.1). In Polybius' view this accusation was part of Apelles' plan to discredit Aratos in the eyes of the king. Nevertheless, the accusation does ring true. For one thing, secret negotiations and intrigues had always been on Aratos' agenda. In 218, the Elean alliance with the Aitolians was against the interests of the Hellenic Alliance. On the other hand, and in the long run, it is also true that if the Eleans accepted Philip's proposals, then Macedonian power would be indeed menacing or at least overwhelming (Errington 1967, 25). Philip had started the war having Corinth, Orchomenos and probably Heraia in his possession. Now, he had added Triphylia and Alipheira.

Just a few years previously, Aratos had practically led the Peloponnese into the arms of Macedon, in order to preserve the Achaian Confederacy as well as his own authority – and not necessarily in that order. Now, he must have realized that Philip's successes were at one and the same time both essential and dangerous to the Confederacy as well as to himself.

* * *

The end of the Social War

The Social War ended in late summer/early autumn 217 with the so-called Peace of Naupaktos. For Philip and the Hellenic Alliance the war had been largely a success but this was also an expensive war, for all sides. There had been plenty of raids and plundering but no decisive battles (Scherberich 2009, 147). Notably, the ultimate decision for peace lay with Philip.¹¹⁵

And as Will (1982, 76) noted, it would leave both sides dissatisfied. As things turned out, the Aitolians were the more displeased, to the point of allying themselves with the Romans a few years later (see p.318).

Polybius (5.101.6–102.1) presents the news of the Carthaginian victory over the Romans at Lake Trasimene as the catalyst that ended the Social War. It was after this news that Philip despatched Kleonikos of Naupaktos to the Aitolians and sent for representatives of his allies to discuss peace (Polyb. 5.102.2–9). In Polybius' view, Philip took the advice of the Illyrian Demetrios of Pharos (who had fled to his court in summer 219), and turned his eyes to the West. That Philip entertained ambitions of global domination is far-fetched; the influence of Demetrios is also rather exaggerated (Gruen 1984, 374–5). The idea that Philip was worried about his north-western frontier which was raided by the Illyrian Skerdilaidas, as well as about Roman control over southern Illyria is certainly plausible¹¹⁶ – the Romans had established a protectorate over Greek and Illyrian communities following the First Illyrian War of 230–228.¹¹⁷

It was at Naupaktos, right before the conclusion of peace, that Agelaos of Naupaktos delivered his much-discussed speech on the 'cloud from the West'. The speech's historicity has been questioned,¹¹⁸ mainly because of its correctly prophetic character. Agelaos predicts the expansion of either the Carthaginians or the Romans to the East (depending on the winner) and their role in Greek affairs. It is most interesting, however, that of all the speeches, Polybius (5.104) chooses to cite the speech of an Aitolian. Given his hostility towards the Aitolians as well as Aitolian rivalry with Macedon, we should reckon that Polybius was sure (rightly or wrongly) of having a true account.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, this does not exclude the possibility of Polybian insertions based on hindsight, with dramatic overtones.¹²⁰ Agelaos called for peace among the Greeks or at least for measures for their safety. He predicted that whoever won, either the Carthaginians or the Romans, would not limit their ambitions to Sicily or Italy. Thus, he implored Philip to tend to the safety of the Greeks – a call for 'benevolent guardianship, not hegemony' (Walbank 1933, 155) – and direct his ambitions to the West. For if he waited 'for these clouds that loom in the West to settle on Greece' (τὰ προφαινόμενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας νέφη προσδέξεται τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόποις ἐπιστῆναι),¹²¹ then the Greeks would no longer have the power to either wage war or conclude peace, in short, to settle their differences by themselves: ὑπάρχειν ἡμῖν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην, καὶ πολεμεῖν ὅταν βουλόμεθα καὶ διαλύεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ καθόλου κυρίους εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμφισβητουμένων. It is this freedom that is at stake, not peace *per se*.

Peace was agreed on the basis of the *status quo* (Polyb. 5.103.7, 105.1). The Achaian Confederacy had added Psophis and Lasion to its members

but Philip had kept Phigaleia, Alipheira and Triphylia – and we should not forget Orchomenos and probably Heraia, as well as Corinth. Additionally, separatism among Achaian *poleis* was going to resurface during the Second Macedonian War. Sparta and Elis remained outside the Hellenic Alliance. Sparta probably retained its gains on the east Parnon seaboard while Elis was deprived of its little empire.

The Messenians remained bound to the Hellenic Alliance only for a few more years. In c.214/3, at the beginning of the First Macedonian War, the Messenians abandoned the Hellenic Alliance, under obscure circumstances but following internal strife, a change of regime from oligarchic to (more) democratic and a couple of attempts by Philip to capture Messene (Plut. *Arat.* 49–51; Polyb. 7.10–12, 13.6 and 8.12.1–2).¹²²

A couple of years later Aratos died. Polybius (8.12.2–6) and Plutarch (*Arat.* 52) record a tradition extremely hostile to Philip, according to which he had Aratos poisoned.¹²³ Whatever the cause of his death, Aratos was honoured by the Sikyonians as an *oikeistēs* and saviour of the city, i.e. as a hero (Plut. *Arat.* 53; Polyb. 8.12.8). We can see here, as in the case of Lydiadas, the influence of the ruler cult on the attitude of a *polis* towards its leading citizens (Buraselis 2003b, 194). Twice a year sacrifices were performed at the Arateion (Aratos' grave monument): on Aratos' birthday and on the anniversary of his liberation of Sikyon. Equally interesting is the fact that before its burial, Aratos' body became a bone of contention between the Sikyonians and the Achaians who wanted to bury Aratos at Aigion, the capital of the Achaian Confederacy. The Achaians are not identified by Plutarch, i.e. whether they were the Confederacy's officials or ordinary people or both. The citizens of Aigion, where Aratos had died, must have had an important part in the claim. The Sikyonians had to struggle to persuade the Achaians to abandon their claim. Furthermore, they secured a Delphic oracle in order to be allowed to bury Aratos within the walls of their own city (Kató 2006, 241, n.16). Evidently, the body of Aratos was considered a major symbol of prestige and status.

After Aratos' death, the need for a leader of the Achaian Confederacy arose in the last decade of the 3rd century, when the Spartans resurfaced. There emerged then one who, unlike Aratos, possessed military competence and trained constantly in order to be a military leader,¹²⁴ but whose diplomatic skills left something to be desired (Plut. *Phil.* 3.1–2): Philopoimen. Also very much unlike Aratos, Philopoimen envisaged incorporation of both Sparta and Messene into the Achaian Confederacy, which he achieved after the Second Macedonian War (200–196). But this turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory that led to the downfall of the Achaian Confederacy.

Notes

¹ See Larsen 1968, 326, for this ‘rather unfortunate name’, the result of ‘translation from Greek to Latin and from Latin to English’. Errington 2008, 182, has coined the term ‘Aitolian war’.

² On the Social War in general see Larsen 1968, 326–58; Walbank 1940, 24–67; 1988, 369–84 and 1984, 473–81; Will 1982, 71–7; Scherberich 2009, 103–56.

³ An honorary epigram on a marble statue base found at Epidauros praises Philip for his achievements: *IG IV².1.590b/ISE 47*.

⁴ See also Ducrey 1999, 87–92.

⁵ Table of events with acknowledgements to Scherberich 2009, 128–9 and to the table in *CAH VII.1*, 1984, 509–11. Cf. Meadows 2013, 103–9, arguing for a single Aitolian campaign in the spring–early summer 220; detailed table of Philip’s winter campaign at pp.113–15.

⁶ Dorimachos’ mission is dated after Doson’s death but a more precise dating is difficult to establish. In *CAH VII.1*, 1984, 509, it is dated in the summer; also Grainger 1999, 255. Scholten 2000, 203 and 277, n.87 dates it in the autumn, after the Aitolian elections; Scherberich 2009, 106, 128, remains uncertain.

⁷ For the date see Scholten 277, n.87; *contra* Walbank 1988, 370, who dates it in late 221.

⁸ Polybius (4.7.1–2) employs the phrase *συνελθόντες δ’ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*, which shows that this *synodos* was a primary assembly (Aymard 1938a, 220–5, 253 and n.6; Walbank 1957, 455–6; Giovannini 1969, 12).

⁹ Polyb. 4.10.2. Walbank 1957, 458, suggests that these troops were *epilektoi*, the same as in Polyb. 5.91.6.

¹⁰ It is not certain that there were no Megalopolitans in the 3,300 under Aratos: Walbank 1957, 461.

¹¹ Probably after the death of Kleomenes: Polyb. 4.35.9–15; Cartledge 2002b, 62.

¹² Eperatos was elected in late February but entered office in May: Aymard 1938a, 251–2; Walbank 1957, 535; 1988, 378. For the time of entry into office of the Achaian *stratēgos* see Polyb. 5.30.7 and 4.37.2; the election could take place ‘between February and May inclusive’ (Walbank 1957, 455), and the *stratēgos* entered office in May. At some point between 217 and 208 the *stratēgos* started entering office in the autumn. See Aymard 1938a, 239–62, 269–70; Larsen (1955, 92–3); Walbank 1957, 538 and 1984a, 245; Errington 1969, 249; the *stratēgos* for 208/7 was Philopoimen.

¹³ Troops were also left in Sparta (Polyb. 5.21.1); Walbank (1957, 556) suggests that they must have amounted to another 2,000.

¹⁴ Polybius (5.95.7) writes *ἐπισυναγαγόντες τοὺς Δυμαίους καὶ τοὺς Πατρεῖς καὶ Φαραεῖς*; the definite article indicates that full levies were raised.

¹⁵ Philip had summoned the *ekklesia* at Aigion with a view to asking for the Confederacy’s help but then persuaded the magistrates to transfer the *ekklesia* to Sikyon (Polyb. 5.1.6–9). This affords evidence of how much the meeting place could matter and that attendance varied accordingly (at least in this period). Polybius reports that at Aigion, those around Aratos were ill-disposed (τοὺς μὲν περὶ Ἀρατον ἐθέλοκακοῦντας) towards Philip because of the machinations in the recent elections which had led to the election of Eperatos to the *stratēgia*. Furthermore, it appears that Aratos and his son were not present at Aigion. Hence the transfer to Sikyon would give Philip the opportunity to meet both of them, as in fact happened, and talk them

round to his case: Aymard 1938a, 309. It seems that until then extraordinary assemblies were held at Aigion (like the *synodoi*), ‘according to the laws’ (Polyb. 5.1.7). The use of the plural indicates custom, which could be ignored when circumstances called for it, as in the War of Kleomenes (Aymard 1938a, 308–10); see also Ghinati 1960, 361.

¹⁶ Larsen 1968, 346; Errington 1967, 23–4.

¹⁷ Pédech (1964, 162) notes that if the Aitolians were aiming at full-scale war, then their behaviour is inexplicable.

¹⁸ Possibly Euripidas’ force consisted of Eleans or mercenaries in their service, given that Polybius (4.59.1) vaguely writes that Euripidas had been dispatched as a *stratēgos* for the Eleans: ἦν ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς τοῖς Ἠλείοις.

¹⁹ Lykos was *hypostratēgos* of the *synteleia Patrikē* in 217/6: Polyb. 5.94.1 and Walbank 1957, 624–5. It is uncertain whether there existed, as in other confederacies, more than one *synteleia*. With particular regard to Aratos’ scheme, Walbank (1933, 149 and n.1) writes of ‘three divisions, the western cities facing Aetolia and Elis, the eastern cities facing Sparta, and the Arcadian section facing Elis and Sparta...the name for such a military subdivision of the League was Synteleia’. Corsten (1999, 165–77) argues for five districts in the second half of the 3rd century and until c.208/7 (mainly on the basis of *IG* IV².1.73, the list of *nomographoi* from Epidaurios; see Ch. 5, n.30), which were then redrawn into three, around Megalopolis, Patrai and Argos respectively. According to Corsten, evidence for a *synteleia* of Megalopolis is provided by *I. Magnesia* 38 (*Syll.*³ 559 / Maier 1959, I, no.34 / Rigsby 1996, no.88), dating soon after 208 and acknowledging *aylia* for Magnesia on the Maiander. This is probably a decree of Megalopolis (Roy 2003b, 123–4) and appended to it are the names of another fourteen Arkadian *poleis* as well as of three Achaian, and Phleious – all described as Arkadian. Errington (1969, 272–5) argues that the Arkadians retained their collective, ethnic name for religious purposes and views the appendix as a special concession to Megalopolis. On the other hand, Roy (2003b, 126–8) accepts that Arkadian sentiments were still strong in the late 3rd century but argues, rightly in our view, that there is nothing to suggest consultation between Megalopolis and the other Arkadian *poleis*, and that the collective name was attributed by the Magnesian *theōroi*; *contra* Rigsby (2001, 185) suggests that the subscriptions to the Megalopolitan decree may reflect the survival of an Arkadian Confederacy ‘if only to maintain the federal cult’. For a review of the problem see Rizakis 2003, 102–4, 106.

²⁰ Mackil (2015, 497) stresses the willingness of these *poleis* ‘to hold the *Koinon* to the terms of its bargain’, the bargain being financial contributions in return for defence above all. A decree of Dyme (now lost) conferring citizenship upon numerous foreigners, who fought with the Dymaians in the war and contributed to the salvation of the city (ll.7–10), is most probably related to the events of 219; the honorands could be identified with the mercenaries hired by the Dymaians or the garrison left at Dyme by Philip V a year later or could even be resident aliens: *Syll.*³ 529 / Rizakis 1990, 123–9, no.II; discussion of the identity of the honorands at pp.127–9; *id.* 2008a, 49–54, no.4; review of the relevant bibliography at p.53. Gauthier (1985, 200–1) and Rizakis (1990, 127–9) ascribe the decree to a wider policy of population reinforcement by the *poleis* in order to withstand aggression.

²¹ Philip spent 219 campaigning in Epeiros and Akarnania. Then he had to rush to Macedon to repulse a Dardanian attack (Polyb. 4.64–66.6).

²² Walbank 1957, 524, suggests that there might have been Achaian losses at Psophis.

²³ Walbank (1957, 561) notes that the private mercenaries employed by the Achaian *poleis* will scarcely have been maintained after the winter campaign.

²⁴ Skerdilaidas joined the Hellenic Alliance in late 220/early 219, offering the advantage of a strong fleet: Polyb. 4.29.2–7; Scherberich 2009, 132–4.

²⁵ Walbank 1957, 625. Leontion was located north of Erymanthos; see Rizakis 2008a, 145 and Morgan and Hall 2004, 483.

²⁶ Aymard 1938a, 88–94; Giovannini 1969, 9; O’Neil 1980, 42.

²⁷ According to Polybius, part of the Megalopolitans were asking for a reduction of the walls to match the size of the population and make the city defensible; the same people were calling the landowners to give one third of their land to those who did not have enough to be citizens. Polybius also states, quite vaguely, that the most serious cause of the dispute were the laws of the Peripatetic philosopher Prytanis who had been sent by Antigonos Doson. See Urban 1979, 195–200; also Walbank 1957, 624.

²⁸ On its location see Rizakis 1995, 188–9; Morgan and Hall 2004, 486.

²⁹ At least four Messenians became Aitolian *proxenoi* in the 220s: *IG* IX.1².1.31, ll.32–7 (A f); Fossey (1996, 161) thinks that there had been seven; also Scholten 2000, 196; Mack (2015, 290, Table 1, 1.8.1 and n.13) draws attention to the fact that four of the honorands in these lines are not given an ethnic, three of them in a row. These three precede the four Messenians.

³⁰ By this formulation we should understand the *polis* by Mt. Ithome, i.e. Messene: see Luraghi 2015, 288, on its significance.

³¹ See also the text in *IG* V.2.419 / *SV*A III, 495 and *IP*Ark 28 (both using *Syll*.³ 472) / Ager 1996, no.40 (employing *IG* V.2.419) / Magnetto 1997, no.38 (employing *IP*Ark 28). The crucial difference between *IG* V.2.419 and *Syll*.³ 472 is in ll. 1–2: the former has διαλϋόντες whereas the latter has διαλ[λακται, which is Hiller von Gaertringen’s restoration in *Syll*.³ 472, l. 2. Daverio Rocchi (1988, 162–4, no.16; reproducing *Syll*.³ 472, ll.1–21) thinks that the agreement might simply represent a systematization of relations.

³² For the date see Magnetto 1997, 235 and Scholten 2000, 120–1.

³³ The Aitolians did not act as arbiters; the term διαλ[λακται is not another term for ‘judges’; see Tod 1913, 9, no.V; Ager 1996, 123; esp. Magnetto 1997, 233–4 and Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 48.

³⁴ Gauthier (1972, 368) argues that in this particular case the term *symbolē* bore a more general meaning than the customary one (i.e. an agreement applying to individual cases) and it would involve Aitolian interests as well.

³⁵ See Gawantka 1975, 67, n.60, laying emphasis on the ἐκατέρως in l.15.

³⁶ Roebuck (1941, 68, n.10) suggests that the territory involved would be on the north slopes of the Phigaleian mountains; more plausibly, Thür and Taeuber, *IP*Ark, p.300: the southern slopes of Elaion and the upper valley of the river Elektra; see also Valmin 1930, 26–7.

³⁷ [ις• εἰ δὲ κα μὴ ἐν]μένωντι οἱ Φιαλέες ἐν τῇ φυλ | [ἴαι τῇ πὸτ τὼς Μ]εσσανίως καὶ Αἰτωλῶς, ἄκυρος ἔ[στι] ὅσοις ἂν ὁ ὁμοιογία. See Larsen 1968, 203; Magnetto 1997, 234; Scholten 2000, 121.

³⁸ Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 49–50, no.7) dates it shortly after the incorporation. Daverio Rocchi (1988, 164, no.16) suggests that regulation of boundaries between Phigaleia and Messenia could have occurred in 221 when the Aitolian Dorimachos was

dispatched to Phigaleia to guard the *chōra* and the *polis* of the Phigaleians (Polyb. 4.3.7). Dating to the same period as *IG* V.1.1430, *IG* V.1.1429A regulates boundaries between Messene and an unknown state, perhaps Megalopolis (in l. 7 there is restored [Μεσσα]νίοις περὶ τῆς [χ]ώρας ποτὶ Μεγ[αλοπο]λίτας). V. Bardani (pers. comm.) firmly argues that these two inscriptions were engraved by the same stonecutter (she has shown me characteristic letters) and that they might even belong to the same stone (on the basis of the letters, the stones themselves and their thickness); she also dates them to the mid-2nd century or even later. Ager (1996, 123–4 and n.3 with bibliography) tentatively suggests that *IG* V.1.1429 and *IG* V.1.1430 might belong to the late 240s but does not exclude a date in the early 2nd century.

³⁹ In 1936 (68, n.30) Walbank wrote that ‘by the time of the Social war the *isopoliteia* had become *sympoliteia*’. Later on, Walbank (1957, 243) wrote that the bond between Aitolia and Phigaleia was probably an *isopoliteia*, on the basis of Polybius’ inconsistent use of the terms; similarly, Larsen 1967, 203.

⁴⁰ Schmitt, *SV* III, p.184.

⁴¹ Walbank (1957, 452) expresses his doubts as to the *de facto* existence of this alliance in 221 because it had been based on an anti-Spartan interest which the Aitolians did not have as late as 221.

⁴² See Ch. 6, p.206 and n.6.

⁴³ The *isopoliteia* with the Phigaleians would also allow any Messenian to acquire Aitolian citizenship by moving to Phigaleia (Roebuck 1941, 68; Larsen 1968, 203; Gauthier 1972, 367; Magnetto 1997, 235).

⁴⁴ See this chapter, n.29.

⁴⁵ Larsen (1968, 327 and n.1) thinks that Kyparissia might have also become a member of the Achaian Confederacy before 220, putting forward the following arguments: 1) The Kyparissians repulsed on their own the Aitolian attack in summer 217 (Polyb. 5.92.5); 2) membership of Pylos would have been ‘almost unthinkable unless also some intervening territory was also Achaean’. Larsen’s arguments presuppose that Messene was capable of co-ordinating military action and that it was strong enough to prevent another community from pursuing its own policy – both suppositions are quite dubious. Furthermore, Luraghi (2008, 262, n.50) points out that it would have been impossible for the Messenians to send ships against Kephallenia in summer 218 if they did not control the harbour of Kyparissia.

⁴⁶ See Livy 27.30.13 and Polyb. 18.42.7, on the Aitolians claiming return of Pylos to the Messenians in 209. The Messenians again laid claim to Pylos (and Asine) after the end of the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.42.7).

⁴⁷ See Polyb. 2.5.2, on pirates raiding Elis and Messenia during the First Illyrian War (230–228); Paus. 4.35.6–7, on pirates raiding ‘the Mothonaia’. Marasco (1980b, 120–1) thinks that the Messenians themselves had handed over Pylos to the Achaian Confederacy in order to protect it from the raids of Illyrian pirates, but see the justified objections of Luraghi 2008, 258 and n.31, on the basis of the repeated Messenian claims to Pylos.

⁴⁸ Will (1982, 71) suggests that Dorimachos might have aimed at forging an alliance between Elis, Messene and Sparta (also Walbank 1984b, 474). If so, it is rather strange that he does not appear to have made a move towards either Elis or Sparta – admittedly, this does not exclude the possibility of meetings with Eleans and Spartans at Phigaleia.

⁴⁹ There was access from Phigaleia to Messenia via Mt. Tetrazi: Scholten 2000, 122.

⁵⁰ Fine (1940, 154) thinks that one reason for the deterioration of relations between the Aitolians and the Messenians was the negotiations between the Spartans and the Aitolians. It is a reasonable hypothesis but one that perhaps lays too much emphasis on Spartan-Messenian relations; *id.* at p.157, thinks that Dorimachos was sent to undermine the pro-Achaian party in Messenia; Roebuck 1941, 72, writes that the assault on Messenia was a 'studied provocation'.

⁵¹ On the *apoklētoi* see Funke 2015, 112–14.

⁵² Walbank (1940, 24–5) argues that Ariston's illness was only temporary since in spring 220 he was at Kyllene (Polyb. 4.6.8, 9.9). Scholten (2000, 201 and esp. 279–80) argues that Dorimachos and Skopas probably held elective offices, those of *grammateus* and *hipparchos* respectively; they certainly held the next two *stratēgiai*. See also Grainger 1999, 252–3, for the alignment in the policies of Ariston, Dorimachos and Skopas; Scherberich 2009, 109; also Fine 1940, 157–8, on the Aitolian support for Dorimachos.

⁵³ A small band occupied Klarion in the Megalopolitis but Timoxenos, the Achaian *stratēgos* and the Macedonian commander Taurion soon recaptured it (Polyb. 4.6.3–5); Walbank 1940, 25, n.5, suggests that Klarion probably lay between Phigaleia and Megalopolis. It is not certain that Dorimachos and Skopas were responsible for this because, as Scholten (2000, 278) has pointed out, Klarion is not mentioned in the list of complaints presented to the Achaian *synodos* of May 220; he further suggests that this band could consist of 'unrestrained' resident aliens in Aitolia; see also Grainger 1999, 258.

⁵⁴ Polybius writes that Dorimachos and Skopas levied the full Aitolian force but, as Walbank (1957, 455) has observed, this must be an exaggeration because in this case Aitolia would have remained undefended. Still, the force must have been considerable. There is no compelling reason to reject Polybius' testimony completely, as Grainger (1999, 260) does. Choosing to disembark at Rhion, i.e. on Achaian territory, might be a way of testing Achaian reactions, as Grainger thinks, but the fact that they later accepted Aratos' ultimatum to evacuate Messenia shows that the Aitolians had not decided to engage in war with the entire Hellenic Alliance (Scholten 2000, 204).

⁵⁵ Fine 1940, 156–7; Walbank 1984b, 475; Scholten 2000, 281.

⁵⁶ Walbank 1940, 26; Scholten 2000, 283; Luraghi 2008, 259. Fine (1940, 160) and Walbank (1940, 26) believe that this demand was made with a view to securing both Messenian and Spartan allegiance. Roebuck (1941, 74, n.32) argues that it would 'tend to weaken Aratos' hold over Messene but if it helped secure Spartan support the aims of the Achaean League would be furthered'. This view presupposes that Spartan politics at the time were mainly dependent on Messenian policies, which is not the case. Roebuck, however, is right in thinking that the Messenians would not be very pleased with Aratos.

⁵⁷ The third Achaian *synodos* of the year: Aymard 1938a, 263–4; Walbank 1957, 461–2.

⁵⁸ Fine (1940, 162) argues that the Aitolians were trying to avoid war against the Hellenic Symmachy as a whole; Roebuck (1941, 76) thinks that they tried to keep the matter between them and the Achaian Confederacy; on the other hand, Larsen (1968, 333–4) views the Aitolian decision as a challenge to war. Scherberich (2009, 114) plausibly suggests that the Aitolians objected to Messenian membership of the Hellenic Alliance, not just to their alliance with the Achaian Confederacy.

⁵⁹ It is not clear whether these attacks on Boiotia and Phokis occurred before or

after the Achaian embassy to Philip (Scherberich 2009, 115 and n.62; Scholten 2000, 202–3 and n.6).

⁶⁰ See this chapter, n.53.

⁶¹ Scholten 2000, 210; Scherberich 2009, 124–5; Dmitriev 2011, 137–8; Mackil 2013, 118.

⁶² Messenian neutrality affords evidence as to the privilege of members of the Hellenic Alliance to remain neutral: Roebuck 1941, 77 and n.48. See also Scherberich 2009, 126–8, on the reactions of the other allies, especially the absence of the Boiotians and the Phokians from the war; only the Achaians, the Akarnanians and the Thessalians followed without any reservations.

⁶³ Grainger 1999, 272; Luraghi 2008, 258.

⁶⁴ On the importance of Kephallenia for control of the sea-passage between Rhion and western Achaia see Walbank 1933, 138–9 and 1940, 53.

⁶⁵ Cf. Mendels (1980, 248–9) who associates the change of policy with a change of regime.

⁶⁶ Walbank 1957, 556; Piper 1986, 85–6.

⁶⁷ See pp.253–4; Shimron 1972, 69–74; Piper 1986, 78–80; Paschidis 2008a, 263–7. Polybius (4.34.5–11) presents the older Spartans in favour of the Macedonian alliance while it was the younger citizens who were against. The former initially persuaded the Spartan assembly to maintain their alliance with Macedon, employing as argument the Aitolian plundering of Lakonia and the benefactions of Antigonos Doson. This indirectly shows that these citizens were very happy without kings, or at least without Kleomenes. However, the pro-Aitolian party did not accept the decision of the assembly and, much as Kleomenes had done, murdered the ephors (in the temple of Athena Chalkioikos), sent into exile the leading anti-Aitolians and appointed another set of ephors (Polyb. 4.35.1–5).

⁶⁸ Pozzi 1970, 400; Shimron 1972, 73; Piper 1986, 82; Cartledge 2002b, 62. According to Polybius, Lykourgos bribed each ephor with one talent to pass over members of the Eurypontid family. Probably in summer 217, Lykourgos forced Agesipolis off the throne (Livy 34.26.12–14; Pozzi 1970, 408, n.157; Piper 1986, 87; Cartledge 2002b, 64).

⁶⁹ Polybius (36.1–2, 6) presents the Aitolian envoy Machatas as a catalyst of war. According to Polybius, Machatas persuaded the Spartans that war against the Achaian Confederacy would end the policies of those in Sparta and Aitolia who were opposing the alliance. This observation lays emphasis on Spartan internal problems and deliberately ignores the fact that a large part of the Spartans had no wish to remain in the Hellenic Alliance.

⁷⁰ See Ch. 6, p.212 and n.34.

⁷¹ According to Shimron (1972, 152–3), c.100 citizens were added to the army annually; see also Walbank 1957, 485; Piper 1986, 82; Cartledge 2002b, 63.

⁷² Paschidis (2008a, 272–3) argues convincingly that this change of policy was dictated by the circumstances, and we should not associate it with a takeover of Messenian policies by moderate democrats; cf. Roebuck (1941, 69–70, 77–9) and Walbank (1940, 72, n.3 and 1957, 541) who follow Polybius in viewing peace (avoidance of war) as an objective of the oligarchs; notably, Roebuck (at p.79) speaks of only ‘a change of personnel in the magistracies’.

⁷³ Walbank (1933, 140–1 and 1940, 53) more plausibly suggests that Leontios aimed

at the subjugation of Sparta and the use of Achaian money (based on an agreement in summer 218; see Polyb. 5.1.6–12). This is part of the so-called ‘conspiracy of Apelles’, allegedly against Philip, Aratos and the Achaian Confederacy; see Polyb. 4.76, 82, 84–6; 5.4.10–13, 5.5–11, 15–16, 28.4–29.1; also Plut. *Arat.* 48.1–3. Walbank 1933 (134–47) and 1940 (47–9, 51–3, 56–61) views Aratos’ role as of primary importance; for a convincing refutation see Errington 1967, 21–6, 35–6 and 2008, 183–4; see also Walbank’s revised view in 1988, 381–3; also Paschidis 2008a, 249–50. See Hatzopoulos 1996, 299–302, on the legality of the procedure followed by Philip towards the alleged conspirators. See Pédech (1964, 231–2) on Polybius’ view of the court’s influence on Philip’s personality.

⁷⁴ See this chapter, p.300 and n.122.

⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards Lykourgos also occupied the Tegean *asty* briefly but failed to capture the akropolis (Polyb. 5.17.1–2); see p.454.

⁷⁶ Roebuck (1941, 80 and n.70) thinks that ‘on the whole it seems probable’ that Kalamai was returned to Messene because there is no recorded Messenian claim to it. On the other hand, Grandjean (2003, 79, n.121) thinks it is possible that it remained Spartan because the peace was concluded on the *uti possidetis* basis.

⁷⁷ According to Walbank (1940, 21) and Marasco (1981, 514), statues of Antigonos Doson and Philip V at Olympia, both crowned by the figure of Hellas (Paus. 6.16.3), may indicate that some sort of rapprochement had been achieved with Macedon after 222, perhaps through a separate peace treaty. However, the hypothesis of Le Bohec (1993, 456–7) that the dedication was made by the Hellenic Alliance is rather more attractive. Things are further complicated by the fact that next to Hellas, Elis was crowning Demetrios Poliorketes and Ptolemy I. Jacquemin (2002, 212–13) sees the statues as a result of Panhellenic action, associated with Olympia, first in the late 4th century and then re-invigorated in the 220s.

⁷⁸ Polyb. 4.36.6: ἐπεισαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἡλείους οἱ περὶ τὸν Μαχατᾶν, παραπλήσια λέγοντες ἄπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (‘those with Machatas persuaded the Eleans, by arguments similar to those they had employed at Sparta’).

⁷⁹ Patterson 2010, 133–5; Funke 2015, 91–2.

⁸⁰ See Ch. 4, p.127 and n.48.

⁸¹ Golan (1987–88, 253–5) thinks that the Eleans preferred to preserve full independence but there is precious little in the sources to substantiate his claim that an alliance was formed as soon as the Aitolians stopped pressing for an *isopoliteia*.

⁸² Lists of honorands in Fossey 1996 and Mack 2015, 288–91, Table 1.

⁸³ Rice (1975) views Elis as ‘a dependent state’ (at p.31), in ‘an unusual condition of subjection’ (at p.69); see also, 26, 32, 56, 77–8, 83.

⁸⁴ See Rizakis (2008a, 25, 27, and nn.13–14 at p.280) on late tradition recording hostility between Dyme and Elis in the Archaic period, and on Dyme serving as the winter quarters of the Spartan king Pausanias and his army in 402–400, in the war of Sparta against Elis (Diod. Sic. 15.75.12).

⁸⁵ On the location of Dyme see Paus. 8.1.2–3; Rizakis 1995, 107, 231 and 2008a, 25; Morgan and Hall 2004, 481; on its importance in general, see Mendoni 1991, 70.

⁸⁶ Walbank 1957, 514, 536; Rizakis 1995, 272–4, 293; 2008a, 28 and nn.36–7 at p.282.

⁸⁷ The war was caused by the refusal of king Augeias to reward Herakles for clearing his stables; see Walbank 1957, 514.

⁸⁸ See Rizakis (1990, 128 and n.82) on the special interest of Philip in Dyme.

⁸⁹ Treves (1949, col. 693) tentatively dates Pantarkes' help to the beginning of the Demetrian War (239–229), when Illyrians in the service of Demetrios II were raiding the Peloponnese. Treves further suggests that the Aitolians included the Eleans in their peace treaty with the Achaian Confederacy (see Ch. 5, p.169 and n.96). See also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 283–4; Zoumbaki 2005, 289, Π 7. But Pausanias writes that Pantarkes arranged for the release of those who were captured from either side *while they were at war*: καὶ ὅσοι παρ' ἀμφοτέρων πολεμούντων ἐαλώκεσαν, ἄφεισιν καὶ τούτοις γενέσθαι.

⁹⁰ Jacquemin (2002, 205) underlines that the Achaian statue in Pantarkes' honour did not celebrate his athletic prowess.

⁹¹ See Ch. 1, p.5 and n.22.

⁹² See Ch. 1, p.15 and nn.107–8.

⁹³ See Zoumbaki (2005, 313–15, Π 50, with bibliography) on the date, historicity and possible interpretations of Pausanias' passage; also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 298; Jacquemin 2002, 218–19.

⁹⁴ Roy (2000a, 141) argues that Pausanias probably alludes to a dispute with an Arkadian *polis* rather than 'the frontier of a unified Arkadia'.

⁹⁵ Golan (1987–88, 251–2) thinks that the Eleans sought the Aitolian alliance in order to lay their hands on Triphylia and other territories.

⁹⁶ Bölte 1928, cols. 776–8; Walbank 1957, 529.

⁹⁷ Scholten (2000, 120, n.107) notes that one can use an ἐπιτείχισμα for either offensive or defensive action, in which case Polysperchon could have been operating after the annexation of Triphylia. Scholten rightly notes (n.109) that Pausanias' use of the term 'Arkadians' cannot be used as evidence that Polysperchon's operations took place before the admission of Arkadian *poleis* into the Achaian Confederacy.

⁹⁸ Walbank 1936, 67 and 1957, 237, 531; Will 1979, 297.

⁹⁹ Urban (1979, 87, n. 412), suggests that Alipheira might have been offered as a means of ransoming prisoners, in which case one wonders how would these prisoners have fallen into Elean hands. Polybius (4.77.10) draws a distinction between the way the Eleans acquired Triphylia (ἐπικρατήσαντες) and the way in which they acquired Alipheira (προσελάβοντο). So it appears that at least in the case of Alipheira they did not employ force of arms, i.e. they did not fight against Megalopolis.

¹⁰⁰ Ed. pr. Orlandos, 1967–68, 152–7, photo at p. 152, text at p.153, no.2 (cf. Woodhead in *SEG* 25.448). Subsequent editions are based on Orlandos' photo of 1935: see Robertson 1976, 261, n.13, on the problem.

¹⁰¹ Robertson offers 'very tentative' restorations in ll.3–4 (= *SEG* 26.470), very different from those in *IPAr* 25. However, Thür and Tauber tentatively accept the decree as Elean; also Ager 1996, 111–12 (no.37) and Magnetto 1997, 208–11, esp. p.210 (no.35).

¹⁰² See Ch. 6 p.211 and n.32.

¹⁰³ Cf. Roy (1999a, 166) who thinks that Psophis (and Lasion) were allied with Elis but of an inferior status.

¹⁰⁴ On the number of the captives see Polyb. 4.69.7. On the total number of the Eleans in this campaign see Walbank 1988, 376; but cf. *id.* 1957, 523, noting that the size of a company varies.

¹⁰⁵ Walbank 1957, 524; Roy 2004, 499.

¹⁰⁶ Walbank 1957, 525; Nielsen 2004a, 533.

¹⁰⁷ Walbank 1940, 49; Ducrey 1999, 90–1, 236.

¹⁰⁸ On Amphidamos see Zoumbaki 2005, 79–80, A 56.

¹⁰⁹ On the walls of Alipheira see Orlandos 1967–68, 27–41; on the capture of Alipheira by Philip see the detailed analysis by Pikoulas 1983b, esp. 49–53, 55.

¹¹⁰ For the date see Robertson 1976, 266 and n.28.

¹¹¹ See also Dubois 1988 II, 248–54 / Ager 1996, 226–8, no.82 / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.6. Thür and Taeuber restore ἐπικλαρω[θέντες?] in ll. 29–30 which is more plausible than the ἐνίκλ in the editio princeps by Orlandos 1967–68, 159, 164, nos. 3 and 4 or the ἐνίκα by A. G. Woodhead in *SEG* 25.449.

¹¹² Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 46.

¹¹³ The Arkadian dialect is employed; see Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 45; also the commentary by Orlandos 1967–68, 159–62, 164–7.

¹¹⁴ Walbank 1957, 532; *contra id.* 1933, 135, 154.

¹¹⁵ In late summer/early autumn 218 and again in summer 217 there had been attempts at peace by third parties: Rhodes and Chios the first time, to which Byzantion and Ptolemy IV were added the second time (Polyb. 5.24.11–12, 28.1–3, 100.9–11). On the substantial record of the Rhodians as arbiters, see Ager 1991, esp. p. 15 on their intervention in the Social War; Errington 2008, 170, for a summary presentation of possible motives of the mediators.

¹¹⁶ Walbank 1940, 68–9; Champion 1997, 119–24.

¹¹⁷ The Romans crossed the Adriatic first in 229, to protect traders from Illyrian raids. In the course of their expedition they freed Kerkyra, Apollonia and Epidamnus. Demetrios of Pharos, commander of the Illyrian garrison at Kerkyra, surrendered to the Romans who effectively made him ruler of Illyria; the Illyrians under Queen Teuta made a treaty with the Romans agreeing not to sail south of Lissos (Polyb. 2.2–12). Subsequently, Demetrios (along with Skerdilaidas) violated the treaty and was defeated in the so-called Second Illyrian War (in 219; Polyb. 3.16, 18–19); he then fled to Philip's court. On the Illyrian Wars see Holleaux 1921, 99–112, 130–9; Harris 1979, 195–7; Gruen 1984, 359–73; Errington 1989a, 85–94; 2008, 97–8, 182; Derow 2003, 51–4.

¹¹⁸ See Mørkholm (1967 245–53 and *id.* 1974) who argues that the speech is a composition of Polybius, and Deininger 1973 who argues for its authenticity; also Walbank 1957, 629 and 1972, 68–71 with notes; Pédech 1964, 264, 282, 296, 506–7; 256–302 on the speeches in Polybius.

¹¹⁹ Walbank 1972, 68–9, n.11.

¹²⁰ Walbank 1988, 389–90 and n.3. Champion (1997, 114–19) defends the historical character of the speech, emphasizing the use of oral tradition by Polybius and arguing that the latter 'selected and embellished a tradition about Agelaos' speech that advanced his own theory of the *symplokē*'; see esp. p. 112 with notes, for discussion of previous bibliography. Gruen (1984, 321–4) writes of 'the cloud-image' and ascribes it to the historian's conception. Wooten (1974, 236, 238–9) notes that Agelaos' speech is one of the very few quoted in complete direct discourse by Polybius (4 out of 29 Greek speeches), as well as the speech's effectiveness, with its move 'from the general to the particular' and its figurative style; Wooten (at p.250) sees the influence of Demosthenes in the use of striking metaphors. Dmitriev (2011, 148–51) discusses

previous bibliography and views the speech as a display of panhellenism, in keeping with ideas current in the late 3rd century.

¹²¹ For the metaphor going back to Homer, see Walbank 1957, 629.

¹²² See in general Roebuck 1941, 81–4; Walbank 1967, 57 and 1988, 396–8; Grandjean 2003, 79–80; Paschidis 2008a, 272–4.

In either summer/autumn 215 or spring 214 (Walbank 1967, 56), Philip first and Aratos a day later arrived at Messene, right in the middle of a *stasis*. According to Plutarch (*Arat.* 49.2–3), Philip encouraged both parties against each other and this led to a massacre of the archons and nearly 200 others by the people and their leaders (the *demagōgoi*). Following Aratos' advice, and against the advice of Demetrios of Pharos, Philip refrained from occupying Mt. Ithome. Aratos' advice was to keep the citadel with Messenian consent, if he could, not by seizing it, because this would cost him the trust of the allies. Walbank (1933, 155–6 and 1940, 73–4), lays emphasis on Aratos' implicit threat. But would even the Peloponnesian allies really care for a city that had largely remained aloof from Peloponnesian affairs, and especially when Philip had so recently proved an able commander? And regardless of the feelings of the allies, one suspects here again that Aratos' advice was dictated by a wish not to see Macedon extending its control over Peloponnesian territories. Indeed, Demetrios' advice, if true, pointed in that direction: 'it is only by holding both his horns that you can keep the ox under' (Plut. *Arat.* 50.4) meaning by the horns Akrokorinthos and Mt. Ithome and by the ox the Peloponnese. However, this remark could very well be ascribed to a Messenian source, given that it credits the Messenian citadel with the same importance as Akrokorinthos, the most important Macedonian holding in the Peloponnese for more than a century. However, later on, possibly in 214/3, the Messenians had to face two Macedonian attacks, one conducted by Philip himself and another by Demetrios of Pharos (Polyb. 3.19.11 and 8.12.1; Plut. *Arat.* 51.2; Paus. 4.29.1–5; Orsi 2000, 261; see also Ch. 4, p.136 and n.83). Walbank (1940, 72–4) argues that Philip's actions were dictated by the need to prevent Aitolian intervention in Messene. It is plausible that Macedonian aggression motivated the Messenians to secede from the Hellenic Alliance but evidence is lacking.

¹²³ See also Paus. 2.9.4. See the speech of Aristainos in 198 on Philip's crimes against Athens, Kios and Abydos (Livy 32.21.21). Philip V is depicted as a murderer in two poems of Alkaïos of Messene, of uncertain date (*Anthologia Palatina* ix.519 and xi.12.); see Walbank (1943, 3–9, 12–13) who dates the poems after 198, having pointed out that Alkaïos was not always hostile towards Philip; Alkaïos' change is explained by Walbank as the result of the fact that Philip had ceased to be a guardian of Peloponnesian freedom.

Relations between Aratos and Philip might have deteriorated after Aratos' refusal to participate in Philip's Illyrian campaign (Plut. *Arat.* 51.1). But this reason is not good enough to lead to murder. Walbank (1933, 157 and 1988, 398) sees Aratos' death as probably the result of lung disease.

¹²⁴ Livy 35.28.1–7 echoing Polybius; Chaniotis 2005, 24, 32.

THE DISASTROUS UNIFICATION OF THE PELOPONNESE

Concluding his narrative of the Social War, Polybius (5.106.3–6) writes that, although the Peloponnesians are as fond as any of a peaceful life, they have enjoyed it less than any other, ‘their spears never at rest’ (οὔποτε ἦσυχαι δορί: quoting Euripides).¹ Then he goes on to identify the primary cause of warfare in the Peloponnese. The Peloponnesians are ‘both ambitious of supremacy and fond of liberty’: ἅπαντες γὰρ ἡγεμονικοὶ καὶ φιλελεύθεροι. This association of liberty and hegemony is an old one (Walbank 1957, 630–1). Polybius applies hegemonic ambitions to all the Peloponnesians (ἅπαντες), which is not quite accurate. By ‘all’ we should understand those who had been politically united in the Achaian Confederacy and, on the other hand, the Spartans. Thus, we can modify Polybius’ observation as follows: liberty for the Achaian Confederacy was understood to mean domination over Sparta and vice-versa.² This is actually adjusting Gauthier’s observation (1987–89, 190) with regard to individual *poleis*: that for a great *polis*, i.e. one aspiring to hegemony, the perfect degree of freedom is perceived as domination over smaller, i.e. less powerful, *poleis*.

Polybius essentially prepares his readers for the next war in the Peloponnese brought about by hegemonic ambitions, i.e. the protracted, final war between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta. Interstate political relations in the Peloponnese from the late 3rd century to 146 largely consist of this war which is part of the expansion of the Achaian Confederacy over the whole of the Peloponnese. It took place against the background of the so-called Macedonian Wars between Rome and Macedon (and their respective allies) and went on after the abolition of Macedonian monarchy in 168. The Achaian Confederacy seemingly won the day with the incorporation of Sparta in autumn 192 and the subsequent incorporation of Messene and Elis. However, relations with Sparta, and to a much lesser extent with Messene, remained difficult at best for about ten years. After some three decades of at least apparent peace, the final episode in the relations of Sparta, the Achaian Confederacy and Rome, between 150 and 146, led to the conquest of mainland Greece by Rome.

Gruen's observations (1984) are essential for our understanding of Peloponnesian politics and the mentality of the belligerent states in this period. First, he underlines that 'the Greeks remained absorbed in their own affairs' and that the First Macedonian War was 'an almost exclusively' Greek conflict (p.438). Warfare went on in the Peloponnese, after the end of that war, with a new war between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta under Nabis; 'no-one gave a thought to the Republic across the sea – and vice-versa' (p.441). The lack of interest on the Roman part is a controversial subject but the first part of Gruen's argument is generally not to be challenged. In the Second Macedonian War, the Greeks and the Peloponnesians in particular became all too aware of the Romans but their mentality did not change much. 'The goals of individual Greek states – goals of territory, power and ascendancy over other Greek rivals – held chief priority' (p.446). Elaborating on Gruen's remark, we can say that more than being absorbed in its own affairs, the Achaian Confederacy, or at least its Megalopolitan leaders, appear obsessed with Sparta to the exclusion of everything else.

* * *

Table 3:³ Main Events, 210–191 (events pertinent to the relations between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy from 192/1 onwards will be recorded in Table 4, to avoid repetition).

Year / Achaian <i>Stratēgos</i> ⁴	Events	Army figures
211/10 Euryleon		
Spring 210?	First Macedonian War: the Aitolians, the Eleans, the Spartans and the Messenians (and Attalos I of Pergamon) on the Roman side.	
210/9⁵ Kykliadas (1 st <i>stratēgia</i>)	Philopoimen (<i>hipparchos</i>) reforms the cavalry of the Achaian Confederacy.	
Summer 209	The Spartan ruler Machanidas threatens the Achaians with border warfare. At a peace conference at Aigion, the Aitolians ask for the restoration of Pylos to Messenia.	
July/August 209	The Macedonian and the Achaian cavalry defeat the Elean cavalry.	
209/8 Nikias		
Late 209	Achaian victory under Kykliadas over the Eleans and the Aitolians (near Messene).	

Late spring 208 ⁶	Machanidas is encamped near the Argolid frontier.	
208/7 Philopoimen (1 st <i>stratēgia</i>)	Philopoimen reforms the infantry of the Achaian Confederacy.	
Summer 208	The Achaians attack the Eleans during preparations for the Olympic Games. ⁷	
Autumn 208? ⁸	Galba sacks Dyme and enslaves its population; later on (in 206?) Philip V buys the slaves and restores them to their city.	
c.Sept. 207 ⁹	Battle of Mantinea: Achaian victory under Philopoimen over the Spartans. The Achaians reconquer Tegea. Lakonia is invaded by Achaian troops for the first time. Nabis rises to power.	Achaian Confederacy: c.12–14,000 citizens + 8,000 mercenaries; Sparta: roughly the same numbers (including more mercenaries); ¹⁰ Spartan casualties of 4,000.
207/6 Unknown		
Autumn 206	Separate peace of the Aitolians with Philip and the Hellenic Alliance.	
206/5 Philopoimen (2 nd)		
July 205	Philopoimen celebrates his victory over Machanidas at the Nemeia.	
Summer 205	Peace of Phoinike – end of the First Macedonian War; <i>adscriptio</i> of Nabis, the Eleans and the Messenians.	
205/4 Unknown		
Autumn 204? ¹¹	Boiotians (foreigners? soldiers?) induce a groom of Nabis to abduct his best horse; raid of Nabis on Megalopolis.	
202/1 Lysippos		
Summer 201	Nabis attacks Messene, gains control of the whole city except Mt. Ithome; repulsed by Philopoimen and Megalopolitan troops.	
201/0 Philopoimen (4 th or 3 rd ?)		
Spring/summer 200	Invasion and plundering of Lakonia by an Achaian army;	Achaian army: all men of military age + <i>epilektoi</i> .

	victory over Spartan mercenaries in an ambush.
Autumn 200	The Second Macedonian War begins.
200/199 Kykliadas (2 nd ?)	
Autumn 200	Nabis, after devastating his neighbours' fields, is threatening their cities.
October 200?	The Achaian assembly decides to raise an army against Nabis. Philip V's offer of help in return for help against the Romans is rejected. Philopoimen goes to Crete and returns probably in autumn 194. ¹²
Spring/summer 199 ¹³	The Aitolians enter the Second Macedonian War.
199/8 Aristainos (1 st <i>stratēgia</i>)	Megalopolitan abortive attempt to exile Philopoimen; intervention by Aristainos. ¹⁴
late 199/ early 198	Philip restores Orchomenos, Heraia and Triphylia to the Achaian Confederacy while Alipheira is restored to Megalopolis.
October 198	Roman envoys promise to restore Corinth to the Achaian Confederacy. The Achaian Confederacy abandons the Hellenic Alliance and joins Rome; the citizens of Dyme and Megalopolis, and some Argives disagree.
	Unsuccessful siege of Corinth by the standing Achaian army; the Corinthians fight on the Macedonian side.
	Macedonian garrison: 500 Macedonians + 800 mercenaries. Achaian army: the standing army = c. 3,000 (?).
	The Argives demonstrate in favour of Philip V, accept a Macedonian force and evict a recently installed Achaian garrison of 500 youths (while Corinth is under siege).
198/7 Nikostratos	
November 198 ¹⁵	Nikaia (Lokris) conference for peace between Macedon and Rome. Aristainos and Xenophon ask from Philip the restoration of Corinth and Argos; truce for two months; the Senate decides to continue the war.

Late 198/ early 197? ¹⁶	700 Corinthian youths are entrusted by Philip V to Androstenes, commander of Corinth.	
Feb./early March 197 ¹⁷	Philip V offers Argos to Nabis who introduces cancellation of debts and redistribution of land.	
Spring 197	Nabis and Flamininus meet at the <i>Mycenica</i> ; truce with the Achaian Confederacy for four months (?). ¹⁸ Nabis reinforces his troops at Argos and installs Pythagoras as commander. Nabis renounces his alliance with Philip V and joins Rome.	
June 197	Roman victory over Macedon at Kynos Kephalai (without Achaian participation). ¹⁹	
	Achaian victory under Nikostratos over Macedonian troops by the Nemea river. Corinth remains in Macedonian hands.	Macedonian army: 6,000 soldiers including 700 Corinthian youths. Achaian army: 5000 infantry + 300 cavalry + mercenaries.
June/July 197	Conference at Tempe – announcement of provisional peace terms.	
197/6 Unknown		
June/July 196	Flamininus and 10 commissioners are dispatched by the Senate to Greece. The city of Corinth is restored to the Achaian Confederacy but the Romans keep Akrokorinthos, Demetrias and Chalkis. Flamininus proclaims freedom for all the Greeks in Asia and in Europe at the Isthmia festival. The 10 commissioners decide against Elean claims over Triphylia and probably against Messenian claims over Pylos and Asine; Triphylia and Heraia are (re)confirmed to the Achaian Confederacy.	
196/5 Aristainos (2nd)		
Winter 196/5	The Senate decides to leave the matter of Argos to Flamininus' discretion.	
Spring 195	Flamininus summons the allies to Corinth; war is declared against Nabis; The Achaian and the Roman armies march to the Argive plain.	Each member-state should send a contingent according to its strength.

Late spring 195	The Argive Damokles conspires to expel the Spartan garrison under Pythagoras and is killed by the Spartans.	
May 195? ²⁰	The Roman-Achaian army liberates Mykenai from Nabis.	
Summer 195	Flamininus leads the attack against Sparta; Nabis is defeated; Flamininus' army plunders Lakonia. L. Quinctius takes the coastal perioikic towns. Pythagoras, commander of Argos, joins Nabis with 2,000 Argives + 1,000 mercenaries. Aristainos advises Nabis to abdicate. The peace terms offered by Flamininus are rejected by the Spartans; fighting continues.	Roman fleet and army + 1,500 Macedonians + 400 Thessalian cavalry + 10,000 Achaian infantry + 1,000 Achaian cavalry + many Spartan exiles under Agesipolis; Possible participation of the Messenians under Deinokrates. Spartan army: 10,000 Lakedaimonians + 2,000 Cretans (1,000 youths) + 3,000 mercenaries + troops from the garrisons + 2,000 Argives.
	Flamininus lays siege to Sparta, employing his entire force; Romans and allies = 50,000. The Argives, under Archippos, expel the rest of the garrison. Armistice and preliminary peace terms: Nabis withdraws garrisons, surrenders five hostages, loses the perioikic towns, etc.	
195/4 Unknown		
Autumn 195	Flamininus proclaims freedom for Argos at the Nemeia.	
Winter 195/4	The Senate ratifies the peace treaty with Nabis who remains in the <i>amicitia et societas Romana</i> .	
Spring 194 ²¹	The Romans evacuate Akrokorinthos.	
194/3 Unknown	Early 194/3 (?): detachment of communities from Megalopolis with the encouragement of Philopoimen	
Autumn 193	Nabis recovers some of the perioikic <i>poleis</i> (with Aitolian encouragement).	
193/2 Philopoimen (5 th or 4 th ?)		
Early winter 192 ²²	Nabis lays siege to Gytheion and devastates Achaian land.	
February 192	The Achaian Confederacy declares war against Nabis.	

March 192	Naval victory of Nabis over Philopoimen at Gytheion. Philopoimen plunders Tripolis (north Lakonia, near Megalopolis) with a small force of light infantry.	
	Philopoimen assembles the army of the Achaian Confederacy at Tegea; Nabis captures Gytheion. Nabis is forced to retreat to Sparta with his main army.	Achaians and allies: Hoplites + peltasts + cavalry under Lykortas + 600 Cretans under Telemnastos. ²³ Spartan army: Infantry + cavalry + Cretans + Tarentine horse.
April/May 192	The Achaians ravage Lakonia for a month; Flamininus intervenes and negotiates truce; Nabis returns the perioikic towns.	
(early) summer 192 ²⁴	Assassination of Nabis by the Aitolian Alexamenos; the Spartans drive the Aitolians out.	
Autumn 192	Philopoimen has Sparta incorporated into the Achaian Confederacy, having persuaded some and against the will of others.	
192/1 Diophanes		
Late October / November 192 ²⁵	Antiochos III comes to Greece following Aitolian invitation.	
November 192 ²⁶	The Romans declare war against Antiochos. At a <i>synklētos</i> at Aigion, the Achaians vote to have the same friends and enemies as the Romans.	
Winter 192/1	The Eleans (Kallistratos and his group) request help from Antiochos (in Chalkis), they receive 1,000 infantry as a garrison.	
April 24 th 191 ²⁷	Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopylai.	
Between late spring and autumn 191	The Achaian Confederacy asks the Messenians and the Eleans to join. The Eleans temporize while the Messenians refuse; Diophanes plunders the countryside and lays siege to Messene; the Messenians offer <i>deditio</i> to Rome.	
Autumn 191	Flamininus orders Diophanes to lift the siege and the Messenians to take back the exiles and join the Achaian Confederacy; possibly, Messenian cities become independent members of the Achaian Confederacy (Korone, Kolonides, Mothone, Kyparissia ²).	
	Achaian <i>synodos</i> at Aigion about the incorporation of Elis and the Spartan exiles. The Eleans join the Achaian Confederacy either during the <i>synodos</i> or shortly afterwards. ²⁸	

The Romans bearing gifts to the Achaian Confederacy

Corinth and Argos

The Achaian Confederacy participated in the First Macedonian War as a member of the Hellenic Alliance against the Romans whose military practices did not leave the best of impressions. In the Second Macedonian War the Achaian Confederacy changed sides and the Romans eventually assumed the role of regulator of intra-Peloponnesian relations, previously the prerogative of Philip V (and of Doson before him). Roman intervention in the Achaian-Spartan war will be examined in the next section. Here our task is to present a list of the territorial benefits bestowed upon the Achaian Confederacy by the Romans in the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War.

In summer 215, following the Roman defeat at Cannae by the Carthaginians,²⁹ Philip V concluded a treaty of alliance with Hannibal in which the Hellenic Alliance also took part³⁰ (Polyb. 7.9; Livy 23.33.4–34; Dio Cassius 9.4.2; Justin 29.4.1–3; *SVF* III, 528).³¹ Shortly afterwards the Romans declared war against Macedon. Hostilities lasted almost ten years during which the Romans were heavily engaged in the Second Punic War and therefore were not in a position to commit significant forces.³²

Being in need of allies in Greece, the Romans concluded an alliance with the Aitolians in either 212 or 211 (*ISE* 87;³³ Livy 26.24.9–14).³⁴ The Romans would keep only movable property while the Aitolians would keep all the cities conquered by either the Romans or the two jointly, as far north as Kerkyra. The Greek world as a whole and the Peloponnesian states in particular were drawn into the war either as members of the Hellenic Alliance or as allies of the Aitolians.

The Roman-Aitolian alliance was an important development in Peloponnesian affairs, but more on a symbolic level than on a practical one. In 210 the Eleans, the Spartans (Livy 26.24.9) and the Messenians joined the alliance, along with Attalos of Pergamon, and the Illyrians Skerdilaidas and Pleuratos.³⁵ Thus, the ancestral enemies, the Messenians and the Spartans, found themselves in the same camp (Themelis 2003, 28), but this was not translated into joint military operations. However, the most important event of the war, from the perspective of intra-Peloponnesian relations, was the victory of Philopoimen over the Spartan ruler Machanidas and the subsequent invasion of Lakonia (Polyb. 11.10.9–18.10; Plut. *Phil.* 10; Paus. 8.50.2; see pp.333–4). As regards Achaian relations with the Romans and the king of Macedon, the most important events were the ravaging of Sikyon and Corinth (Livy 27.31.1) and, above all, the sack of Dyme and the enslavement of its population by Sulpicius Galba at some point between 210 and 206, possibly in autumn 208.³⁶ Perhaps

in 206, Philip V restored the population and rebuilt the city (Polyb. 9.42.5; Livy 32.22.10). This act generated loyalty to Philip and, we can assume, yet again a sense that the Achaian Confederacy could not protect its own members: a few years later, in autumn 198, the Achaian *stratēgos* Aristainos, being himself from Dyme, reminded the Achaians of their inability to protect the city (Livy 32.21.28). But against Aristainos' view (Rizakis 2008a, 29), the Dymaians initially refused to abandon the Hellenic Alliance and join the Romans in their war against Philip (Livy 32.22.7–9). Incidentally, this act raises the question how far a leading statesman of the Achaian Confederacy represented the views or the interests of his own *polis*.

Due to the limited Roman contribution to the war, the Aitolians were forced to conclude a separate peace treaty with Macedon in 206 (Livy 29.12.1, 4; App. *Mac.* 3.3–4). It is possible that the Spartans, the Eleans and the Messenians were part of the separate Aitolian-Macedonian peace, but there is no record of their participation.³⁷

The Peace of Phoinike between Macedon and Rome (Livy 29.12.8–14; App. *Mac.* 3; *SVF* III, 543) 'redefined the political constellation of Greece' (Derow 2003, 58): the Macedonians and their allies on the one hand, the Romans with their own allies on the other. The Spartan ruler Nabis, the Eleans and the Messenians appear on Livy's list of *foederi adscripti*,³⁸ i.e. 'written into the treaty', which means that they were part of the general peace terms as *amici* of Rome (Livy 29.12.14; Errington 1989a, 105).³⁹ According to the peace terms Philip would retain his conquests in Illyria, with the exception of the Parthini and Dimallum. As it turned out, the conflict between the Romans and Philip had only just began.

The Achaians had their hands full with Nabis of Sparta when, in autumn 200, five years after the end of the First Macedonian War, and only two years after their victory over the Carthaginians, the Romans declared war against Macedon (Livy 31.18.9), seen by Polybius (3.32) as one with the First Macedonian War (Derow 2003, 58–9). Roman motives and, more generally, the nature of Roman imperialism have provoked a long and exciting debate. Defensive or aggressive imperialism, fear of Philip (enhanced by his campaign in the Hellespont and his attack on Athens) and the wish to settle the issue with Macedon once and for all, Philip's agreement with Antiochos III of Syria (in winter 203/2) to divide between themselves the Ptolemaic empire, which threatened to overturn the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean,⁴⁰ ambitions of certain members of the Roman elite – these are the main interpretations of Roman motives for the declaration of the Second Macedonian War.⁴¹

Pergamon, Rhodes and Athens were on the Roman side while the

Aitolians joined the Romans in 199 (Livy 31.40.9–10; Grainger 1999, 364). The Achaian Confederacy, being preoccupied with the war against Nabis, remained neutral for two years. In order to preserve their neutrality the Achaians even rejected Philip's offer to help them against Nabis in exchange for troops to garrison Oreos, Chalkis and Corinth (in October 200; Livy 31.25.3–11).⁴² As Gruen (1984, 444) has observed, the Achaian Confederacy's primary concern was to crush Nabis, not to fight Philip's war.⁴³ Not even Philip's restoration of Heraia, Orchomenos and Triphylia in the winter of 199/8 was enough to keep the Achaian Confederacy on his side (Livy 32.5.4–5).⁴⁴ The handing over of Triphylia must surely have annoyed the Eleans (Grainger 1999, 372) who did not stop entertaining ambitions of re-acquiring the region.

In autumn 198, following a tumultuous meeting at Sikyon,⁴⁵ the Achaian Confederacy, on the advice of its *stratēgos* Aristainos, decided to abandon Philip V and the Hellenic Alliance and take sides with the Romans (Livy 32.19. 5–23.3; Plut. *Phil.* 17.3; *Flam.* 5.3; Paus. 7.8.1–2; App. *Mac.* 7).⁴⁶ Fear that Philip could no longer protect them from either Nabis or the Romans (Livy 32.19.6–10, 21.15–20, 26, 29–31), as well as the Roman promise to restore Corinth (Livy 32.19.1–4; Polyb. 18.45.12), which had been in Macedonian hands since 224 – these were the determining factors.⁴⁷ The fear of Sparta runs through Aristainos' speech, Nabis was the main Achaian concern, but we should not underestimate the importance of ambition for Corinth. In 195, after the Roman victory over Macedon and the restoration of Corinth to the Achaian Confederacy, the Aitolian Alexandros Isios – admittedly hostile – accused the Achaians of unprincipled opportunism which he associated (in the same sentence) with territorial ambitions: they fought with Philip, then they abandoned him when he appeared to be losing the war, they captured Corinth and now (in 195) they were after Argos (Livy 34.23.6).⁴⁸

Immediately after the meeting at Sikyon, the Achaian Confederacy mobilized its standing army (Larsen 1968, 392), i.e. c. 3,000 (see p.277),⁴⁹ and brought it outside the walls of Corinth (Livy 32.23.3–13). However, the Achaian troops were not able to capture Corinth due primarily to the reinforcements sent by Philip (Livy 32.23.11) but also because of the stout resistance of the Corinthians who fought on the side of Androsthenes (commander of the garrison) as if he were their own citizen and elected *stratēgos* (Livy 32.23.5; Walbank 1940, 158). Dixon (2014, 180–1) views this behaviour as a result of the 'symbiotic relationship' developed over the years between Corinthians and Macedonians.⁵⁰ Conversely, we can emphasize the unattractiveness of both the Achaian Confederacy and the Romans. The Achaians had handed over Corinth to Macedon less than

three decades ago, so there must not have been too much love lost on the Corinthian side.

The advent of the Romans also brought to the fore the loose attachment of the Argives to the Achaian Confederacy. Argive bonds with Macedon outweighed loyalty to the Achaian Confederacy – if there had ever been any. The latest manifestation of Macedonian goodwill had occurred at the Nemeia of 209, when Philip had added a few extra days to the festival, at his own expense (Livy 27.30.7–8, 15–17). In October 198 *some* Argives had abandoned the aforementioned meeting at Sikyon refusing to vote for an alliance with Rome (Livy 32.22.7–9). Incidentally, the fact that some Argives stayed in the assembly and voted for the alliance indicates disagreement within the citizen body as to foreign policy. Subsequently, the Argives demonstrated massively in favour of Philip, when, on the day of the elections of the magistrates the usher did not add his name to the names of Zeus, Apollo and Herakles. Either then or immediately after the Roman alliance, an Achaian garrison consisting of 500 youths was swiftly installed (Livy 32.25.3–4, 6).⁵¹ This was not enough to prevent the revolt of the Argives when Macedonian troops arrived to lift the siege of Corinth and then proceeded to Argos asking for the surrender of the garrison (Livy 32.25.1, 7–10). Is it a sign of general military weakness, and unwillingness to take up arms, that the Argives had not made a move to secede from the Confederacy without Macedonian help? Or were those who had voted for the Roman alliance numerous enough to prevent action? In any case, the Achaian Confederacy was deprived of two out of its three most important member-states (Livy 32.25.11) – the third one being Megalopolis. The Megalopolitans also had a long history of cordial relations with Macedon and had also refused to vote for the Roman alliance but there is no evidence of upheaval, perhaps because Polybius avoided recording dissension within the citizen body of his own *polis* or perhaps because no Macedonian troops got there.

Following these events the Achaian Confederacy resorted to diplomatic means. In late autumn 198, at the peace conference in Nikaia (Lokris), Aristainos and Xenophon asked for the restoration of both Corinth and Argos (Polyb. 18.2.5 and Livy 32.33.8) and procured, through the consul Flaminius, Philip's promise that he would restore both (Polyb. 18.8.9–10 and Livy 32.35.11). It is uncertain what the Achaian representatives meant by τὸν Κόρινθον: the city alone or the entire Korinthia, including Akrokorinthos? Aymard's argument (1938b, 118–20) seems the most convincing. The request was deliberately ambiguous: they did not wish to ask the Romans for too much; if the Romans so wished, the Akrokorinthos would be included. It is also unclear what Philip promised to restore.⁵²

However, the war went on and we cannot know whether Philip had any intention of keeping his promise.

The Achaian Confederacy had another go at Corinth. A substantial force of more than 5,000 men, under the *stratēgos* Nikostratos (Livy 33.14–15), inflicted defeat on a Macedonian force of 6,000 men under Androsthenes, including 700 Corinthian youths,⁵³ allegedly on the same day that the Romans defeated the Macedonians at Kynos Kephalai, in June 197.⁵⁴ Livy (33.15.7), transmitting Polybius, proudly records that Androsthenes was bewildered at the appearance of the Achaian forces, because he did not expect them to become the aggressors. This initiative, without Roman support, and the victory signal considerable military progress, a result of the military reforms of Philopoimen (see pp.331–2), set in gear in 209 (Larsen 1968, 396). Because of this victory ‘the whole of Achaia was relieved of great fear’, says Livy (33.15.16), alluding to what had characterized Achaian relations with their former allies for a quarter of a century. On the other hand, the victory did not result in eviction of the garrison, and the Achaian Confederacy had to rely on its superior ally to get Corinth as a gift, in a reversal of what had happened in 224 when it had offered the city and its citadel to Macedon.

Corinth – but not Akrokorinthos – was eventually restored to the Achaian Confederacy in 196. The Romans took up the role of donors of freedom to the Greek cities and replaced Philip V as donor of territories to the Achaian Confederacy. Restoration of Corinth was not a straightforward matter. It was the result of negotiations between Flamininus and ten commissioners who were dispatched to Greece to announce the final peace terms.⁵⁵ Flamininus prevailed upon them as to the restoration of the city but the commission insisted on keeping Akrokorinthos, along with Demetrias and Chalkis – the fetters of Greece as Philip V himself had called them (Livy 32.37.4) – allegedly for fear of Antiochos III who was Philip’s ally and had already conquered Asia Minor.⁵⁶ At the Isthmia of summer 196 (Polyb. 18.44.6) Flamininus famously declared freedom and autonomy for the Greek cities, both in Europe and in Asia (Polyb. 18.46.5–12; Livy 33.32.4–10; Plut. *Flam.* 10). It was ‘a *munus* of the Roman people’ (Will 1982, 173) and of an intruder (Pelling 2002, 243). There was thus initiated a policy of ‘political philhellenism’ (Crawford 1992, 63).⁵⁷ Corinth was included among the freed cities, but in its case freedom was translated into re-incorporation in the Achaian Confederacy. As before 224, no Corinthian assumed a leading political role in the Achaian Confederacy (Wiseman 1979, 458), at least none that we know of. A Roman garrison was installed on Akrokorinthos and departed in spring 194 (Livy 34.49. 4–5, 50.7–8; Dixon 2014, 210, n.5).

Argos was the second large city of the Peloponnese to be treated as a gift by Philip V who, unable to guard both Corinth and Argos, offered the latter to Nabis of Sparta (Livy 32.38.1–2) in early 197. Following a joint Roman-Achaian war against Sparta in the name of Argive freedom, under the leadership of Flamininus, Argos became a gift by the Romans to the Achaian Confederacy, in 195. The Spartan-Argive affair as part of the Achaian-Spartan war will be discussed in detail further below. Here we shall concentrate on the role of the Romans as contributing to the aggrandisement of the Achaian Confederacy. While the Second Macedonian War lasted, the Romans renewed the alliance of 210 with Nabis and acknowledged his possession of Argos, at a meeting at the *Mycenica* in February/March 197 (Livy 32.39.5–11).⁵⁸ During that meeting, the Achaian *stratēgos* Nikostratos was present but it was king Attalos of Pergamon who raised the issue of Argos, to no avail (Livy 32.40.1–4). Things changed after the Roman victory. Flamininus, acting as proconsul, obtained permission from the Senate to deal with Nabis as he thought best for Rome (Livy 33.45.3–6). Flamininus summoned the allies at Corinth where he emphasized the fame of Argos and the need to restore it to a state of liberty, at the same time declaring that the decision belonged to the Greeks alone (Livy 34.22.10–12). Liberty was clearly equated with restoration to the Achaian Confederacy, as shown by Flamininus' question to his allies: 'what do we decide as to war with Nabis if he does not restore Argos to the Achaians?' (Livy 34.24.6; Aymard 1938b, 209–10). Various interpretations have been advanced as to Flamininus' motives, not necessarily mutually exclusive: personal honour (Gruen 1984, 450–5), a wish to weaken Sparta and achieve a balance of power in the Peloponnese (Briscoe 1967, 9); an excuse to keep an army in Greece, in view of Aitolian and Thessalian unrest and of the threat of a campaign to Greece by Antiochos III (Aymard 1938b, 195–6; Cartledge 2002b, 75); a wish to gain Achaian loyalty in view of Aitolian discontent after the Isthmos declaration (Smith 1997, 49).⁵⁹ In any case, the Achaian Confederacy was very happy to have the Romans take the lead in the recovery of Argos – Aristainos, in fact, asked them to do so (Livy 34.24.1–4) – especially after the Aitolians intervened promising to rid the Peloponnese of Nabis (34.23.10). This proposed intervention was no small matter. There was a long history of rivalry between the two Confederacies, and the possibility of having the Aitolians overthrow Nabis and possibly control Sparta goes a long way towards explaining the readiness with which the Achaians called for Roman leadership. In doing so, they were acting in conformity with their previous practice of fighting under external (previously Macedonian) leadership.

However, the Achaians did raise an army of 10,000 infantry and 1,000

cavalry (Livy 34.25.3–5) and set it under Flaminius' command. The army marched to the Argive plain where Flaminius and Aristainos prevailed upon the army assembly, and it was decided to march on Sparta instead of Argos (Livy 34.26.5–7). Thus Argos clearly became a pretext for war against Sparta. Eventually, Nabis had to face a siege by a force of 50,000 troops, the largest army ever to invade Lakonia (Livy 34.38; Cartledge 2002b, 75). He capitulated and, among other things, he agreed to remove his garrisons from Argos and the Argolid (Livy 34.35, 40.4).⁶⁰ While Sparta was under siege the Argives evicted the Spartan garrison (Livy 34.40.5–6). Argos was solemnly declared free by Flaminius at the Nemeia of 195 (Livy 34.41.4), but as in the case of Corinth freedom was identified with (re)incorporation in the Achaian Confederacy.⁶¹ Again like Corinth, Argos produced no *stratēgos* in the years to come, at least none that we know of, but one Argive (Bippos) was a member of an embassy to Rome in the winter of 182/1 (Polyb. 23.18.4–5); at least three assemblies of the Achaian Confederacy were held in Argos.⁶² Being accustomed to forging relations with non-Peloponnesian powers, the Argives showed an interest in cultivating amicable relations with Rome. First, they founded the Titeia in honour of Flaminius.⁶³ In 170/69 they bestowed proxeny and citizenship upon Cn. Octavius for his favourable disposition towards the Achaian Confederacy as well as the city of Argos (ed. pr. Charneux 1957 = *SEG* 16.255 / *ISE* 42).

The Roman Senate was, or became, aware that both the Corinthians and the Argives had no strong bonds with the Achaian Confederacy. In winter 183/2, the Senate associated Argos and Corinth with the recalcitrant Sparta, threatening the Achaian envoys (they had come to ask for help against Messene; see p.357) that 'that not even if Sparta, Argos and Corinth revolted from the Confederacy, should the Achaians be surprised if the Senate did not think it concerned them' (Polyb. 23.9.11–14).

The curtailment of the micro-imperialisms of Elis and Messene and their incorporation in the Achaian Confederacy

Apart from restoring Argos and Corinth to the Achaian Confederacy, the Romans played a key role in the preservation of its territory by curtailing Elean and Messenian micro-imperialistic ambitions. Both these states had maintained their Aitolian connections and neither had any wish to be part of the Achaian Confederacy. The Romans, however, were directly responsible for the incorporation of Messene in 191 and also had an indirect role in the incorporation of Elis in the same year.

The Messenians are hardly visible in the First Macedonian War. However, an Achaian victory over the Eleans and the Aitolians, near

Messene, as Livy (27.33.5) briefly reports, suggests that Messene must have experienced some kind of assault. At an abortive peace conference at Aigion, right in the middle of the First Macedonian War, in the summer of 209, the Aitolians *prima facie* promoted Messenian interests by asking for the restoration of Pylos to the Messenians, of Atintania to Rome, and of the Ardiaei to Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus (Livy 27.30.13).⁶⁴ Philip refused to listen and the attempt at peace failed.

However, the Messenians did not renounce their ambitions and asked for Pylos and Asine as a gift from the Romans after their victory at Kynos Kephalai (Polyb. 18.42.7). Both *poleis* had been reluctant to join the Messenian state in the 4th century. Pylos had joined the Achaian Confederacy before 220 (the beginning of the Social War) and perhaps already during the Demetrian War, 239–229 (Luraghi 2008, 258).⁶⁵ Asine had become a member of the Achaian Confederacy possibly during the First Macedonian War.⁶⁶ In c.200 Asine renewed bonds of *syngeneia* with Hermione in the Argolid (see pp.460–1) further detaching itself from Messene. The Messenian claim was rejected by the ten commissioners to the benefit of the Achaian Confederacy.⁶⁷ By rejecting the claim on both cities the Romans again identified freedom with membership in the Achaian Confederacy. But in the case of Pylos and especially Asine, the equation appeared valid.

A few years later, it was Messene's turn to become a Roman gift to the Achaian Confederacy, in the aftermath of Rome's victory over the Seleucid Antiochos III. In late October 192 Antiochos had arrived to liberate Greece, on the invitation of the Aitolians (Livy 35.32.1–33.11) who had been seriously offended by the Roman settlement of Greek affairs in 196, considering it a violation of their alliance of c.211.⁶⁸ The Achaian Confederacy voted to have the same friends and enemies as the Romans (Livy 35.50.2–4). It is uncertain whether the Messenians had any part in the war although they retained their bonds with Aitolia and they must have held a grudge against the Romans for depriving them of Pylos and Asine (Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 515).⁶⁹

Antiochos was defeated at Thermopylai by the Roman troops in April 191 and left Greece (Livy 36.16–19; 36.35.11; Polyb. 20.8; App. *Syr.* 20) but this was not the end of the war for Antiochos and the Aitolians.⁷⁰ Thus, before autumn 191, the Achaian Confederacy, taking advantage of the *kairos*, i.e. the lack of Aitolian protection, asked both the Eleans and the Messenians to become members of their Confederacy (Livy 36.31.1–3).⁷¹ The Eleans tried to gain time and this was accepted. Things were different with the Messenians. According to Livy (36.31.4) the Messenians did not give any reply to the Achaian envoys and prepared for

war: *Messenii sine responso dimissis legatis moverant bellum*. The latter information is sufficiently vague to make us wonder whether Livy (based on Polybius) tries to justify subsequent Achaian action: did the Messenians really start military preparations? The *stratēgos* Diophanes of Megalopolis plundered the countryside and laid siege to Messene (Livy 36.31.5). The Messenians reacted by offering their *deditio* to Rome (Livy 36.31.1). It is uncertain whether this was formally and fully accepted⁷² but Flamininus (then in Andania, between Megalopolis and Messenia) certainly took care of things: he ordered Diophanes to raise the siege, rebuked him for his initiative but nevertheless ordered the Messenians to take back the exiles and join the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 36.31.6–9).⁷³ These exiles were perhaps pro-Romans, driven out by the pro-Aitolians at some point between 195 (after the war against Nabis) and 191 (Errington (1969, 125–7). However, the intervention of Flamininus signals the first time that a leader of the Achaian Confederacy was warned, however mildly, not to take action without previous Roman approval (Aymard 1938b, 343–5).

The Messenian reaction is the violent outcome of a long policy of neutrality vis-à-vis Peloponnesian politics. By choosing Rome, the Messenians were consistent in their policy of not allowing any Peloponnesian power to exercise influence or control over their affairs. The Messenians had always preferred the protection of an external power, Macedon in the 4th, Aitolia in the 3rd century. Even their brief participation in the Hellenic Alliance (between 220 and c.215) is not really an exception to this pattern since their perceived protector was Macedon or the Hellenic Alliance first and foremost and not the Achaian Confederacy. As to the latter, the difference in its reaction towards Elis and Messene can be explained by the fact that by then it had a long interest in expanding to the west, it had already acquired part of Messenia and thus the whole region of Messenia would look an easier target than Elis.

The list, newly discovered at Aigion, of the *nomographoi* (Rizakis 2008a, 168–70, no.116), dating between 191 and 182 (see ch.5, n.30), confirms older views according to which Messene suffered more territorial losses after 191. In this list, Kyparissia, Asine, and Korone appear with one *nomographos* each (ll.4, 8–9) – actually, Kyparissia might have become a member of the Achaian Confederacy by the late 3rd century.⁷⁴ We do not know how Korone was detached from Messenia, i.e. by force, persuasion or of its own accord, but in 182 it was subjected to a Messenian attack, perhaps along with its neighbour Kolonides (Livy 39.49.1 and Plut. *Phil.* 18.3; Luraghi 2008, 262, n. 50).

The same list shows that the Messenians were represented with two *nomographoi* (ll. 6–7) – a step towards integration on the part of the Achaian

authorities but, as we shall see, this was not enough to prevent the Messenians from revolting less than ten years later.

The attack of the Megalopolitan *stratēgos* Diophanes is the first hostile action by a Megalopolitan against Messene; the two cities had entertained friendly relations, at least in the 4th century, having both been anti-Spartan foundations. The Megalopolitan leaders of the 2nd century did not endorse the reported advice of Epameinondas to remain of one mind (Polyb. 4.32.10; Walbank 1957, 479). During the next decade, the actions of Philopoimen and Lykortas made matters much worse and the whole situation reached its climax with Messene's revolt, Philopoimen's assassination in 182 by the Messenians and the violent re-incorporation of Messene by Lykortas (see pp.361–2). It has been observed that from c. 215, it is hostility towards the Achaian Confederacy that defines Messenian politics, not hostility towards Sparta.⁷⁵ Slightly modifying this important remark, I would say that as early as the 3rd century (from the 270s) hostility towards Sparta had ceased to be *the* definitive feature of Messenian politics.

* * *

In the First Macedonian War, the Eleans, like the Messenians, were also on the Roman side, through their alliance with the Aitolian Confederacy. The Eleans demonstrated their usual lack of military skill when their cavalry was defeated by the Macedonian and by the reformed Achaian cavalry, in summer 209 (Livy 27.31.9–11; Plut. *Phil.* 7.6–7). As in the Social War, the Eleans provided Philip and the Achaian Confederacy with substantial material resources after Philip's plundering of Pyrgon: 4,000 captives and 20,000 cattle (Livy 27.31.9–32; 27.32.7–9; Plut. *Phil.* 7). On a dedicatory epigram (found at Aigion) the Achaian Confederacy and its *stratēgos* Kykliadas of Pharai advertised this success as primarily their own achievement with the Macedonians appearing to have only an auxiliary role (ed. pr. Papapostolou 1987 = *SEG* 36.397). In late 209 the Eleans (along with the Aitolians) suffered yet another defeat by Achaian troops (Livy 27.33.5). Nothing more is heard of the Eleans until the Peace of Phoinike in 205 when they appear as *foederi adscripti* of the Romans (Livy 29.12.14).

In the winter of 199/8 Philip V restored Triphylia to the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 32.5.4).⁷⁶ However, the Eleans, being accustomed to receiving territories as gifts and to taking advantage of opportunities (or what they perceived to be an opportunity), claimed Triphylia again in 196 (Polyb. 18.42.6–8), this time as a gift from the Romans following the latter's victory over Macedon in the Second Macedonian War and their declaration of freedom for the Greeks at the Isthmian Games. The Eleans

perhaps thought that they had a chance because Philip had given Triphylia to the Achaian Confederacy without the former having previously belonged to it (Walbank 1967, 606–7). Another reason for the Eleans to be optimistic was that they belonged to the *foederati adscripti* of Rome. Their hopes were dashed as the Romans confirmed possession of Triphylia by the Achaian Confederacy, along with Corinth and the Arkadian Heraia (Livy 33.34.9; Polyb. 18.47.10).⁷⁷ However, the Eleans re-acquired Triphylia, probably in 146, this time as a gift by Mummius, following his victory over the Achaian Confederacy (Will 1982, 396–400; Roy 1999a, 164–7 and n.78).

Elis became a member of the Achaian Confederacy in autumn 191. This came about as an indirect result of the victory of the Romans over Antiochos III and the Aitolian Confederacy. Elean involvement in the war had been minimal but the loss of Aitolian protection combined with fear both of the Romans (Errington 1969, 131–2) and of the Achaian Confederacy which had very recently violently incorporated Sparta (see pp.343–4), led the Eleans to abandon their policy of detachment from Peloponnesian politics and agree to become members of the Achaian Confederacy.

During the war the Eleans theoretically took sides with the Aitolians and Antiochos, but they played hardly any part in hostilities. In early winter 192/1, in conformity with their traditional military weakness, they asked Antiochos for a garrison (Livy 35.51.6–10). They received a force of 1,000 infantry under the leadership of the Cretan Euphanes (Polyb. 20.3.1, 5–7; Livy 36.5.1–3), which might have served, indirectly, to protect Messenia as well.⁷⁸

When the Achaian Confederacy asked the Eleans to become its members their initial answer was astonishing in its sincerity: they would think about it after the withdrawal of the royal garrison. The Achaian Confederacy accepted this answer probably because Messenia was higher in their priorities (Livy 36.31.4–9). At an Achaian *synodos* at Aigion, Flamininus posed the problem of Elean incorporation. Livy (36.35.9) writes that the Eleans wished their incorporation to be their own doing rather than through the Romans – it is unclear whether Elean representatives were present or whether this was the answer of the Achaians. It was fear of Roman retaliation or intervention, as in Messene shortly before, but also fear of the Achaian Confederacy which now controlled the neighbouring Zakynthos⁷⁹ that made the Eleans join the Confederacy, of their own accord but without enthusiasm (Aymard 1938b, 354), either during the Aigion *synodos* or shortly afterwards.⁸⁰ Thus, the Romans indirectly contributed to Elis' becoming the last member-state

to join the Confederacy and to an illusory unification of the entire Peloponnese.

Unlike Messene, Elis created no problem for the Achaian Confederacy, at least none that we know of. But like Messene it seems that it was not (fully) integrated. We hear of no Elean *stratēgos* but we do read of the Elean Nikodemos as head of an embassy to Rome in late autumn 187 (Polyb. 22.7.1).⁸¹ In the final Achaian-Spartan clash, which developed into a war of Achaia against Rome, between 148 and 146, neither the Eleans nor the Messenians sent any troops. Instead, they remained at home, allegedly to guard against possible Roman attacks from the west (Polyb. 38.16.3). This is curious given that Patrai was in an even more vulnerable position but, nevertheless, sent troops (Grandjean 2003, 229–30).

Collective Megalopolitan memory ignored the Roman role in the incorporation of Messene and Elis. In the *agora* of Megalopolis Pausanias saw an epigram on a statue base (8.30.5)⁸² according to which Diophanes, son of Diaios, was the first to incorporate the entire Peloponnese into the Achaian Confederacy:

ἐλεγεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ ἐνὸς γεγραμμένον τῶν βάθρων Διοφάνους φησὶν εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα, Διαίου μὲν υἱοῦ, συντάξαντος δὲ ἀνδρὸς πρώτου Πελοπόννησον τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς τὸν ὀνομασθέντα Ἀχαϊκὸν σύλλογον.

The Megalopolitans chose to see things as the work of Diophanes, in whose *stratēgia* both states had become members of the Achaian Confederacy. It did not matter to them that Diophanes had hardly anything to do with Elis while for Messene it was Flamininus who should take credit. The epigram in fact contradicts Polybius' statement (2.40.2) that Philopoimen was the first to unite the entire Peloponnese and thus alludes to antagonism between the two *stratēgoi* (Errington 1969, 120, n.1).

Megalopolitan and Spartan hegemonic ambitions or the 'small border wars' (c.209–192)

The border warfare between Sparta and Megalopolis, c.209–198

In the eyes of the Roman consul Flamininus, the Megalopolitan Philopoimen, the most conspicuous *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy, was a leader of small border wars (Plut. *Flam.* 13.2); and by small border wars we should understand the war between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy.

...ἴσα τῷ Τίτῳ κυδαίνοντες Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ τιμῶντες ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, ἐλύπουν ἐκεῖνον, οὐκ ἀξιοῦντα Ῥωμαίων ὑπ'αὐτῷ προπολεμοῦντι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄνθρωπον Ἀρκάδα, μικρῶν καὶ ὁμόρων πολέμων στρατηγόν, ὅμοια θανατῶσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς.

he [Philopoimen] was extolled by the Achaians as much as Titus, and equally honoured in their theatres. This annoyed Titus, who thought it out of keeping that a man of Arkadia, who had held command in small border wars, should receive just as much admiration from the Achaians as a Roman consul, who was waging war on behalf of Greece.

This passage, set in the context of the aftermath of the plundering of Lakonia by Philopoimen in 192, reflects the very real difference between wars on a large scale conducted by Rome and war(s) for what to a Roman must have looked a small piece of land. And yet, Flamininus was spiteful (or so Plutarch tells us) because he wished to be admired more than Philopoimen, for his liberation of Greece. Flamininus' attitude towards the Achaian-Spartan war(s) reminds us of Alexander labelling another Spartan war, that of Agis III, as *myomachia* ('battle of mice'). In both cases there is an inherent dichotomy: both wars were small by comparison with the wars conducted by Flamininus and Alexander, and yet both men cared enough to express their contempt. Also, the war against Sparta was one in which Flamininus had a predominant role and was declared by him to be part of the liberation of Greece.

The 'small border wars' between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy (re)started in the course of the First Macedonian War. In spring 210 the Aitolian Chlaineas, trying to secure the Spartan alliance against Macedon, indulged Spartan pride by stating that Antigonos Doson had allied with the Achaian Confederacy because he was both envious and afraid, and wished to annihilate Spartan supremacy (Polyb. 9.29.10–12). Chlaineas' argument is revealing of contemporary attitudes towards the Spartans: the Greeks still expected a lot from them.

Anticipating Spartan fears, Chlaineas argued that the Achaians would not only be unable to damage Lakonian territory but that they would be lucky to keep their own territory safe, with the Eleans, the Messenians and the Aitolians attacking them; as to Philip V, he would be cowed facing the combined forces of the Aitolians, the Romans and Attalos of Pergamon (Polyb. 9.30.5–8). The Akarnanian Lykiskos, calling the Spartans to ally with Macedon, warned against the 'cloud from the west' (Polyb. 9.37.10) and also attempted to indulge Spartan pride, by emphasizing another aspect of their glorious, remote past: that of champion of Greek freedom against the barbarians, urging them not to fight against almost all of the Greeks (Polyb. 9.38.1–5, 39.6). Finally, Lykiskos urged the Spartans at least to remain neutral (Polyb. 9.39.7). As mentioned above, the Spartans took sides with the Aitolians and the Romans but we have no information as to how exactly this came about. Presumably, the feelings of the majority had not changed in the decade between 220 and 210: Macedon continued to be

the enemy *par excellence*. And this counted more than fighting against almost all the Greeks. Furthermore, the Spartans must have known much less than the Akarnanians and the Aitolians about what was going on in northwestern Greece. However, Chlaineas' views were belied in more than one way. The Eleans and the Messenians posed hardly any threat to the Achaian Confederacy. Also contrary to his predictions, Lakonian territory was indeed invaded.

The Spartans went to war under the leadership of Machanidas, labelled as tyrant (Livy 27.29.9). Possibly, he was the guardian of (the still minor) Pelops, son of Lykourgos (the latter must have died in or shortly before 211).⁸³ The Spartan role has been viewed as merely supportive of the Roman-Aitolian cause, distracting Philip from his operations in the Adriatic by harassing the Achaian Confederacy (Piper 1986, 89). However, it seems that Machanidas was planning to set Arkadia under his control, pretty much in line with Kleomenes' policy a couple of decades earlier. It is possible that he reconquered the Belminatis, an old bone of contention with the Megalopolitans, which shows that he fostered plans of restoring Sparta to its ancestral borders, at least at the expense of Megalopolis. Our evidence is *post hoc*. Livy (38.34.8), writing about the events of 189/8, records that the Belminatis was restored to Megalopolis (Livy 38.34.8).⁸⁴ It cannot be excluded, however, that it was Nabis who reconquered the Belminatis, perhaps in autumn 200.

A very short-term gain for the Spartans was Tegea. We are not informed as to when exactly and how Machanidas achieved this, whether it was taken by assault or betrayal, or whether the Tegeans reverted to their old pro-Spartan stance and opened the gates.⁸⁵ We only learn that Machanidas delivered a speech to his army at Tegea shortly before the battle of Mantinea in 207 and that the Achaians reconquered the city immediately after his defeat and death in the battle (Polyb. 11.11.2, 18.8). Livy (27.29.9) also records vaguely that Machanidas was threatening the Achaians (in summer 209) and that he was 'hovering over the Argive frontier' in 208 (Polyb. 10.41.2; Livy 28.5.5–6). In 207, he entered Mantinean territory where he met Philopoimen's reformed army and was killed in battle.

Prior to the battle of Mantinea, in 210/9, there had been set in train an important development in Peloponnesian political-military affairs, i.e. the re-organization of the army of the Achaian Confederacy by the Megalopolitan Philopoimen who had made his first conspicuous appearance at the battle of Sellasia in 222.⁸⁶ The immediate cause of his reforms was probably that Philip V could not be relied upon to provide help whenever needed, given his deep involvement in the war against the Romans. Whether Philopoimen aimed, *from the very beginning*, at something more than

defending the territories of the Achaian Confederacy is hard to tell, but his reforms provided the foundation for later expansion.

Aratos had previously made an attempt to create a standing army of *epilektoi*, but he had not attacked the problem at its core since the force he established was a select one and most of the citizens had remained without proper training. Furthermore, according to Polybius (and Plutarch following him) there was also a problem in leadership – allowing for a degree of exaggeration on Polybius' part who wishes to exalt the role of his fellow Megalopolitan Philopoimen in the re-organization of the army (Errington 1969, 50). In 210/9, Philopoimen, acting as *hipparchos*, first re-organized the cavalry (Polyb. 10.23; Plut. *Phil.* 7.3–7).⁸⁷ Polybius (10.22.8–10) insists that the *hipparchoi* either lacked proper military experience or they viewed the *hipparchia* only as the necessary step to the *stratēgia* and, consequently, they were either indifferent or only interested in ingratiating themselves with future voters. Either way, the cavalry suffered from lack of discipline and skill; the horses themselves were not much good either. However, Philopoimen went round the cities, inspiring ambition (*philotimia*) in the young men by organizing drills, parades and contests where there would be lots of spectators (Plut. *Phil.* 7.4). His efforts bore fruit very soon, in summer 209, when the Macedonian and the Achaian cavalry defeated the Elean cavalry (Livy 27.31.9–11; Plut. *Phil.* 7.6–7).

Generally speaking, Philopoimen paid great attention to the spectacle provided by his troops as a means of inspiring respect and enthusiasm in friends and fear in enemies. Public parades and contests were part of his re-organization of the infantry two years later, during his first *stratēgia* (Plut. *Phil.* 8–9; Paus. 8.50.1; Polyb. 11.8–10.8). He introduced the heavy shield and the long Macedonian sarissa (replacing the light *thyreos* and the short javelin respectively), introduced phalangite helmets, breastplates and greaves and trained the soldiers to fight while retaining their position.⁸⁸ Polybius explicitly presents the reform of the infantry as targeting Sparta: after seven months of training Philopoimen called his army to Mantinea and presented the attack on the Spartan army as a first step towards liberation of all the Peloponnese (Polyb. 11.10.9). This may sound like a pompous slogan, given that Sparta did not dominate the Peloponnese at the time. On the other hand, the past had shown that the Spartans were extremely resilient, capable of making the most of opportunities. The conquest of the Belminatis (possibly) and Tegea was a warning.

Philopoimen's efforts bore fruit in September 207, at Mantinea, when he led his troops to an overwhelming victory over Machanidas' army (Polyb. 11.10.9–18.6; Plut. *Phil.* 10; Paus. 8.50.2). This was 'the greatest

pitched battle fought in Greece after Sellasia' (Larsen 1968, 375), 'the last act of the long drama of internal Hellenic warfare' (Freeman 1893, 464).⁸⁹ Indeed, there was to be no other battle of this scale between Greeks alone.

Initially the battle was between mercenaries, and Machanidas' were victorious (Polyb. 11.13.3–8). Then Philopoimen led the decisive attack at the head of the phalanx (Polyb. 11.15.2–17.2). The Spartan ruler was supposedly slain by Philopoimen's own hand.⁹⁰ Years later, after Sparta had been forced to join the Achaian Confederacy, the Achaian *Koinon* honoured Philopoimen, posthumously, with a bronze equestrian statue at Delphi, depicting him right at the moment he charged Machanidas with his spear (*FD.III.1.47* / *Syll.*³ 625; Plut. *Phil.* 10.8).

Philopoimen's companions stripped the body of its armour and cut off the head (Polyb. 11.18.3–6). Long ago Freeman (1893, 465) noted that 'they did not show Machanidas the respect Kleomenes had shown to Lydiadas' body'. Elaborating on this observation, we can add that the treatment of Machanidas' body was intended to give a completely different signal: Kleomenes had made a conciliatory gesture to the Megalopolitans (see p.222) while Philopoimen's men (and Philopoimen himself who had allowed this) signalled the exact opposite to the Spartans. Polybius (11.18.7–8) goes on to describe how elated the Achaian troops were at the sight of the head, implicitly and against his bias acknowledging the long-standing, paralyzing fear felt for the Spartans.

From the Peloponnesian point of view, this battle was the most important event of the First Macedonian War. It was the first, much sought, overwhelming victory of Achaian Confederacy troops over Spartan, and this without any aid from Macedon.

Philopoimen's victory was followed by an invasion of Lakonia by troops of the Achaian Confederacy, which was all the more symbolically significant since it was conducted by a Megalopolitan (Polyb. 11.18.8–10). No less than 4,000 Lakedaimonians were slain – mercenaries and helots must have been included (Errington 1969, 67, n.2). Yet, Philopoimen made no attempt at this point to capture Sparta and to make it a member of the Achaian Confederacy (Errington 1969, 65). Philopoimen's attitude reminds us of the Thebans unwilling to invade the Peloponnese for a year after their victory at Leuktra. Was it because Sparta might very well prove too hard to digest? The Achaian army might have conquered Sparta immediately but could the Achaian Confederacy keep a city which had always been recalcitrant? The victory over Machanidas constituted evidence of military superiority only at that given moment whereas the past had been in favour of Sparta. Another factor taken into account might very well have been fear of Macedonian reaction. Both Doson and Philip V had

left Sparta out of the Achaian Confederacy. Whatever the reason for Philopoimen's conduct, it implicitly shows awe or even respect. Fifteen years later, in 192, he certainly was much bolder.

The victory invested Philopoimen with enormous prestige and formed part of his image as the enemy of Spartan so-called tyrants: Kleomenes III, Machanidas, and Nabis (Pédech 1951, 85). If Philopoimen did not entertain ambitions of Achaian domination over the whole Peloponnese right after his victory, his attitude a couple of years later, immediately after the peace of 205, shows that by then he did. More than that, he envisaged himself in the leading role. In the Nemeia of 205, he celebrated his victory by presenting himself and his troops as the liberators of Greece (Plut. *Phil.* 11; Paus. 8.50.3). Upon his well-orchestrated entrance into the theatre he received a standing ovation while the opening verse of Timotheos' *Persae* was being chanted: κλεινὸν ἐλευθερίας τεύχων μέγαν Ἑλλάδι κόσμον ('Glorious the crown of freedom which he maketh for Hellas'). The spectacle had multiple recipients: apart from his fellow members of the Achaian Confederacy, it was perhaps also directed at the Macedonian king (Errington 1969, 65–7, 76–7). For its enemies, Sparta even at the time of its worst defeat, still represented a danger to (part of) the Greeks.

Machanidas' death led to the rise to power of Nabis, of Eurypontid descent.⁹¹ Nabis set about eliminating his rivals and introducing revolutionary measures, such as distribution of the exiles' estates to landless Spartans and to mercenaries, as well as massive liberation and enfranchisement of helots (but he did not abolish helotage as an institution).⁹² These acts earned him the label of tyrant from Polybius and all literary sources more or less dependent on him (Livy, Diodorus, Plutarch and Pausanias).⁹³ His restoration of the walls as well as his building of a rampart and a fosse, show that he wished to be ready for a siege (Livy 34.27.1–2; Paus. 7.8.5; Kourinou 2000, 58–61). His hiring of mercenaries, his replenishing of the citizen body with freed helots, and his building of a fleet indicate that he wished to restore Spartan power and even give it a new basis (the sea) but his precise plans for domination are not easy to identify.

In 204 the war between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy was renewed. This renewal has its origins in a series of border raids exchanged between Spartans and Megalopolitans. Actually, these raids may not have been a new thing. Plutarch (*Phil.* 4.1) writes of Philopoimen: 'when, set free from teachers and tutors, he took part in the incursions into Spartan territory which his fellow-citizens made for the sake of booty and plunder...'. This brief notice takes us back to the 230s and just shows us how much we do not know about intra-Peloponnesian relations, Spartan-

Megalopolitan in particular. In any case, probably in autumn 204 (Walbank 1967, 421), some Boiotians (foreigners? soldiers?) induced a groom of Nabis to abduct his best horse; Nabis' men chased them as far as Megalopolis, got the groom and the horse back and arrested the Boiotians; the Megalopolitans intervened demanding that the men be brought before the magistrates, and Nabis' men departed. Polybius (13.8.3–7) asserts that Nabis was looking for some pretext to attack Megalopolis but Nabis was not the initiator of the raid. He might have been too eager to accept the challenge (Errington 1969, 78–9) but he was challenged first nonetheless. Furthermore, Polybius never explains why the Boiotians induced the groom to take Nabis' horse. Surely, they must have known that this would not go unnoticed. Secondly, why should the Boiotians have been brought before Megalopolitan, not Spartan, magistrates? And we never hear how the Megalopolitans dealt with the Boiotians.⁹⁴ Next, Nabis led a raid against the cattle of a certain Proagoras. It is unclear whether border raids started then. Plutarch (*Phil.* 13.1) writes of a series of attacks by Nabis against Megalopolis in the years after Philopoimen's departure for Crete, i.e. after the autumn of 200 (see pp.380 n.12, 386 n.100).

In summer 201, Nabis, during a night attack, suddenly seized Messene except for the akropolis of Ithome (Polyb. 16.13.3, 17.7; Livy 34.32.16; Plut. *Phil.* 12.4–5; Paus. 8.50.5; 4.29.10–11).⁹⁵ This attack, the first after the late 280s-early 270s, *prima facie* appears in sharp contrast with Kleomenes' policy. However, it is unclear whether it was part of a plan to recover the ancestral Spartan land or to acquire a useful ally (Texier 1975, 39) or more simply to get a firm base of operations against Megalopolis (Errington 1969, 79).⁹⁶ The fact that Nabis got into the city during the night and that he did not even try to face Philopoimen's force which came to evict him indicates that he was not accompanied by numerous soldiers. This in turn may indicate that he had internal help, but since nothing is mentioned in our sources we should not rush to think in terms of a pro-Spartan party – just a handful of people greedy for money would have been enough.⁹⁷ Plundering of movable property was certainly part of the agenda since in summer 195, after his defeat by the Romans and their allies, Nabis was forced to surrender all the property which the people of Messene could collect together and identify (Livy 34.35.6).

Whatever Nabis' plans, it appears that he did not repeat his attack.⁹⁸ On the other hand, it must have served as a reminder to the Messenians, and to everybody else in the Peloponnese, of just how dangerous the Spartans could be.

At this point, we have the first evidence, after the 220s (see pp.223–6), of yet another deviation of Megalopolitan policy from the official policy of

the Confederacy, as well as of the personal bonds between Philopoimen and at least part of the Megalopolitans. Lysippos, the *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy, did not wish to intervene in Messene, despite Philopoimen's view to the contrary. Rapidly and without any authorization, Philopoimen intervened taking with him Megalopolitan troops and forced Nabis to escape. No source mentions that Philopoimen had been invited to intervene, so it is possible that his aim was to prevent Nabis from acquiring a base of operations against Megalopolis and perhaps, in the long run, to re-establish Achaian influence over Messene (Grandjean 2003, 81).

It took another year before the Achaian Confederacy decided that Nabis had to be contained, and significantly, when Philopoimen was *stratēgos* (Livy 31.25.3–4; Errington 1969, 78, n.3). In spring/summer 200 Philopoimen and all men of military age invaded and plundered Lakonia (Polyb. 16.36–7). His soldiers were victorious over Nabis' mercenaries in an ambush at Skotitas (between Tegea and Sparta). As Aymard (1938b, 44–5) has observed,⁹⁹ Plutarch does not mention this campaign and this probably means that Philopoimen was not able to force a pitched battle and achieve a really decisive victory. Sometime later, perhaps in 200/199, Philopoimen mysteriously departed for Crete where he stayed, probably until 194.¹⁰⁰

However, after Philopoimen's term of office had ended, between 200 and 198 Nabis went on plundering the fields of his 'neighbours', getting alarmingly near their cities (Livy 31.25.3). More vividly, Plutarch (*Phil.* 13.1–2) recounts that the Megalopolitans 'lived upon their walls and planted their grain in the streets, since their fields were ravaged and the enemy were encamped almost in their gates'. In October 198, the Spartan menace was one of the decisive factors, if not the *most* decisive, that made the Achaian Confederacy abandon the Hellenic Alliance and join Rome (Livy 32.19.6–10, 21.15–20, 26, 29–31).¹⁰¹

There is no information as to what transpired, if anything, between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy after the Achaians had joined Rome in 198. It seems that while the Second Macedonian War lasted, re-possession of Corinth dominated the Achaian agenda. However, after the re-incorporation of Corinth in 196, the Achaian Confederacy became steadily more aggressive towards Sparta, which had become unpredictably more menacing ever since it had acquired control of Argos and its resources in 197 – Argos was one of the largest, if not the largest city, in the Peloponnese in terms of population. Characteristically, the Achaian leaders did not take the initiative; instead they turned to Flamininus (Livy 34.24.1–4). How the Achaian Confederacy re-acquired Argos has been discussed above (pp.323–4). At this point we shall be concerned with Spartan-Argive relations between 197 and 195.

Spartan-Argive relations, 197–195: a major break from traditional hostility?

Nabis did not actively seek to gain Argos and this is something that we should bear in mind when discussing his hegemonic ambitions. It landed in his lap as a deposit by Philip V in late February / early March 197 (Livy 32.38.1–9; Justin 30.4.4–5). This is the reverse of the past state of affairs when Macedonian kings had heavily reduced Spartan territory, to the benefit of Argos among others. It was an offer that allowed Nabis to make Argos part of Sparta – no other Spartan ruler had achieved that.¹⁰² Thus he also re-acquired the east Parion seaboard which Macedonian kings had previously turned over to Argos. In more grand terms this was the first step towards the creation of a great Peloponnesian state (Texier 1975, 53), something that would make Sparta look more like a contemporary Hellenistic kingdom.

Nabis struggled to keep Argos but this does not amount to aggressive imperialism. Livy is our only source for the event; his own sources, both Polybius and the annalists, were hostile to Nabis, and this is something to remember when discussing Nabis' relations with the Argives. To put the question simply: how accurate is the picture of unanimous hatred against Nabis drawn by Livy? Did Nabis, at any point, enjoy any degree of popularity among the Argives? The answer is certainly complicated but it seems that he progressively gained more and more followers.

Nabis already had connections with Argos: his wife was Apia (Apega in Polyb. 13.7.6), a relative (perhaps niece) of Aristomachos II,¹⁰³ first tyrant of Argos and later *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy. The marriage took place probably in the 220s, since in 198 Nabis had a marriageable son (Livy 32.38.3). It is even possible that it took place c.225 during the negotiations that brought Argos briefly over to Kleomenes' side (Texier 1975, 18). Whatever the date of Nabis' marriage, it is a manifestation of cross-*polis* elite relations, something that may indicate that he would not have been without followers among the Argive elite in 197. We know, for example, of Pythagoras, the commander of the Spartan garrison installed at Argos, who was at the same time Nabis' son-in-law and brother-in-law (Livy 34.25.5).¹⁰⁴ In 195 Flamininus indicated that Nabis had support among the elite, when he insisted that only two or three eminent citizens supported Nabis, not the people as a whole (Livy 34.32.6–7; the latter claim is questionable as we shall see).

According to Livy (32.38.2), Philip '*thought* the best course would be to place it [Argos] in the hands of Nabis ... as a deposit to be restored to him should he be victorious, or should he meet with reverses to remain under the tyrant's rule'.¹⁰⁵ As Aymard (1938b, 134, n.9) has observed, this would

make Nabis wish for the king's defeat.¹⁰⁶ However, Philokles, commander of Corinth and Argos, conducted the negotiations. Demonstrating good will, Nabis at first asked for a decree of the Argive assembly. The Argives were consulted but they were 'pouring contempt and even execration on his name' (Livy 32.38.4–5). This is the only time we hear about a massive Argive demonstration against Nabis.¹⁰⁷ It sounds reasonable: the Argives discovered that they were the object of a transaction and they would not have it. It was one thing to have the Macedonian king protect them from the Romans, with their own consent, another to have their enemy of old in command of their city, allegedly for the same reasons. In the Kleomenic War, the rapprochement with Sparta had at least been negotiated by the Argive ruler. Yet, we do not know how exactly Philokles posed the question. It is possible that the Argives remained with the impression that they had a choice and that the Macedonian king would not abandon them after all.

After hearing the news from the assembly, Nabis asked Philokles to deliver the city immediately, got in during the night and shut the gates. Few of the well-off managed to escape and their property was confiscated; those who remained were stripped of their silver and gold, i.e. movable property, not their land (Livy 32.38.5) – an indication of Nabis' need for cash.¹⁰⁸ Nabis' next move was truly revolutionary: unlike Kleomenes, he exported, or tried to export, his social measures to Argos. At an assembly meeting, he announced land redistribution and cancellation of debts (Livy 32.38.9; Texier 1975, 56–61). There is no information as to how exactly Nabis went about implementing his plans, or whether he had the time to do it there and then, but at least confiscated property must have been redistributed pretty fast. It is thus possible that Nabis' measures would have gained him some (though perhaps not many) supporters already in 197. We do not know enough about Argive society to appreciate the impact of Nabis' (announcement of) revolutionary measures. It is often suggested that social problems must have been acute in Argos, and recent research, based on the mortuary record, has shown that social divergence deepened in the Hellenistic period, perhaps as a result of population growth.¹⁰⁹

A couple of months after his taking over Argos, at the *Mycenica* meeting with Flamininus, Nabis acknowledged that he feared the refugees (32.39.9). On the other hand, answering king Attalos' reproach, he insisted that the Argives had invited him in to defend them (32.40.1–3). That he refused to withdraw his garrison might be an indication that he feared the masses as much as the wealthy refugees – in other words, that he was lying about his relations with the Argives. On the other hand, given that Nabis wished to keep Argos, it would not have been sensible to leave it ungarrisoned

whether he was popular or not – for one thing, an attack by the Achaian Confederacy could not be ruled out.

A negative picture of Spartan-Argive relations is offered by a decree of the Argive *kōmē* of Mykenai (*Syll.*³ 594; see pp.461–2), in honour of Protimos from either the Arkadian or the Cretan Gortys, which refers to Mykenaian ephebes taken by Nabis to Sparta (ἐς Λακεδαίμονα); Protimos had secured their salvation (l. 10: διασωθέντων).¹¹⁰ We are not told the purpose for which Nabis took the ephebes: to sell them in Crete (Rostovtzeff 1941, II, 608), to serve in his army (Aymard 1938b, 216, n.17; Errington 1969, 36–7), or to keep them as hostages thus removing opposition in Mykenai (Fossey 1997, 57)? However, Charneux (1988, 385, no.587) crucially observes that ephebes very rarely served in a campaigning army and thus suggests that the ephebes were either victims of brigandage / piracy or hostages.¹¹¹ The latter possibility seems more plausible since those abducted were not picked at random but belonged to one particular age group.¹¹²

At the time of the declaration of war by Rome and the Achaian Confederacy, in spring 195, Nabis' relations with Argos appear more positive. For one thing, in the two years that had passed he had the time to implement his measures in Argos and thus gain considerably more followers.¹¹³

At about the time that the Roman-Achaian army marched into the Argolid, in spring 195, the Argive Damokles tried to expel the Spartan garrison but he was betrayed by members of his group. He was killed by the Spartans while several of his supporters fled to the Roman camp (Livy 34.25.7–10). Livy (34.25.9) writes that no Argive rose because they saw no prospect of success. But this is his or Polybius' view of the situation. It might be that the Argives simply chose to remain detached as they had done in 235 during one of Aratos' attacks (see p.172) or that no Argive wished to support the uprising.¹¹⁴ The refugees themselves told the Romans that their compatriots were paralysed by fear, and that had they [the Romans] been nearer the Argives would rise (Livy 34.26.1–3). Again, this is the refugees' evaluation of the situation aiming at persuading the Romans to attack Argos, expel the garrison and restore them. The Argives, however, did not rise, even when Roman light troops met the Spartan soldiers at the Kyllarabis gymnasium, just outside Argos, and pushed them back behind the walls. Fear is again the explanation offered by Livy (34.26.1–4), but how would the Romans know?

When the Roman-Achaian army invaded Lakonia (Livy 34.17), Pythagoras, the commander of the garrison at Argos, took with him 1,000 mercenaries and 2,000 Argives and joined Nabis' army (Livy 34.29.14). This is a decisive event in our appraisal of Nabis' relations with the Argives.

As Shimron (1972, 95) crucially observes, it is unlikely that Nabis would have enlisted in his army 2,000 enemies.¹¹⁵ These men must have joined the army willingly. And this tells us a lot not only about the degree of support possessed by Nabis but also about the unattractiveness of both the Romans and the Achaian Confederacy. It also throws a retrospective, unfavourable light on Argive-Achaian relations.

After the departure of most of the garrison and of the 2,000 Argives, and while Sparta was under siege, the Argives, under a certain Archippos, did rise and expelled the by then heavily reduced garrison (Livy 34.40.5–6). This can be taken to mean that these men had never been supporters of Nabis and now felt free to act. On the other hand, it may also indicate that now that Nabis seemed defeated, these Argives, who did not have to be numerous, took the opportunity to ingratiate themselves with the Romans. The whole situation is strongly reminiscent of the Argives' shift of allegiance from Kleomenes to Doson, in 224, when they also appeared divided, albeit to a lesser extent (see pp.231–6).

The Romans declared the Argives free at the Nemeia of 195 and according to Livy (34.41.2) the latter rejoiced at the return of their compatriots from Sparta. So, is this to be taken as a sign that hostility towards Nabis was unanimous? (Eckstein 1987b, 225). The answer can be that either Livy is exaggerating or the Argives wished to maintain or regain social order and avoided a witch-hunt. The Romans themselves had set the tone, laying the blame only on two or three leaders and refusing to incriminate the people (Livy 34.32.6; during the abortive peace talks with Nabis). If their liberators did not wish to pursue the matter any further, why would the Argives do it, risking Roman intervention?

The war against Sparta had been conducted in the name of Argive freedom. Argos was declared free by the Romans who, therefore, had an interest in presenting the Argives as unanimously against Nabis while only a few leaders were to blame. In order for the Romans to pose as liberators of Argos, the Argives had to be victims. A similar stance had been adopted by Antigonos Doson: Aristomachos and his group alone were blamed for the secession from the Achaian Confederacy. Argos, the alleged birthplace of the Argeads, had been much too precious to the Macedonian king for it to be blamed, let alone punished.

The incorporation of Sparta by the Achaian Confederacy

Following the failure of the Roman troops to induce revolt in Argos, Flamininus convened a war-council to decide whether they should attack the city. There, the Achaian *stratēgos*, Aristainos, spoke against attacking Argos but Livy (34.26.5–6) does not record whether he actually said that

they should attack Sparta. However, Flamininus approved of Aristainos' view and declared that they should direct their efforts against Sparta and its tyrant (Livy 34.26.7). The question is whether the Achaian Confederacy, Aristainos in particular, had a plan from the beginning to attack Sparta and even to incorporate it. The number of Achaian troops – 10,000 and 1,000 cavalry – is surely too high for an attack just on Argos (Aymard 1938b, 214 and n.9). So if the Achaians did not *plan* an attack against Sparta, they must have surely *anticipated* it. Aymard (1938b, 193) writes of a 'programme minimum' identified with the recuperation of Argos, and of a 'programme maximum' identified with the fall of Nabis and the incorporation of Sparta, provided that the Romans agreed. As we shall see below, Aristainos may indeed have had such a plan but he did not (or dared not) express it.

The Romans had the leading role in the attack against Sparta. First Flamininus defeated Nabis forcing him to retreat behind the walls while the Achaian troops had a rather auxiliary role, inflicting heavy losses on Nabis' retiring soldiers (Livy 34.28.9–11). An even more important achievement of the Romans was the capture of the perioikic towns, Gytheion being the hardest to get (Livy 34.29). Following its loss, Nabis was forced to ask for a peace meeting with Flamininus (Livy 34.30).¹¹⁶

Aristainos' proposal in this meeting is of particular interest.¹¹⁷ He recommended that Nabis should imitate other Peloponnesian tyrants who laid down their rule and lived a long and happy life thereafter (Livy 34.33.1–2). Aymard (1938b, 225 and n.49) rightly observes that what Aristainos really meant but did not say was: abdicate and join the Achaian Confederacy. Probably the Romans would not have been so familiar with Peloponnesian history and would not have penetrated Aristainos' encoded offer. Elaborating on Aymard's most important point, we can emphasize the conciliatory mode of Aristainos' proposal. Furthermore, we could see in this proposal an attempt to outwit Flamininus and not be dependent on him to offer Sparta as yet another gift.

However, the peace terms offered by Flamininus (Livy 34.35) were rejected by the Spartan assembly (Livy 34.36–7), and fighting resumed. Flamininus had to invest Sparta with a siege, this time employing his entire force, 50,000 in all. This was the largest army ever to invade Lakonia, and the Spartans did not have a chance. Nabis on the other hand mustered c. 17,000 (including the 2,000 Argives mentioned above),¹¹⁸ less than the army of Kleomenes at Sellasia.

Armistice and preliminary peace terms (the same as before) were agreed (34.35, 40.4) between Nabis and his opponents, i.e. Rome, Eumenes II of Pergamon and the Rhodians; the Achaian Confederacy was ignored. Nabis had to withdraw his garrisons from Argos and the Argolid; surrender five

hostages, including his own son; he was to possess only two light vessels; all the property which the people of Messene could identify was to be given back to them; he was to pay an indemnity of 100 talents of silver immediately and an annual instalment of 50 talents for the next eight years. The most serious blow was that Nabis and Sparta had to give up the perioikic *poleis* which were placed under the tutelage of the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 35.13.2; 38.31.2) – yet another gift, but one that would not allow the Achaian Confederacy to have absolute power over the former *perioikoi* and thus provoke further conflict (Aymard 1938b, 251–5 with notes). The loss of the maritime towns deprived Nabis of access to the sea and of the possibility of maritime expansion (Shimron 1972, 93). The process of slicing off Spartan territory that had started in the aftermath of Leuktra was now almost complete.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, Nabis kept the Belminatis, and those sent by him into exile did not return (Livy 34.36.2; Cartledge 2002b, 76).

In winter 195/4 the peace terms were ratified by the Roman Senate (Livy 34.43.1–2; Diod. Sic. 28.13.1). To the dismay of the members of the Achaian Confederacy, Nabis remained in the *amicitia et societas Romana*, probably so that a balance of power would be maintained in the Peloponnese.¹²⁰

Warfare between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy broke out again in autumn 193 but the incorporation of Sparta was not its direct result. As we shall see below, the Achaian troops indulged themselves in thorough plundering of Lakonia, under Philopoimen (elected *stratēgos* for 193/2 after his return from Crete), but the Romans intervened and brought about a peace settlement. We do not know whether Philopoimen had any well thought-out plan to incorporate Sparta immediately and was simply prevented by Spartan walls and Roman intervention. But he was surely ready to take advantage of the *kairos*, i.e. Nabis' unexpected death.

At Aitolian instigation (Livy 35.12.8) Nabis recovered some of the maritime, formerly perioikic, communities of Lakonia (Livy 35.13.1). His main target was Gytheion which he eventually placed under siege (by early winter 192; Livy 35.25.2).¹²¹ The Achaian Confederacy initially avoided military action (Livy 35.13.2–3): envoys were sent to Nabis warning him that he was violating the peace. A report was sent to Rome and to Flamininus.¹²² His advice was to wait for the Roman fleet dispatched by the Senate (Livy 35.22.2), and it probably arrived right in the middle of an extraordinary meeting of the Achaian assembly at Sikyon in February 192.¹²³ The participants, who were all for war before the letter of Flamininus, became hesitant. At that point they turned to Philopoimen who did not openly state his view but urged them to decide quickly,

promising to carry out their decision faithfully; war was voted unanimously (Livy 35.25.4–10).

It turned out to be a plundering campaign, in which the Achaian troops excelled and Nabis proved largely inferior to Philopoimen militarily. The fighting started badly for Philopoimen with a naval defeat at Gytheion (Livy 35.26.3–10; Plut. *Phil.* 14.3; Paus. 8.50.7). Next, Philopoimen burnt the Spartan camp at Pleiai (in southern Lakonia: Briscoe 1981b, 184) and went on to plunder Tripolis in northern Lakonia with a small force of light infantry which may have consisted of Arkadians, if Pausanias is to be trusted (Livy 35.27.1–9; Paus. 8.50.8). By the time the army of the Achaian Confederacy arrived at Tegea, Nabis had captured Gytheion (Livy 35.27.10–16). Eventually, however, Nabis was forced to retreat to Sparta and the Achaian army went on plundering Lakonia for a month (Livy 35.29–30; Plut. *Phil.* 14.5–7). Then Flamininus intervened and negotiated a truce with Nabis by which the perioikic towns were returned to the Achaian Confederacy (Plut. *Phil.* 15.2; Paus. 8.50.10; Livy 35.35.2).¹²⁴ The plundering of Lakonia was rather unduly considered as a success by the Achaians who put Philopoimen on a par with Flamininus (Livy 35.30.11; Gruen 1984, 464–5); there had been no glorious victory in a pitched battle, and Philopoimen had even failed to capture Gytheion (Errington 1969, 104). On the other hand, it had been some fifteen years since the first and last time that the Achaian Confederacy had enjoyed success over Sparta (at the battle of Mantinea in 207); therefore, Achaian pride was not entirely misplaced.

The incorporation of Sparta was the result of chance and of Philopoimen's readiness to take advantage of opportunity: ἀρπάζας τὸν καιρὸν (Plut. *Phil.* 15.2). In summer 192, Nabis was murdered by the Aitolians to whom he had turned for help (Livy 35.35–6).¹²⁵ The Spartans drove the Aitolians out, but with Sparta headless understandably chaos ensued. Amidst the chaos, and in the last days of his *stratēgia*, Philopoimen hurried to Sparta with what was perhaps a small force. There he convinced the leading citizens to make Sparta a member of the Achaian Confederacy, partly by compulsion and partly by persuasion. It was a miraculous deed, no small thing to make such a city part of Achaia, as Plutarch aptly puts it (*Phil.* 15.2–3):

καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπίσας, προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόμισεν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν. οὗ γενομένου θαυμαστῶς μὲν εὐδοκίμησε παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, προσκτησάμενος αὐτοῖς ἄξιωμα πόλεως τηλικαύτης καὶ δύναμιν (οὐ γὰρ ἦν μικρὸν Ἀχαιᾶς μέρος γενέσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην), ἀνέλαβε δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τοὺς ἀρίστους, φύλακα τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐκείνον ἐλπίσαντας ἔξιν.¹²⁶

We know very little about the terms imposed on Sparta but it seems that Philopoimen and the other Achaian authorities behaved rather moderately. They showed no wish to upset Spartan society as formed by the previous revolutionary regimes: no Spartans were sent into exile and no exiles were restored. Furthermore, Sparta retained its territory and its 'ancestral laws', including the *agōgē* and the *syssitia*, and its walls.¹²⁷ As Aymard (1938b, 321) put it, 'the acquisition of Sparta, without battle and independently of Rome, was worth a few sacrifices'. On the other hand, Philopoimen installed the *aristoi* in power, among whom we must count his guest-friend Timolaos (Plut. *Phil.* 15.4); quite possibly the *Gerousia* had a share in the government (Cartledge 2002b, 77).¹²⁸ None of these would have been *actively* hostile against Nabis, otherwise they would have been exiled or executed (Errington 1969, 111). Incidentally, that there were bonds of *xenia* between a Spartan and a Megalopolitan shows us how the *poleis*-elites could operate beyond interstate political relations; and again we are reminded of how much we do not know.

The moderate nature of Philopoimen's measures was not much of a consolation for the majority of the Spartans: their being part of the Achaian Confederacy must have been 'a shock and a humiliation' (Cartledge 2002b, 77). Social-economic problems caused by the lack of access to the sea and, especially, by the various exiles pressing for their return turned the incorporation into the beginning of a long clash lasting until 180.

The recalcitrant members: Sparta and Messene

Sparta proved very hard for the Achaian Confederacy to digest.¹²⁹ The political history of the Peloponnese from 192 to 180 is marked by repeated clashes between the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta over the restoration of various groups of exiles: those exiled under previous regimes but also those exiled by the Achaian Confederacy in 188. On two occasions the Spartans seceded: in 189/8 and in 182. The first secession brought about the violent abolition of Spartan laws and institutions, which only intensified problems.

Ironically enough, it was the Messenian revolt that probably gave the Spartans the opportunity to secede in 182. For both states, the enemy was the Achaian Confederacy. But contrary to Roman hopes, the two did not see eye to eye. Their paths ran parallel to each other but did not merge.¹³⁰

We have hardly any information on Messenian internal affairs that would allow us to explain how the Messenians came to revolt in 183/2, less than ten years after their incorporation in 191. As in the case of Sparta in 188, the Megalopolitan *stratēgoi*, who largely dominated affairs in the

Achaian Confederacy, applied harsh measures after the suppression of the revolt.

In the decade from 192/1 to 182/1 three Megalopolitans – Philopoimen, Diophanes and Lykortas – shared between them at least five *stratēgiai*, Philopoimen having the lion's share with three or four. All of them believed that the Achaian Confederacy should include Sparta and Messene but Diophanes held different views as to how they should go about it: when he was no longer *stratēgos*, he advocated conciliatory policy and involvement of the Romans. His divergent attitude was only increased by the fact that he was competing with Philopoimen as to who should have the honours for the unification of the Peloponnese.¹³¹ On the other hand, Philopoimen from 189/8 onwards adopted an inflexible and even violent attitude towards the Spartans. Lykortas was also inflexible towards the Spartan problem and he endorsed a harsh attitude towards the Messenians. Both he and Philopoimen acted on the principle that they should have a free hand in dealing with their recalcitrant members, i.e. without Roman involvement.

The Romans wanted to keep Sparta in the Achaian Confederacy but they did show a progressively increasing sympathy for the Spartans, for the most part admonishing the leaders of the Achaian Confederacy for their policies but in the end imposing their own solution to the problem. It was this increasingly favourable disposition of the Romans towards the Spartans and the ability of the latter to shape Achaian-Roman relations that made the Achaian Confederacy members fearful of the Spartans at their weakest moment.

Table 4:¹³² **Main events for Sparta and Messenia (192/1–c.180)**

Achaian <i>Stratēgos</i> Year/ <i>Stratēgos</i>	
192/1 Diophanes	
Late October / November 192 ¹³³	Antiochos III comes to Greece (at Demetrias) following Aitolian invitation.
Spring 191	Agitation in Sparta. Diophanes marches against Sparta, accompanied by Flamininus; Philopoimen arrives before them, shuts the gates and brings about a bloodless settlement (unclear terms).
Spring 191?	Change of government at Sparta? (and exile of the Philopoimenist party?).

April 24 th 191 ¹³⁴	Defeat of Antiochos III at Thermopylai.
Summer 191	Spartan embassy to the Senate asks for restitution of the <i>perioikis</i> and the five hostages surrendered in 195.
Summer or early autumn 191 ¹³⁵	Return of the Spartan embassy from Rome: first mention of the old exiles (<i>archaioi phygades</i>).
Autumn 191	Achaian <i>synodos</i> at Aigion about the incorporation of Elis and the Spartan exiles: Glabrio and Flamininus support their return while Philopoimen objects.
191/0 Philopoimen (6 th or 5 th ?)	
Winter 191/0 ¹³⁶	The Spartan hostages are restored, except for Nabis' son. ¹³⁷
189/8 Philopoimen (7 th or 6 th ?)	
October/ November 189	The Spartans attack (Spartan) exiles at Las who appeal to the Achaian Confederacy; the Spartans put to death thirty supporters of Philopoimen and of the exiles, they secede and offer <i>deditio</i> to Fulvius.
February 188	The Achaians declare war against Sparta.
Late February 188	Fulvius summons an extraordinary meeting at Elis and urges both sides to abstain from hostilities and send embassies to Rome.
March/April 188	Spartan and Achaian embassies to Rome; Lykortas and Diophanes hold opposing views; ambiguous reply of the Senate.
May 188	Philopoimen marches into Spartan territory with his army and Spartan exiles. Philopoimen restores the exiles; the Spartan leaders of the secession are put to death at Kompasion. Sparta is forced to rejoin the Achaian Confederacy and adopt its laws and institutions. Megalopolis receives Belminatis.
188/7 Aristainos (3 rd)	
Winter 188/7	Certain Spartans complain to the Senate about Kompasion and Philopoimen.

187/6 Philopoimen? (7 th) or Archon? (2 nd)	
Late autumn 187 ¹³⁸	Philopoimen sends an embassy to Rome headed by the Elean Nikodemos.
Late in 187? ¹³⁹	The Spartans secure a letter of Lepidus (consul) criticizing the Achaians.
186/5 Aristainos (4 th)	
Spring 185 ¹⁴⁰	(at a <i>synodos</i> at Megalopolis) The Elean Nikodemos and those with him read the Senate's reply: displeasure at the demolition of the Spartan walls, perhaps also at the abolition of Spartan ancestral laws; decisions remain valid; ¹⁴¹ the matter is shelved.
July 185	(at Argos) Q. Caecilius Metellus reprimands the Achaian magistrates about Kompasion. Diophanes criticizes Philopoimen for his treatment of both Messene and Sparta; Philopoimen, Lykortas and Archon defend the <i>status quo</i> . The magistrates refuse Metellus' demand to convene an assembly.
185/4 Lykortas (1 st)	
Winter 185/4	Areus and Alkibiades go as envoys to the Senate; dispute with Apollonidas of Sikyon over Philopoimen's settlement in Sparta. Metellus accuses the Achaians over their management of affairs in Sparta. The matter is delegated to a commission headed by Appius Claudius Pulcher, and the Achaians are advised to treat Roman envoys properly. ¹⁴²
Spring / summer 184	The Achaian Confederacy condemns Areus and Alkibiades <i>in absentia</i> . Pulcher, with Areus and Alkibiades, arrive at a <i>synklētos</i> meeting at Kleitor. Lykortas defends Achaian treatment of Sparta in 188 and admits that supreme power rests with the Romans. The death sentence of Areus and Alkibiades is cancelled. Pulcher gives permission to the Spartans to send envoys to Rome.
184/3 Archon?	

Winter 184/3	Four groups of Spartan envoys to the Senate: 1) Lysis' group for the old exiles; 2) Areus' and Alkibiades' group (also old exiles); 3) Serippos' group (= official envoy); 4) Chairon's group (exiled by the Achaian Confederacy). Roman commission of three decides: those exiled or condemned should be restored while Sparta should remain in the Confederacy; capital charges should be brought before foreign judges.
Winter 184/3	Embassy of the Messenian Deinokrates to Rome; he secures Flamininus' help.
Between late winter 184/3 and late summer 183 ¹⁴³	Restoration of those Spartans exiled by the Achaian Confederacy (Chairon's group). The Spartan old exiles are exiled again (after the return of the envoys from Rome).
Summer 183 ¹⁴⁴	Preparation of the Messenian revolt.
Late summer / autumn 183 ¹⁴⁵	Deinokrates returns to Greece with Flamininus who fails to persuade Philopoimen to convene an assembly.
Autumn 183	Appeal of the Messenians to Q. Marcius Philippus.
183/2 Philopoimen (8 th); replaced by Lykortas	
Autumn 183 ¹⁴⁶	Achaian refusal to take Roman views into consideration.
Autumn 183 ¹⁴⁷	Outbreak of the Messenian revolt.
Autumn ¹⁴⁸ 183	(At Megalopolis) the Achaian Confederacy declares war on Messene.
Winter 183/2	Achaian envoys ask the Senate for help against the Messenians; two groups of Spartan envoys: old exiles and those in power (under Serippos). The Senate replies to Serippos that they had done everything in their power but the matter did not concern them at present. Marcius Philippus advises the Senate to ignore Achaian pleas so that Sparta and Messene will soon see eye to eye.
April 182	The Messenians attack Korone. Philopoimen invades Messenia with a small cavalry force from Megalopolis and is captured.
May/June 182	Philopoimen is put to death by the Messenians. The Achaians elect Lykortas to replace Philopoimen.

July 182	Surrender of Messene following an attack by Lykortas; surrender of those responsible for the revolt and Philopoimen's death; an Achaian garrison is installed at Ithome; many wealthy Messenians are sent into exile. Godlike and other honours for Philopoimen. Abia, Thouria and Pharai become independent and join the Achaian Confederacy.
Spring/summer? 182	Sparta secedes under Chairon. ¹⁴⁹ Serippos gains control of Sparta; forges a coalition with Chairon. The Spartans ask to be re-admitted into the Achaian Confederacy.
c.August 182	Reunion with Sparta negotiated at an Achaian meeting at Sikyon, on the proposal of Lykortas. Diophanes defends the old exiles.
Later 182	Those old exiles who had not offended the Achaians are restored.
182/1 Apollonidas ¹⁵⁰	
Winter 182/1	Achaian embassy sent to Rome to report about Messene; two groups of Spartan envoys to the Senate: one for the official Sparta (Chairon) and one for the exiles (Kletis and Diaktorios); the Senate promises to send a letter to the Achaians asking for their return.
Spring 181	The Spartan exiles bring a letter from the Senate to the Achaian Confederacy; no action is taken. The Messenians acquire three years' exemption from taxes.
181/0 Hyperbatos	
Summer 180? ¹⁵¹	Hyperbatos raises the question of the Senate's letter; Lykortas advises against action; it is decided to send an embassy to inform the Senate of Lykortas' arguments.
Summer 180 ¹⁵²	Embassy of Kallikrates, Lykortas and Aratos (II) to Rome; envoys of the Spartan exiles present their case. Kallikrates advises the Senate to formulate its suggestions to the Achaian Confederacy as orders.
180/79 (or 179/8?) ¹⁵³ Kallikrates of Leontion	Upon entering office, Kallikrates restores all the remaining Spartan exiles, and the Messenian ones.

The Spartans as members of the Achaian Confederacy: most dangerous at their weakest?

Less than a year after the incorporation of Sparta there arose the first problem (Plut. *Phil.* 16.1–2). Diophanes, the *stratēgos*, was informed that the Spartans were agitating for a change of regime (νεωτερίζειν)¹⁵⁴ and he wished to punish the Spartans. Philopoimen, however, disagreed, saying that Diophanes should pay more attention to the war festering in Greece between the Romans and Antiochos III. He should ‘not stir up domestic trouble’ and ‘he should be somewhat blind and deaf to the wrongdoings’ (τὰ δ’ οἰκεία μὴ κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παριδεῖν τι καὶ παρακοῦσαι τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων). This indicates that the situation was not so pressing.

However, Diophanes marched against Sparta with Flamininus,¹⁵⁵ Philopoimen arrived before them, shut the gates, quelled the agitation and restored Sparta to the Confederacy. We are not told how this came about, but we should at least envisage discussions with eminent Spartans – there is no indication of fighting although Philopoimen must have been accompanied by a small force. Plutarch (*Phil.* 16.2) claims that the Spartans were on the path of war, throwing the Peloponnese into confusion, and that Philopoimen restored Sparta to the Confederacy: this could be explained as a way of magnifying the danger in order to defend the action of Philopoimen, which Plutarch himself admits was illegal.¹⁵⁶ This was the second time that Philopoimen had ignored the view of the *stratēgos* in office, the first one being the eviction of Nabis from Messenia in summer 201 (see pp.335–6).

Real trouble started shortly afterwards, in summer 191 with a Spartan embassy to Rome asking for the restitution of the maritime towns and for the restoration of the five hostages surrendered by Nabis (Polyb. 21.1.1–4).¹⁵⁷ This is actually the only Spartan embassy asking for restitution of territory.

The Senate’s reply was evasive but also allowed for some hope: ‘as to the villages the Senate would give orders to its emissaries; as to the hostages they had to think further; as to the old exiles, they were surprised that the Spartans did not restore them, since they were now free’. This is the first mention of the old exiles (ἀρχαῖοι φυγάδες). It is not clear whether the subject was brought up by the Senate or by the Spartans themselves.¹⁵⁸

The second, more complicated, question concerns the identity of these exiles and whether the qualification ‘old’ means that there were now new exiles, as a result of an overthrow of the group established in power by Philopoimen. First, as to the identity of the old exiles: they must have been all those Spartans exiled by Kleomenes, Lykourgos, perhaps Machanidas, and Nabis. Those exiled by Lykourgos were in fact Kleomenes’ supporters,

as a result of internal faction within this group (Shimron 1972, 137). There is no need to think that these old exiles were only those exiled by Kleomenes (so Shimron 1972, 142–4, 145, n.23). If that had been the case, Polybius probably would not have missed the opportunity to make the point against Kleomenes and would have been more specific instead of referring repeatedly and vaguely to the *archaioi phygades* (again in 22.1.9, 11.7; 23.4.2, 5.18, 17.10, 18.2).

Secondly, the request for the restoration of the hostages, including Nabis' own son, seems to indicate that there was now a new group in power consisting of active supporters of Nabis.¹⁵⁹ This is certainly plausible but it is not certain that the new government sent more people into exile. Thus, the group of the '*archaioi phygades*' need not be seen in juxtaposition with a new group of exiles, especially since Polybius usually employs the term *archaios* simply in the sense of old/ancient.¹⁶⁰

We know precious little about the composition of the group installed in power by Philopoimen, i.e. how far were they his supporters. We do know that Philopoimen had allowed Nabis' supporters to remain in Sparta, and this would have made the internal balance of power quite fluid. In other words, we should perhaps envisage supporters of Nabis *taking the upper hand* instead of a complete overthrow of the group empowered by Philopoimen. The very fact that a mission asking for the restoration of Nabis' son was possible shows that the control of the Achaian Confederacy over Sparta was far from tight. An *argument ex silentio* is drawn from the fact that we do not hear of any Achaian attempt to restore these new exiles.

In the subsequent *synodos* at Aigion (in the autumn) there was only the question of the old exiles (apart from the incorporation of Elis) whom the Achaian Confederacy refused to have restored, despite the view of Glabrio and Flamininus (Livy 36.35.7–8). Livy (36.35.9) and Plutarch (*Phil.* 17.4) claim that the Achaians wanted to have the credit themselves (see also Paus. 8.52.4). However, things may have been different. In the context of 189/8, Livy (38.31.1) writes that Philopoimen had always championed the cause of the exiles and had tried to *persuade* the Achaians 'to abridge the resources and prestige' (*opes et auctoritatem*) of the Spartans. In other words, it was not just a wish to prevent the credit from going to the Romans that had kept the Achaian Confederacy members from restoring the exiles. It was that there existed different views on the restoration of the exiles and on whether more trouble should be created for Sparta.¹⁶¹

We do not know details of what went on between the Spartans and the old exiles in the next two years but in October/November 189 the Spartans attacked the exiles living at the perioikic town of Las. Livy (38.30.7) writes that the Spartans wanted access to the sea for purposes of trade but also

in case they wanted to send an embassy to Rome or elsewhere. This alludes to the wider problem of freedom for the Spartans to exercise their own foreign policy.¹⁶²

The attack was repulsed, and the exiles appealed to the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 38.30.8–9). Philopoimen, then *stratēgos*, demanded the surrender of those responsible for the attack at Las, the Spartans reacted by putting to death thirty supporters of Philopoimen and the Achaian Confederacy (Livy 38.31.1–2). Their greatest fear, Livy says, was that Philopoimen would hand over Sparta to the exiles. Whether this was their greatest fear or not, the comment is indicative of the deep changes undergone in Spartan society in the previous decades and of the upheaval that would be created if all the exiles returned asking for their property. Being unable to take up arms the Spartans seceded and then followed the same path as the Messenians in 191: they dispatched envoys to Kephallenia offering *deditio* to the Romans and to the consul M. Fulvius (Livy 38.31.5).¹⁶³ The Spartans had reached the nadir of their power.

The Achaian Confederacy declared war against Sparta in February 188 (Livy 38.32.1–2). In a *synklētos* meeting of the Achaian assembly at Elis, M. Fulvius urged both sides to abstain from hostilities and to send embassies to the Senate (Livy 38.32.3–4).¹⁶⁴ Lykortas and Diophanes were dispatched: the latter wished for the Senate to settle the matter, while Lykortas insisted that the Achaian Confederacy should execute its decree concerning the surrender of the initiators of the attack at Las. The Senate replied ambiguously that Sparta's position should remain unchanged (Livy 38.32.7–9).¹⁶⁵ The Achaians interpreted this as a signal to execute their decree by force and Philopoimen marched into Lakonia, pitched his camp at Kompasion, having brought along the exiles. It looks as if Philopoimen wished to see the Spartans come to blows and thus humiliate themselves.¹⁶⁶ The subsequent indifferent conduct of the Achaian troops points in this direction.

The authors of the revolt surrendered, after having received guarantees for their safety (Livy 38.33.1–4). There followed a clash between the two Spartan bodies, in which the exiles stoned to death seventeen of the authors of the revolt while the Achaian troops were mere onlookers (Livy 38.33.5–10 and 39.36.14–16). On the next day, the remaining sixty-three were found guilty after a summary trial. Next, Philopoimen laid down his terms: the Spartans should demolish their walls, the mercenaries should depart, the helots set free by Nabis should leave Lakonia and, finally, the Spartans had to abrogate the laws of Lykourgos and endorse the Achaian laws (Livy 38.34.1–3; Plut. *Phil.* 16.5). In a subsequent assembly meeting at Tegea, it was decided to restore the exiles but no measures were taken for

their re-integration. Three thousand former helots were arrested and sold (Livy 38.34.4–8; Plut. *Phil.* 16.3–6; Polyb. 21.32c.3).¹⁶⁷

Only Megalopolis benefited from this money, which was used to rebuild the portico that had been once constructed to celebrate the first Megalopolitan victory over the Spartans (in c. 262; see p.138) and destroyed by Kleomenes (Paus. 8.30.7). For Plutarch (*Phil.* 16.4) this happened as ‘if in mockery’ of the Spartans’ fate. This was yet another means of humbling Sparta, in conformity with Philopoimen’s general aim (Polyb. 21.32c.3–4). The other gain for Megalopolis was the Belminatis (Livy 38.34.8) which later was to become again a bone of contention.

* * *

The massacre at Kompasion and the violent incorporation of Sparta generated or increased Roman sympathy for the Spartans – Flamininus had already refrained from crushing Sparta. For a long time this was translated into verbal reprimands which the Achaian authorities stubbornly ignored. The Roman attitude could be described as neutrality favourable to Sparta. First, a Spartan embassy (dispatched in winter 188/7) managed to get a letter from the consul M. Aemilius Lepidus reprimanding the Achaian magistrates for the massacre at Kompasion and Philopoimen’s behaviour (Polyb. 22.3.1–4).¹⁶⁸ Philopoimen had sent the Elean Nikodemos to the Senate, perhaps while the Spartan embassy was still in Rome (Polyb. 22.10.6).¹⁶⁹ Upon their much delayed return in spring 185, the envoys informed the *synodos* that the Senate was displeased at the massacre at Kompasion as well as at the demolition of the walls. On the other hand, it invalidated nothing and thus the Achaian assembly did not discuss the matter (Polyb. 22.7.5–7).¹⁷⁰

More serious was the involvement of Q. Caecilius Metellus in July 185, because the Achaian leaders had to face him in person and to defend their policies.¹⁷¹ According to Pausanias (7.8.6) Metellus had been approached by Spartans, which sounds plausible although Pausanias’ account is compressed (Moggi and Osanna 2000, 244–5). Metellus arrived at Argos (on his return journey from Macedon), perhaps invited by Aristainos, the *stratēgos*, to attend the Nemeia. There, he admonished the Achaian magistrates for their cruel treatment of the Spartans (Polyb. 22.10.2: φάσκων αὐτοὺς βαρύτερον καὶ πικρότερον τοῦ δέοντος κεχρησθαι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις); he ended by urging the Achaians to make amends. At this point Achaian leadership appeared divided (Polyb. 22.10.4–7). Aristainos remained silent, perhaps trying not to provoke Metellus any further. Diophanes went one step further than Metellus, stating that the cases of both Sparta and

Messene had been mismanaged. Polybius explains¹⁷² that the Messenians were objecting to both Flamininus' edict (ordering the restoration of the exiles) and to Philopoimen's unidentified amendment – of these problems Diophanes and the others were surely aware. However, the image of divided Achaian leadership should not prevent us from seeing that Diophanes was assessing the situation correctly and turned out to be right – two years later both the Messenians and the Spartans revolted – and, therefore, we should perhaps see in his statement more of a genuine interest in the Confederacy's welfare and less of a wish to antagonize Philopoimen and his supporters.¹⁷³

Polybius does not record in detail the arguments put forward by Philopoimen, Lykortas and Archon in defence of the *status quo*. He only gives the main points: their arrangement was in the Spartan interest and they could not make any changes without offending both men and the gods, alluding probably to the restoration of the old exiles.

The meeting ended badly with Metellus demanding an assembly and the Achaian magistrates rejecting his demand since a letter of the Senate was necessary in order to convene an extraordinary meeting (a *synklētos*; Polyb. 22.10–13; Walbank 1979, 194–5).

In the winter of 185/4 the dispute was transferred to Rome where a debate took place between on the one side the formerly old exiles Areus and Alkibiades, both of royal background,¹⁷⁴ and Lykortas and Apollonidas on the other (Polyb. 22.12).¹⁷⁵ The Achaian envoys were infuriated at the presence of the former old exiles because they considered it extreme lack of gratitude. But as Larsen (1968, 451) has observed, this mission of the old exiles shows that Achaian settlement of affairs was so bad that even those who should have been grateful turned against them.

This is the first time that we get information from the inside as to what it meant for a Spartan to be a member of the Achaian Confederacy – especially for an upper class Spartan. First they presented the image of a depopulated and thus insecure Sparta, all the more so because of the demolition of its walls; there was no freedom of speech: ἐπισφαλή και ἀπαρρησίαστον καταλείπεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν ('the state was left with neither safety nor freedom of speech'). Not only did the Spartans have to abide by the decisions of the Achaian Confederacy; as individuals they also had to serve (or obey) those in power at any time: καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπηρετεῖν τοῖς αἰ καθισταμένοις ἄρχουσιν (Polyb. 22.12.2–3). The 'τοῖς αἰ καθισταμένοις ἄρχουσιν' is rather unclear but probably it alludes to the Achaian *stratēgoi*.¹⁷⁶ In any case, the phrase, combined with the ἀπαρρησίαστον indirectly points to the possibility that disobedience might lead to any kind of punishment, exile first and foremost.

Areus and Alkibiades surely did not like the limitations of membership in the Achaian Confederacy but did they propose secession? If they had that in mind, they certainly did not say so.¹⁷⁷ And neither were they accused of that later on by Lykortas, the *stratēgos* for 185/4. At a meeting summoned by him in late spring – early summer 184,¹⁷⁸ Livy, transmitting Polybius, reveals contemporary attitudes towards Sparta. There was ‘fear lest they [the Spartans] should be more dangerous now that they were defeated than when engaged in war...now these very Romans were more partial to the Lakedaimonians than to the Achaians’ (Livy 39.35.6). This is actually another form of the old fear, existing ever since Leuktra, that the Spartans were always capable of a comeback.

Next, Areus and Alkibiades were accused of having undertaken a mission to Rome against the Achaian Confederacy and of having spoken as if they had been exiled by them (Livy 39.35.7). The way the passage is formulated, it appears that Lykortas is more concerned about Achaian relations with Rome than about Sparta’s membership. Despite this fear, the assembly, demonstrating independence of will, condemned Areus and Alkibiades to death (Livy 39.35.8).

A few days later, there arrived a commission under Appius Claudius Pulcher, appointed by the Senate to investigate the matter (Polyb. 22.12.4). Nor was any question of secession raised during this meeting. Pulcher recited Spartan complaints: about the massacre at Kompasion, the demolition of the walls and the abolition of Lykourgan laws (Livy 39.36.3). Lykortas answered by claiming first that it was the Achaian duty to defend the maritime communities and that it was the exiles who were responsible for the massacre (Livy 39.36.9–16).¹⁷⁹ Secondly, he attempted to appear more of a supporter of Lykourgan laws than the Spartans themselves, arguing that the walls were against Lykourgos’ spirit and that they were a symbol of enslavement by the tyrants; as to the Spartan laws, none had been left (Livy 39.37.1–8). Finally, Lykortas compared the Achaian attitude towards the defeated Spartans with the Roman attitude (Livy 39.37.9–12). He ended his speech admitting Achaian fear of the Romans but nevertheless insisted on upholding Achaian decisions (Livy 39.37.13–18).

Pulcher replied by actually threatening the Achaians with force: he advised them ‘to court the favour of the Romans whilst they could do so of their own free-will, lest they should soon be compelled to do so against their will’ (Livy 39.37.18–19).¹⁸⁰ In the face of this threat the Achaian Confederacy cancelled the death sentence for Areus and Alkibiades (Livy 39.37.21). Permission was granted by Pulcher to send envoys to the Senate (Paus. 7.9.4).¹⁸¹ At this point, as Ferrary has pointed out (1988, 303–306; 1997, 118), we should take account of Pausanias’ testimony (7.9.6) on the

role played by Roman protectors of the Spartan exiles, Appius (Pulcher) first and foremost.

A few months later, in winter 184/3, things had become worse for the Achaian Confederacy: Spartan secession was actually put on the table. The Senate was faced with a most perplexing situation: no fewer than four groups of Spartan envoys, plus the Achaian envoys who had come to renew their alliance with Rome and also to watch over the Spartan problem.¹⁸² Lysis' group, representing the old exiles, asked for full recovery of their property; 2) Areus' and Alkibiades' group asked for restoration of their property up to the value of one talent and for the rest to be distributed to those worthy of citizenship; 3) Serippos' group asked for the maintenance of the *status quo*; 4) Chairon's group asked for their own restoration, as well as that of the Spartan constitution (Polyb. 23.4.1–6). Only Serippos' group represented the official Sparta and only Chairon's group were exiles.¹⁸³ The latter group had been exiled by the Achaian Confederacy in 188. Areus and Alkibiades essentially called for a restoration of Kleomenean society.¹⁸⁴

A commission of three Romans was appointed to solve the problem on the spot: Flamininus, Metellus and Pulcher. All three had shown their favourable disposition towards the Spartans, one way or another; the latter two had openly expressed their displeasure at the Achaian treatment of Sparta in 188. Thus, they decided that those exiled should be restored, the sentences passed on them should be annulled while Sparta should remain in the Confederacy; capital charges were to be brought before foreign judges, presumably to avoid a repetition of sentences such as those after Kompanion (Errington 1969, 182); no agreement was reached between the three on the property issues. The Achaian representative Xenarchos agreed (Polyb. 23.4.7–10; Livy 39.48.4; Paus. 7.9.5).

Between late winter 184/3 and late summer 183 those Spartans exiled by the Achaian Confederacy were restored while the old exiles were exiled again, probably as a result of a coalition between Serippos and Chairon who were both hostile to the old exiles (Polyb. 23.5.18; Errington 1969, 188, 289). An even more serious problem for the Confederacy was Messenian agitation in summer 183 and the ensuing revolt in late 183/early 182 (see below). Achaian refusal to take account of Roman views on the Messenian problem (Polyb. 24.9.12) only intensified the Spartan problem.

In the winter of 183/2 Achaian envoys turned to the Senate for help. Unfortunately for them the report of Q. Marcius Philippus had got there first.¹⁸⁵ He had visited the Peloponnese as a legate of the Senate, probably to supervise the execution of decisions with regard to Sparta, and had faced the Achaian refusal to respect Roman views when dealing with the

Messenians (Polyb. 24.9.12). Philippus reported that the Achaians wished to manage everything by themselves without referring to the Senate. He went on to predict that, if the Senate ignored Achaian pleas, the Spartans would soon be reconciled with the Messenians and then the Achaians would be all too glad to ask for help (Polyb. 23.9.8–9). As we know, this did not happen. When the Achaian envoys requested the Senate either to send troops or at least to see to it that neither food or arms were imported to Messene, the Senate replied provocatively: ‘not even if Sparta, Argos and Corinth revolted from the Confederacy, should the Achaians be surprised if the Senate did not think it concerned them’ (Polyb. 23.9.12–13). Polybius (23.9.14) states that this was an open invitation to revolt. On the other hand, the Senate did not bother to deal with Spartan problems and answered the Spartan envoys under Serippos who were also present ‘that they had done all in their power for the Spartans, but at present they did not think that the matter concerned them’ (Polyb. 23.9.11–12). The aim of the Spartan envoys with Serippos remains unclear: perhaps to make excuses for the banishment of the old exiles, or to re-assert their pro-Achaian stance.¹⁸⁶ There was also another group of Spartan envoys, representing the old exiles but we are not informed as to the Senate’s answer.

In summer 182 the Spartans, under Chairon, seceded. Upon his return Serippos regained control and probably reconciled himself with Chairon.¹⁸⁷ As soon as the Achaian Confederacy had suppressed the Messenian revolt, an assembly was convened by Lykortas at Sikyon (Polyb. 23.17.5–18.2). Lykortas proposed to receive Sparta in the Confederacy since on the one hand the Romans had declared that the matter did not concern them and, on the other, the present rulers of Sparta wished to be re-admitted.

It is notable that the members of the Achaian Confederacy needed persuading: that is, there existed a substantial number of voters who thought that the Confederacy would be better-off without Sparta or without Spartan problems. Lykortas employs two, rather narrow, arguments based on gratitude and the lack of it: first, the Achaians will thus receive those who remained loyal; second, those ungrateful among the old exiles will get what they deserve (Lykortas alludes to Areus and Alkibiades who had turned against the Achaian Confederacy after their restoration by it; Polyb. 23.17.7–10). More than what Lykortas says, it is what he does not say that is of interest. Nowhere does he refer to the ideal of the unification of the Peloponnese under the Achaian Confederacy. It seems that his audience was much more interested in taking revenge on the ungrateful Spartans. Diophanes and some others argued against the persecution of the old exiles but they did not argue against the re-admission of Sparta (Polyb. 23.17.12; Errington 1969, 196–8).

Sparta was re-admitted, a *stēlē* was set up, and those of the old exiles who had not been guilty of ingratitude were restored (Polyb. 23.18.1–2). The remaining old exiles turned to Rome once again, in the winter of 182/1; Chairon was also present representing official Sparta (Polyb. 23.18.4–5).¹⁸⁸ The Senate sent a letter to the Achaïans, which was ignored for a while (Polyb. 24.2.1–4; Walbank 1979, 255). The matter was brought up again by Hyperbatos, *stratēgos* for 181/0 (Polyb. 24.8.1–8).¹⁸⁹ Again Lykortas took a hard line against the exiles but this time the Megalopolitan front, in which a homonymous grandson of Lydiadas was included, was not powerful enough. Philopoimen was dead (see p.361), and now there was Kallikrates of Leontion who, not being from Megalopolis, did not hold the same grudge against the Spartans.¹⁹⁰

It was finally decided to send an embassy to inform the Senate of Lykortas' arguments, consisting of Lydiadas (II), Aratos (II) and Kallikrates.¹⁹¹ In a notorious speech Kallikrates urged the Senate to adopt a harder line and give orders instead of instructions (Polyb. 24.9).¹⁹² Without naming them, he turned against those statesmen who received the highest honours for opposing Roman wishes. He also heavily criticized Achaian treatment of the Messenians. The Senate was quite pleased with Kallikrates but decided nothing on the exiles. It was Kallikrates who restored both the remaining Spartan exiles and the Messenian ones (Polyb. 24.10.13–15; Gruen 1984, 499), thus establishing order, or the appearance of it, in the Achaian Confederacy and in the Peloponnese for the next thirty years.

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Had it only been for literary evidence we would have thought that the history of the Achaian Confederacy and Sparta was only a series of more or less violent episodes. But, as with Messene, epigraphic evidence gives us a different aspect of relations between the two between 191 and 182, amidst the series of embassies to Rome: that of partial integration. In the *nomographoi* list from Aigion Sparta is represented with three members, one more than Megalopolis which now has two,¹⁹³ instead of the three Megalopolitans in the earlier *nomographoi* list from Epidauros, dating between 210 and 207 (*IG IV*².1.73, frg. a, ll.25–7).¹⁹⁴ Thus, the list also shows that in terms of human resources, Sparta still outdid Megalopolis. Furthermore, one wonders what the Megalopolitans would have thought seeing themselves outnumbered on an Achaian board.

Even more interesting is the piece of information provided by a recently discovered inscription at Messene recording a series of arbitrations

between Messene and Megalopolis after Philopoimen's death. Until this inscription came to light, we thought that there had only been one Spartan *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy, Menalkidas in 151/0. Now, we learn that there had probably been another: Ainetidas, in c.180 and not after 175 according to Habicht (at p. 545 in Luraghi and Magnetto 2012). This election shows us both that the Spartans were willing and ready to assume a prominent position in the machinery of the Achaian Confederacy, and, conversely, that the majority of the members favoured a Spartan as their *stratēgos* only a few years after the final settlement of the exiles problem. We have no idea as to how this election came about, but if we accept Habicht's extremely interesting identification of Ainetidas with the sculptor Ainetidas, son of Antilas, Lakedaimonian, who had made a statue to honour Philopoimen's brother Xenainetos, then we might have a lead: Ainetidas would have been part of the Spartan elite friendly to Philopoimen whose followers could have facilitated or promoted his election.¹⁹⁵

The Messenians revolt, without seeing 'eye to eye' with the Spartans

Our sources leave us in the dark as to the reasons that led the Messenians to revolt from the Achaian Confederacy in the second half of 183. It is also unclear whether the Messenians supported the revolt massively or whole-heartedly. In 185, Diophanes had pointed out that the Achaian Confederacy had mismanaged affairs in Messenia. In this context, Polybius explains that the Messenians had some objections with regard both to Flamininus' restoration of the exiles in 191 and to Philopoimen's unknown measures sometime afterwards (22.10.6–7).¹⁹⁶ Thus, we do not know whether the revolt was a result of a severe problem with former exiles or a bid for independence and for re-acquisition of the territories lost in the 190s.

However, our sources, ultimately all based on Polybius, present the revolt as the work of Deinokrates – a friend of Flamininus since the days of the war against Nabis in 195 (Polyb. 23.5.2) and possibly one of the exiles restored in 191¹⁹⁷ – and his group. It also appears that there would have been no attempt at secession had the Messenian elite not counted, as usual, on external, i.e. Roman help. In the winter of 184/3, Deinokrates was sent as envoy to Rome. We are not informed as to the purpose of this mission,¹⁹⁸ but he secured Flamininus' promise that he would do his best to help the Messenians revolt (Polyb. 23.5.10–12; Plut. *Flam.* 17.3).¹⁹⁹ The revolt is presented by Polybius (23.5.14) as the result of Deinokrates' initiative and wishes: upon his return to Greece with Flamininus, Deinokrates was convinced that from the moment of his arrival he could

manage Messenian affairs according to his will: πεπεισμένος ἔξ ἐφόδου τὰ κατὰ τὴν Μεσσηνίην χειρισθῆσθαι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν.²⁰⁰ Polybius (23.5.9) essentially presents Deinokrates as playing the same evil role as Kallikrates: Deinokrates καὶ τότε κεκινηκὼς ἀρχὴν μεγάλων κακῶν τῇ πατρίδι ('had just begun a series of terrible calamities for his country') whereas Kallikrates μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι ('had been the initiator of great calamities for all Greece'; 24.10.8–9). Plutarch (*Phil.* 18.3), also viewing things from the perspective of individual policies, adds Deinokrates' personal rivalry with Philopoimen. Polybius' pronounced tendency to ascribe everything to individuals, especially those he dislikes, prevents our estimating how far the Messenian populace wished to secede.²⁰¹

Deinokrates returned to Messenia only in late summer/autumn 183, with Flamininus who was on his way to Bithynia. This delayed return indicates that, when he addressed Flamininus, revolt was not imminent and that a lot depended on Flamininus' help. The latter, while at Naupaktos, sent a letter to the Achaian Confederacy asking for an assembly. We do not know whether this happened at Deinokrates' request, in which case we should think that he was prepared for a peaceful settlement with Roman help (Errington 1969, 183). However, Philopoimen turned down Flamininus' request (Polyb. 23.5.15–17). Those Messenians agitating against the Achaian Confederacy must have approached Q. Marcius Philippus. In any case, we are told only that Philippus had done a lot to prevent the Achaian Confederacy from making a decision with regard to the Messenian problem without consultation with the Romans (Polyb. 24.9.12).

War against Messene was declared by the Achaian Confederacy before the winter of 183/2 (see this chapter, nn.147–8). Soon afterwards envoys were dispatched to the Senate. As mentioned above, Philippus estimated that, if the Senate ignored Achaian pleas, the Spartans would soon be reconciled with the Messenians and then the Achaians would beg for help (Polyb. 23.9.8–9). The prediction did not come true but it is interesting that Philippus thought that there was enough to bring ancestral enemies together.

Our information is meagre. The only recorded action of the Messenians is an attack on Korone in spring 182 (Livy 39.49.1) and perhaps also on its neighbour Kolonides (Plut. *Phil.* 18.3; Paus. 4.34.8), which indicates that the Messenians probably aimed at recovering the whole region (Luraghi 2008, 263).²⁰²

At the time of the attack Philopoimen was ill at Argos but he nevertheless marched to Megalopolis where he gathered a select force of 60 cavalrymen (Paus. 8.51.5);²⁰³ he also had with him an unidentified

number of Thracians and Cretans (Livy 39.49.2). Plutarch (*Phil.* 18.4) underlines Philopoimen's personal bonds with his fellow Megalopolitans:

κάκειθεν εὐθὺς ἐβοήθει τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀναλαβὼν, οἵπερ ἦσαν ἐνδοξότατοι μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, νέοι δὲ κομίδῃ, δι' εὐνοίαν τοῦ Φιλοποίμενος καὶ ζῆλον ἐθελονταὶ συστρατεύοντες.

From there [Megalopolis] he at once set out for the rescue [of Korone], taking with him the horsemen. These were the most prominent citizens, but altogether young, and serving as volunteers under Philopoimen out of good will and admiration for him.

Thus, the war of the Achaian Confederacy against Messene gets a specifically Megalopolitan tint. Pausanias (8.51.5–6; 4.29.11–12) mentions another, unsuccessful plundering campaign in Messenia led by Lykortas, only a few days before Philopoimen's expedition. Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 518–20 and n.32) point out that in this case the retreating army of Lykortas should have met with Philopoimen's. If, on the other hand, Lykortas campaigned *after* Philopoimen, then we must think that the Achaian Confederacy remained inactive while its *stratēgos* was incapacitated. And this in turn would say a lot about the personal influence – both negative and positive – of Philopoimen on Achaian military machinery and morale.

However, one wonders what Philopoimen thought he was doing with a small force and in his convalescent state: one last bid for glory perhaps, although he was in no position to lead the main Achaian army.²⁰⁴ If glory was his goal then he failed miserably, since he was captured alive by a force of 500 Messenians under Deinokrates (Plut. *Phil.* 18.5–8; Livy 39.49.3–5). Livy (39.49.7–11) and Plutarch (*Phil.* 19.1–2) present us with a most melodramatic scene: in a direct reversal of his glorious appearance at the Nemeia of 205 where he had his troops parade in front of an exhilarated audience, the old *stratēgos* became now a spectacle for the crowds; instead of applause he generated pity, after the initial elation; some Messenians even remembered that Philopoimen had driven away Nabis – or so we are told.

Philopoimen was first imprisoned in the public Treasury (Livy 39.50.3 and Plut. *Phil.* 19.3)²⁰⁵ and then, according to our sources, ultimately all based on Polybius, he was poisoned by Deinokrates and his group (Polyb. 23.12.3; Livy 39.50.1–8; Plut. *Phil.* 20.1–2; Paus. 8.51.7–8). Philopoimen's alleged last words concerning Lykortas' safety have Polybius' – the son of Lykortas – fingerprints all over them.²⁰⁶ All sources insist on differentiating between the attitude of the Messenian populace on the one hand, and Deinokrates' group on the other.²⁰⁷

Lykortas was elected to replace Philopoimen by an army assembly at

Megalopolis (Plut. *Phil.* 21.1; Polyb. 23.12.7),²⁰⁸ and engaged in thorough plundering of Messenia. Pausanias (8.51.8) writes that Lykortas assembled troops from the Arkadians and the Achaians and that the Messenian *dēmos* came over to the Arkadians straightaway: καὶ ὁ δῆμος αὐτίκα ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων προσεχώρησε τοῖς Ἀρκάσι. The second part of his statement is technically a mistake but Pausanias may very well allude to a preponderance of troops from Arkadia, Megalopolis in particular.

The Messenians, with the mediation of two Boiotians, asked for peace. Perhaps they were pro-Achaian (Luraghi and Magonetto 2012, 520 and n.32) or perhaps they simply saw no other way out. The terms imposed by Lykortas were harsh: the authors of the revolt and of Philopoimen's murder were surrendered, a garrison was installed, and everything else was submitted to the discretion of the Achaian Confederacy. Then Lykortas assembled the Messenians and promised that they would not regret entrusting their future to him. At the second *synodos* of the year, in Megalopolis, the guilty Messenians were ordered to commit suicide – Deinokrates had already done so (Polyb. 23.16.6–12; Plut. *Phil.* 21.1–2; Paus. 8.51.8; Livy 39.50.9). To complete the slicing off of Messenian territory, Abia, Thouria and Pharai (northeastern side of the Gulf of Messenia)²⁰⁹ were detached and became independent members of the Achaian Confederacy (Polyb. 23.17.1–3).²¹⁰ The work of Epameinondas nearly two hundred years ago was almost undone.

Polybius (23.16.12) writes that the meeting was convened at Megalopolis 'as for this very purpose': ὥστερ ἐπίτηδες συνέβαινε τότε πάλιν συνάγεσθαι. We do not know whether the meeting places of the *synodoi* were arranged long in advance. There might have been reasons of military convenience for this choice (O'Neil 1980, 45) but, in any case, one cannot but think that the Megalopolitans, in their outraged mood for the loss of their hero, would have exercised enormous influence on the decisions of the *synodos*. And if the *synodos* was a primary assembly,²¹¹ then we can easily think that the Megalopolitans would have formed the majority of the voters.

The re-incorporation of Messene brought back to the fore an essential defect of the Achaian Confederacy. Once more a leading *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy had shown no mercy to the defeated: one remembers Aratos and his treatment of Mantinea and of the Argive Aristomachos as well as Philopoimen and his treatment of Sparta in 188. This time, at Philopoimen's funeral, Messenian prisoners were part of the procession and – most remarkably – were stoned to death on his tomb (Plut. *Phil.* 21.5).

Philopoimen was buried in the *agora* of his native Megalopolis as Aratos before him had been buried at his native Sikyon (see p.300). Plutarch (*Phil.*

21.4) records that there was a feeling in the city that, by losing Philopoimen, it had also lost its supremacy among the Achaians: καὶ βαρέως φέρουσιν, οἰομένην συναποβελλῆναι τὸ πρωτεύειν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς.²¹² To make up for their loss the Megalopolitans voted for Philopoimen godlike (*isotheoi*) honours (Buraselis 2003b, 194).²¹³ For the Megalopolitans, losing their most eminent citizen was losing the most important part of their civic identity (not the ethnic, i.e. Arkadian). Without individuals like Philopoimen, Diophanes, or Lydiadas, the Megalopolitans were reduced to insignificance.

Relations between Messene and Megalopolis had reached their nadir. Soon after the incorporation of Messene there started a series of arbitrations between Megalopolis and Messene (and not only between these two). As we shall see below, the scales were tipped in favour of Messene. The Megalopolitans were not wrong in estimating that they had lost their dominant position in the Confederacy's affairs, after losing the man who for a long time had dictated Achaian policy.

Megalopolitan expansionism and its curtailment

The history of intra-Peloponnesian relations after 182 consists of a series of arbitrations in all of which (or in all but one) Megalopolis was one of the litigant parties. The Achaian Confederacy authorities were directly involved, whereas in the past they had only been involved directly in the dispute between Epidauros and Corinth (see pp.164–7). Furthermore, in contrast with the practice followed in arbitrations in the 3rd century, now foreign judges, i.e. from outside the Achaian Confederacy, were often called to adjudicate. This signals the complexity of the problems encountered and perhaps it is also an admission on the part of Achaian authorities that it was difficult to find impartial judges within the Confederacy or judges capable of imposing respect for their decisions.

The relationship of the Megalopolitans with their territory had been somehow ambivalent. On the one hand, the artificial character and the uncertainty involved in the initial composition of the *polis* (see pp.26–30) had allowed powerful individuals to have communities detached. In the mid-240s the then tyrant Lydiadas had handed over Alipheira to the Eleans. In c.194 or shortly afterwards,²¹⁴ Philopoimen was the next eminent Megalopolitan to curtail the territory of his own *polis* by *instructing* certain constituent communities to say that they did not belong to Megalopolis from the beginning (Plut. *Phil.* 13.5). It is implied that the communities had no objections to the secession or even that they wished to secede, and Philopoimen showed them the way to go about it. It is difficult to tell whether only personal interests were at work, i.e. the promotion of Philopoimen's policies (Errington 1969, 90–1)²¹⁵ or whether he aimed at

increasing the influence of Megalopolis as a whole.²¹⁶ But the result must have been support for Philopoimen. We have no information about immediate Megalopolitan reactions to this reduction of territory. That certain communities were allowed to go may be an indication that they were troublesome and that therefore the Megalopolitans parted happily from them. Alternatively, it could be that the Megalopolitans saw an opportunity to increase *Arkadian* versus *Achaian* influence (Rizakis 2008b, 277–8). But this would still mean that attachment to their territory was rather loose.

On the other hand, the Megalopolitans, as a whole, were interested in territorial acquisitions. First, they sought to have Alipheira restored to them by Philip V, in 208 and again in 199/8. They succeeded the last time, but it was perhaps one of the communities detached by Philopoimen. Possibly the interest of Megalopolitans in Alipheira should be seen in association with their loss of the Belminatis to Sparta, which they eventually re-acquired in 188 (Livy 38.34.8).

After Philopoimen's death, the Megalopolitans lost no time in claiming Messenian territory. On a symbolic level, this was an attempt at re-asserting themselves. The Achaian authorities, however, resisted Megalopolitan demands: had they been accepted, Messene, already deprived of a large part of its territory, would have been devastated (Rizakis 2011, 279). The dispute lasted at least two years (Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 521–2). The Messenians celebrated their victory in an inscription 190 lines long, of which the first 101 – a Messenian decree – were published by Themelis in 2008 (*SEG* 58.370).²¹⁷ The entire text is divided into four documents. After the Messenian decree there are recorded 1) a challenge (*proklēsis*)²¹⁸ of Megalopolis to Messene to stand trial, 2) a fine (ζαμία) imposed on the Messenians by the *damiorgoi* of the Achaian Confederacy, and 3) a decision (κρίμα) of Milesian judges in favour of Messene.²¹⁹

As soon as Messene had been incorporated in the Achaian Confederacy the Megalopolitans claimed Endania (Andania: on the western side of the Stenyklaros plain; Map 1)²²⁰ and Pylana, probably during the *synodos* at Megalopolis in summer 182 (Polyb. 23.16.6–12), where harsh measures had been imposed upon the Messenians.²²¹ Their request (αἴτηνα or αἴτημα: 1.8) was rejected by the Achaians but the Megalopolitans re-instated their claim at a *synodos* at Elis and called the Messenians to go to court. This time Megalopolis was also claiming the Akreiatis and the Bipeiatis (ll. 13, 31–2) which were already a subject of dispute.²²² The litigant parties agreed to have their dispute arbitrated by a court of 17 eminent citizens: 3 Sikyonians, 2 Aigeiratan, 5 Aigeis, 1 Dymaean, 3 Pharaeis, 1 Leontesios and 2 Eleans (ll. 1–28). One of the Sikyonians was the well known politician

Apollonidas, of whom we learn now that he was *stratēgos* at the time (ll. 30–1). The citizen from Leontion was none other than Kallikrates.²²³ Understandably, there could be no Arkadian on the panel. But it is curious that there was none from Corinth, Argos, or the Argolid. This first arbitration between Messene and Megalopolis was largely an affair of the old Achaia.

Both sides gave to Apollonidas their description of the borders. There followed inspection on the ground. In the end the Megalopolitans withdrew their claim on the Akreiatis and the Bipeiatis (ll. 29–43). No verdict is mentioned (Arnaoutoglou 2009–10, 185–6), but it seems that the disputed regions remained in Messenian hands. Andania and Pylana are not mentioned again, and it is unclear whether the initial Achaian decision was upheld.²²⁴

In any case, this was not the end of the dispute. According to the Messenians, the Megalopolitans did not deter the Kaliatai from laying claim to the Akreiatis and the Bipeiatis (ll. 43–4).²²⁵ The Messenians went to court against the Kaliatai and perhaps the Megalopolitans as well (ll. 48–9).²²⁶

This time the city of Aigion was chosen to arbitrate, again keeping the whole affair within the confines of the Achaian Confederacy. 140 judges out of 147 voted in favour of the Messenians, on the basis of the description of borders given to the *koinoi damiorgoi* (ll. 59–61). Next the Messenians sued the Megalopolitans asking for two talents as compensation for the produce of the Akreiatis (ll. 65–70; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 514). According to the unpublished *proklēsis* of the Megalopolitans, there had been an agreement between the two parties to share the produce until ownership of the land was decided; after that the defeated party ‘had to render twice the value of his half’ (ll. 131–3; Thür 2012, 300). The Megalopolitans issued again a *proklēsis* on the grounds that there had never been a verdict. The Messenians refused to go to court and were fined by the *damiorgoi*,²²⁷ when Ainetidas was probably *stratēgos* (ll. 71–9, 96–7).

A Milesian court consisting of six judges took over.²²⁸ The appointment of a foreign court indicates that the situation was getting out of hand for the Achaian Confederacy.²²⁹ It is actually the first or the second time that a court from the other side of the Aegean was employed to settle a dispute within the Confederacy. As we shall see below, Rhodian judges may have been employed to arbitrate a dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta and perhaps also between Megalopolis and Helisson. Furthermore, Rhodian and Milesian judges arbitrated in the 170s the dispute between Epidauros and Hermione (see p. 426).²³⁰

However, the Milesians unanimously resolved that the case of the

Akreiatis and the Bipeiatis had already been decided and therefore the fine was unjustified (ll. 80–90).²³¹ The Messenians repeat three times in this latter section that they won: ἐνικάσαμεν and ἐνικάσαμες (ll. 80–1, 87 and 89–90; Themelis 2008, 220).

Messene was not the only rival of the Megalopolitans in those years. Between 182 and 167, the Megalopolitans were involved in border disputes with the newly independent Messenian Thouria and the Arkadian Helisson. The source for these is an extremely fragmentary inscription set up at Olympia: *IPArk* 31 IIA & IIB and *IPArk* 31 IA & IB respectively (superseding *IvO* 46).²³² The two cases must have been adjudicated at roughly the same time, since a commission under a certain Aristomenes has a central role in both.²³³ Polybius was a member of the Megalopolitan delegation in the dispute with Thouria. Thus, the *terminus ante* is set at 167, i.e. Polybius' deportation to Rome after the end of the Third Macedonian War.²³⁴ Quite possibly, however, both disputes were adjudicated very shortly after the suppression of the Messenian revolt. The decision to settle the border dispute between Thouria and Megalopolis was taken by an Achaian *synodos* at Sikyon shortly after the detachment of Thouria, Abia and Pharai.²³⁵

The dispute between Megalopolis and Thouria (south of Megalopolis, in southeastern Messenia; Map 1) perhaps concerned pastoral land.²³⁶

First, an Achaian *synodos* at Sikyon²³⁷ produced a decree (*IPArk* 31 IIA, ll. 16–17) by which possibly it authorized 'the initiation of a dispute resolution process' (Arnaoutoglou 2009–10, 189). Next, we learn that Megalopolis was to receive territory except for the so-called Doris (*IPArk* 31 IIA, ll. 17–18: Δωρίδα),²³⁸ but it is unclear whether this was a decision of the *synodos*.²³⁹ A commission under Aristomenes was appointed to conduct inspection on the ground and submitted a report (*IPArk* 31 IIB, ll. 13–14); an *ekklētos* (unknown) *polis* (responsible for the publication of the decision) dealt with the demarcation on the basis of the commission's findings; the representatives of both parties argued their case, both agreed with the demarcation; finally, the approval of a Roman official was probably sought and received (*IPArk* 31 IIB, ll. 20–24).²⁴⁰

The Megalopolitans really threw their weight about in their dispute with Thouria (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 151–2): nine representatives were appointed while Thouria only sent three (*IPArk* 31 IIB, ll. 4–10). Diophanes, and Lykortas' sons Polybius and Thearidas, were among the nine representatives (Tod 1913, 119–20). Technically, the disproportion was of no importance, since the delegates had no vote, but it does show how much importance the Megalopolitans attached to this dispute. Furthermore, men of such calibre must have been expected to be very

persuasive, even overwhelming. We cannot exclude the possibility that the final decision, which was in favour of Megalopolis, was influenced by their presence (Ager 1996, 314).

This was not the end of the story between Megalopolis and Thouria. According to a decree of the Thourian *synedrion*, at an uncertain date, either before or, perhaps more likely, after 146, the city of Patrai was called to arbitrate a dispute of uncertain nature (Valmin 1928–29, no.1 = *SEG* 11.972).²⁴¹ This time, Thouria sent a massive number of representatives (at least 104), whose names are inscribed on the stone, and won. We cannot say that the victory was a direct result of Thourian massive representation but numbers did make an impression.²⁴²

As mentioned above, the border dispute between Megalopolis and the Mainalian Helisson (west of Mt. Mainalon, near Mantinea; Maps 1 and 2)²⁴³ was arbitrated at about the same time as the one between Megalopolis and Thouria (*IPArk* 31 IA & IB).²⁴⁴ The same commission under Aristomenes and an unidentified *ekklētos polis* were responsible for the delineation of boundaries (*IPArk* 31 IA, l. 3). Both parties sent representatives (31 IB, l. 28–9). Taeuber (2006, 344 and n.24) cautiously suggests that this *ekklētos polis* may have been Rhodes, restoring in *IPArk* 31 IA, ll. 3–4: καὶ ἃ π[ό]λις ἑκκλητος τῶν Ῥοδίων.

For the Megalopolitans there may have been an old axe to grind. Helisson had been one of those communities which, according to Pausanias (8.27.3–4), were designated to become part of Megalopolis. However, there is scattered evidence from 351, c.300 and 207, showing Helisson as an independent *polis*.²⁴⁵ We do not know whether Helisson had belonged to Megalopolis at any point in the 3rd century or after 207. The Achaian Confederacy was somehow involved, as shown by the reference to the Achaian *damiorgoi* (*IPArk* IB, l.30: Ἀχαιῶν δαμιοργ[...]). Probably one of the two sides addressed the Confederacy but, given the extremely lacunose state of the stone, we cannot tell whether this side was Helisson, which would have implied that Megalopolis was the aggressor.²⁴⁶

The most famous dispute of the period after 182 is the one between Megalopolis and Sparta, recorded in *Syll.*³ 665.²⁴⁷ To be exact, the litigant parties were ‘the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians’ (l. 2). The juxtaposition is quite revealing: the Spartans were members of the Achaian Confederacy and yet they were opposed to it; or, to put it differently, they had not become Achaians.

Five judges (two names are preserved), necessarily outside the Achaian Confederacy since the latter was one of the litigant parties (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 144), adjudicated the ownership of land and the legitimacy of a fine imposed on Sparta (ll.5–7). First they present their guiding principle: they

aim at upholding the validity of previous judicial decisions by the *Hellēnes* and *Symmachoi* (ll. 16–20). There follows a long digression on a previous *krisis* between Sparta and Megalopolis, with regard to possession of the Skiritis and the Aigytis (ll. 19–39), probably in the aftermath of the battle of Sellasia in 222 (see pp.248–50). It had been decided then that the Skiritis and the Aigytis had been Arkadian ever since the return of the Herakleidai (ll. 34–6). Therefore, the fine must be the result of yet another dispute over these two regions, in which the Spartans lost again and, subsequently, contested the verdict.²⁴⁸

The vocabulary employed in the inscription indicates that the upheaval was treated very seriously: the judges repeatedly lay emphasis on the need for the Achaians to be of one mind (ὁμονοοῦντες) and live permanently in peace and under the order of law; the Romans are the protectors of *eunomia* and *homonoia* (concord):

ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ' αὐτοὺς | ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ
διατε[λ]ώντι εἰς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ εὐνομίᾳ (ll. 17–19);
κα μάλιστα μένειν [τὰ ποθ'] αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ὁμονοοῦν[τας, εἰ] (ll. 39–40);
καὶ Ῥωμαίους τοὺς προεστακότας τὰς τῶν Ἑλλάν[ων εὐνομίᾳ][ας καὶ
ὁμο]νοίας (ll. 43–4).

Another interesting element in the phraseology is how the Megalopolitans are implicitly identified with all the Arkadians: since the Aigytis and the Skiritis belonged to the Arkadians at the time of the Herakleidai, then the Megalopolitans who are the only Arkadians to claim them are entitled to their possession (ll.34–6).

The inscription has been commonly seen as closely postdating an event mentioned by Polybius 31.1.7: in c.164 the Senate dispatched C. Sulpicius Gallus²⁴⁹ and M. Sergius to arbitrate in a territorial dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta. The inscription does testify to Roman involvement, calling the Romans protectors of the Greek *eunomia* and *homonoia* (ll.43–4). Recently, however, Taeuber (2006, 342–4) made a serious case for dating the inscription c.180. First, he pointed out that the genitive Πολυκράτης of a judge's name is predominantly characteristic of Rhodes. Thus the document is added to the series of disputes arbitrated by Rhodian judges; the Achaian Confederacy certainly employed Rhodian services on two occasions: for the dispute between Epidauros and Hermione and for the controversial honours to Eumenes II of Pergamon. Secondly, according to Taeuber, if the five judges were Rhodians, then a date after the end of the Third Macedonian War, in 168, is untenable since the Rhodians had then fallen out of favour with the Romans. The latter have a prominent role in the inscription, specifically being described as protectors of Greek *eunomia*

and *homonoia* (ll. 43–5). Thus, Taeuber argues that the best context for the arbitration would be the aftermath of Kallikrates' embassy to Rome and the restoration of the last Spartan exiles by Kallikrates in c.180.

The case for the Rhodian identity of the judges appears quite strong. As to the date, the 170s is also a plausible period, since it was then that the Rhodians had a prominent role as arbiters of disputes in the Achaian Confederacy.²⁵⁰

If Polybius and the inscription refer to two distinct events, then in a period of twenty-five years after the incorporation of Sparta and after Megalopolis had re-acquired the Belminatis (in 188; Livy 38.34.8), the Spartans claimed ancestral territories of theirs from the Megalopolitans twice.

Regardless of the date of the inscription, Polybius' information remains important: in the late 160s there was agitation in the Achaian Confederacy because of the ancestral hostility between Sparta and Megalopolis. In this context, the Spartans are rightly seen as trying to take advantage of a *kairos*, after their principal opponents in the Achaian Confederacy, i.e. Polybius and the rest, had been deported to Rome as hostages (Cartledge 2002b, 85–6), for their alleged lack of support to Rome in the Third Macedonian War (171–168).²⁵¹

It is possible that in the 160s there was another dispute, between Sparta and Argos. Pausanias (7.11.1) reports that ὁ Γάλλος was dispatched to Greece to arbitrate between the Spartans and the Argives but he delegated the task to Kallikrates. *Prima facie*, it seems that Pausanias is confused but it is not to be excluded that the Spartans tried to open the case of territories once assigned to Argos by the Macedonian kings.²⁵²

After the late 160s we have hardly any information on interstate relations in the Peloponnese. Thus, it is very difficult to understand why exactly things turned ugly between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy, c.150, when we hear of the next, and last, dispute between the two, which led to the loss of Greek independence. We have no idea about possible shifts in the balance of power, which in 151/0 had led to the election of the Spartan Menalkidas to the *stratēgia*. Taking into account the evidence for Ainetidas' (probable) *stratēgia*, this election looks now less remarkable.

The Achaian War: the final act of the drama between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy

The last act of the long conflict between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy was played out from c.150 to 146. This is the period in which the Romans were engaged in the Third Punic War (149–146); Carthage was razed to the ground in 146 and Africa became a Roman province. From 150 to 148, the Romans also operated in Macedon where Andriskos,

a pretender to the Macedonian throne, led the four Macedonian states to revolt. The war ended in 148, and Macedon became a Roman province.²⁵³ Against this background of hardened Roman attitude and increasing impatience,²⁵⁴ which the Achaians failed to perceive, and against Roman wishes, they declared the ultimately disastrous war against Sparta – the so-called Achaian War.

Table 5: The Achaian War

Achaian <i>Stratēgos</i> Year/ <i>Stratēgos</i>	
151/0 Menalkidas	
	The Oropians appeal to the Achaian Confederacy for help against Athens and bribe Menalkidas with 10 talents; the latter promises half the money to Kallikrates; threat of invasion of Attike by an Achaian army under Menalkidas.
150/49 Diaios	Kallikrates charges Menalkidas with treason for an embassy of his to Rome (before his <i>stratēgia</i> ?). Menalkidas bribes Diaios with 3 talents to avoid impeachment.
Winter 150/49 ²⁵⁵	Spartan embassy to Rome, for a disputed territory; the Senate refers the matter to the Achaian Confederacy. The Achaians claim the right to try the Lakedaimonians on a capital charge and deny the Spartans the right to send an embassy to Rome. Diaios declares war against those stirring up trouble in Sparta. The Spartans try to avoid war; they expel 24 men.
Summer/ autumn 149 ²⁵⁶	Menalkidas and Diaios speak to the Senate which promises to send envoys (they arrive 18 months later).
149/8 Damokritos	
Late 149/ early 148	Sparta secedes from the Achaian Confederacy.
Spring 148	Metellus asks the Achaians not to take arms against Sparta but to wait for the Roman embassy.
Late summer/ early autumn? 148 ²⁵⁷	Despite Roman warnings Damokritos invades and plunders Lakonia; he defeats the Spartans but withdraws.

autumn 148	Damokritos is fined 50 talents for his withdrawal from Sparta and goes into exile.
148/7 Diaios	
Autumn/ winter 148? ²⁵⁸	Metellus sends again envoys to the Achaians asking them to wait for Roman delegates; Diaios promises to wait but proceeds to garrison perioikic towns. Menalkidas sacks Iason; the Spartans refuse to support Menalkidas who commits suicide.
Late summer or autumn 147 ²⁵⁹	L. Aurelius Orestes announces to the Achaian leaders the decision of the Senate: Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenos and Herakleia in Trachis have the right to secede; the Achaian leaders call an extraordinary meeting at Corinth; Spartans residing at Corinth are thrown into prison. Achaian embassy is sent to Rome headed by Thearidas. ²⁶⁰
147/6 Kritolaos; succeeded by Diaios	
Autumn 147	Roman embassy headed by Sextus Iulius Caesar who urges the Achaians not to offend either the Romans or the Spartans. Arrangement of a meeting of all parties at Tegea; only Kritolaos attends, declaring that he will bring the matter to the next <i>synodos</i> (six months later).
Winter 147/6	Kritolaos declares a moratorium on debts for the duration of the war.
Spring 146	Meeting at Corinth in the presence of four Roman envoys sent by Metellus; the people jeer at the envoys; war is declared against Sparta.
Spring? 146	The Senate authorizes L. Mummius to prepare a fleet and an army.
Spring/summer 146	Kritolaos lays siege to Herakleia; Metellus defeats Kritolaos' army at Skarpheia; Kritolaos disappears; 1,000 Arkadians under Diaios are slain by Metellus at Chaironeia; Diaios succeeds to the <i>stratēgia</i> .
	Troops of the <i>synteleia</i> of Patrai are defeated in Phokis. 12,000 slaves are freed; all men of military age gather at Corinth (= 14,000 infantry and 600 cavalry); the Eleans and the Messenians remain at home. Mummius defeats the Achaian army in a pitched battle (Roman army = 23,000 foot + 3,500 horse). Sack of Corinth. Disbanding of the Achaian Confederacy.

Polybius' book 37, narrating the events leading up to the war, is lost. Thus we have to rely on Pausanias (7.12ff) who draws partly on Polybius²⁶¹ and describes events as the work of villainous leaders on both sides: the Spartan Menalkidas, *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy probably in 151/0, Kallikrates of Leontion, Diaios (son of Diophanes) of Megalopolis, *stratēgos* for 150/49 and 148/7, and finally Kritolaos. The upper echelons of the Achaian Confederacy appear contaminated with personal rivalries, greed for money, corruption to the point of instigating a war to cover their wrongdoings, stupidity and even insanity. More specifically, Menalkidas appears as corrupt and leading Sparta to disaster but it is mostly Diaios and Kritolaos who are depicted as warmongers.²⁶²

Pausanias' story starts with Athens and its occupation of Oropos (Paus. 7.11.4–6) in c.158/7. Following an Oropian appeal, the Romans appointed the Sikyonians as mediators who sentenced the Athenians to a fine of 500 talents. The Athenians had their fine reduced by the Romans to 100 talents and they did not bother to pay even that. Next, the Athenians installed a garrison on Oropos. The Oropians appealed to the Achaian Confederacy for help, bribing Menalkidas with 10 talents. The latter promised Kallikrates half the amount. It was decided to help the Oropians but help was delayed and an invasion of Attike was prepared instead. However, the army withdrew mainly as a result of Spartan opposition (Paus. 7.11.7–8). Anyway, Menalkidas kept the money and refused to give Kallikrates his share (Paus. 7.12.1). When his period of office ended, Kallikrates accused him of treason, saying that while on an embassy to Rome, Menalkidas had tried to detach Sparta from the Confederacy (Paus. 7.12.2). To protect himself, Menalkidas bribed Diaios, his successor to the *stratēgia*, with 3 talents. Diaios secured his acquittal, despite the objections of the Achaians. To avoid charges against himself he turned Achaian attention to more ambitious goals, i.e. war against Sparta (Paus. 7.12.3–4). The pretext (προφάσει), Pausanias says, was a Spartan appeal to the Roman Senate about a disputed territory. The Senate replied that all cases, except for capital charges, should be under the jurisdiction of the Achaian Confederacy.²⁶³ Diaios, however, misled the Achaians by saying that the Senate had allowed them to sentence to death any Spartan (Paus. 7.12.4–5). The Spartans claimed that Diaios was not speaking the truth and wished to refer the matter to the Senate whereupon the Achaians claimed that no member of the Confederacy had the right to send, separately, an embassy to the Senate (Paus. 7.12.5).

What can we make of Pausanias' narrative so far? First of all, Pausanias ignores the role of Hieron of Aigeira in the liberation of Oropos (*I. Orop.* 307).²⁶⁴ Secondly, all the Achaian *stratēgoi* appear as prone to bribery.

We cannot dismiss off-hand these charges which, however, may very well have been largely slanderous and the result of fierce competition in the ranks of the elite (Gruen 1976a, 54).

There are further questions, pertaining to the problematic relations of Sparta with the Achaian Confederacy, which Pausanias, focused as he is on individual misdemeanour, consistently plays down. When did Menalkidas go to Rome? Was Menalkidas an official envoy of Sparta? If he was, then did he have permission from the Achaian Confederacy? If he did, then secession could not possibly have been on his *official* agenda. If he did not, then the Confederacy's control over Sparta was rather loose. Was Kallikrates' charge true? If secession of Sparta had been discussed openly in the Senate, then this would have become known and Kallikrates would not have been able to use this information when it suited him. If Menalkidas had discussed secession in private then we must assume that Kallikrates had his informants. Either way, why would Kallikrates have refrained from pressing charges before the time he did? Whether or not Menalkidas had been an official envoy, he must have been to Rome before his *stratēgia*; Kallikrates would have probably been informed shortly before he brought charges.²⁶⁵

Most important, it is only in passing that we are informed that Spartan envoys appealed to the Senate for some disputed, unidentified, territory – in the winter of 150/49 during the *stratēgia* of Diaios. In Pausanias' view the territorial problem is a mere pretext. A small piece of land must have seemed pretty trivial to someone who wrote in a Roman world and three centuries after the events.

However, the disputed territory must have belonged either to Argos or to Megalopolis (Walbank 1979, 702). If the Spartans were claiming Megalopolitan territory, then this was most probably the Belminatis which had been given to Megalopolis in 188 by the Achaian Confederacy (Cartledge 2002b, 87–8). The Skiritis and the Aigyti should probably be excluded since it does not seem very likely that the Spartans would have turned to the Romans asking for the overturning of a decision that had their approval. Similarly it does not seem very likely that the Spartans would have claimed Argive territory, if the case had been fairly recently arbitrated and the Romans had again been involved.

The problem acquired wider dimensions. It came to concern the right of the Spartans to send an embassy to Rome, that is, to exercise independent foreign policy and, correspondingly to concern the sovereignty of the Achaian Confederacy (Nottmeyer 1995, 126). The above mentioned Spartan mission (in 150/49) concerning territory cannot have had Achaian authorization. Again, Achaian charges against the Spartans

on this score appear as a pretext in the eyes of Pausanias who fails to attribute the proper weight to the long history of hostility between the Spartans and the Achaian Confederacy.

The Spartans tried to avoid war by sending envoys to the member-states and negotiating with Diaios who had declared that he would wage war not against Sparta but against the Spartan troublemakers (Paus. 7.12.6). The performance of the Spartans in the subsequent hostilities as well as their wish to come to a peaceful settlement later on (in autumn 147) shows that they were indeed in a bad state.

Pausanias presents the member-states as unanimously willing to go to war: they replied that they could not disobey their chief magistrate. Diaios named 24 Spartans as agitators. On the motion of Agasisthenes, they went into voluntary exile; Agasisthenes claimed that the Roman Senate would soon restore them (Paus. 7.12.7). Now, it is hard to believe that this would have been said in public, and one wonders how Pausanias (or his source) could have known. Next we hear that the exiles underwent a nominal trial and were condemned to death *in absentia*. Was the trial really nominal? This sounds more the view of Pausanias (or of his source). We should probably think that there was serious dissension within Sparta as to their relations with the Achaian Confederacy. No names of the exiles are given but Menalkidas must have been one of them since he spoke on their behalf in Rome (Oliva 1971, 313–14).

The Achaian Confederacy dispatched Kallikrates and Diaios to Rome but Kallikrates died on the way.²⁶⁶ Menalkidas and Diaios argued their cases to the Senate and upon their return they both deceived their respective audiences. The Senate evaded the issue promising to send envoys, as it had done so often in the past. Pausanias accuses both Diaios and Menalkidas of purposeful deceit but we should more likely think that the Senate's reply allowed misunderstanding. Diaios supposedly made the Achaians believe that the Senate had allowed subjugation of the Spartans while Menalkidas made the Spartans believe that the Senate had freed them from the Achaian Confederacy (Paus. 7.12.8–9). It is indicated that Menalkidas returned to Sparta. Thus, one wonders whether the Achaians had any control over what went on in Sparta or whether the Senate allowed the return of the exiles. The latter may have been the case: knowing that the Senate allowed their return, Pausanias (7.12.7) presented Agasisthenes as making a prediction to that effect.

The Spartans must have seceded from the Achaian Confederacy at some point in late 149 or early 148.²⁶⁷ Despite Roman warnings (from Metellus via envoys to Asia) to wait for the Roman legates, Damokritos, *stratēgos* for 149/8, invaded Lakonia. The Spartans were defeated, losing 1,000 youths,

and retreated behind their walls.²⁶⁸ Damokritos did not lay siege to Sparta; instead he took to plundering and finally withdrew (Paus. 7.13.1–5). For this failure he was fined 50 talents by the Achaians and, unable to pay, went into exile.²⁶⁹ Numerous explanations could be advanced for Damokritos' actions: unwillingness to undertake a perhaps lengthy siege, avoidance of the risk of a bloody battle, anxiety about the possible reaction of Metellus, or even a belief that Sparta was still useful to the Confederacy.²⁷⁰

Diaios succeeded Damokritos in the *stratēgia*. Perhaps in the autumn or late winter of 148 Metellus sent another message to the Achaians asking them to wait for the Roman embassy (Paus. 7.13.5). Diaios did not resume hostilities but according to Pausanias (7.13.6) he established friendly relations with the communities around Sparta and installed garrisons in them so as to use them as bases against Sparta. We are allowed to doubt the friendly character of Diaios' relations with these Lakonian communities.

In response, the Spartans with Menalkidas as their *stratēgos* attacked and captured Iason, on the Lakonian border.²⁷¹ Pausanias (7.13.7) gives credible details of Spartan weakness: they were unprepared, they lacked money, their land was not sown (due to the invasion of Damokritos). The result was turmoil in Sparta. The Spartans refused to support Menalkidas who committed suicide (Paus. 7.13.8).

Sparta was near submission but then there arrived at Corinth (after a year and a half's delay) the Roman embassy charged with solving the dispute between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy. L. Aurelius Orestes announced most shocking news to the magistrates of the member-states of the Achaian Confederacy: the Senate had thought that it was right for Sparta, Corinth, Argos, the Arkadian Orchomenos and Herakleia in Trachis (in central Greece, on Mt. Oite, west of Thermopylai)²⁷² not to belong to the Achaian Confederacy because they were neither part of the Achaian *genos* nor did they belong to the Confederacy from the start (Paus. 7.14.1). Whether this was a firm resolution or a mere threat, as Polybius (38.9.6) asserts, has been much debated.²⁷³ But all parties concerned would have certainly taken the message of the Senate very seriously. Even the most optimistic could not take it for granted that this was mere intimidation. The Achaian Confederacy was faced with the possibility of severe reduction.

We do not know whether there had been any contacts between (part of) the Corinthians, the Argives, the Herakleians, or the Orchomenians and the Senate. There is no evidence that these cities wished to secede. But it is possible that the Senate named these particular cities because their loyalty to the Confederacy had been shaky in the past – that of Corinth and Argos in particular. Could it be that the Orchomenians, loyal allies of

Sparta in the past, shared with the Spartans an anti-Achaian stance? In any case, so far as we know, only Herakleia in Trachis revolted.

The Achaian magistrates called an extraordinary assembly at Corinth. Feelings ran very high against the Spartans, and Orestes was not able to restrain the assembly; those Spartans residing at Corinth were thrown into prison (Paus. 7.14.2–3).²⁷⁴ Upon his return to Rome, Orestes gave the Senate a rather exaggerated version of his sufferings, even stating that his life had been in danger (Polyb. 38.9.2–3).

Shortly after these events Kritolaos was elected to the *stratēgia* for 147/6, insanely passionate to wage war against the Romans, according to Pausanias (σὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ τὸν Κριτόλαον πολεμεῖν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἔρωσ ἔσχε; 7.14.4). But as we shall see, Kritolaos did not even expect to fight against the Romans. However, a second embassy headed by Sextus Iulius Caesar arrived in autumn 147 to reprimand mildly the Achaian Confederacy for what had happened but also to warn it not to give offence to either the Romans or the Spartans (Polyb. 38.9.3–5, 10.4–5). Again, Roman attitude is open to diametrically different interpretations: should we focus on the mild warning (so Gruen 1976a, 61–2 and n.135) or should we think that despite Caesar's mild behaviour, the decision announced by Orestes remained in force?²⁷⁵

According to Polybius (38.10.7–11), most remained silent but resentful. In particular, Diaios, Kritolaos and their group thought that the Romans, having their hands full with the war against Carthage, would tolerate anything, i.e. that they would let them deal with Sparta as they pleased. Next, the Achaian leaders promised to follow the legates as far as Tegea and meet the Spartans trying to find a solution to their problems, probably the territorial dispute but also to the question whether the Achaian Confederacy had the right to inflict capital punishment on the Spartans (Walbank 1979, 702). This would probably have involved a meeting of representatives of the member-states (Walbank 1979, 702) but only Kritolaos appeared, having secretly arranged with the other magistrates not to attend (Polyb. 38.11.3; Paus. 7.14.4–5). The Spartans were present, called urgently by the Romans (ἐπισπασαμένων; Polyb. 38.11.2), a sign that they wished for a peaceful settlement. The Roman call to the Spartans may very well be an indication that they were on their side (Larsen 1968, 493).

Kritolaos said that he could not make a decision without taking into account the opinion of 'the many' (οὐκ ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν οὐδὲν οἰκονομεῖν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν γνώμης; Polyb. 38.11.5). Further, he promised to discuss the matter in the following Achaian *synodos* six months later. Gruen (1976a, 63) plausibly argues that Kritolaos wished to avoid another tumultuous assembly and, above all, to organize the war against Sparta and

present the Romans with a *fait accompli* – much as had happened in 192. However, according to Polybius (38.11.6) the Roman envoys left, accusing Kritolaos of ignorance and madness.

In the following six months the Achaian Confederacy prepared for war against Sparta. Among the measures introduced was a moratorium on debts for the duration of the war (Polyb. 38.11.10–11).²⁷⁶ Kritolaos went round the cities allegedly to inform them about his answer to the Romans but in truth to give an inflammatory version of what the Romans had said and thus incite people to war – so says Polybius (38.11.8–10).

War against Sparta was declared at Corinth in spring 146, in the presence of Roman envoys dispatched by Metellus, but it appears that it never happened. Instead, what happened was war against Rome. The assembly at Corinth was a tempestuous event.²⁷⁷ According to Polybius (38.12) emotions ran very high both against the Spartans and against the Roman envoys – the latter urging the Achaians not to proceed to hostilities against Rome, either on account of the Spartans or through their dislike of the Romans.²⁷⁸ This was a crowded assembly, packed with artisans and manual workers, says Polybius (38.12.5). These lower-class people must have come from all member-states, not just Corinth (Fuks 1970, 84–5). On the other hand, there is no evidence that the upper class as a whole opposed the war.²⁷⁹ There were certainly some who did so: Kritolaos named two and accused them of favouring more the Romans and the Spartans than the interests of the Confederacy (Polyb. 38.13.3–6).

Kritolaos' answer to the Roman envoys shows that the issue was freedom to deal with what the Achaian Confederacy considered an internal matter, without Roman intervention (Gruen 1976a, 64): '...he wished to be friends with Rome, but he was not at all minded to make himself subject to despots' (Polyb. 38.12.8). In other words, the Achaian Confederacy authorities wished to continue along the lines of Philopoimen's policy.

One wonders how fluid the balance of power was in the Achaian Confederacy, given the shift, within five years, from the election of a Spartan to the *stratēgia* to passionate declaration of war against Sparta.

Our patchy literary evidence does not record any Achaian attack against the Spartans.²⁸⁰ Kritolaos appears to have chosen to lead his troops to central Greece and lay siege to Herakleia in Trachis which had revolted (Paus. 7.15.2). Information on this campaign is scarce. For one thing, we do not know the number of troops Kritolaos had with him. Thus, we cannot assess his intentions: did he only aim at re-incorporating Herakleia or did he also plan to hold Thermopylai, i.e. to block Roman access to southern Greece (so Larsen 1968, 495)?

Kritolaos was assisted in the siege by the Thebans (Paus. 7.15.9; Livy,

Periocha 52). On the other hand, there was no help from the other Boiotians, nor from Phokis or Lokris (Gruen 1976a, 68). Kritolaos had also arranged for a select corps of 1,000 Arkadians under Diaios to join him (Polyb. 38.14.3; Paus. 7.15.5). The *synteleia* of Patrai sent an unidentified number of troops to Phokis – they must have been numerous because later on Patrai had no troops to send for the final battle against the Romans. It appears that there had been no general call to arms. Neither division arrived in time; co-ordination or will was lacking.

Whatever preparations and plans Kritolaos had made came to naught: Metellus marched through Thessaly, Kritolaos fled in terror but Metellus caught the Achaian army near Skarpheia (eastern Lokris). One thousand men were slain and the *stratēgos* himself disappeared (Paus. 7.15.3–4). The Arkadian contingent was initially received by the Elateians but was sent away as soon as news of Skarpheia arrived. The Arkadians too were caught and slain by Metellus near Chaironeia (Paus. 7.15.5). In an anti-Arkadian and anti-Macedonian spirit Pausanias sees vengeance of the gods coming upon the Arkadians for their refusal to take part in the battle of Chaironeia in 338.²⁸¹ The division from Patrai apparently met with an even worse disaster. Polybius (38.16.4–9; 39.1.11) paints a picture of uncontrollable terror and despair in the cities after the event (Larsen 1968, 496).

Following Kritolaos' disappearance, Diaios took over the *stratēgia*. The hasty measures taken by him indicate that the Achaian Confederacy had not expected, and had not been prepared, to fight against the Romans. It had simply persisted in its grudge against Sparta and at the same time had miscalculated Roman reactions based on a long history of Roman indifference and haphazard involvement.²⁸²

Diaios ordered the cities to liberate 12,000 slaves, home-born and home-bred, to arm them and send them to Corinth. Money was lacking and thus special contributions were demanded from the well-off, men and women (Polyb. 38.15.3–6).²⁸³ All citizens capable of bearing arms were ordered to assemble at Corinth. Polybius (38.15.7–8) reports that the cities 'were full of confusion, disturbance, and misery. They praised those who had fallen and pitied those who were marching off...' (πλήρεις ἀκρισίας, ταραχῆς, δυσθυμίας. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπολωλότας ἐπῆνουν, τοὺς δ' ἐκπορευομένους ἤλέουν...). In other words, they had not expected to be called to arms and they were not keen to be so.²⁸⁴ The Eleans and the Messenians were excused, allegedly to guard against an attack from the West (Polyb. 38.16.3), but one can very well think that the Eleans and the Messenians, faithful to their tradition of non-involvement and possibly holding a grudge against the Confederacy, were not willing to send contingents, and the Achaian authorities were in no position to coerce them.²⁸⁵ Patrai had no troops left

to send (Polyb. 38.16.4) or they were so demoralized that they would not even consider sending whatever troops they had left. In the end, 14,000 infantry and 600 cavalry were gathered; 4,000 were dispatched to Megara (Paus. 7.15.7–8).

The Achaian Confederacy's unready army was no match for the 23,000 foot and 3,500 horse of the consul L. Mummius (Paus. 7.16.1). The Megarians surrendered (Paus. 7.15.11). The Achaian army was defeated in a pitched battle near the Isthmos (Paus. 7.16.2–6). Two days later Mummius sacked Corinth (Paus. 7.16.7–8; Polyb. 39.2; Livy, *Periocha* 52).²⁸⁶ The city was made a *colonia* much later by Julius Caesar (Paus. 2.1.2).

The Achaian Confederacy was dissolved (Paus. 7.16.9; Polyb. 39.4).²⁸⁷ The Romans perpetuated its ghost; 'Achaia' would later be the name of the Roman province embracing all southern Greece. Sparta on the other hand fared much better: while the former perioikic towns remained free and the Dentheliatis remained Messenian, the Belminatis probably returned to Spartan hands. Sparta was granted freedom (exemption from tribute) and part of its ancestral laws were restored (Cartledge 2002b, 90; Spawforth 2002, 136).

Notes

¹ μάλλον δέ πως κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἦσαν ἀεὶ πρασίμοχθοί τινες καὶ οὐποτε ἦσυχαι δορί. The verse of Euripides is unidentified: see Walbank 1957, 630.

² See Walbank 1943, 9: 'in the towns of Achaia liberty was conceived in anti-Spartan terms'.

³ For the chronology of events the table is based on Walbank 1940, 338–44, *id.* 1967, 1979, 1988, *passim*, and Table in *CAH* 1989, vol. VIII, 527–30; also Aymard 1938b, *passim*; for events involving Sparta in particular, see also Texier 1975, 107 and Errington 1969, Table I, 297; Grandjean 2003, 268, for Messenia. Differences of opinion are noted where necessary.

⁴ For a list of the *stratēgoi* between 211/10–179/8, see Errington 1969, Appendix 2 B, 248–65, and Table II, 300–1; deviations from this list are noted where necessary.

⁵ It appears that Kykliadas had entered office in autumn 210, since he was still the *stratēgos* in summer 209.

⁶ Scherberich 2009, 166.

⁷ Livy (28.7.14–18; 28.8.4) writes that it was Machanidas who was ready to attack the Eleans but ran off upon hearing news of Philip's arrival. This must be a mistake: see Walbank (1940, 96 and Appendix III, 304, n.5) who thinks it is possible that 'the Achaeans usurped Olympia'; followed by Larsen 1968, 373; *contra* Errington (1969, 60–1) who accepts Livy's testimony and argues that Machanidas aimed at putting 'the anti-Achaean potential of the base to better effect' – a rather too complicated view. Rigsby (2001, 185) also accepts Livy's testimony adducing the evidence of *I. Magnesia* 39, an Achaian decree acknowledging *asylia* for Magnesia, in which (in l. 48) it is appended that the Eleans also agreed. Rigsby suggests that in 209/8 a pro-Achaian

group of Eleans took over the organization of the games. His hypothesis is accepted by Freitag 2013, 134. (Rigsby 1996, no. 89, at p.222, briefly notes that the Eleans were enemies of the Achaian Confederacy.) However, this grouping of the Achaian Confederacy with the Eleans may very well be the result of the distribution of the Magnesian *theōroi*: Philiskos was the sole envoy to Achaia (*I.Magnesia* 39, l.3) and presumably to Elis; upon their return the *theōroi* would have handed over the decrees and most probably a secretary decided, after consultation with the *theōroi*, which answers would be recorded in full (see Roy 2003, 125, on the destinations of the Magnesian *theōroi* and on the manner of classification; also Rigsby 2001, 183–4, on the problem of subscriptions in the Magnesian archive). Thus, in the present state of the evidence, the most economical hypothesis is that of Walbank (above) since, in order for the Eleans to group themselves with the Achaians in a decree, there should have been a major change of policy, albeit very brief, for which there is no evidence.

⁸ Walbank 1940, Dixon 2014, 178.

⁹ For the date of the battle of Mantinea see Errington 1969, 249: the decisive argument is that if Philopoimen had been victorious in June, then he would have celebrated in the Nemeia of 207, not of 205; *contra* Walbank 1967, 282 and 1988, 407 who dates the battle in June 207; but he opts for autumn at 1940, 99.

¹⁰ On the army figures see Walbank 1967, 282–3, based on the theoretical potential of 30,000–40,000 for the whole Peloponnese in 168 (Polyb. 29.24.8); Kleomenes' army amounted to less than 20,000 while Nabis could raise an army of c.18,000 or less (Livy 34.27.1, 29.14). Therefore, since Machanidas had more mercenaries than the Achaians, his army was probably the same size as the Achaian.

¹¹ So Walbank 1940, 114, 339.

¹² Plut. *Phil.* 13.1; perhaps after the elections of 200/199: Errington 1969, 74–5, 90.

¹³ Grainger (1999, 364) suggests August 199.

¹⁴ Plut. *Phil.* 13.4; Errington 1969, 72–4.

¹⁵ Or late autumn/ early winter 198: Carawan 1988, 216.

¹⁶ Dixon 2014, 182.

¹⁷ Aymard 1938b, 132, n.2.

¹⁸ Livy 32.40.4; Aymard (1938b, 148–9, n.54) argues that the truce must have been agreed until the end of the war, observing that the four months coincide suspiciously with the period until the battle at Kynos Kephalai; view accepted by Walbank 1940, 166, n.2; Livy's information is accepted by Briscoe 1973, 245–6.

¹⁹ Probably, Achaian support was not solicited by Flamininus: Aymard 1938b, 160–2.

²⁰ Suggestion of Boethius 1921–23, 424.

²¹ Walbank 1940, 189; Dixon 2014, 210, n.5.

²² See Walbank 1940, Appendix III, 326–7 for the date in early 192; Aymard (1938b, 298, n.21) follows Livy's chronology for the beginning of the siege and dates it in autumn 193; Larsen (1968, 408) thinks that the siege was interrupted and then resumed in early spring 192.

²³ Livy 35.28.8 writes that Philopoimen also had Tarentine horse but he has probably misunderstood Polybius: Briscoe 1981b, 187.

²⁴ On the date see Aymard 1938b, 317, n.7.

²⁵ Eckstein 2006, 304.

²⁶ Derow 2003, 64.

²⁷ Walbank 1940, 329–31; *id.* 1988, 452.

²⁸ Errington 1969, 131–2.

²⁹ In 217/6 Philip V repulsed the attacks of the Illyrian Skerdilaidas (he had abandoned the Hellenic Alliance before the Peace of Naupaktos and raided upper Macedonia: Polyb. 5.95.1–4, 101.1–4) and won a number of cities in Illyria (Polyb. 5.108.1–8). In early summer 216 Philip made an abortive attempt to occupy the eastern coast of the Adriatic (Polyb. 5.109; Livy 23.32.17).

³⁰ Scherberich (2009, 160) argues that it is quite dubious whether Philip sought the allies' approval.

³¹ Among other things, it was provided that if the Carthaginians concluded a peace treaty with the Romans, Macedon would be included, provided that the Romans did not wage war against Philip and abandoned their possession of Kerkyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimallum, the Parthini and Atintania. This clause indicates that Philip primarily wished to secure his western frontier but it could also be construed as a threat. See the commentary by Walbank 1967, 42–56, esp. 54–6; also 1940, 70–2 and 1988, 393–5; Will 1982, 82–5; Gruen 1984, 377–8. Holleaux (1921, 179–85) labels the alliance as defensive for the future but as offensive at the time of its conclusion. Briscoe (1978, 153) thinks that the clause providing for assistance to Hannibal indicates that an invasion of Italy by Philip was a possibility.

³² On the First Macedonian War see Holleaux 1921, 188–257; Walbank 1940, 68–107 and 1988, 391–410; Larsen 1968, 358–78; Harris 1979, 205–8; Will 1982, 85–99; Gruen 1984, 373–81; 438–48 on Greek attitudes; Errington 1989a, 94–106 and 2008, 185–90. Scholarly views range from haphazard interest of Rome in the East to pure aggression (the latter view is mainly put forward by Harris). See also Grainger 1999, 305–37, for the Aitolian part in the war (n.b.: Grainger is employing the term 'Macedonian wars' to denote wars between Aitolia and Macedon). Scherberich (2009, 157–69) emphasizes the marginalization of the Hellenic Symmarchy.

³³ Also *IG* IX.1².1.2.241 / *SV*4 III, 536; translation in Bagnall and Derow 2004, no.33 and Austin 2006, no.77.

³⁴ See Eckstein 2002, 271 and n.9 with bibliography, on the delay between the conclusion of the alliance and its official ratification.

³⁵ It was provided that the Eleans and the Lakedaemonians might join the alliance, if the Aitolians so wished. Presumably, the Aitolians thought that they might still be able to count on their previous alliance during the Social War. See Derow 2003, 55–6, on the threat represented by the Achaian Confederacy as a Spartan motive. On the other hand, the Messenians are not included in Livy's text and the inscription is too fragmentary. Either they were omitted accidentally, which does not seem very likely, or they joined Aitolia shortly afterwards, but before the Aitolian embassy to Sparta in spring 210, since the Aitolian-Messenian alliance is referred to in the speech of the Aitolian Chlainas (Polyb. 9.30.6; Roebuck 1941, 84–5 and nn.88, 95; Grainger 1999, 316–17; Luraghi 2008, 261).

³⁶ Walbank 1940, 98; Dixon 2014, 178; Rizakis 2008a, 29 and 282, n.43.

³⁷ Holleaux 1921, 261–3; Walbank 1940, 101 and n.3; *id.* 1988, 409, n.1; *contra* Gruen 1984, 441, n.13.

³⁸ See Badian 1970, 52 and n.79, on the meaning of the term *adscriptio*: it protects the *adscripti* but it does not bind them.

³⁹ See Schmitt, *SV*4 III, pp. 283–4 for bibliography. The authenticity of the list of

adscripti has been a subject of debate, especially as regards the presence of Athens and Ilion in it; see Errington 1989a, 105 for a summary presentation of the problem (he cautiously accepts the list as authentic). Holleaux (1921, 258–71) argued that Aitolia's allies were part of the peace of 206 but he rejected almost entirely Livy's list of *foederi adscripti* to the Peace of Phoinike in 205 (apart from Attalos of Pergamon). Walbank 1940, 103–4 and n.6 also rejects the list. More recent scholarship accepts the inclusion of Nabis, the Eleans and the Messenians as genuine: Balsdon 1954, 30–4, Badian 1970, 52, n. 79; Will 1982, 95–6 (with bibliography) and Gruen 1984, 441, n.13. Larsen (1968, 377–8) accepts the Spartans, the Eleans and the Messenians as *foederi adscripti* but argues plausibly that the title ascribed to Nabis (*Lacedaemoniorum tyrannus*) bears evidence that 'the list has been tampered with'.

⁴⁰ Holleaux 1921, 280–331 (esp. 317ff); McDonald and Walbank 1937, 182–7, 204–7; Walbank 1940, 112–13, 127–8; re-instated by Eckstein 2006, 104–10, 259–75 and *id.* 2008, 129–80.

⁴¹ Crawford (1992, 60–3) believes that the Romans regarded the peace of 205 as provisional and argues for a combination of individual ambitions to outdo Scipio Africanus with, perhaps, the view that a war in the East would replenish the Roman treasury. Harris (1979, 212–18) argues for the ambitions of a certain part of the Roman elite; Will (1982, 131–49, with bibliography; 149–74 for the war itself) minimizes the importance of events in the Orient and argues that the real cause of the war lay in the political ambitions of certain families; Gruen 1984 (382–98) explains the war as a result of the Romans' wish to restore their tarnished image from the First Macedonian War. See Walbank 1940, 138–85 and 1988, 411–47, for a narrative from Philip's perspective; Walbank (1988, 419–20) writes of the varying motives of the senators and emphasizes the 'crude and cunning' character of the ultimatum delivered to Philip at Abydos (to make war on no Greek state, to refrain from touching Ptolemaic possessions and to submit the injuries done to Attalos of Pergamon and Rhodes to arbitration: Polyb. 16.34.1–7; Livy 31.8.1–4); Errington (1989b, 256) argues for a group of 'eastern specialists' or 'lobby' in Rome who had fought in the First Macedonian War, had been dissatisfied and thought that Macedon 'provided the potential for a triumph'; see *ibid.* 257–70, for a narrative of the war; *id.* 2008, 198–212, especially on the effects on Greek states. See Erskine and Mitchell 2012, for a presentation of approaches to Roman imperialism and to the growth of Roman power. See Larsen 1968, 378–400, for a narrative from the perspective of Greek states; Grainger 1999, 352–404, for the Aitolian part in the war.

⁴² Aymard 1938b, 67; Walbank 1967, 549; Bastini 1987, 41–3; Errington 1989b, 262–3; Paschidis 2008a, 290.

⁴³ Similarly Larsen 1968, 381.

⁴⁴ Walbank 1940, 148 and *id.* 1967, 606–7; Aymard 1938b, 59–61, n.53.

⁴⁵ Aymard (1938b, 82, n.54) notes that Sikyon was carefully chosen by the magistrates as the meeting place of the assembly, instead of Argos which was much closer to Kenchreai where the Roman envoys came from; but the chances were that pro-Macedonian sentiments would run very high in Argos.

⁴⁶ The relationship between Rome and the Achaian Confederacy became a formal alliance (*foedus aequum*) some years later, after the Isthmia of 196 (Polyb. 18.42.6), and probably between November 192 (when the Achaians declared war against the Aitolians and Antiochos III) and late spring 191. See Badian 1952, 79–80, mainly on

the basis of Polyb. 24.11–13, esp. 11.6 (referring to the period between 193 and 187). Livy 39.37.9 explicitly refers to the treaty in the context of 184 while Polyb. 23.4.12 refers to its renewal in the next year. Badian's view is endorsed by Walbank 1979, 219–20, Ferrary 1998, 95, n.164 and Errington 2008, 217–28; Gruen (1984, 33–4) prefers a date not long after the winter of 191/0 (the Aitolian treaty with Rome, following the end of the war against Antiochos III); Aymard (1938b, 261–7) dates the treaty to 193.

⁴⁷ See Walbank 1940, 157–8 and 1988, 427, for the fear of the Romans; also Aymard 1938b, 9–12 and Errington 2008, 204–5. Whether this fear was justified is another matter: see Badian (1970, 39–40) who argues that it is doubtful whether the Romans would have dared attack the Achaian Confederacy, because this would render diplomatic success, i.e. to win over Greece, impossible. But the Achaians of the time could not have predicted Roman reaction.

Aymard (1938b, 85–6) argues that the promise to restore Corinth was made unofficially to Aristainos and his friends. On the other hand, Briscoe (1973, 201) plausibly suggests that any diplomatic initiative would have been impossible if the Senate had not committed itself. Still, the fear that the Romans would win and thus the Achaian Confederacy would be on the losing side appears as a good enough motive. Wooten (1974, 247–8) stresses that the most prevalent argument employed in speeches of Greeks in Polybius is that of expediency.

On the meeting at Sikyon see Aymard 1938b, 83–102; Eckstein 1987a, 142–4. Carawan (1988, 214–15) observes that in Livy Aristainos is the first to announce the claim that the Romans had come to liberate the Greeks.

⁴⁸ Eckstein (1987a, 148) writes of 'sheer territorial greed'.

⁴⁹ If the entire army had been mobilized, as had been decided at the meeting at Sikyon, then it is difficult to see how Corinth could have withstood the siege. Possibly, the decision was translated into having the military force of each member-state stand by.

⁵⁰ See Wiseman 1979, 466–8, on the degraded state of city walls of Corinth, already from the time of Kleomenes; Dixon 2014, 179–80, 183–4, on the damage done at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia.

⁵¹ Briscoe (1973, 215) observes that since some Argives had stayed and voted for the alliance, the Achaians could claim 'some justification' for the installation of the garrison.

⁵² Scholarly views are divided: Briscoe (1973, 233, 239) thinks that the Achaians demanded both Corinth and Akrokorinthos while Philip promised only the city. Similarly Walbank 1967, 559, on Philip's intentions. On the other hand, Dixon (2014, 184–6) thinks that by 'Corinth' Philip meant the entire Korinthia.

⁵³ Livy 33.14.5. The Corinthians had probably seen by then that Philip's chances were slim, and would not commit more troops: see Aymard 1938b, 165–6 and Dixon 2014, 182.

⁵⁴ Polyb. 18.18–33; Livy 33.4–10; Plut. *Flam.* 7–8.

⁵⁵ Provisional peace terms had been agreed between Flamininus and Philip at a conference at Tempe (Polyb. 18.36–7; Livy 33.13). According to Polybius (18.37.2, 8, 12) the Romans thought that it was in the interest of the Greeks that the Macedonian kingdom should not be destroyed.

⁵⁶ Polyb. 18.45.7–12; Livy 33.31.3–5, 11; Plut. *Flam.* 10.1. On the relations between Flamininus and the commissioners see Briscoe 1967, 34–5; Will 1982, 168; Carawan 1988, 229; Eckstein 1990, 49–50; Errington 2008, 207.

⁵⁷ The bibliography on the Isthmia declaration and Roman policy as a whole is enormous. See, e.g. Badian 1970, 54–7; Walbank 1940, 180–2; *id.* 1967, 610–14; Will 1982, 164–5 and 273; Gruen 1984, 145–57; Ferrary 1988, 81–94; Errington 1989b, 272–3. See Eckstein 1990, 45–6 for a summary of the various views on the initiator of the policy of freedom for the Greeks; Eckstein (1990, esp. at pp. 64–8) stresses the role played by the Achaian politicians in the formation of Flamininus’ policy. Dmitriev (2011, 151–81) advances the controversial view that the idea of the slogan originated with the Senate; see Carawan 1988, 230–1, for a comparison of the sources. See Gruen 1984, 167 with notes 61–2, on the honours for Flamininus from all over the Greek world.

⁵⁸ Aymard 1938b, 144–51; Texier 1975, 64–6; Briscoe 1973, 245; Gruen 1984, 446; Cartledge 2002b, 74.

⁵⁹ Larsen (1968, 400–13) and Harris (1979, 218, n.5) emphasize that Nabis’ radical social programme in Sparta would have made him highly unpopular with the Senate; Errington (2008, 212) adds that Flamininus’ army needed ‘something useful to do, if its continued presence were not to feed further Aitolian discontents’.

⁶⁰ At some point Hermione had passed under Nabis’ control: see Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 91 and n.33) who tentatively suggest that Nabis may have gained the Argolic Akte before Argos.

⁶¹ Aymard 1938b, 205; Larsen 1968, 403.

⁶² In 189, in 185 and in 171: Livy 38.30.4, Polyb. 22.10.1–3, Livy 42.44.7, respectively.

⁶³ Daux 1964, esp. 575–6.

⁶⁴ Ptolemy, the Chians, the Rhodians and the Athenians had mediated for peace between Philip and the Aitolians (Livy 27.30). Eckstein (2002, 278) accepts Livy’s testimony that the demands of the Aitolians increased as soon as they were informed of the arrival of the Roman and the Pergamene fleets off Naupaktos.

⁶⁵ See Ch.7, p.281 and n.46.

⁶⁶ Aymard 1938b, 13, n. 6; Walbank 1967, 606–7; Henning 1996, 22.

⁶⁷ Aymard 1938b, 180–1; Roebuck 1941, 90–1 and n.109; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 515.

The differences between Messene and Pylos were solved by the late 2nd – 1st century, as evidenced by a Messenian honorific decree for a citizen of Pylos (ed. pr. Themelis 2002 [2005], 31–3 = *SEG* 52.379).

⁶⁸ According to the Aitolian-Roman treaty, the Aitolians would keep all the cities conquered by either the Romans or the two jointly, as far north as Kerkyra (see this chapter, p.325 and n.33). In 196 the Aitolians had been allowed to incorporate Phokis and eastern Lokris but from Thessaly only Phthiotic Thebes.

⁶⁹ Aymard (1938b, 339, n.3) thinks that Messene declared war, as did the Eleans. Roebuck 1941, 91 thinks it is probable. Luraghi (2008, 261 and n.49) urges caution and draws attention to Livy’s vague wording in 36.31.2: *cum Aetolis sentiebant*; also Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 516 and n.9.

⁷⁰ The war ended with the defeat of Antiochos at the battle of Magnesia in winter 190/89 and the subsequent Peace of Apameia in 188. See Harris 1979, 219–23; Will 1982, 178–209; Gruen 1984, 612–43; Walbank 1940, 190–221 and 1988, 448–55; Briscoe 1981b, 244–50; Errington 1989b, 271–89 and 2008, 208–11, 214–20; Derow 2003, 61–5; Eckstein 2006, 292–306. For a narrative from the perspective of the Greek states, see Larsen 1968, 408–42 and Grainger 1999, 407–98.

⁷¹ Larsen (1968, 422) characteristically notes that ‘the Achaeans, no more than the Romans, cared to fight for what they could have for the asking’.

⁷² Denied by Roebuck (1941, p.92 n.117), Aymard (1938b, 342–4 and n.7 at p.344), Larsen (1968, 422); *contra* Walbank 1979, 193.

⁷³ Explanations of Flamininus’ action have been diverse. Errington (1969, 123–4) explains it as a wish ‘to extend his *clientela* both in Messene and in Achaia’, at the same time establishing a policy of creating discord in a city which he made a member of the Achaian Confederacy; Gruen (1984, 468–9) argues for personal prestige at the expense of the Achaians; Ferrary (1988, 122–4) believes that Flamininus did not so much wish to weaken the Confederacy as to ‘reduce its pretensions to *isologia*’. See also Walbank (1979, 220–1) and Grandjean (2003, 82).

⁷⁴ Kyparissia might have become a member of the Achaian Confederacy before 213: see Ch. 7, n.45. To the losses we should most probably add Mothone. See Roebuck 1941, 94 and n.124; Rizakis 2011, 273, 275, n.13; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 516. See Henning 1996, 29–30, on the importance of Mothone for sea voyages around the Peloponnese.

⁷⁵ Sineux 1997, 18; also Auberger 2005, 197.

⁷⁶ See Ch. 1, n.172; Ch. 5, n.130.

⁷⁷ There is a lacuna in Polybius 18.47.10, supplemented in the Loeb edition with the help of Livy’s text as follows: Κόρινθον δὲ καὶ τὴν Τριφυλίαν καὶ <τὴν Ἡραιῶν πόλιν Ἀχαιοῖς ἀπέδωκαν. Ὡρεὸν δ’>, ἔτι δὲ τὴν Ἑρετριέων πόλιν ἐδόκει μὲν τοῖς πλείοσιν Εὐμένει δοῦναι; see Walbank 1967, 618. Livy 33.34.9 writes ‘*Corinthus et Triphylia et Heraea – Peloponnesi et ipsa urbs est – redditae Achaeis*’ but as Walbank (1940, 182, n.3) observes, we are dealing with confirmation, not restoration of territories – on the assumption that Philip V had indeed restored Triphylia and Heraia to the Achaian Confederacy in 198 (Livy 32.5.4–5); see also Briscoe 1973, 175, 315.

⁷⁸ Larsen 1968, 416; Walbank 1979, 65–6.

⁷⁹ Livy 36.32.1; Errington 1969, 123.

⁸⁰ Errington 1969, 131–2; Roy 2003, 86.

⁸¹ On the date see Walbank 1979, 178, 188, *contra* Errington 1969, 257. See also Zoumbaki 2005, 268, N 15 Νικόδημος.

⁸² See Moggi and Osanna 2003, 433–4: since it was erected in the *agora*, the statue for Diophanes must have been a public monument.

⁸³ Polyb. 11.10.9; Livy 34.32.1; Paus. 8.50.2; Plut. *Phil.* 10.1; Diod. Sic. 22.1.1; Pozzi 1970, 409–11; Texier 1975, 11; Fontana 1980, 923–5; Piper 1986, 88–9; Cartledge 2002b, 65–6.

⁸⁴ Pozzi (1970, 413, n.197) and Shipley (2000a, 373), following Kolbe in *IG* V.1, p.11; Magnetto 1994, 296, n.58.

⁸⁵ Errington (1969, 60) suggests that Machanidas might have captured Tegea just before his march to the Argive frontier.

⁸⁶ After 222 and until 211 Philopoimen had served as a *condotierre* in Crete, on the side of the Gortynians against the Knossians (the latter were supported by Nabis): Errington 1969, 27–48; Cartledge 2002b, 66.

⁸⁷ Errington 1969, 51–4 and n.2.

⁸⁸ Anderson 1967, 104–5; Errington 1969, 49–50 and 62–4; see the criticism of Will 1982, 93, on Errington’s view that the reforms took place at Philip’s *instigation* so that he would be relieved of the protection of the Peloponnese.

Chapter 8

⁸⁹ See Walbank 1967, 283–94, for the battle; Errington 1969, 65; also Cartledge 2002b, 66.

⁹⁰ See Chaniotis 2005, 193–5, on Polybius 11.11–18 as the *locus classicus* for the representation of war in Hellenistic historiography, stressing the role of the great personality; Ma (2004, 201) stresses the military culture borne out by Polybius' narrative; see also Eckstein 2006, 198–9.

⁹¹ Texier 1975, 16–17, 24–5; Fontana 1980, 927–8; Cartledge 2002b, 67–8.

⁹² Oliva 1971, 279–82; Shimron 1972, 84–91, 96–8; Texier 1975, 26–36; Cartledge 2002b, 70.

⁹³ Polyb. 13.6–8.2; Oliva 1971, 274–8 with a review of the bibliography on Nabis; Shimron 1972, 80–5; Texier 1975, 19–20; Walbank 1967, 420–1; Birgalias 2005, 141–3, 149–50.

⁹⁴ See the analysis of Aymard 1938b, 38–9, n.49, from a judicial point of view; Texier (1975, 37–8) thinks that Nabis was all too ready to attack Megalopolis because many opponents of his regime must have found refuge there.

⁹⁵ The alliance of 210 of Sparta, Elis and Messene with Aitolia might have still been in force: Walbank (1967, 516–17 with bibliography) suggests that the alliance must have continued as a defensive one; *contra* Fontana 1980, 930.

⁹⁶ Aymard (1938b, 39–43) argues that Nabis' attack on Messene was the decisive event that showed that he was after hegemony. More modestly, Roebuck (1941, 88–9) writes that this aimed at recovering influence over Messene.

⁹⁷ Errington (1969, 79) writes of an anti-Achaian party; Oliva (1971, 283) thinks that Nabis either was called in by the Messenian democrats or tried to take advantage of internal conflict; Texier (1975, 38) thinks that Nabis was invited by the populist party at Messene, which is not impossible given Messene's problems with exiles. But cf. Luraghi (2008, 261) who suggests that we do not have to think in terms of pro- or anti-groups. But, if we have to talk about factions, a pro-Spartan group is more likely than an anti-Achaian.

⁹⁸ In Livy 34.32.16 Flamininus accuses Nabis of seizing Messene; he would not have failed to refer to repeated attacks.

⁹⁹ Endorsed by Walbank 1967, 545.

¹⁰⁰ Plutarch (*Phil.*13.1) explains Philopoimen's departure by a wish to help the Gortynians, which sounds quite unconvincing; next (13.2) he associates it with the election of other men to public office, which sounds convincing. Errington (1969, 73–5) argues that Philopoimen, being by then anti-Macedonian, left when Kykliadas, an advocate of the Macedonian alliance, was elected to the *stratēgia*. Larsen (1968, 381) argues that Philopoimen left thinking that the war was over, which does not sound plausible, given that Philopoimen had not won a pitched battle and Nabis was still around.

¹⁰¹ See this chapter, p.320 and nn.46–8.

¹⁰² Kleomenes had brought over Argos to his side, and had installed a Spartan garrison but his relationship with Argos was an alliance; *contra* Shimron 1972, 95.

¹⁰³ Aymard 1938b, 150–1, n.60 and *IG IV*².1.621 / *ISE* 45.

¹⁰⁴ Pythagoras was the brother of Apia: Aymard 1938b, 216.

¹⁰⁵ ...*et magis tamen de Argis quam de Corintho sollicitus, optimum ratus Nabidi eam Lacedaemoniorum tyranno velut fiduciarium dare, ut victori sibi restitueret, si quid adversi accidisset ipse haberet.*

¹⁰⁶ Aymard is perhaps right in suggesting that Philip did not formulate his offer in the above terms but offered Arkadian territories in case he was victorious.

¹⁰⁷ Texier (1975, 52) argues that the Argives were unanimously hostile on this occasion.

¹⁰⁸ Oliva (1971, 285–9, 293) labels those well-off Argives opposing Nabis as oligarchs but neither do we know enough about the Argive constitution at the time to make such a judgement, nor is possession of property necessarily to be identified with oligarchic beliefs.

¹⁰⁹ Dimakis 2011, 40–2; see also Piérart and Touchais 1996, 69–72.

¹¹⁰ Bielman (1994, 162) stresses that the verb indicates that the ephebes were placed in safety, not that they had already returned to Mykenai. On the other hand, Boethius (1921–23, 424) takes it for granted that they had.

¹¹¹ Bielman (1994, 161) leaves the matter open.

¹¹² Eckstein (1987b, 228) assumes that the ephebes served in Nabis' army and sets the Protimos decree and the joy at the ephebes' return in a wider context of unanimous hostility in the Argolid against Nabis; nevertheless, he observes that it is not so clear that their service was involuntary.

¹¹³ Galimberti (2006, 358) argues for the progressive ascendance of radical forces from 198 onwards. It is also not to be excluded that Nabis' rule was legitimized by an Argive assembly, although Livy records no such thing; Galimberti 2006, 349 with bibliography.

¹¹⁴ Texier 1975, 74–5; Galimberti 2006, 352. Eckstein (1987b, 223) argues that the garrison was too strong, but the fact that it was pushed back behind the walls would have shown the exact opposite to the Argives.

¹¹⁵ See also Aymard 1938b, 216–17 and n.17; Texier 1975, 75.

¹¹⁶ The arguments exchanged between Flamininus and Nabis (Livy 34.31–2), especially as to the legitimacy of the latter's rule over Argos, have been much discussed. See e.g. Aymard 1938b, 229–37; Briscoe 1981b, 99–100; Eckstein 1987b; Dmitriev 2011, 203–4.

¹¹⁷ Aymard (1938b, 221–2) notes that no other allied state of mainland Greece was represented at the meeting.

¹¹⁸ On the army figures see Walbank 1967, 282–3 and Briscoe 1981b, 92–3.

¹¹⁹ Former Lakonian perioikic communities established the Lakedaimonian *Koinon* sometime after 195 or after 146. The whole process must have been gradual; see Kennell 1999, 192–3. Cf. Shipley 2000a, 387 and n.183, on a *lex sacra* from Gytheion (Kougeas 1928, 16–38, no.II, ll.11–12 = *SEG* 11.923), dating from Tiberius' time and celebrating Flamininus on the sixth day of a festival (after the imperial family), which in Shipley's view 'strongly suggests he and no other person was responsible for setting up the Lakedaimonian league'. However, Flamininus need not be seen as doing more than setting the process in gear by freeing the formerly perioikic towns. Gytheion honoured Flamininus with a statue and declared him a saviour (*Syll.*³ 592); see also Plut. *Flam.* 10.1–3, 16.3–4 for the honours conferred upon Flamininus by other Greeks (Kougeas 1928, 25).

¹²⁰ Larsen 1968, 403–4; Briscoe 1967, 9; Errington 1969, 89; Cartledge 2002b, 76. Gruen (1984, 454–5), on the other hand, insists that Flamininus' purpose was more limited: 'to reinforce his esteem and justify his propaganda'. Ferrary (1988, 107–8 and n.200) stresses the importance of Spartan reputation.

¹²¹ Texier 1975, 95–7.

¹²² See Gruen 1984, 463 on Achaian cautiousness.

¹²³ See Errington 1969, 95–8, on Flamininus' wish to deprive the Achaian Confederacy and, Philopoimen in particular, of military glory.

¹²⁴ Livy omits Flamininus' intervention which probably occurred while the Achaian army was still in Lakonia: see Aymard 1938b, 309–15 and Briscoe 1981b, 189; *contra* Errington 1969, 106, n.1.

¹²⁵ For different views on Aitolian motives see Larsen 1968, 413; Errington 1969, 108–9; Shimron 1972, 100; Texier 1975, 98–100; Briscoe 1981b, 197–8.

¹²⁶ 'and partly by compulsion, partly by persuasion, brought it over to his purposes and made it a member of the Achaian Confederacy. This achievement brought him an amazing repute among the Achaians, since through his efforts they had acquired a city of so great dignity and power (and indeed it was no slight matter that Sparta had become a member of the Achaian Confederacy); moreover, Philopoimen carried with him the principal men among the Spartans, who hoped to have in him a guardian of their freedom'.

¹²⁷ On the paucity of the sources and the concessions made to the Spartans see Aymard 1938b, 320–2. In a thought-provoking article, Texier (2014, 238–54) expands Aymard's points arguing in detail that Sparta became a member of the Achaian Confederacy only in 188. His most significant argument (at pp. 247–8 and n.56) is Livy's use of the word *societas* (= alliance) to describe Philopoimen's action in 192 (35.37.1–2): *societati Achaeorum Lacedaemonios adiunxit*. Texier's work certainly highlights the ambivalence in Spartan-Achaian relations but with Polybius' relevant text missing, it is rather difficult to discard Plutarch's testimony in the *Philopoimen*, which is generally thought to be based on Polybius.

¹²⁸ Errington (1969, 110, n.2) underlines that, although he himself often employs the term 'Timolaus' group', we cannot know whether Timolaos actually led the Philopoimenist regime.

¹²⁹ See the neat exposition of the problem by Errington 2008, 238–40.

¹³⁰ Polybius (23.5.2) records that the Messenian Deinokrates became a friend of Flamininus during the *Lakonikos polemos*, i.e. the war against Nabis in 195. This is no firm basis for deducing that there was a Messenian contingent in the war (so Roebuck 1941, 91 and n.110; also Errington 1969, 124 and n.2).

¹³¹ See Errington 1969, 128–30, on the relations between Diophanes and Philopoimen; also Gruen 1984, 468.

¹³² The chronology of events is based on Walbank 1979, 1988, *passim*; for events involving Sparta in particular, see also Errington 1969, Table I, 298–9; Briscoe 1981b, 110, for chronology of events from autumn 189 to May 188; Grandjean 2003, 268, for Messenia; the Table in *CAH* 1989, vol. VIII, 530–1 is also helpful. Different views are noted where necessary.

¹³³ Eckstein 2006, 304.

¹³⁴ Walbank 1940, 329–31; *id.* 1988, 452.

¹³⁵ Aymard 1938b, 356–8, n.1; accepted by Walbank 1979, 88–9; *contra* Errington (1969, 133–5, 286–7) who dates events as follows: 1) change of government at Sparta in later autumn, after the Achaian *synodos* at Aigion; 2) Spartan embassy to Rome in the winter of 191/0; 3) return in spring/summer 190; accepted by Shimron 1972, 104, n.8.

¹³⁶ Walbank 1979, 89.

¹³⁷ Canali de Rossi (1997, 29, no.32) suggests that there was another Spartan embassy.

¹³⁸ For a date of the Achaian embassy while the Spartans were still in Rome and as soon as Philopoimen entered office see Walbank 1979, 178, against Errington (1969, 257) who thinks that the embassy of Nikodemos left late in Philopoimen's *stratēgia*.

¹³⁹ For the date see Walbank 1979, 177.

¹⁴⁰ Walbank (1979, 188) suggests that Nikodemos may have been delayed because of the disruption caused by the Bacchanalia scandal (Livy 39.8–19).

¹⁴¹ There is a lacuna in the text of Polyb. 22.7.6: see Walbank 1979, 188.

¹⁴² On the identification with Pulcher see Walbank 1979, 196–7; Moggi and Osanna 2000, 246.

¹⁴³ On the date see Errington 1969, 288–9 and Walbank 1979, 217 and 223.

¹⁴⁴ Roebuck 1941, 97.

¹⁴⁵ It is unclear whether Flamininus arrived in Greece before or after the Achaian electoral assembly. Roebuck 1941, 96 and n.134; see also Walbank 1979, 222.

¹⁴⁶ Roebuck (1941, 97 and n.136) thinks that perhaps Marcius' arrival coincided with the Achaian electoral assembly.

¹⁴⁷ Livy 39.49.5 places the revolt before Marcius' arrival, which must be wrong: Roebuck 1941, 97, nn.136, 137; also Briscoe 2008, 385: p. 97, n.137: the report of Philippus at the Senate is the *terminus ante quem* for the revolt. *Contra* Larsen 1968, 457; Derow (1989, 297–8) places Achaian declaration of war round the time of Marcius Philippus' arrival.

¹⁴⁸ Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 518) suggest that war may have been declared in the same meeting at which Philippus had appeared.

¹⁴⁹ The date of Spartan secession is open to conjecture: did it occur while Serippos was still in Rome or after his return? The crucial passage is Polyb. 23.17.5: εἰς δὲ τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα παραγενομένων τῶν πρεσβευτῶν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης καὶ κομιζόντων τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, εὐθὺς ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν μετὰ τὸ συντελέσαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Μεσσηνίην συνῆγε τοὺς πολλοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Σικυωνίων πόλιν. ἀθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν (ἀνεδίδου διαβούλιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ προσλαβέσθαι (τὴν Σπάρτην) εἰς τὴν συμπολιτείαν.... The εὐθὺς seems to be related to the arrangement of affairs at Messenia (Walbank 1979, 251) and not to the arrival of the envoys at Sparta (Errington 1969, 289–90). The arrival of the envoys, the Messenian revolt, its suppression, and the meeting at Sikyon seem to be chronologically close. Walbank (1979, 251) thinks that there may have been time for the Spartans to secede even after the envoys' arrival. The text indicates that the secession had occurred while the Achaian Confederacy had its hands full with the Messenian revolt, hence it dealt with the Spartan problem as soon as (εὐθὺς) the Messenian problem was settled. Errington (1969, 289–90) argues that Chairon led the secession and he is most probably right, given that he was the main rival of Serippos.

¹⁵⁰ Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 525–6, 541–3 (based on the evidence of Themelis 2008, ll.17–18, 31 [= *SEG* 58.370], a series of arbitrations between Messene and Megalopolis after Philopoimen's death in the summer of 182); see also Themelis 2008, 216.

¹⁵¹ Walbank (1979, 260) on the date and on the possibility that this Hyperbatos was perhaps a grandson of the *stratēgos* of 226/5.

¹⁵² Walbank 1979, 261.

¹⁵³ For the different dates see Walbank (1979, 19 and 264) and Errington (1969, 263–4) respectively; see also Gruen 1984, 499 and n.80.

¹⁵⁴ Piper (1986, 119) suggests that the cause of agitation may have been Antiochos' presence in Greece, which is plausible; it is less plausible to associate the agitation solely with Nabis' followers, whom she misleadingly calls 'democrats'.

¹⁵⁵ Flamininus must have been at Corinth: see Aymard 1938b, 334, n.14.

¹⁵⁶ Errington (1969, 119–20) argues that there did occur a secession; *contra* Aymard (1938b, 333–4) writes of only an attempt at secession. For an evaluation of the two views see Gruen 1984, 467 and n. 176. Pausanias (8.51.1–2) writes that Diophanes accused the Spartans of rebelling against the Romans. Aymard (1938b, 333–4) suggests that the Spartans were asking for the restitution of the perioikic towns, perhaps at the secret instigation of the Achaians who were interested in enlarging Spartan territory and, consequently, their own. But this would have been a much too complicated and much too risky way of approaching their goal.

¹⁵⁷ Canali de Rossi 1997, 25–6, no. 28.

¹⁵⁸ Errington (1969, 124, 133) argues that the subject was raised by the Senate at the instigation of Flamininus who, in his view, wished to create discord in every city he made a member of the Achaian Confederacy; the latter view seems quite dubious. Aymard (1938b, 359) thinks that the envoys mentioned to the Senate the problems caused by the intrigues of the exiles, which is a reasonable possibility; similar views are held by Gruen 1984, 471–2.

¹⁵⁹ Errington 1969, 133–5; Walbank 1979, 88–9 on the identity of the exiles and the new group in power.

¹⁶⁰ Polyb. 1.9.3; 2.56.6, 4.20.3; 5.32.1; 6.45.1; 12.25e 5,7; 12.25k 2; 13.3.2, 15.25.17; the use of the superlative form ἀρχαιοτάτην in the case of a *polis* only implicitly compares it to others (4.54.6 and 30.20.4). It is only in two passages (3.22.3 and 7.10.1) that Polybius draws a clear distinction between old and new (the Roman language and the Messenian citizens respectively).

¹⁶¹ The hostages were restored by the Senate, except for Nabis' son (Polyb. 21.3.3–4), in winter 191/0.

¹⁶² See Briscoe 2008, 110 for the right order of events in Livy 38.30.

¹⁶³ Errington (1969, 137) and Briscoe (2008, 113) think that Fulvius had already left for Rome; *contra* Walbank 1979, 138.

¹⁶⁴ See Gruen 1984, 473–4, on Fulvius' attitude.

¹⁶⁵ Canali de Rossi 1997, 38–9, nos. 41, 42.

¹⁶⁶ Piper (1986, 124) writes of 'traditional Megalopolitan hatred of Sparta'.

¹⁶⁷ Errington 1969, 144–7; Shimron 1972, 103–7, 112–13; Gruen 1984, 473–4; Briscoe 2008, 116–18.

¹⁶⁸ Canali de Rossi 1997, 43, no.46. Errington (1969, 148–90) argues that these anonymous envoys were the survivors of the tyrants' party because they had suffered the most from the restoration of the old exiles.

¹⁶⁹ Canali de Rossi 1997, 43–4, no.47.

¹⁷⁰ See also Diod. Sic. 29.17 with Larsen 1968, 449.

¹⁷¹ Derow (1989, 296) points out that until 185 things had been left in Achaian hands. Gruen (1984, 485–6) distinguishes between Metellus' 'impromptu blustering' and senatorial policy.

¹⁷² The text moves from reported speech in the infinitive to indicative: ἔφη γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ Λακεδαιμόνα κεχειρίσθαι κακῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ Μεσσηνίην ἦσαν δὲ περὶ τῶν φυγαδικῶν τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἀντιρρήσεις τινές....

¹⁷³ Larsen (1968, 450) observes that ‘the Achaeans never learned to present a united front to the outside world’.

¹⁷⁴ Walbank 1979, 195–6.

¹⁷⁵ See also Paus. 7.9.2–3; Canali de Rossi 1997, 52–3, nos. 60, 61.

¹⁷⁶ Walbank (1979, 196 with bibliography) argues against the idea that this phrase means that Achaian governors were appointed.

¹⁷⁷ Errington (1969, 175) argues that Areus and Alkibiades aimed at re-establishing ‘a glorious and independent Sparta’...‘free of the limitations which the federal mechanisms inevitably imposed on them’ (at p.176).

¹⁷⁸ It is uncertain whether this *concilium* (as described by Livy) was the spring *synodos*: Larsen 1955, 177; Walbank 1979, 200.

¹⁷⁹ See Briscoe 2008, 341–4 for Lykortas’ speech, especially his deliberate omissions; see also Pédech 1964, 285; Errington 1969, 177.

¹⁸⁰ *tum Appius suadere se magnopere Achaeis dixit, ut, dum liceret voluntate sua facere, gratiam inirent, ne mox inviti et coacti facerent.*

¹⁸¹ As in the case of Metellus, Gruen (1984, 121–2 [and n.130], and 488–9) distinguishes between Pulcher’s behaviour and senatorial policy.

¹⁸² Polybius’ account (23.4) is the most detailed; see also Livy 39.48.1–3; App. *Mac.* 9.6; Justin 32.2.3; Canali de Rossi 1997, 56–8, nos. 68, 69.

¹⁸³ Shimron (1972, 109, 146–50) argues that apart from Serippos’ group all the others were exiles, but restoration of property can be an issue only when the exiles have actually been restored: see Walbank 1979, 216–17. Errington (1969, 181 and n.2) and Shimron (1972, 115) observe that Chairon actually asked for the restitution of Nabis’ regime.

¹⁸⁴ Errington 1969, 179–80; Shimron 1972, 108, 113, 115.

¹⁸⁵ Canali de Rossi 1997, 59–61, nos. 71, 72.

¹⁸⁶ Errington 1969, 189–90; Walbank 1979, 228. The Senate’s policy has been much discussed: was it indifferent as well as fed up with Peloponnesian politics? (Gruen 1984, 495); did it aim at creating divisions? (Briscoe 1967, 13–14; Dmitriev 2011, 319–20); did it intend to incite revolt in Sparta? (Larsen 1935, 208–9; Walbank 1979, 229; Derow 1989, 299; Cartledge 2002b, 82). Errington (1969, 186) argues that Philippos *undoubtedly* hoped that Messene could secure a settlement but where would he have based such hopes?

¹⁸⁷ We only hear about Sparta’s secession in the context of the discussion for Sparta’s re-admission into the Achaian Confederacy; the ‘τοὺς δὲ κυριεύοντας τῆς Σπάρτης κατὰ τὸ παρὸν’ (Polyb. 23.17.9) points to a change of government after the secession; for a reconstruction of events see Errington 1969, 196, 289–90 with Walbank (1979, 251–2) pointing out, *contra* Errington, that the fact that Chairon was later an official representative of Sparta to the Senate shows that there must have been a compromise between him and Serippos, not a counter-coup.

¹⁸⁸ In either 181 or 180 Chairon attempted a redivision of the land of the exiles (Polyb. 24.7.1–10). A board of *dokimastēres* was set up to investigate the use of public funds; Chairon had one of the *dokimastēres* murdered; Lykortas or perhaps Hyperbatos had Chairon imprisoned while steps were taken to restore property to the relatives of

exiles. Walbank (1979, 259) dates, hesitantly, these events to 180; see also Cartledge 2002b, 83.

¹⁸⁹ Perhaps following another letter of the Senate: Polyb. 24.8.1 with Walbank 1979, 260–1; *contra* Gruen 1984, 496, n.67.

¹⁹⁰ Errington 2008, 239–40; Cartledge 2002b, 81.

¹⁹¹ In Bastini's view (1987, 118), Kallikrates was included because the defeated party had to be represented. Nottmeyer (1995, 16–21) denies the existence of such a practice and argues that Kallikrates was chosen to represent the views of Hyperbatos, the *stratēgos*. The question has to remain open given that we have no precise idea of the procedure followed for the election of envoys.

¹⁹² Polybius (24.10.8–9) states that Kallikrates 'μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησι', ascribing to him a major change in Roman policy for the worse. On Polybius' attaching exaggerated importance to his speech see Briscoe 1967, 14–15; Larsen 1968, 459; Errington 1969, 198–205; Walbank 1979, 262–3; Ferrary 1988, 293–306 and 1997, 117; Gruen 1976b, 31 and *id.* 1984, 497–8; Cartledge 2002b, 84. Champion (2004, 207–11) emphasizes the personal grudge of Polybius against Kallikrates since the latter was responsible for his deportation to Rome; see also Champion 2007, 258–9, 262–3. On the other hand, Bastini (1987, 122–6) accepts Polybius' view of Kallikrates. See Nottmeyer (1995, 26–7) for a review of the bibliography on Kallikrates' speech.

¹⁹³ Rizakis 2008a, no.116, ll.10–11, 13–14.

¹⁹⁴ See Ch. 5, n.30.

¹⁹⁵ During a long dispute with Megalopolis, the Messenians were fined by the *damiorgoi* of the Achaian Confederacy ἐπὶ Αἰνητίδα (Themelis 2008, l. 97). His office is not recorded but Habicht argues persuasively that the mention of only the name of a magistrate is best understood if it refers to the chief magistrate of the year (in Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 534, n.82). Cf., however, Arnaoutoglou (2009–10, 187 and n.24) who thinks that Ainetidas might have been the head *damiorgos* or the *grammateus* of the board. For the sculptor Ainetidas and the identity of Xenainetos see Kreilinger 1995, 373–8 (= *SEG* 45.341).

I am most grateful to C. Habicht who kindly discussed this case with me (via e-mail).

¹⁹⁶ Perhaps Philopoimen's interference had something to do with securing tighter control over Messene: Errington 1969, 155 and n.1; accepted by Walbank 1979, 193, 220–1.

¹⁹⁷ See this chapter, p.326 and n.73; n.130.

¹⁹⁸ Errington (1969, 183) notes that, as far as we know, Deinokrates made no attempt to meet the Senate.

¹⁹⁹ Canali de Rossi 1997, 58–9, no. 70.

²⁰⁰ Similarly in Polyb. 23.5.3: Deinokrates thought that Flamininus would 'manage all affairs of Messene entirely as he himself desired' (χειριεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Μεσσηνίην πάντα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν).

²⁰¹ Errington (1969 191–2) suggests that a Messenian source was responsible for exonerating the Messenians after their capitulation.

²⁰² See also Roebuck (1941, 99 and n. 146) who observes that Deinokrates might have intended to use the harbour of Korone to import supplies from Italy. Walbank (1979, 239) thinks that an attack on Korone is more likely. Errington

(1969, 190 and n.2) believes that Livy and Plutarch perhaps refer to the same operation.

²⁰³ Very briefly, Polyb. 23.12.1–2.

²⁰⁴ Errington (1969, 190 and n.3) argues that the presence of the Cretans and the Thracians makes Philopoimen's campaign less hazardous than it seems.

²⁰⁵ Themelis (2006 [2008], 51–2) reports the discovery of an underground chamber in the Messenian *agora*, which he identifies with the so-called *Thesaurus* (public Treasury).

²⁰⁶ Errington (1969, 191–2) casts doubt on the veracity of the information concerning the poisoning.

²⁰⁷ Moggi and Osanna (2003, 522) underline that Pausanias is trying to exonerate the Messenians in 8.51.7–8 but in 4.29.11 he presents Deinokrates as leader of the people. See also Bearzot 1992, 179–81, on the idealized image of Philopoimen in Pausanias.

²⁰⁸ On Lykortas' election and the army assembly see Aymard (1938a, 211–14), Larsen (1955, 68), O'Neil 1980, 44 and Walbank (1979, 241).

²⁰⁹ On Abia, Pharai and Thouria see Shipley 2004a, 554, 565–6.

²¹⁰ Roebuck 1941, 102; Walbank 1979, 249; Luraghi 2008, 263–4; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 521.

²¹¹ See Ch. 5, pp.152–3 and n.22.

²¹² See Kató 2006, 240–2, on the funeral of Philopoimen serving to strengthen Megalopolis' position in the Confederacy.

²¹³ Diod. Sic. 29.18 and *Syll.*³ 624 for the godlike honours. It is possible that at roughly the same time the Megalopolitans re-inscribed the decrees for Eudamos and Lydiadas, probably destroyed by Kleomenes, thus aligning the leaders of the past with the leader of the present. See Stavrianopoulou (2002, 148, 150–1, n.105) who dates the re-inscribing between 190–180. If Philopoimen was still alive, then the re-inscribing was an expression of enhanced pride; if dead, then it would have been another way of making up for lost supremacy.

²¹⁴ Errington 1969, 90; also Robertson (1976, 265–6) and Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 44; Jost (1992–93, 14) believes that the detachment took place when Philopoimen was *stratēgos* in 191/0.

²¹⁵ Plutarch (*Phil.* 13.4–5) associates this act of Philopoimen with a personal grudge of his for a previous attempt of his fellow citizens to have him exiled because he left for Crete leaving them to suffer Nabis' assaults.

²¹⁶ Aymard 1938a, 382–3, n.8; Jost 1992–93, 14–15.

²¹⁷ Themelis' text is reproduced by Arnaoutoglou (2009–10, 198–201) and Thür (2012, 293–8), who both offer a translation in English; text with certain different restorations and English translation also in Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 510–14.

²¹⁸ Thür 2012 discusses the nature of the Megalopolitan *proklēsis* on the basis of the unpublished text, shown to him by Themelis, but it is difficult to follow arguments without seeing the actual text for ourselves.

²¹⁹ Themelis 2008, 211.

²²⁰ See Themelis 2008, 215, n.4 for the different spelling. See *ibid.*, 215–16 and Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 522–3, for Pylana; also Shipley 2004a, 553 on Andania.

²²¹ Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 524.

²²² In l. 13 the phrase ἂ πρότερον χώρα is employed; see Themelis 2008, 216. In the unpublished *proklēsis*, the Megalopolitans declare that they possessed the regions when

they joined the Confederacy, that is in 235, while the Messenians did not have them when they joined the Confederacy, that is in 191; both parties had agreed to submit their case to a court of Mytilenaians who never actually decided the case (ll. 108–12, 148, 153; Thür 2012, 299–300, 302). As for the Akreiatīs and the Bipeiatīs, Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 526–7) speculate that they must have been located on the slopes to the south of Mt. Tetrāzi (Map 1).

²²³ On the prosopography see Themelis 2008, 217–218.

²²⁴ Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 529–30) carefully suggest that by placing the initial decision of the Achaians with regard to Andania and Pylana at the very beginning of the decree, the Messenians show that this decision was irreversible; they also draw attention to the present tense in the expression *καθώς ἐστὶ ἡμῖν ἡ χώρα* ('the land as we own it'). *contra* Roebuck (1941, 102–3, n.167), on the basis of Strabo 8.3.6 who calls Andania an Arkadian town, referring to Demetrios of Skepsis. Thür (2012, 303), based precisely on the silence of the Messenians, thinks that Andania was lost to them.

²²⁵ It is uncertain whether the Kaliatai were the inhabitants of Kalliai mentioned in Paus. 8.27.4; see Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 531–3) who also observe that the Kaliatai must have had a direct interest in the Akreiatīs and the Bipeiatīs. On Kalliai see Nielsen 2004a, 507.

²²⁶ Thür (2012, 308) argues that the Megalopolitans could only act as supporters or witnesses; Youni (2012, 320) draws the parallel of the Athenian *synēgoros*.

²²⁷ Arnaoutoglou (2009–10, 190–1) stresses that this is the first evidence we have for the involvement of the *damiorgoi* in the administration of justice; cf. Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 539.

²²⁸ On the even number of judges see Arnaoutoglou 2009–10, 187–8, n.25.

²²⁹ Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 539 and n.92) observe that there is no reference to procedural matters and suggest that in cases of an appeal against decisions of the Confederacy's organs, 'an external court was designated (regularly?)'.

²³⁰ In c. 138, the Milesians were employed again in the dispute between Sparta and Messene over the Dentheliatis (*Syll.*³ 683); see Ch. 6, p.250 and n.141.

²³¹ Arnaoutoglou (2009–10, 192–6) discusses extensively cases of a court upholding an earlier decision. See also Youni 2012, 322.

²³² It was previously thought that one of the arbitrations was between Messene and Megalopolis but Thür and Taeuber have established that the rival of Megalopolis was Helisson. See Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.8 for Helisson and no.9 for Thouria. Ager 1996, no.116, employs *IvO* 46.

²³³ Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, p.309; Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 68–9) notes the singular phenomenon of a commission being appointed before the judges.

²³⁴ Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, p.310; Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 66.

²³⁵ It is uncertain whether this *synodos* (*IPArk* 31 IIA, ll. 16–17) is to be identified with the assembly referred to in Polyb. 23.17.5, convened to discuss the re-admission of Sparta; see Roebuck 1941, 103–4, n.168; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, 521 and n.36. Aymard (1938a, 25–6, n.4) argues that the assembly in Polyb. 23.17.5 was a special meeting (a *synklētos*), not a *synodos* and, therefore it should not be identified with the *synodos* referred to in the Olympia inscription; see also Walbank (1979, 251). Thür and Taeuber (*IPArk*, p.310) observe that the absence of Lykortas and the massive representation of his family on the board of Megalopolitan representatives points to a date in which Lykortas was *stratēgos*.

²³⁶ Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 72; see also Roebuck 1941, 103–4, n.168.

²³⁷ Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 68) notes that it would be highly unusual if the Achaian assembly operated as a court of law but that this can be explained in the context of the detachment of Abia, Pharai and Thouria.

²³⁸ Valmin (1930, 106–7, 116–18) identifies Doris with Dorion mentioned in Paus. 4.33.7 and Strabo 8.3.25, and places it in the Soulima plain district; see also Roebuck 1941, 103, n.167; Shipley 2004a, 553.

²³⁹ Arnaoutoglou 2009–10, 189 and n.27, arguing against Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, p.323, who believe that it was a decision of the *synodos* to award territory to Megalopolis.

²⁴⁰ For the reconstruction of the procedure see Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, pp. 321–5, with the preceding note; also Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 66–7.

²⁴¹ See text also in *ISE* 51 / Rizakis 1995, no. 699.

²⁴² Valmin (1928–29, 5–6) assigns this decree to the same context as *IPArk* 31 IIA & IIB, on the basis of the presence of a certain Aristomenes who is one of the Thourian representatives and a *grammateus* of the *synedroi*. See the criticism of Roebuck (1941, 103–4, n.168) who points out that Aristomenes in the first dispute was the head of a commission and that it would have been impossible for him to make a ruling being at the same time a representative of Thouria. Levi (1931, 93–7) points out that *SEG* 11.972 is commemorative in character but thinks that it antedates the inscription set up at Olympia (at p.95). See Robert, J.& L. 1966, 378–9, no.202, reviewing previous bibliography. See Guarducci 1932, 84–5 and n.2 for the *synedron* as an institution of the second half of the 2nd century.

²⁴³ For the location of Helisson see Jost 1985, 188, n. 4.

²⁴⁴ Thür and Taeuber, *IPArk*, p.320 and 325: 31 IB must be either a revision or an amendment, perhaps necessitated by a new dispute on a larger scale.

²⁴⁵ After 182, perhaps in c.167, Helisson appears as an independent member of the Achaian Confederacy issuing its own bronze coinage (Warren 2008, 99). See also Ch. 1, p.28 and nn.166–7.

²⁴⁶ Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 123 and 128) cautiously argues that it was Helisson that turned to the Achaian Confederacy.

²⁴⁷ Text also in *IvO* 47 / Ager 1996, no.137 / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.11.

²⁴⁸ Luraghi and Magnetto (2012, 538, n.88) observe that the verb ἀντιποιεῖν[αι] in l. 6, indicates the use of legal means, not violence, by the Spartans.

²⁴⁹ For the identification of C. Sulpicius with Galus, the consul for 166, see Walbank 1979, 464. The cognomen is Gallus in Livy 44.37.5 and *Periocha* 46 but Galus in Cic. *Brut.* 78.

²⁵⁰ See Ch. 9, p.426 and n.117; Ch. 7, n.115; this chapter, n.64.

²⁵¹ On the Third Macedonian War see Crawford 1992, 86–9; Harris 1979, 227–33; Will 1982, 257–85; Gruen 1984, 403–36; Walbank 1988, 505–69; Derow 1989, 302–18; *id.* 2003, 67–9; Errington 2008, 243–5, 249–50; Larsen 1968, 461–85. The list of those Achaians to be deported was drawn up by Kallikrates. See Polyb. 30.13.6–11; Livy 45.31.9.11; Paus. 7.10.7–11. The hostages returned in 151 (Polyb. 35.6; Plut. *Cato* 9).

²⁵² Bowman (1992, esp. 97–100) first argued strongly in favour of Pausanias' credibility, identifying the '*ho Gallos*' in his text with L. Anicius Gallus, and dated his mission to 155. More plausibly, Höghammar (2000–1, esp. 66–9) retains the chronology c.164/3 and the identification of Gallos with Sulpicius Gal(l)us; further,

she adduces the evidence of a later inscription from Kos, recording arbitration between Argos and an unknown *polis*. See also Canali de Rossi (1997, 90–2, nos. 117, 118, 119), for objections to Bowman’s chronology and identification. Pausanias’ testimony is accepted by Dmitriev 2011, 330–1; Moggi and Osanna (2000, 254–5) leave the matter open; also Camia (2009, 28–9), Cartledge (2002b, 86, hesitantly) and Gruen (1976a, 50–1); the latter also suggests that the task would have been delegated to Achaian magistrates as a whole, not just to Kallikrates.

²⁵³ Polyb. 31.2.12; 35.4.11; 36.10, 17.13; Diod. Sic. 31.40a; 32.9a–b, 15; Will 1982, 387–9; Gruen 1984, 505–14.

²⁵⁴ Errington 2008, 253.

²⁵⁵ Larsen 1968, 491.

²⁵⁶ Larsen (1968, 491) places the embassy at the end of Diaios’ term of office. Derow (1989, 321) dates the embassy in the winter of 150/149.

²⁵⁷ Pausanias (7.13.7) reports that the Spartans had been prevented from sowing the late autumn/early winter cereals; see Oliva 1971, 315; also Cartledge 2002b, 88.

²⁵⁸ Gruen 1976a, 56–7 and n.95: before the capitulation of Andriskos; see also Lafond 2000, 146.

²⁵⁹ The month of Orestes’ arrival is uncertain: see Walbank 1979, 699.

²⁶⁰ Canali de Rossi 1997, 110, no.149.

²⁶¹ On Pausanias’ sources see Walbank 1979, 698; Lafond 2000, 131–2.

²⁶² See Aymard 1938a, 127–30 on Polybius’ criticism of Kritolaos; 130, n.2 on Diaios.

²⁶³ Canali de Rossi 1997, 106–7, nos. 144, 145.

²⁶⁴ Ager 1996, no. 141; Austin 2006, no.157; Mackil 2013, 480–1, no.46; Gruen 1976a, 52–3; Moggi and Osanna 2000, 256–8.

²⁶⁵ Gruen (1976a, 55, n.74) thinks that this mission took place years before Menalkidas’ *stratēgia*, perhaps in connection with the dispute with Megalopolis in the late 160s; he is followed by Walbank 1979, 698. In this case, things get more complicated since Kallikrates would have been aware for a long time but would have chosen to remain silent on such a serious matter. Aymard (1938a, 180, n.2) argues that Menalkidas acted in a private capacity, before his *stratēgia*, and that Kallikrates did not bring charges earlier because a magistrate could not be charged during his term of office for something that he had done before he entered office.

²⁶⁶ Ager 1996, no.147; Canali de Rossi 1997, 107–8, nos. 146, 147. Nottmeyer (1995, 128, 130) notes that his death let loose the forces that were heading for a confrontation with Sparta and Rome.

²⁶⁷ Polyb. 3.5.6; Oliva 1971, 314 and n.1.

²⁶⁸ The walls had been rebuilt c. 183: Paus. 7.9.5; Kourinou 2000, 61.

²⁶⁹ Walbank 1979, 699.

²⁷⁰ Moggi and Osanna 2000, 262; Nottmeyer 1995, 129. Gruen (1976a, 56) denies that Roman advice was a factor.

²⁷¹ See Moggi and Osanna 2000, 262–3, on the possible location of Iason.

²⁷² Herakleia had joined the Confederacy sometime after 167 (Walbank 1979, 709).

²⁷³ Gruen (1976a, 57–61 and *id.* 1984, 521 and n.197) argues strongly for Polybius’ credibility. Harris (1979, 241–4) argues that the Romans saw this dispute as an opportunity for expansion. Cartledge (2002b, 89) leaves the matter open; Ferrary (1988, 325–7) argues that Polybius by denying that the Romans intended to

dismember the Confederacy, is furthering his thesis of peoples destroyed by their leaders. Nottmeyer (1995, 133–8) argues that the Senate did not *initially* plan to dismember the Achaian Confederacy, but it changed its policy after it had failed to dissuade the Confederacy from military action against Sparta; Moggi and Osanna (2000, 259) think that Pausanias anticipates the future dismemberment of the Achaian Confederacy. See Larsen (1968, 492, n.1) for a comparison with other sources.

²⁷⁴ Moggi and Osanna (2000, 263) argue that for the arrest of the Spartans, active participation of the Corinthians was necessary. They must have played a part but things were out of control and did not follow procedure.

²⁷⁵ Fuks 1970, 79; Harris 1979, 242; Derow 1989, 322; Nottmeyer 1995, 143.

²⁷⁶ Polybius presents things as the work of Kritolaos alone but Fuks (1970, 80) has shown that his wording points to an Achaian decree; see also Walbank 1979, 703–4). Diodorus (32.26.3–4) mistakenly writes of cancellation of debts.

²⁷⁷ This was probably the spring *synodos*: Aymard 1938a, 124–33, 142; Walbank 1979, 705; O’Neil, 1980, 46.

²⁷⁸ Pausanias (7.15.2) gives a different version of Metellus’ message: he urged the Achaians to release Sparta and the other states and said he would forgive them, despite their previous disobedience.

²⁷⁹ Nottmeyer 1995, 145–6; Dmitriev 2011, 345–6. See Gruen 1976b, 35, on the lack of substance in the theory that the members of the Achaian Confederacy (as well as other states) were divided along class lines in their attitude to Rome (referring to the Third Macedonian War).

²⁸⁰ Nottmeyer (1995, 146–7) suggests that there may have been a campaign against Sparta which Pausanias fails to record.

²⁸¹ Pausanias is surely not following Polybius here: Walbank 1979, 710.

²⁸² Gruen 1976a, esp. 50–1, 53, 55, 61, 64–5, 69.

²⁸³ An inscription from Troizen records a long list of contributions from various groups for the fortification of the city (*IG* IV 757); text and commentary by Maier 1959, I, no.32; see also Migeotte (1992, no.21 [face A = ll.1–10]) discussing the identity of the various contributors and the diverse nature of the contributions.

²⁸⁴ Larsen 1967, 497: ‘they must have been a sorry lot mobilized in this way’.

²⁸⁵ See Roebuck 1941, 106 on Messene.

²⁸⁶ Wiseman 1979, 491–6.

²⁸⁷ Walbank 1979, 734–5. Errington 2008, 253 with bibliography.

ASPECTS OF FRIENDLY INTRA-PELOPONNESIAN RELATIONS: PARTICIPATION IN FESTIVALS AND AWARDING OF HONOURS

The evidence

In this chapter, we shall present patterns of friendly Peloponnesian interstate relations between 371 and 146. We shall trace participation in festivals, connections in honorific decrees, *proxenoi* lists, as well as statues for leading Peloponnesians. Evidence for festivals consists of lists of victors and lists of *theōrodokoi*, that is mostly men, but sometimes women, usually appointed by their native *polis* to entertain the *theōroi* (sacred envoys) who announced the forthcoming celebration of a festival.¹ The connection between the honorific decrees and participation in festivals is that most Peloponnesian honorific decrees derive from *poleis* celebrating a festival and include the *theōrodokia* among the honours.

The largest part of our evidence on friendly relations among Peloponnesian states is related to participation, by means of the *theōrodokia*, in the Panhellenic Nemeia and in the Heraia organized by Argos, as well as the Epidaurian Asklepieia (and perhaps another lesser festival organized by Epidauros in honour of both Asklepios and Apollo). Lists of *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi* have survived from Epidauros. From Argos there have come down to us two lists for the Nemeia and the Heraia but the part recording Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* is largely lost. However, individual Argive honorific decrees almost invariably award the *theōrodokia*. No Elean list of *theōrodokoi* has come down to us, although the institution first emerged at Elis.² On the other hand, we do have the names of numerous *Olympionikai*, which also highlight Peloponnesian relations, since athletes were both competing on their own behalf and representing their *polis* (Hansen 2004, 108–9). As to the other festivals celebrated in the Peloponnese, including the Panhellenic Isthmia, there is only scarce information on either victors or *theōrodokoi*. Among the festivals not included in the *Periodos*, the Megalopolitan Lykaia are of interest, as are to a lesser extent, mainly due to the very scarce nature of the evidence, the Hemerasia (in honour of Artemis) at Lousoi and the Chthonia (in honour of Demeter) at Hermione,

the latter being the only Peloponnesian festival that did not include an *agōn* (Perlman 2000, 14).

Our examination of the evidence will be conducted by region, starting from Elis. We shall examine the catalogue of *Olympionikai* (largely as established by Moretti 1957), starting from the first Olympics after the battle of Leuktra, i.e. 368. Next, we shall present the evidence on relations between Epidauros and Peloponnesian *poleis* as they emerge from lists of *theōrodokoi*. Relations between Argos and other Peloponnesian *poleis* will be discussed on the basis of individual honorific decrees; in this context, relations with Arkadian *poleis* form a main thread. Because of their very limited number, decrees related to the festival in honour of Artemis Hemerasia, and the festival in honour of Demeter Chthonia, will be discussed in the context of intra-Peloponnesian relations established by Arkadian and other *poleis*. Relations between Arkadian *poleis*, as well as between them and other Peloponnesian states, occupy a central place in the chapter.

Certain of the inscriptions can be related to events known from literary sources but more often than not they are only vaguely dated. However, suggestive patterns can be observed. Our task will be to present these patterns and, where evidence allows it, to set the various Peloponnesian epigraphic ‘moods’ or tendencies into an historical context. As regards participation in festivals in particular, a correlation with politics can often be observed, but there are also cases where personal ambition and culture prove superior to politics.

* * *

A review of the Peloponnesian epigraphic output shows that Sparta’s fall from dominance after 371 did not have an impressive effect on the epigraphic mood of the Peloponnesian *poleis*. No inscription relating to the foundation either of Megalopolis or of Messene has survived, but Pausanias could very well have had at his disposal an official list for the *synoikismos* of the former (see p.27). Similarly, the monumental change of the Peloponnesian geopolitical map after 338 has not left any contemporary epigraphic trace. As a whole, Peloponnesian epigraphic output appears to have been little affected by Philip II’s control of Peloponnesian affairs.

Honorific decrees for Peloponnesian citizens are practically non-existent before the late 4th century. The number of inscriptions generally increases in the era of the *Diadochoi*, in the late 4th–early 3rd centuries, and becomes substantial (relatively speaking) later in the 3rd century. Argos and Arkadian

poleis figure prominently as givers of honours in the late 4th and 3rd centuries, while the rest of the Peloponnesian *poleis* appear as givers of honours mainly in the 2nd century. In the case of the epigraphy we know best – that of Classical Athens – we know from contemporary literature that the flow of epigraphy marks grand political developments, the rise and acme of democracy and empire. Guided by this knowledge, we should explore the possibility that, at least on certain occasions, the outbursts of epigraphy from Peloponnesian states similarly mark (important) political developments. Combined with the scarcity of honorific (and other) inscriptions prior to this period, this increased number of inscriptions suggests that the turbulent periods of their existence led at least some of the Peloponnesian *poleis* to forge more bonds between themselves or to advertise them. The award of a large number of proxenies and other privileges in the Hellenistic period is a feature of the Greek world as a whole and these honours are neither routine nor meaningless.³

From the 330s to the mid-2nd century, the total (certain) number of Peloponnesian honorific decrees for citizens of Peloponnesian *poleis* amounts to c.40. To this we should add the long list of c. 60 Peloponnesian *proxenoi*⁴ from the Arkadian Kleitor, plus the honorands in the lists of *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi* from Epidauros, Argos and Hermione (c.80, 4, and 12 respectively).⁵ In addition to the honorific decrees there are 17 statue bases for citizens of Peloponnesian *poleis* while the grant of a statue is included in three decrees.⁶

A major problem is that even when Peloponnesian decrees are preserved fairly intact or are safely dated, they are characterized by uninformative, fairly routine contents. It is only rarely that we get a glimpse of the motivation for the honours. The actual services provided by the honorands usually remain in the dark. The honorand's *aretē* and his *eunoia* towards the awarding *polis* are often recorded in dedications but rarely in decrees. Apart from the *theōrodokia*, *proxenia* first and foremost is the primary honour.⁷ *Ateleia* (exemption from taxes),⁸ *asylia* (protection from seizure of person or property)⁹ and *asphaleia* (security in wartime), also feature as honours. *Inpasis* or *empa(s)is* or *enktēsis*, that is the right to acquire land and house, as well as *epinomia*, i.e. the right of pasture, are awarded much more rarely as we shall see below. *Proedria* (presidency) of games was another rare honour:¹⁰ it was offered in four cases by Argos and in another two by its *kōmē* Mykenai (see Tables 13 nos. 3, 4, 7 and 16 nos. 6, 7).

Among the honours, the *proxenia* has the most distinctly political character, first and foremost to the benefit of the awarding *polis*.¹¹ On the other hand, *ateleia*, *inpasis* / *enktēsis*, *epinomia*, *asylia* and *asphaleia* are more to the practical benefit of the honorand – when they do not have a purely

honorary value.¹² The practical or symbolic value is something that in most of the cases we can only speculate upon, due to the scarcity of information both as regards the services of the honorand and the honorand himself – quite frequently the person is not known from other sources. However, in practical terms, *ateleia*, i.e. exemption from taxes of varying scope, could be bestowed ‘to consolidate or enhance the honorand’s future financial contacts with the community’ (Rubinstein 2009, 116). The right to acquire land and a house forges strong bonds between the honorand and the awarding *polis* (Mack 2015, 125–7).¹³ The same applies to *epinomia*, a right similar to *enktesis* and similarly ‘one of the elements that constitute citizenship’ (Chandezon 2008, 112). *Asylia* and *asphaleia* are intended to protect the beneficiary in peacetime and wartime respectively (Gauthier 1972, 219–21, 283–4). We can suggest that these privileges were inspired by or cognate with the *ekecheiria* (truce) before games – very much a Peloponnesian speciality given that three of the four Panhellenic games took place in the Peloponnese. The above-mentioned privileges are essential for people engaged in activities that involve travelling – trade comes easily to mind but attending or participating in a festival is also included. They do not seem to have much practical value for *theōrodokoi* who offer their services at their place of residence – of course this does not exclude the possibility of their travelling to the awarding *polis* and being in need of protection. We have to take account of the fact that the Peloponnese, save for the period between 272–250, was a theatre of almost constant warfare of varying scale. Furthermore, internal disputes went on, as inscriptions recording arbitration imply. In other words, a *polis* could never be sure that either its citizens or its benefactors would move freely or go about their business without obstruction.

Politeia and *isopoliteia*, i.e. grant of citizenship either to an individual or to a whole *polis* (in the latter case *isopoliteia* can be either unilateral or bilateral) and upon the fulfilment of certain requirements,¹⁴ feature rarely. This rarity, together with the rare grant of *enktesis* shows that the Peloponnesian *poleis* had or went on having an exclusive view of citizenship. Among Peloponnesian *poleis* Argos, a few Arkadian *poleis* – Phigaleia, Tegea, probably Stymphalos, Lousoi and Thisoa – as well as Elis figure as donors.¹⁵ Argos awarded its citizenship to the Corinthian Eukles (most probably) and (certainly) to Alexandros of Sikyon, while among the Arkadian *poleis* award of citizenship was largely an intra-Arkadian affair, as we shall see below. Tegea conferred *isopoliteia* upon Aristomachos of Argos in 229/8¹⁶ while Elis conferred the citizenship upon Corinthian judges. Messene and Phigaleia agreed on *isopoliteia* in c.240 (see pp.279–80).

Why did Peloponnesian *poleis* not feel obliged to analyse the motives behind the award of honours – save for a few exceptions? In the first place, brief contents could very well reflect a *polis*' degree of literacy and the stage of development of the written word. But this can be only part of the explanation. The Tegeans, for instance, had been quite capable of producing (a few) long inscriptions relating to religious matters, public works¹⁷ or the return of exiles (see p.72), in the 4th century, but their honorific decrees are truly 'laconic'. Argive decrees are also generally uninformative with the exception of the decree for the envoys from Pallantion in the late 4th century (see pp.437, 441–2). Important diplomatic services by the Argives, during a critical period in Peloponnesian history, were involved in this case. Therefore, it was necessary for the generally underperforming Argives to present in detail their role at that particular moment. In short, brevity could allude to absence of services beyond the ordinary.

However, when we view the decrees as a whole, the repetitive and seemingly routine nature of the honours and motives acquires a different weight. It can very well reflect a widespread ideology concerning the nature of honours and phraseology appropriate to benefactions. On a practical level, repetition and similarities in vocabulary could correspond to widespread, identical expectations as well as goals, such as the need or wish to protect a useful merchant and his merchandise by offering him *ateleia*, *asylia* and *asphaleia*; or the wish to protect a citizen of another *polis* who has offered his diplomatic services.

We should also bear in mind that our knowledge is further impaired by the strong tradition of 'anonymity' in the Peloponnesians, as Rhodes and Lewis have put it (1997, 78, 492). Proposers are rarely mentioned¹⁸ – Argive decrees are an exception. When proposers are indeed mentioned, they are for the most part unknown from other sources. Therefore, apart from those leading men who appear in literature, we are unaware of the identity of other leading citizens in most Peloponnesian *poleis*, those who were interested enough to cement bonds with citizens of another *polis*. Consequently, we are often on slippery ground when trying to ascribe a decree to a specific historical context.

The aforementioned anonymity of proposers of decrees stands in sharp contrast with evidence for statues or even godlike honours for leaders prominent in literary sources. The most telling evidence is afforded by Sikyon and especially Megalopolis, the two cities which produced the most illustrious *stratēgoi* of the Achaian Confederacy. On the basis of surviving evidence, it appears that these are the only Peloponnesian cities which awarded heroic or godlike honours to fellow citizens. In Sikyon, the *dēmos*

offered Aratos various honours after its liberation from the tyrant Nikokles in 251, and former exiles awarded him a statue (Plut. *Arat.* 14.3; Paus. 2.7.5). Most importantly, Aratos received heroic honours after his death (Plut. *Arat.* 53; Polyb. 8.12.8). Megalopolis also posthumously awarded heroic honours to Eudamos, tyrant of Megalopolis, and to his son Lydiadas, initially tyrant of Megalopolis and later *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy.¹⁹ Two other members of the family received statues: Aristopamon, probably a son of Lydiadas,²⁰ and Lydiadas (II), probably a son of Aristopamon.²¹ Godlike honours (τιμαὶ ἰσόθεοι) were awarded to Philopoimen (*IG* V.2.432 / **Syll.*³ 624; Livy 39.50.9; Diod. Sic. 29.18). The Megalopolitans also set up four statues of Philopoimen in all the main civic spaces²² while statues of him were also set up elsewhere in the Peloponnese (Plut. *Phil.* 21.10). To these we add the statue set up in the *agora* by the Megalopolitans for Diophanes who, according to the epigram in his honour, was the first to unite the entire Peloponnese under the Achaian Confederacy (Paus. 8.30.5). Such honours constitute an excellent proof of the wish of the Megalopolitans to advertise their recently acquired history.²³

Intra-Peloponnesian relations via festivals

Elis, the Olympic Games and the Peloponnesian poleis, 368–148

Table 6: *Olympionikai* (by region, clockwise: Achaia, Sikyonia, Korinthia, Arkadia, Lakonia, Messenia, Elis; *poleis* within regions are recorded alphabetically; the numbers in the list of *Olympionikai* are those in Moretti 1957.)

Origin	Date of Olympic victories ²⁴	Victor	<i>Olympionikai</i>	Victories in other Peloponnesian games; + victories in the Pythia
Achaia				
Aigeira	272?	Kratinos	541	
Aigion	280	Ladas	535	
Patrai	332?	Chilon	461	Isthmia (4), Nemeia (3), Pythia (2).
	328?	Chilon	465	
Pellene	356?	Chairon	432	Isthmia or Nemeia (2).
	352?	Chairon	437	
	348?	Chairon	443	
	344?	Chairon	447	

Korinthia Sikyonia Sikyon	364 ²⁵	Sostratos	420; Bousquet 1961, 74–8; Moretti 1987, 70; <i>id.</i> 1992, 120.	Isthmia and Nemeia (12), Pythia (2).
	360	Sostratos	425	
	356	Sostratos	433	
	236	Pythokles	571	
	232? ²⁶	Aratos	574	
Corinth	304	Andromenes	493	
Argolid Argos	c.350–325	Kleainetos	Charneux 1985, 357–75, no.I; Ebert 1986; ²⁷ Moretti 1987, 84.	Isthmia (6), Nemeia (1?), Lykaia (1?), Epidaurian Asklepieia (1?), Argive Heraia (1?), Pythia (1?).
	328	Ageus	464	Lykaia ? (1).
	300	Keras	502	
	224	Iolaidas	578	
	208?	? ²⁸	592; Moretti 1953, 117–21, no.45.	Isthmia (5), Nemeia (2), Heraia (2), Lykaia (4), Pythia (1).
	204 ?	?	595	
	200 ?	?	599	
	196 ?	?	605	
Epidauros	368 ?	Aristion	415	
	End of 3 rd ?	?	<i>LAEpid</i> 210; Moretti 1987, 85.	Argive Heraia (2), Isthmia (3), Nemeia (1).
Arkadia Arkadia	292?	Philippos	529; Moretti 1953, 84–7, no.33.	
Heraia	312?	Alexibios	483	Lykaia (1).
Kleitor	336	Kleomantis	456	
	296	Myrkeus	520	
Mantineia	296	Timarchos	514	
Megalopolis	188	Arkesilaos	608	

Tegea	308	Apollonides	486	
	208?	Damatrios	593	Nemeia (4), Isthmia (3?), Pythia (1–2), Hekatomboia (2), Asklepieia (1), Alcaia (4), Lykaia (4). ²⁹
	200?	Damatrios	600	
Thelphousa	228?	Emaution	576	
Triphylia Lepreon	mid-late 3 rd ? ³⁰	Xenon	426; Moretti 1987, 70; Zoumbaki 2005, 277, Ξ 15.	
Lakonia Sparta	368?	Euryleonis	418	
	316	Deinosthenes	478; Moretti 1953, 79–82, no.31. ³¹	
	308?	Seleadas	487	Lykaia (1).
	300?	Eubalkes or Diares	510	
	296	Amphiaros	515	
	248?	Euryades	565	
	244	Alkidas	566	
Messenia Messene	368	Damiskos	417	Nemeia (1), Isthmia (1).
	344?	Damaretos	448	
	340?	Telestas	453	
	304?	Sophios	496	
	232?	Gorgos	573	
	228	Hagesidamos	Ebert 1982, 201; Moretti 1987, 72; <i>id.</i> 1992, 120–1. ³²	
	224	Hagesidamos	Ebert 1982, 199, 201; Moretti 1987, 72; <i>id.</i> 1992, 120–1.	
	220	Hagesidamos	580	

	Late 3 rd — early 2 nd	Antisthenes	Moretti 1970, 298; <i>id.</i> 1987, 85	
Elis Elis	332?	Satyros ³³	462; Zoumbaki 2005, 319–20, Σ 7. ³⁴	Nemeia (5), Pythia (2).
	328?	Satyros	466	
	320?	Pyttalos	476; Zoumbaki 2005, 313–15, Π 50.	
	316?	Choirilos	480; Zoumbaki 2005, 379–80, X 23.	
	308?	Theotimos	489; Zoumbaki 2005, 186, Θ 16.	
	304?	Nikandros	494; Zoumbaki 2005, 264, N 4.	Nemeia (6).
	304?	Kallon	497; Zoumbaki 2005, 214, K 20.	
	300? ³⁵	Nikandros	501	
	300?	Timosthenes	505; Zoumbaki 2005, 339, T 25.	
	300?	Hippomachos	506; Zoumbaki 2005, 203, I 10.	
	296	Archidamos	522; Zoumbaki 2005, 119, A 132.	
	292?	Eperastos	530; Zoumbaki 2005, 156, E 10.	
	288?	Telemachos	531; Zoumbaki 2005, 335–6, T 11. ³⁶	Pythia (1).
	280?	Paraballon	536; Zoumbaki 2005, 290–1, Π 9. ³⁷	
	272?	Nikarchos	540; Zoumbaki 2005, 265, N 6.	

	268?	Alexinikos	544; Zoumbaki 2005, 73, A 45.	
	252?	?	560	
	248?	Lastratidas	562; Zoumbaki 2005, 239, A 13.	Nemeia (2).
	248?	? son of Taurinos	563; Zoumbaki 2005, 391, T 33.	
	240?	Euanoridas	570; Zoumbaki 2005, 164–6, E 26. ³⁸	Nemeia (1).
	mid-late 3rd ³⁹	Asamon	452; Moretti 1987, 70; <i>id.</i> 1992, 120; Zoumbaki 2005, 120–1, A 136.	
	228?	Pantarkes	577; Moretti 1953, 62–4, no.140; Zoumbaki 2005, 289, II 7.	
	216	Paianios	583; Zoumbaki 2005, 285, II 1. ⁴⁰	Pythia (3).
	216?	Thrasonides	585; Zoumbaki 2005, 195, Θ 30.	
	212	Kapros	587, 588; Zoumbaki 2005, 215–16, K 22.	
	200	Timon	601; Zoumbaki 2005, 340–1, T 28. ⁴¹	Nemeia, Pythia (unknown number).
	164?	Lysippos	621; Zoumbaki 2005, 248, A 35.	
	148?	?	639	

Being the host of a Panhellenic festival, one would have expected Elis to have developed as many bonds as possible, like Epidauros. But, surprisingly enough, there is no trace of a list of *theōrodokoi*. Of course this does not mean that there had not been one, especially if we bear in mind the Elean preference for lead tablets as a recording material. Still, it is possible that the Eleans simply relied on the prestige of their games, while the Argives, for instance, had to struggle to bring the Nemeia onto an equal footing with the other games of the *Periodos*. The Olympic victors' list bears out a slightly more positive picture of Elis' relations with other Peloponnesian states than its hardly existent record of honorific decrees, but still it is rather surprising that the Peloponnesians do not appear to have shown great interest in the Olympics – bearing in mind of course that victors and participants do not coincide. Conversely, it is equally possible to infer that the Eleans themselves did not solicit or encourage participation of Peloponnesians in their games.

Although the victors' list is incomplete, the number of Elean victories is overwhelming: 29,⁴² by 26 participants – and this fits into the overall image of Elis as the most successful *polis* in the Olympics.⁴³ Notably, Elis did not loom large in the most prestigious events such as the *stadion*, the *dolichos* (long-distance race), the *pankration* (wrestling and boxing) or the four-horse chariot race (Crowther 1988, 304–6).

The general impression is that the Olympics were not very popular among the Peloponnesian states for most of the 3rd as well as the first half of the 2nd century. In fact, this was always the case, from the beginning of the Olympic Games.⁴⁴ A comparison with the number of non-Peloponnesian victories shows the relatively small importance the Olympic Games had to the Peloponnesians and vice-versa: we have a total of 151 known non-Peloponnesian victories, starting from 368 and going down to 148:⁴⁵ 49 in the 4th century, 70 in the 3rd century and 32 in the 2nd century compared to a total of 80 Peloponnesian victories – 35, 41 or 40, and 4 or 5, in the 4th, the 3rd and the 2nd centuries respectively. As mentioned above, 29 of these belong to Eleans. The majority of the Elean victories are dated to the 3rd century: 10 to the 4th (including the year 300), 17 to the 3rd and 2 to the 2nd century (Crowther 1988, 303, Table II, and 305, Table IV). Thus, we come up with an unimpressive total of 51 Peloponnesian, non-Elean, victories. Of these, 25 date to the 4th (including the year 300), 23 or 24 to the 3rd (including the year 200) and 3 or 2 to the 2nd century (the victory of Antisthenes is dated either to the late 3rd or to the early 2nd century).

Sparta, Messenia and Argos stand out. Again, we have to note the continuity: Sparta in particular but also Argos had a significant presence in

the Olympics from the beginning of their history. As we shall see further below, in the Hellenistic period participation in the Olympic Games was conditioned, to a certain extent, by relations with the Achaian Confederacy and the latter's relations with Elis.

Sparta had 7 victories. Spartan participation adds an additional dimension to the largely amicable political relations with Elis from the late 360s onwards. The number of Sparta's victories is surely very small when compared to the number of its victories in the Archaic and Classical periods: 47 victories are recorded from the late 8th to the late 6th centuries.⁴⁶ In the 5th century, however, the number drops to 13, while in the 4th, before 368, Spartans had won all in all 4 times – presumably their participation was unimpressive due to their hostile relations with Elis. After their (probable) victory in 368, the Spartans reappear fairly regularly in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries, right at the time when they had been left to their own devices and when only the Olympics offered them an opportunity for glory. It is rather surprising that there is no recorded victory during the peak of Areus' reign, in c.280 until his death in 265, since Elis and Sparta were allies during the Chremonidean War in the 260s, and Areus had set out to glorify Sparta and himself. However, after a gap of almost half a century the Spartans reappear in 248 and 244 but never again until 104. From a short-term perspective, the Spartan disappearance from the Olympic Games after 244 can perhaps be partly explained by the fact that the Eleans were allied with Sparta's enemies at the time, i.e. the Aitolians who attacked Sparta in c.240, following Agis IV's death (Plut. *Kleom.* 18.3; Polyb. 4.34.9; Scholten 2000, 127–8). In this context, the Aitolians could have brought about a rupture between Elis and Sparta. Yet, the Eleans and the Spartans were again on friendly terms when they took sides with Kleomenes III against the Achaian Confederacy (Plut. *Kleom.* 3, 5, 14) but the Spartans remained absent from Olympia. A much more important factor for the disappearance of Spartans from the Olympic Games in the second half of the 3rd century is the upheaval, especially in the ranks of the Spartan elite, brought about by the attempts at reforming Spartan society in the 240s and the 220s, as well as the Kleomenic War. After the era of Kleomenes the Spartans were on friendly terms with the Eleans but their continuous conflict with the Achaian Confederacy and the turmoil in the upper echelons of Spartan society, after the end of the Agiad-Eurypontid diarchy, would have quite possibly deterred the Spartan elite from competing in the Olympics. Finally, the incorporation of Elis into the Achaian Confederacy in 191 (Livy 36.31.1–3, 35.7; 42.37) and the continuous turmoil in Spartan society would have made competition in the Olympics impossible or unimportant for the Spartans.

Argos has got on record probably 8 victories (if one includes Kleainetos). As with Messene and Sikyon, there is an impressive gap: the first Argive victories are recorded in the second half of the 4th century – in 350–25, in 324 and again in 300 – and then it takes almost a century to find an Argive victor again. The victory in 324 is the most interesting. In roughly the same period the Nemeia were again celebrated in Argos and a *theōrodokos* for the Epidaurian Asklepieia was appointed (in 328). As we shall see, the Argives in the same period also appear regularly in the Arkadian Lykaia. In other words, the Argives engaged in a co-ordinated effort to make their presence felt through festivals. Notably, there is no sign of participation in the Olympics by an Argive tyrant, in stark contrast to the practice adopted by Chairon of Pellene. After 300 we have to wait until 224, in the middle of the Kleomenic War, in which Argos had started as a member of the Achaian Confederacy, changed sides and returned to the Confederacy probably shortly before the Olympic Games of 224 (Polyb. 2.54.1; Plut. *Arat.* 44.2 and *Kleom.* 20.3–4). After 224 an Argive victor (probably the same one) appears in 208, 204, 200 and 196. Interestingly enough the Argives were not deterred by the hostile relations between Elis and the Achaian Confederacy of which they were members until 198 and again from 195 onwards. Argive participation in the Achaian Confederacy was far from whole-hearted and therefore their sympathies would not have been conditioned by the Confederacy's sympathies. At the other end of the spectrum, Elean participation in the Nemeia appears to be steadily receding: 24 of 246 victories on record belong to Eleans: 20 (of 41) in the 4th, 2 (of 16) in the 3rd, none in the 2nd, 2 (of 17) in the 1st century and none after that (Crowther 1988, 307–9).⁴⁷

The participation and victory of the twelve-year-old Messenian Damiskos⁴⁸ in 368 can be viewed as a means of celebrating and advertising the independence of Messene. The importance of this victory was not lost on Pausanias (6.2.10) who underlines that after the migration of many Messenians from the Peloponnese, they had never enjoyed an Olympic victory. After 368, Messenian victories occur or are commemorated at critical points in Messenian, and Peloponnesian, history. More specifically, the Messenians celebrated 1 or 2 victories in the 340s, and one wonders whether their presence must be associated, even if indirectly, with the political support and the consequent moral boost offered by Philip II of Macedon (see pp.53–4). The Messenian victory of 304 could be associated with possible liberation from Polyperchon by Demetrios Poliorketes, but Messenian political status in this period is quite uncertain (see p.101). Much later, the participation and victory of the politician Gorgos (Polyb. 7.10.2;

Walbank 1967, 57), perhaps in 232, can be viewed as a statement of friendly disposition towards Elis. The two states had become indirectly linked through their alliance with the Aitolian Confederacy and their opposition to the Achaian. It is possible that Gorgos' victory coincided with a victory of Aratos (neither victory is securely dated). The victories of Hagesidamos in 228 and 224 can be ascribed to the pattern of rapprochement between Messenia and Elis, but his victory in 220 postdates the Messenian rapprochement with the Achaian Confederacy by a few months (Polyb. 4.5.8–9; Roebuck 1941, 73–4). Notably, Elis was still on the Aitolian side then, i.e. different political camps were not an impediment in this case, probably because Hagesidamos' personal bonds with Olympia and his ambitions outweighed interstate relations.

Sikyon has 5 victories on record (by 3 men), the first 3 in the first half of the 4th century. After that we have to wait until the 230s to see again a victorious Sikyonian. The 3rd-century victories can be seen as an attempt to glorify the *polis* of Sikyon after it became part of a new political entity. The victory of Aratos in particular represents clear evidence for the political usage of an Olympic victory by a leader: the aim was clearly the increase of his personal prestige as well as that of the Achaian Confederacy itself in the Peloponnese. It is also possible that Aratos participated in an attempt to offset the strong Aitolian influence in the western Peloponnese. Notably, the Aitolians had celebrated an Olympic victory in 240 (Moretti 1957, no.568). However, subsequent Sikyonian absence can be partly accounted for by the hostile relations between Elis and the Achaian Confederacy. The Achaian Confederacy even made an attempt to attack the Eleans while they were preparing for the games in 208 (Livy 28.7.14–18; 28.8.4; see ch.8, n.7). As with the Nemeia, the Confederacy failed and it did not even try to assume administration of the games after Elis' incorporation in 191 (Aymard 1938b, 355). It is interesting that the Confederacy tried to place Panhellenic games controlled by *poleis* more or less hostile to the Achaian Confederacy under Achaian aegis, but not the Isthmia controlled by Corinth, a *polis* that had willingly joined the Confederacy and after 224 was under Macedonian control. It is also notable that the Confederacy only showed a *sporadic* interest in controlling the games.

The Arkadian presence in the Olympics is rather unimpressive: Tegea has 3 victories, while Kleitor probably has 2 victories; Mantinea, Heraia, Thelphousa, an unknown Arkadian *polis* and Megalopolis have 1 victory each. Most Arkadian victories date to the late 4th–early 3rd century (6 out of 10); the other four date to the late 3rd century. This picture stands in sharp contrast with that for the period between 479 and 368, when the Arkadians, both from large and small cities, had surpassed other

Peloponnesian states in Olympic victories (Nielsen 2002, 401; Appendix VIII, 547). At least the beginnings of this change should be associated with the war between the Arkadian Confederacy and Elis in 365 and the short-lived Arkadian attempt to control the Olympic Games in 364 (see pp.14–15). Apart from an alliance with Mantinea after 362, we have hardly any information about direct Elean-Arkadian relations for the rest of the 4th century or in the 3rd century to account for the absence of the Arkadians from Olympia. Twice the Eleans and the Arkadians were in the Spartan camp: in 331/0 and in 268 (see pp.70, 130).

With regard to Myrkeus (victor in 296), Moretti (1970, 297; citing *IG* V.2, p.85–6) notes that he could very well have been designated as Ἀρκᾶς ἐκ Κ<α>λειτο<ρίου> (*POxy.* 2082, fr.4. ll.32–3), thus distinguishing himself from the other Arkadians. Nevertheless, alongside the distinction we should also see in this designation an emphasis on the supra-*polis* ethnic identity.

The victory of the Triphylian Xenon (ἐκ Λεπρέου: Paus. 6.15.1), dating to the mid-late 3rd century, probably belongs to the period shortly before Triphylia's annexation by Elis. As in the case of the monument for another Lepreatan Olympic victor (Antiochos), in 400 (Paus. 6.3.9; Roy 2013, 118), the Eleans allowed the setting up of a monument which was embarrassing to them, given that they had lost Triphylia in the 420s but never gave up their claim on it.

While a small number of Eleans were victorious in the Lykaia in the late 4th century, there is no trace of Megalopolitan participation in the Olympics until the early 2nd century. Megalopolis appears only once in the Olympic victors' list, in 188, a record which corresponds interestingly with the extreme paucity of evidence of *poleis* forging bonds via attribution of honours. This victory, however, is quite telling, since it occurs in the very first Olympic year after Elis had been forced by circumstances to join the Achaian Confederacy in 191. Megalopolitan politicians had a leading role in this incorporation. In other words, the Megalopolitans celebrated their policy and success right in the territory of their former rival. The political element becomes more obvious if we take account of Moretti's argument (1957, 143) that the *Olympionikēs* Arkesilaos of Megalopolis could be identified with the politician active during the Third Macedonian War (Polyb. 28.6 and 29.25.6).

The absentees from the Olympic victors list are equally interesting. As regards the Achaian *poleis*, their record is as follows: 1 victory for Aigeira, 1 for Aigion, 2 for Patrai, 4 for Pellene (all belong to the tyrant Chairon). Neither Patrai nor Pellene appear on the list after the late and mid 4th century respectively.⁴⁹ Aigion's single victory deserves a comment: it cannot

be a coincidence that it occurred in August 280, a few months after the re-establishment of the Achaian Confederacy (its first official year started in May 280; see p.116). It does appear as a very good way for the not-so-renowned capital of the newly restored Achaian Confederacy to advertise its name and acquire some reputation.

Corinth appears only once, very much in conformity with its absence from any pattern of liaisons between Peloponnesian states. In this case, however, we have to take account of (mythical) tradition. The Eleans were not allowed to participate in the Isthmia ever since Herakles had killed two Elean *theōroi* (Paus. 5.2.1–5; Crowther 1988, 307 and n.9). The only Corinthian victory belongs to 304, after Demetrios Poliorketes had liberated part of the Peloponnese, including the Corinthian harbour of Kenchreai, from Kassandros (see p.99).

There are only two victors from Epidauros, one probably in 368 and possibly another one at the end of the 3rd century. Combined with the fact that only one Elean *theōrodokos* appears on the lists from Epidauros we can safely conclude that Elis and Epidauros did not much care for each other's festival in the 3rd and early 2nd centuries.⁵⁰ Any attempt to explain this pattern is speculative. There is no evidence but one could suggest that neither the Eleans nor the Epidaurians felt safe too far away from their home city.

Corinth, Argos and their intra-Peloponnesian relations via their festivals

Table 7: Peloponnesian *Isthmionikai* and *Nemeonikai* (by region, clockwise, starting with Achaia; *poleis* within regions are recorded alphabetically; in the case of inscriptions the asterisk indicates the edition used here).

Origin	Victor	Date of the Isthmian victories	Isthmian victories	Nemean victories	Source
Achaia Patrai	Chilon	c.340–322? ⁵¹	4	3	Paus. 6.4.6–7; Farrington 2012, 49, no.1.63 and pp.120–1, nn.284–6.
Pellene	Chairon	c.360–c.340	Isthmia or Nemeia: 2		Paus. 7.27.7; Farrington 2012, 81, no.5.4 and p.171, n.685.

Korinthia-Sikyonia					
Sikyon	Sostratos	c.370?– c. 348? ⁵²	Isthmia and Nemeia: 12		Paus. 6.4.2; Moretti 1953, 62–4, no.25; Farrington 2012, 49, no.1.66 and pp.122–3, nn.289–91; Kostouros 2008, 172, no.187.
	Kallistratos ⁵³	c.275?– c. 220? ⁵⁴	4	5	<i>IG</i> IV 428; *Moretti 1953, 103–8, no.40; Kostouros 2008, 92–3, no.84; Farrington 2012, 52, no.1.87 and p.128, nn.326–8.
Argolid Argos	Kleainetos	350–325?	6 ⁵⁵	1 ⁵⁶	Charneux 1985, 357–75; *Ebert 1986; Kostouros 2008, 94–5, no.8.
	Prateas	375–345?	2	1?	Amandry 1980, 217–20 and fig.5; Farrington 2012, 49, no.1.65 and p.122, n.288; Kostouros 2008, 165, no.174.
	?	210–194?	5	2	Mitsos 1940 = <i>SEG</i> 11.338; Moretti 1953, 117–21, no.45; Farrington 2012, 53, no.1.94 and p.130, nn.341–4; Kostouros 2008, 222–3, no.275.
Epidauros	?	246– c.200 ⁵⁷	3	1	<i>IAEpid</i> 210; Moretti 1987, 85; Farrington 2012, 53, 1.91 and p.129, nn.333–5; Kostouros 2008, 222, no.273.

Hermione	[Pytho]kles	c.270–250 ⁵⁸	Isthmia, Nemeia and Pythia: 13.		<i>IG</i> IV 682; *Nachtergaele 1977, 317–23, 429–30, no. 15bis; Farrington 2012, 52, no.1.85 and p.127, nn.323–4; Kostouros 2008, 168, no.179.
Arkadia Tegea	Damatrios	c.212?– c.194?	3? ⁵⁹	4 (in 207 or 205?) ⁶⁰	<i>IG</i> V.2.142a&b; *Moretti 1953, 115–16, no.44; Farrington 2012, 53, no.1.93 and p.130, nn.339–40; Kostouros 2008, 61, no.40.
Messenia Messene	Damiskos	366–352?	1	1	Paus. 6.2.10–11; Farrington 2012, 50, no.1.69 and p.127, n.296; Kostouros 2008, 62, no.41.
	Telestas? ⁶¹	After 340?		1?	Moretti 1987, 70; <i>id.</i> 1992, 120; Kostouros 2008, 228–9, no.3.
Elis Elis	Satyros	332?		5	Paus. 6.4.5; Kostouros 2008, 169, no.180.
	Nikandros	304?		6	Paus. 6.16.5; Kostouros 2008, 142, no.146.
	Lastratidas	248?		2	Paus. 6.6.3; Kostouros 2008, 100, no.97.
	Euanoridas	240?		1	Paus. 6.8.1; Kostouros 2008, 78, no.65.
	Timon	200?		1?	Paus. 5.2.5, 6.16.2; Kostouros 2008, 181, no.201.

The data for the *Isthmionikai* and the *Nemeonikai* are terribly incomplete – the latter are slightly less bad than the former. Farrington (2012, 9–10, 16; also 22, Fig.1) estimates that we only know fewer than 2% (= 220 victors) of the *Isthmionikai*.⁶²

The table above appears discouraging enough for anyone attempting to draw a coherent picture of Peloponnesian participation in the Isthmia and the Nemeia. However, it is clear that we are dealing here with ‘professionals’ of the games. This is to a large extent due to the fact that our principal source is Pausanias who is interested in precisely recording the achievements by and honours for such athletes. However, with the exception of Kallistratos of Sikyon and [Pytho]kles of Hermione, the rest had been Olympic victors as well.⁶³ The vast majority had been victorious in both the Isthmia and the Nemeia, with the exception of the Elean *Nemeonikai* (the Eleans traditionally did not participate in the Isthmia),⁶⁴ and probably the Messenian Telestas.

Thus, given the present state of the evidence, we should view participation more as a matter of professionalism and prestige-hunting than as something conditioned by or reflecting intra-*poleis* relations – especially in the cases of veritable professional victors like [Pytho]kles of Hermione, Sostratos of Sikyon and Damatrios of Tegea.

Epidauros, the Asklepieia and intra-Peloponnesian relations

On the basis of surviving evidence Epidauros figures as a major giver of honours, *theōrodokia* and *proxenia*, to both Peloponnesians and non-Peloponnesians, mostly promoting the penteteric, agonistic festival of Asklepios celebrated every other Isthmian year, nine days after the Isthmia (the Isthmia were celebrated every two years, on the second and the fourth year of each Olympiad),⁶⁵ and perhaps an annual, non-agonistic festival in honour of both Asklepios and Apollo.⁶⁶ For the period extending from c.350 onwards there have also survived 3 individual honorific decrees for Peloponnesians. The number appears low when we compare it to the total of 22 Epidaurian decrees.⁶⁷ However, to the above there are added 2 lists of *theōrodokoi* dating to the 4th century, 1 undated list of *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi* and 3 *stēlai* with summary texts of decrees for *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi* covering a period probably from c. 260 to the late 3rd or early 2nd century. This means that the number of honorands is considerably higher than individual decrees allow us to think (Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 75). The number of Peloponnesian honorands in particular is quite high, in contrast to the picture offered by the individual *stēlai*. On the other hand, curiously enough, only once does a citizen of Epidauros itself appear as a recipient of honours from another city, i.e. Argos. As we shall see below, the Epidaurian lists do show that there was a long-lasting bond between Argos and Epidauros.

The first list of honorands (*IG* IV².1.94 / Perlman 2000, 177–9, E 1), dating between 365 and 360, during the reign of Perdikkas III (*theōrodokos* for Macedon),⁶⁸ falls beyond the scope of our study since no names of Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* or *proxenoi* are recorded.⁶⁹ The second, dating to 356/55, records *theōrodokoi* in northwestern Greece and Magna Graecia; there is only one Peloponnesian, the Corinthian Lykomedes (l. 2).

The following tables record the names of honorands on the individual *stēlai*, the name of the Peloponnesian honorand on the *stēlē* of 356/5, the names on the undated list and, finally, the honorands on the three *stēlai* of decrees. For the dates of the lists and the assignment of decrees to specific years I follow Perlman 2000.⁷⁰ With particular regard to the list dated to c.220–200, the ‘c.220’ should be understood as ‘before 223’, i.e. the date of Mantinea’s destruction, which is recorded on the list (Mitsos 1933 [1935], 11; Perlman 2000, 87–8).

Table 8: Peloponnesians individually honoured by Epidaurus

(Instead of the accusative employed in the decrees for the honorands’ names I use the nominative, except for the uncertain cases. Instead of the ethnic, I have indicated the name of the city of origin; the asterisk indicates the edition of the inscription employed here).

Origin/ Honorand	Honours	Date	Text
1 Argos: Drymos (+ descendants)	<i>Theōrodokos</i> for Asklepios; <i>proxenos</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ; <i>asylia</i> , in war and peace, on land and sea.	c.350	ed. pr. Mitsos 1976 [1977], 83–6, no.2 (= <i>SEG</i> 26.445); Perlman 2000, 200, E 12.
2 Heraia? ⁷¹ [Nikom]achon ⁷² (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>euergetēs</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> for Apollo [and Asklepios]; ⁷³ [<i>ateleia</i>]; [<i>asylia</i> in peace and war, on land and sea].	c.250– 225	*ed. pr. <i>NIEpi</i> 11; Mitsos 1976 [1977], 83, no.1= l.3 (= <i>SEG</i> 26.446); Perlman 2000, 201–2, E 14 (= ll.1–9).
3 Corinth: ⁷⁴ Damophanes (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> ; <i>euergetēs</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ; <i>asylia</i> , in war and peace, on land and sea.	?	ed. pr. <i>NIEpi</i> 13; *Perlman 2000, 202, E 15.

Table 9: Peloponnesians in an Epidaurian list of *theōrodokoi*, 356/5

(The list records the honorands' names in the nominative).

Origin / Honorand	Date	Text
1 Corinth: Lykomedes, col.1, l. 2	356/5	* <i>IG</i> IV ² .1.95; Perlman 2000, 180–4, E 2; <i>LAEpid</i> 41 = ll. 78–91.

Table 10: Peloponnesian honorands in an Epidaurian list of *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi*, of unknown date

Peek, *NIEpi* 16 / *Perlman 2000, 194–6, E 6.

(I use the nominative for the honorands' names, as in the list. Instead of the ethnic, I indicate the name of the city of origin).

Origin / Honorand	Honours
1 Corinth ? ⁷⁵ [.....] ON [...], l. 14	<i>Proxenoī</i> ⁷⁶
2 Corinth ? ⁷⁷ Aristomedes, l. 21	
3 Phleious: Neokles, l. 24	
4 Phleious: ⁷⁸ Karneadas, l. 25	
5 Phleious: Saon, l. 26	
6 Heraia: ⁷⁹ Aristokrates, l. 27	
7 Corinth? ⁸⁰ Dameas, l. 28	
8 Mantinea: Dieuxes, l. 29	
9 Argos: Phalakros, l. 30	

Table 11: Peloponnesian honorands in three Epidaurian lists of decrees for *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi*, from c. 260 to the late 3rd or early 2nd century

a) **List of decrees, c. 260–240** (Instead of the accusative employed in the list for the honorands' names, I use the nominative, except for the uncertain cases. Instead of the ethnic, I indicate the name of the city of origin).⁸¹

*IG IV*².1.96;

*Perlman 2000, 184–9, E 3;

Mitsos 1935, 5–7, no.1 = ll. 1, 5, 12, 13, 24, 25, 29, 31, 49, 53, 55, 60–1, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72 (= *SEG* 11.412);

Peek, *LAEpid* 42 = ll. 1–32, 51–65.⁸²

Origin / Honorand	Honours	Decree / Year
1 Megalopolis: [....]opiston (+ descendants), l. 3	<i>Theōrodokos</i> for Apollo and Asklepios; <i>ateleia</i> ; <i>asylia</i> on land and sea, in war and peace.	II / 1?
2 Sparta: ⁸³ Eudoros, ll. 13–14	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>energetēs</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> for Apollo and Asklepios.	III / 2
3 Argos: Damatrios, l. 14	<i>Proxenos</i>	
4 Aigion: Ag[asipp]os, ll. 17–18	<i>Proxenoī</i> ; <i>energetai</i> ;	IV / 2
5 Aigion Alkimachos, l. 18	<i>theōrodokoi</i> for Apollo and Asklepios.	
6 Tegea: Theon, ⁸⁴ l. 22	<i>Proxenoī</i> ; <i>energetai</i> ;	V / 3
Aigion: Agasippos, ⁸⁵ l. 22	<i>theōrodokoi</i> for Apollo and Asklepios.	
7 Argos: Aristeus, l. 24	<i>Proxenoī</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ;	
8 Argos: Nikippos, l. 24	<i>asylia</i> on land and sea, in peace and war, also for their descendants and their possessions.	VI / 4
9 Aigion: Hagesias, ll. 24–5		
10 Sparta: Daimachos, l. 30	<i>Proxenoī</i> ; <i>theōrodokoi</i> for Apollo and Asklepios;	
11 Argos: Krates, l. 30	<i>ateleia</i> ; <i>asylia</i> on land and sea, in peace and war, also for their descendants and their possessions.	

12	Megalopolis: Anaxidamos, l. 34	<i>Theōrodokoi</i> for Apollo and Asklepios; <i>proxenoi</i> .	VII / 5
13	Heraia: Theoktas, l. 35		
14	Megalopolis: Nikasippos, ⁸⁶ ll. 39–40	<i>Proxenos</i> .	IX / 6
15	Orchomenos: Thorsilas, l. 42	<i>Proxenoī</i> .	X / 7
16	Heraia: Aristokrat[es], ll. 42–3		
17	Alea: ⁸⁷ Lysibios, l. 46	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> of Apollo and Asklepios.	XI / 8
18	Kleitor: Timias, l. 46		
19	Pheneos: Gorgippos, l. 48	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> of Apollo.	XII / 9
20	Pellene: Hipparchos, ll. 49–50	<i>Proxenos</i>	XIII / 10
21	Argos: Simylos, l. 54	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> of Apollo and Asklepios.	XIV / 11
22	Pellene: P[ausania]s, ⁸⁸ l. 60	<i>Proxenoī</i> ; <i>theōrodokoi</i> of Apollo and Asklepios.	XVI / 13
23	Messene: Philon, ll. 60–1.		
24	Argos ⁸⁹ Phantas, ⁹⁰ l. 61		
25	Deraī, ⁹¹ Messenia [Ari]starchidas, l. 61		
26	Sparta: Polyphantos, ⁹² ll. 63–4	<i>Proxenoī</i> ; <i>theōrodokoi</i> of Apollo and Asklepios.	XVII / 13
	Messene: Philon, l. 64 ⁹³		
	Pellene: Pausanias, ⁹⁴ l. 64		
27	Phleious : [.....c.11.....], ⁹⁵ l. 64		
	Deraī, Messenia: Aristarchidas, ll. 64–5		
28	Megalopolis: Kallipatas, l. 67	<i>Proxenoī</i> .	XVIII / 14
29	Megalopolis : Theopompos, l. 67		
30	Kyparissia: Dionysodoros, ll. 67–8		

31 Kyparissia: Aristoni[k]os, l. 68		
32 Sparta Ariston, l. 70	<i>Proxenoî.</i>	XIX / 13
33 Tegea: Aristeus, l. 70		
34 Pheneos Kleaios, ll. 70–1		

b) List of decrees, c. 240–200 (For the honorands' names I employ the nominative, as in decree I; decree II employs the accusative. Instead of the ethnic, the name of the city of origin is recorded):⁹⁶

ed. pr. Mitsos 1935, 7–10, no.2 = *SEG* 11.413;

*Perlman 2000, 189–91, E 4;

Peek, *LAEpid* 330 = ll. 9–22.⁹⁷

Origin / Honorand	Honours	Decree
1 Argos: [...4–5..]on, l. 10	<i>Theōrodokos;</i> <i>proxenos.</i>	I
2 Sparta: [...8–9....]M[...], l. 17	<i>Proxenoî.</i>	
3 Sparta: [...4–5..]telidas, ⁹⁸ l. 18		
4 Messene: Eudamos, l. 26	<i>Theōrodokoi;</i> <i>proxenoî.</i>	II
5 Sparta: [.]marmenidas, ⁹⁹ l. 27		
6 Dyme: ?, l. 28		
7 Heraia: Apellias, l. 28		

c) List of decrees, c. 220–200 (For the honorands' names the nominative is employed, as in the list. Instead of the ethnic, the name of the city of origin is recorded).

ed. pr. Mitsos 1933 [1935], *Αρχ. χρον.*, 10–20 (= *SEG* 11.414);

*Perlman 2000, 192–4, E 5;

Peek, *LAEpid* 331 = ll. 1, 2, 15–17, 20–1, 22–3, 31, 36.¹⁰⁰

Origin / Honorand	Honours	Decree
1 Argos: [Da]mo[k]ritos, l. 1	?	I
2 Argos: Mn[a]sistratos, ¹⁰¹ l. 1		
3 Argos: Episthe[nes], ll. 1–2		

4	Argos: [...7–8....]o[.], ll. 2–3		
5	Tegea: [...k]rates, l. 3		
6	Pheneos: Diares, l. 7	<i>Theōrodokoi.</i>	II
7	Kaphyai: Pausias, ll. 7–8		
8	Tegea: Kallik[ra]tes, l. 8		
9	Phleious: Kleandros, l. 10	<i>Proxenoí.</i>	
10	Phleious: Phaidros, ll. 10–11		
11	Argos: Lys[i]ppos, l. 11		
12	Corinth: ¹⁰² ?, ll. 14–15	<i>Theōrodokoi.</i>	III
13	Messene: ¹⁰³ Dexi[...][...].os, ¹⁰⁴ l. 15		
14	Stymphalos: [...et[...3–4...].s[...2–3].s, l. 16	<i>Proxenoí.</i>	
15	Messene: [...t[...on, ¹⁰⁵ l. 17		
16	Corinth: [...c.16...], l. 18		
17	Tegea: [...tonoos, ¹⁰⁶ l. 22	<i>Theōrodokoi.</i>	IV
18	Tegea: [A]ndromachos, l. 22		
19	Tegea: Theodoros, l. 23		
20	Mantineia: [...4–5...], ll. 23–4	<i>Proxenos.</i>	
21	Megalopolis: Aleximenes, ll. 26–7	<i>Theōrodokos;</i> <i>proxenos.</i>	V
22	Sparta: Theotimos, ll. 29–30	<i>Theōrodokoi;</i> <i>proxenoí.</i>	VI
23	Argos: Aischinas, l. 30		
24	Argos: Dion, ¹⁰⁷ ll. 31–2		
25	Troizen: Patrokleidas, ¹⁰⁸ ll. 36–7		
26	Mantineia: Kleotimos, ll. 37–8		
27	Sparta: Hippotas, l. 39		

Table 12: Summary presentation of Peloponnesians honoured by Epidaurus (by region, starting from Achaia, clockwise; within regions the *poleis* are recorded alphabetically). The number of honorands who were awarded only the *proxenia* or the *theōrodokia* is recorded in a parenthesis; when only a number is recorded, it is to be understood that both the *theōrodokia* and the *proxenia* were awarded.

P = *Proxenos*; T = *Theōrodokos*; U = Unknown.

Individual decrees	List of <i>theōrodokoi</i> 356/5	List of <i>proxenoi</i> Date ?	List a) of decrees c.260–240	List b) of decrees c.240–200	List c) of decrees c. 220–200
			Aigion: 3 Pellene: 2	Dyme: 1	
Corinth: 1; date?	Corinth: 1	Corinth: 3?			Corinth: 2 (1 T+1 P)
Argos: 1; c.350		Argos: 1	Argos: 6 (4 P)	Argos: 1	Argos: 7 (1 P, 4 U)
					Troizen: 1
		Phleious: 3	Phleious: 1		Phleious: 2 P
			Alea: 1		
Heraia?: 1; c.250–225		Heraia: 1	Heraia: 2 (1 P)	Heraia: 1	
					Kaphyai: 1 T
			Kleitor: 1		
		Mantineia: 1			Mantineia: 2 (1 P)
			Megalopolis: 5 (1 T, 3 P)		Megalopolis: 1
			Orchomenos: 1 P		
			Pheneos: 2 (1 P)		Pheneos: 1 T
					Stymphalos: 1 P
			Tegea: 2 (1 P)		Tegea: 5 (4 T+ 1 U)
			Sparta: 4 (1 P)	Sparta: 3 (2 P)	Sparta: 2
			Derai (Messenia): 1		
			Kyparissia: 2		
			Messene: 1	Messene: 1	Messene: 2 (1 T+1 P)

All in all, of the c. 130 Peloponnesian *poleis* Epidaurios appears to have formed contacts with 20, for the promotion of the Asklepieia. On the other hand, taken together, the lists show that over time the Epidaurians were progressively more interested in promoting their festival among Peloponnesian states and at least as much as they were interested in promoting it among states outside the Peloponnese.

The list of c. 260–240 has a distinctly Peloponnesian character. It records 34 honorands from the Peloponnese while from the rest of the Greek world we find only 16 names (plus 3 of unknown origin). We cannot draw a similar conclusion about the list of c. 240–200 since the stone is broken across the top and the bottom and what is left is extremely fragmentary. However, 7 Peloponnesian honorands are recorded, with the Spartans forming the majority (3). As to the rest of the Greek world, only 3 names are preserved. In the list of c. 220–200, honorands are spread fairly evenly between the Peloponnese and states outside of it, with the Peloponnesians being slightly outnumbered: 27 against 31 non-Peloponnesians (from the nearby Megara, Athens, Aigina, Delphi, various *poleis* in Boiotia, Crete and even the very distant Kos, Knidos and Kalchedon).

Beyond political or practical considerations, Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* for the Epidaurian Asklepieia reflect Asklepios' widespread popularity in the Peloponnese (and all over the Greek world). In other words, common cult should be seen as one of the factors at play in the formation of bonds between Epidaurios and certain *poleis* in the Peloponnese.

Messenia is one of the regions, along with Thessaly and Argos, associated in literary sources with the birth of Asklepios. His cult was probably introduced upon the foundation of Messene/Ithome where he assumed the role of its patron deity along with the heroine Messene.¹⁰⁹ In the late 3rd-early 2nd century, or in the second quarter of the 2nd century,¹¹⁰ the Messenians built a monumental complex in honour of Asklepios incorporating previous buildings (Paus. 4.31.10).¹¹¹ Messenian presence on the Epidaurian lists is not particularly impressive but perhaps it is not coincidental that we come across two Messenian honorands at the very end of the 3rd century, when Asklepios was becoming more and more important for Messenian identity. The importance of a common cult is better exemplified by the Arkadian honorands. Of the 7 Arkadian *poleis* with *theōrodokoi* for the Epidaurian Asklepieia, 4 worshipped Asklepios in the 4th and 3rd centuries: Kleitor, Mantinea, Tegea, Megalopolis; there were also two Asklepieia in Gortys (in the Megalopolitis). Heraia had a cult for Asklepios' children in the 3rd century (*IG* V.2.416). Evidence from Pheneos consists of archaeological remains of the 2nd century (Jost 1985, 31–2) while for Orchomenos and Kaphyai there is only Roman imperial coinage.¹¹²

Pausanias (2.21.1, 23.4) reports three sanctuaries of Asklepios at Argos (Piérart 2004b, 20–1).

The immediate neighbours of Epidauros in the Argolid, with the important exceptions of Argos (16 honorands) and Phleious (6 honorands) are hardly present in the lists: only Troizen appears with just one *theōrodoikos*, in 220–200. As to the absence of *theōrodoikoi* at Hermione, there is evidence showing that the two *poleis* were not on the best of terms. First, there is evidence of an armed clash between Hermione and another state in the first half of the 3rd century, settled by a treaty set up in the Epidaurian Asklepieion (*IG* IV².1.74 / **SV*A III, 559). The name of Hermione's rival is lost, but ὁ Ἐπιδάυριος has been restored in l.4 by Hiller.¹¹³ It is possible that the two parties agreed then on common exploitation of land.¹¹⁴ However, by the early 2nd century, probably between 175 and 172, Hermione and Epidauros were (again?) at odds. It appears that the dispute had been going on for some time, and Hermione lodged a complaint against Epidauros,¹¹⁵ presumably because Epidaurian shepherds constantly used grazing land belonging to Hermione (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 148). Six Milesian and probably more than six Rhodian judges¹¹⁶ decided that the Epidaurians and the Hermioneis should share the disputed land (in the region of the Didymia). Furthermore, 'any fine pending against the cities is to be cancelled. No claim is to be made concerning cropping or pasturage [which occurred] before this decision. The previous decision concerning the payment of fees to tax collectors for the pasturage of goats is to remain in force' (copy from Hermione, ll. 19–23; trans. by Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 597).¹¹⁷

Taken together, the lists of *theōrodoikoi* show that Epidauros had a constant relationship with Argos through the Asklepieia and the *theōrodoikia*. Argive honorands constitute the majority – 16, out of whom 9 are *theōrodoikoi*. Notably, almost half of them (7) appear on the list of c. 220–200. However, the picture becomes complicated by an Argive decree indicating some kind of Argive control over public space at Epidauros or at least Argive interest in making its presence felt in the Asklepieion, at an extremely uncertain date. More specifically, the decree for the Phleiasian Menekles (*IG* IV².1.69 + Mitsos 1947, 82–4, no.A = *SEG* 11.400 / *LA* *Ep*id 24) was set up at the Asklepieion of Epidauros, which could only have happened if the Argives exercised some kind of control or authority over Epidauros. Mitsos (1947, 83) offers two alternatives for the date with a slight preference for the second:¹¹⁸ either the second quarter of the 4th century, in the 360s, when Argos was at war with both Phleious and Epidauros – in which case Menekles would have been a Phleiasian democrat in exile – or the aftermath of Chaironeia as a punitive,

Macedonian measure for the help Epidauros had provided to the Athenians after the battle.¹¹⁹ According to the second line of thought, thanks to Philip II the Argives would have acquired control over the sanctuary of Asklepios. Burford (1969, 17 and n.1, 29 and n.7–8), having pointed out the early interest of the Argives in the Epidaurian sanctuary and in the Isthmian Games, argues that Epidauros must have passed under Argive control after 338 on the basis of a list of recipients of corn from Kyrene, dating to 326, in which Epidauros does not appear while all the other states of the Akte do (Tod 1948, no.196). Thus, the decree may afford further proof of Macedonian policy of supporting Argos in matters beyond territorial disputes with Sparta. Being in agreement with Mitsos on the implied Argive control, Piérart offers a new restoration (2004b, 32–4 = *SEG* 54.439),¹²⁰ arguing that there may even have been an Argive cleruchy at Epidauros: [εὐεργέτ]αν εἶμεν τοῦ [δάμου τῶν Ἀργείων ἐν Ἐ]πιδαύρῳ κα[τοικούντων (ll. 6–8). Given the state of the stone, however, Piérart wisely remains hesitant about the date, not excluding a date long before 338.¹²¹

The only certain thing is that no other Argive decree has been found at the Epidaurian Asklepieion, and this, unless accidental, indicates either that at some point Argos ceased to be in a position to publish inscriptions there or that it ceased to be interested in doing so. We do not know how this relationship between Argos and Epidauros developed. If there was indeed a cleruchy – and Piérart's restoration does appear attractive – we do not know when, if ever, it ceased to exist. The aftermath of the Lamian War is a plausible candidate. In this case, Antipatros would have restored independence to Epidauros as a punitive measure against the Argives after their participation in the war. The problem is that Epidauros had also taken part in the war but one could argue that Antipatros would not have tolerated extensive power in the case of Argos. Needless to say, all this is purely conjectural.

In any case, the noteworthy point is that, however unpleasant relations between Epidauros and Argos had been in the Classical period (see pp.7–8), at some point relations improved and the Epidaurians decided that it was in their best interest to be on good terms with the Argives. And, as Piérart (2004b, 30–1) has observed, apart from political hostility, there had been cultural exchange between the two *poleis*.

Additional proof for Argive-Epidaurian relations based on cult and games is offered by two inscriptions. An Argive honorific decree of uncertain date (3rd century) awards a certain Kleandros son of Kleaichmidas *proxenia* and *theōrodoxia* (ed. pr. Vollgraff 1915, 375–6, no.F / *Perlman 2000, 213–14, A 7). There is additional evidence of Argive participation in the Asklepieia after 229 (the date of Argos' admission into the Achaian

Confederacy): Φίλιστος Καλλισθένους Ἀργεῖος ἀπ' Ἀχαΐας, ἀνὴρ πένταθλος participated in the Asklepieia and was fined 1,000 staters (*IG* IV².1.99 / *Syll.*³ 1076, ll.18–19).

A policy of rapprochement with Argos would have only been reinforced or indeed dictated by the tension in relations of Epidauros with its neighbours, especially Corinth, even though the latter was no longer the great power of the past. Corinth is absent from the lists of 260–240 and of 240–200. This can be explained by the fact that the two states had been involved in a land dispute prior to their joining the Achaian Confederacy in 243.¹²² The dispute was resolved between 242/1 and 238/7 by arbitration (see pp.164–8), and this is probably how Corinthian *theōrodokoi* came to appear on the last list. Also reflecting good relations between Epidauros and Corinth in the 3rd century, *IG* IV².1.97, ll.17–19 records that a Corinthian by the name of Apollas contributed two Corinthian staters for a holocaust sacrifice (presumably during the Asklepieia).

The Spartans come second after Argos, with 9 honorands, 3 of whom were appointed *proxenoi*. This should be seen in the light of the long-lasting friendly relations between Sparta and Epidauros (see pp.5–7). Spartan bonds with Epidauros appear strong enough while in the same period there is no trace of Spartan participation in the Olympic Games. It is possible to associate this trend with practical considerations on the part of the Spartans. It was perhaps less troublesome and less expensive to be a *theōrodokos* than to participate in Panhellenic games in a period during which Sparta underwent enormous social and political changes.

The bonds between the Spartans and the Asklepieion in Epidauros, evident in the hymn of Isyllos,¹²³ obviously continued (Christien 2013, 350). The bonds between the two *poleis* were maintained despite the conflict between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy to which Epidauros had belonged since 243/2 (with a brief interruption during the Kleomenic War, 228–222). In other words, the festival and the past transcended contemporary politics in this case.

As to the Arkadians, they are mainly represented by the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans and the Heraians – with 7, 6 and 5 honorands respectively. Relations of Epidauros with Megalopolis and Tegea follow opposite paths: between 260–240, it is Megalopolis that has the majority of honorands (5) but only 1 later on. Conversely, Tegea has only 1 *theōrodokos* and 1 *proxenos* in the first list but 4 *theōrodokoi* plus 1 honorand in the last.

The absence of Elis is notable. It mirrors the general distance of the Eleians from their fellow Peloponnesians, obvious among other things in the Olympic victors list. It also corresponds to the almost total absence of the Epidaurians from the records of the Olympic Games.

The Epidaurians tended to appoint multiple *theōrodokoi* or *proxenoi* in certain *poleis* in a single decree: in XVI (4 *proxenoi* and *theōrodokoi*), in XVII (4 again but 2 of them are the same as in XVI) and in XVIII (4 *proxenoi*) in the list of c. 260–240; in decree II on the list of c. 240–200 we have 4 *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi*. The tendency becomes a marked feature in the list of c. 220–200: 5 Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* are appointed by Epidauros in decree I, 4 of them being Argives (plus 1 Megarian and one Knossian); 3 *theōrodokoi* (plus 3 from Kos and 4 Cretans) and 3 *proxenoi* in decree II; 3 *theōrodokoi* plus 1 *proxenos* in decree IV (plus 1 from Kalchedon). Finally, we have an impressive number of 6 *theōrodokoi* and *proxenoi* in decree VI in which are also recorded an astonishing number of another 16 *theōrodokoi* and 4 *proxenoi* from outside the Peloponnese.¹²⁴ These multiple appointments in the last Epidaurian list represent a clear indication of a wish to establish a network of as many supporters as possible for their festival in the Peloponnese as well as elsewhere. From a wider perspective, this practice should be viewed against the widespread popularity of the festival in honour of Asklepios at Kos, whose sanctuary had been granted inviolability and its games Panhellenic status in 242 (Rigsby 1996, 106–7). Notably, the Epidaurians had also appointed *theōrodokoi* at Kos.

Ateleia and *asylia* in war and peace, on land and sea, feature in all individual decrees from Epidauros. They are also granted to 6 out of 35 Peloponnesian honorands in the list of c. 260–240. The specification ‘on land and sea’ could be the result of practical considerations: one could reach Epidauros on both elements.¹²⁵ The point becomes stronger when we take into account that three of the honorands were Argives, i.e. neighbours and perhaps engaged in financial activities at Epidauros. The practical character of the honour is also borne out by the very rarity of the award by Epidauros. In the lists of c. 240–200 and c.220–200 no other privileges are recorded beyond the *theōrodokia* or the *proxenia*.

We cannot know to what extent the substantial presence of Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* at Epidauros had its equivalent in the agonistic part of the Asklepia since the list of known victors is lamentably short. We know of only four victors until the mid-2nd century, three of them Peloponnesians. From the mid-late 4th century we know of the Argive Kleainetos, son of Epikrates; from the late 3rd century Damatrios of Tegea; from the very end of the same century, Akestoridas of Troas; Kallistratos of Sikyon was victorious sometime in the 3rd century. All three Peloponnesians had excelled in many festivals, Damatrios and Kleainetos in particular (see pp.405–6, 416). Kleainetos was probably the brother of Drymos honoured by Epidauros in c.350.¹²⁶ He was probably a *periodonikēs* and also victorious in the Arkadian Lykaia. Kallistratos was a professional

victor in games celebrated in the Peloponnese: in the Lykaia (3 victories), the Nemeia (5 victories) and the Isthmia (4 victories).¹²⁷

The Nemeia, the Hekatomboia/Heraia and the relations of Argos with Peloponnesian *poleis*

Argos and Kleonai

Politically speaking Argos had been a chronic underperformer in the Classical period. After the battle of Leuktra it did not set out to assume a leading role in Peloponnesian affairs. It remained ‘strangely subdued’, preferring to deal with its neighbours in the Argolid – Epidauros and Phleious – and in fact proving unable to do so (Tomlinson 1972, 142–3). Similarly, after 338, the Argives remained largely content with the territorial gift by Philip II and at no time did they attempt to translate their territorial superiority into political control over the Peloponnese.

Instead, the Argives set out to make their presence strongly felt in the Argolid and in the wider Greek world through the organization of the festivals of the Hekatomboia/Heraia¹²⁸ and the Panhellenic Nemeia which, in fact, were the least glamorous among the *Periodos* (Strasser 2007, 329).

This use of the games as ‘a mechanism of self-assertion’ (Hornblower 2002, 86 and 27) was actually in keeping with a time-honoured Argive policy, going back at least to the early-mid 5th century, after the terrible losses inflicted by the Spartans at the battle of Sepeia (Hdt. 6.75.3–80; Plut., *Mor.* 223a–c). In the 5th century the Argives had got hold of the temple of Apollo Pythaios in Asine (Thuc. 5.53). After eliminating Mykenai, the Argives acquired control of the Heraia (Amandry 1980, 234–5).¹²⁹ In 390, two years after the political unification with Corinth, the Argives attempted to celebrate the Isthmian Games but withdrew to the *asty* at the approach of a Spartan army led by king Agesilaos.¹³⁰ Plutarch (*Agesilaos* 21.3) reports a charge that rings a bell: Agesilaos stated that the Argives, although interested in the *agōnothesia*, were not willing to fight for it.

In the 5th century Kleonai held presidency of the games,¹³¹ probably ‘under the suzerainty of Argos’.¹³² Following a fire at the end of the 5th century the Nemeia ceased to be celebrated at Nemea for an uncertain period of time. For the most part of the 4th century it is uncertain where the games were celebrated – Argos or Nemea or even Kleonai – and under whose control, i.e. that of Argos or Kleonai.¹³³ The games were (again?) celebrated at Nemea either in the 330s or in the 320s, after the completion of a massive construction programme under Macedonian patronage.¹³⁴

Presidency of the Nemeia by Argos has been commonly associated with its incorporation of Kleonai. According to one theory, Kleonai was incorporated after the battle of Chaironeia and before 323.¹³⁵ A second

theory is that it was incorporated after Antipatros' death in 319/8 and before 315, during the struggle between Kassandros and Polyperchon, before Argos had passed under the control of the former.¹³⁶ However, since 2006 these two theories appear no longer to be valid or at least to have been seriously undermined. Kritzas (2006, 427–8) reports the discovery of lead tablets which show that Kleonai was a *kômē* of Argos already in the early 4th century, certainly by 370, and perhaps during the Corinthian War in the 390s or shortly afterwards.¹³⁷ Furthermore, the fact that Kleoniaians are recorded as holding high offices is strong evidence of privileged status, although the incorporation was possibly the work of democrats (in both cities) and rather troublesome as is indicated by the recording of confiscation of properties.¹³⁸ As to the Nemeia, Kritzas (2006, 429) adduces the testimony of Pausanias (4.27.6) as proof that the Argives controlled the games in 368: upon the foundation of Messene, the Argives sacrificed to Hera Argeia and Zeus Nemeios.

On the other hand, there is evidence showing that Kleonai was acting as an independent state minting two bronze issues in the second half of the 4th century, with heads of Zeus and Herakles (the latter in the Nemean Lion's skin) respectively on the obverse.¹³⁹ Furthermore, these issues bear the legends ΚΛ and ΚΛ|ΕΩ¹⁴⁰ respectively on the reverse within a wreath of celery, i.e. the prize for the victors in the Nemeia – a depiction of Kleonai's connection with the games. How are we to reconcile the evidence of the lead tablets with the evidence of the coins? One could plausibly argue that Argos might have lost control of Kleonai, as it probably lost control of Thyrea.¹⁴¹ But in the case of Kleonai we have to take account of the long-standing friendly relations with Argos and its subsequent privileged status. The two kinds of evidence could be reconciled, if we suppose that Kleonai had been allowed to mint its own coinage, *only* in order to serve the games, exceptionally and *honoris causa*.¹⁴² Admittedly, such a situation would have been quite unusual but almost everything about Kleonai is unusual: its status in the 5th century, its incorporation and especially its subsequent status as a dependent *kômē*. As to the coinage, there is the parallel of the Eleusinian 'festival' bronze coinages, issued in the second half of the 4th century (until the mid-3rd century) and bearing the legend ΕΛΕΥΣΙ. Their purpose was to facilitate small-scale transactions during the Great Mysteries and, in general, to promote the festival. Thus the bronze coinages of Kleonai can be explained in this light. The legend can be seen as a reference to the location of the festival, not as an ethnic.¹⁴³ Like the Eleusinian issues, they must have been authorized by Argos in order to facilitate transactions during the Nemeia and to encourage foreign participation.

The new evidence makes the problem of the administration of the Nemeia prior to the 330s even more complicated. It remains a question which city organized the games. Kleonai could have been assigned organization of the games, *honoris causa*, under the suzerainty of Argos, as the case may very well have been in the 5th century. In other words, presidency of the Nemeia could be dissociated from political independence.¹⁴⁴

The incorporation by Argos was not the end of the story for Kleonai, and the Nemean Games went on having a turbulent history, providing the battlefield for a clash between Argos and the Achaian Confederacy. At some point before 235, possibly in c. 270, the Nemeia changed location from Nemea to Argos.¹⁴⁵ Kleonai remained Argive until 235 when Aratos of Sikyon restored it to its *polis* status and made it a member of the Achaian Confederacy (Plut. *Arat.* 28.5–29). As to the games, Plutarch (*Arat.* 28.3–4) writes that Aratos brought them to Kleonai (προσήγαγεν ἐν Κλεωναίς). It is not quite clear whether this means that the games were now administered *by* or *at* Kleonai or both. It seems more likely that these games, under the administration of Kleonai and the suzerainty of the Achaian Confederacy, took place at Nemea, but their success in the long run is quite uncertain (Miller 2001, 97–9). Furthermore, the games were also celebrated at Argos immediately after the detachment of Kleonai. And, on this occasion, the Achaian Confederacy, Aratos in particular, for the first but not the last time demonstrated brutality towards an enemy: those travelling to participate in the games organized by Argos were captured and sold into slavery (Plut. *Arat.* 28.4; Ducrey 1999, 303–4).¹⁴⁶ This act is an extreme proof of the intense political importance the Nemeia had as a symbol.

However, at least from 225¹⁴⁷ onwards, the games were celebrated again at Argos, while the site of Nemea appears to have been abandoned.¹⁴⁸ This celebration indicates that Aratos and the Achaian Confederacy acknowledged the fact that their attempt to usurp the Nemeia was not successful; at the same time they wished to placate a most valuable member of the Confederacy.

We do not know what exactly happened between 235 and 225 but a fragmentary *stēlē* records an agreement of uncertain content between Argos and Kleonai (Bradeen 1966, 323–6, no.6 = *SEG* 23.178).¹⁴⁹ The agreement dates after 235 (Kleonai is being referred to as a *polis* in l. 4), and probably before 225. An appropriate *terminus post quem* for the reconciliation between Argos and Kleonai is 229/8, when Argos joined the Achaian Confederacy. It is quite possible that the Achaian Confederacy was involved, for reasons of prestige if for no other reason (Buraselis 2013, 181).¹⁵⁰ The agreement between the two disputing parties must have paved the way for undisturbed celebration of the Nemeia at Argos in 225.

The dispute between Argos and Kleonai probably involved both boundaries and the Nemeia. The text refers to περιάγησιν to take place in the future (l. 5), that is inspection of a site, which most likely points to a problem over boundaries (Bradeen 1966, 325 reporting Blegen's view). The area in dispute could have been the fertile valley of Kephalaria (today part of Korinthia), on the route from Mykenai to Kleonai and with one of the routes from Argos to Korinthia (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 32–3; also 1996–97, 255). Legal action is indicated by the references to a court of unknown provenance (l. 9), to a fine of 1,000 *drachmai* (l. 11) and to a law on violence and murder (ὁ νόμος περὶ τῶν βιαιῶν καὶ φονικῶν, ll.11–12). This law and more so the recurring forms of the verb 'παραίγνομαι', i.e. 'attend festivals', (in ll. 7, 15, 18, 19) indicate that the Nemeia were part of both the dispute and the agreement (Bradeen 1966, 326). As mentioned above, two Nemeia had been celebrated in 235 while violence and murder did occur at the instigation of Aratos. We do not know whether this dual celebration was repeated for the next Nemeia (of 233, 231, 229 and 227) but violence must have gone on at least between Argos and Kleonai (Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 30; 1996–97, 254) and quite possibly between Argos and the Achaian Confederacy. The arbiter between Argos and Kleonai – if a third party was involved – remains unknown.¹⁵¹

Amidst the uncertainties, what seems to be most interesting is that despite its privileged previous status, Kleonai did have a bone of contention with Argos. We do not know who initiated the procedure but, if indeed there was territory involved, the initiator is likely to have been Kleonai since Argos had been in possession of the territory. This in turn would show how being given independence made the Kleonaians confident enough to get involved in boundary disputes with Argos.

Kleonai appears independent in the last decades of the 3rd century since it provides two *theōrodokoi* for Delphi (Plassart 1921, 15, col.II, ll.147–8) and one of the twenty-four *nomographoi* for the Achaian Confederacy after 228, possibly in 210–207 (*IG* IV².1.73, ll. 9–10).¹⁵²

The proxenoi and theōrodokoi for the Argive festivals: the predominance of Arkadian liaisons

In the last three decades of the 4th century, two lists of *theōrodokoi* were published, one at Argos and another at Nemea, both consisting of an original text and subsequent addenda (Perlman 2000, 100–12). Scholars agree that the Argives published both lists, the one at Argos preceding the Nemean, but their precise date, manner of composition and the festivals concerned (neither list mentions the name of the festival), especially of

the Argive list, have been the subject of debate, associated, among other things, with the problem of Kleonai's incorporation.

The Argive list (*Charneux 1966 = *SEG* 23.189 / Perlman 2000, 206–7, A 1) was published between 331/0 and probably 324.¹⁵³ It could concern either the Hekatomboia/Heraia alone¹⁵⁴ or both the Hekatomboia/Heraia and the Nemeia. However, in the light of the recent discovery regarding Kleonai's incorporation, it seems now best to conclude that the Argive list concerned both festivals. The list (arranged in two columns) preserves the names of *theōrodokoi* in north-western Greece, Asia Minor and the Peloponnesians. Of Peloponnesian *poleis*, the surviving part of the *stēlē* refers only to *theōrodokoi* in four Arkadian *poleis* – Kleitor, Pheneos, Stymphalos, Alea – but the names of the other Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* would have been recorded on the missing part of the stone. At some point between 323/2 and 315 another list was published at Nemea recording in its surviving part *theōrodokoi* on Cyprus, in Akarnania, on Kerkyra, Leukas, and in east Macedon (ed. pr. Miller 1988 = *SEG* 36.331 / Perlman 2000, 236–9, N 1).¹⁵⁵

The publication of both lists served more than one purpose, perhaps least of all practical ones (these were very well served by perishable archives). Public recognition of the *theōrodokoi*'s role was certainly a result if not a goal in itself. As in Epidauros, more than acknowledgement of the *theōrodokoi*'s role, the lists were an advertisement for the *polis* of Argos itself, since the Argives showed every single visitor the extent of participation in their festivals.¹⁵⁶ It is notable that the Argive list is the earliest securely dated Argive inscription of the 4th century (Perlman 2000, 153).

The lists bear testimony to the way in which the *polis* that had benefited the most from Spartan decline and Macedonian benevolence chose to view its role in this new world. Thanks to Philip II Sparta had been quelled, a new stadium at Nemea was under way or complete, and Argos had become the largest *polis* in the eastern Peloponnese. In this context the Argives decided that it was the right time to advertise on stone the fact that they controlled the sanctuary of Zeus and the Nemeia, with their web of liaisons around the Greek world and the prestige of their festivals.

The impression of new extravertedness is intensified when we examine the overall Argive epigraphic output of the late 4th–early 3rd centuries.¹⁵⁷ It was especially in this period that the Argives forged bonds with the other side of the Aegean, usually awarding to an individual the *proxenia* and the *theōrodokia* for the Heraia and the Nemeia. Even entire *poleis* such as Rhodes and Aspendos were the recipients of substantial honours on the basis (among other things) of their *syngeneia* with Argos.¹⁵⁸

On the other hand, Argive citizens appear infrequently as recipients of honours from other Peloponnesian *poleis*: only 3 honorific decrees have

survived – from the Arkadian *poleis* of Mantinea/ Antigoneia, Orchomenos and Tegea – plus 2 statue bases from Epidauros and the Messenian Asine. Among the above, 1 decree and 1 statue concern the tyrant Aristomachos II in the late 3rd century. Therefore, it may seem either that the Argives owed favours or, more likely, aimed at establishing a network of people indebted or grateful to them and in a position to promote Argive festivals, but not many Peloponnesian *poleis* (felt that they) had a reason to honour an Argive citizen. It emerges that it was the festivals that led to a rapprochement between the Argives and other Peloponnesians but only rarely a matter irrelevant to the games – one such case is represented by the honours for the Pallantieis (although they too are appointed *theōrodokoi*).

Twenty-six Argive decrees award the *theōrodokia* for both the Heraia and the Nemeia, bearing testimony to the role of religious festivals as a means of forging bonds between communities. Ten of them concern Peloponnesians. To the latter we add another two which do not award the *theōrodokia*¹⁵⁹ – for [Ar]etakles of Megalopolis and Philon of Pheneos; there is also an unpublished proxeny decree for a Kleitorios, which might date after 146.¹⁶⁰ The vast majority of Argive decrees are vaguely dated to the late 4th and the 3rd centuries¹⁶¹ while, notably, Argos is much less prolific in the 2nd century (Shipley 2005, 327).

Among the decrees involving Peloponnesians, only the one concerning Pallantion is dated with reasonable certainty, to the last years of the 4th century or the very beginning of the 3rd. The others could belong to any time after the assumption of the presidency of the Nemeia by the Argives.

Table 13: Peloponnesian honorands in Argive decrees (by region, clockwise, starting from Korinthia and Sikyonia; the *poleis* within the regions are cited alphabetically; the names of the honorands and the honours are given in the nominative except for the uncertain cases; the two decrees certainly awarding only the *proxenia* are nos. 8 & 10; as to inscriptions the asterisk indicates the edition employed here).

Origin / Honorand	Honours	Date	Text
Korinthia-Sikyonia			
1 Corinth: Eukles (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> [and <i>euergetēs</i> and <i>politēs</i> ?]; ¹⁶² <i>theōrodokos</i> for Zeus and Hera; [<i>asphaleia</i> and <i>asylia</i> ?] on land and sea, in peace and war; <i>empasis</i> of [land] and house.	249–244?	ed. pr. Vollgraff 1915, 372–4, no. D 2; Charneux 1991, 298–9, no. I, ll.3–4; *Perlman 2000, 229, A 23.

2 Corinth: Agathonymos	[<i>Proxenos</i>] and <i>euergētēs</i> (+ descendants); <i>theōrodokos</i> for Zeus and Hera; [<i>ateleia</i> ? Right to acquire land] and house; [<i>asylia</i> ? and <i>asphaleia</i> ? in war and peace?] on land and sea. ¹⁶³	Late 3 rd ?	ed. pr. Vollgraff 1915, 380–2, no. M; *Perlman 2000, 232–3, A 25.
3 Sikyon: ?	[<i>Ateleia</i> ?] [<i>asphaleia</i> ? and <i>asylia</i> ? on land?] and sea, [in war?] and peace; ¹⁶⁴ [<i>proedria</i> ?] of the games.	3 rd	ed. pr. Charneux 1956, 598–9, no. I = <i>SEG</i> 16.246; *Perlman 2000, 227, A21.
4 Sikyon: Alexandros	<i>Politēs</i> (+ descendants); <i>theōrodokos</i> for Zeus and Hera; <i>proedria</i> of the games; crown; bronze statue.	First half of 3 rd ?	ed. pr. Vollgraff 1916, 64–71, no. III; <i>ISE</i> 41; ¹⁶⁵ *Perlman 2000, 230–1, A 24; ¹⁶⁶ Amandry 1980, 227 (ph.; no text).
Argolid 5 Epidauros: Kleandros	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>euergētēs</i> (+ descendants); <i>theōrodokos</i> [for Zeus and Hera].	Late 4 th – 3 rd ¹⁶⁷	ed. pr. Vollgraff 1915, 374–6, no. F; *Perlman 2000, 213–14, A 7.
Arkadia 6 Mantinea: Diatages	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>theōrodokos</i> for Zeus and Hera.	Before 223/2 ¹⁶⁸	ed. pr. Vollgraff 1915, 376–7, no. G; *Perlman 2000, 222, A 16.
7 Mantinea: Theainetos	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>euergētēs</i> (+ descendants); <i>theōrodokos</i> of Zeus and Hera; <i>ateleia</i> and <i>asylia</i> on land and sea, in peace and war; <i>proedria</i> of the games.	After 272 ¹⁶⁹ – before 223/2	ed. pr. Charneux 1958, 7–13, no. II B = <i>SEG</i> 17.143; Perlman 2000, 221, A 15.
8 Megalopolis: [Ar]etakles	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>euergētēs</i> .	3 rd	ed. pr. Charneux 1958, 1–5, no. I = <i>SEG</i> 17.141.

9	Pallantion: Seven envoys: Milon; Phileas; Timostratos; [...] pon; Xenippos; En[en.]na Daimachos	<i>Proxenoí</i> and <i>energetai</i> ; <i>theōrodokoi</i> for Zeus and Hera.	Late 4 th – early 3 rd	<u>Pallantion copy</u> : ed. pr. Guarducci 1941–43 [1948] = <i>SEG</i> 11.1084; <i>SVF</i> III, 419 (Guarducci's text); readings of ll. 19, 36 by Mitsos (reported by Robert, J. & L. 1950, 159–60, no.114); * <i>ISE</i> 52; Bielman 1994, no.14; Perlman 2000, 208–9, A 3; ¹⁷⁰ L'Institut Fernand- Courby 2005, no. 9. <u>Argive copy</u> (= ll. 23–41 of the Pallantion copy): *ed. pr. Charneux 1983, 251–6 = <i>SEG</i> 33.276; Perlman 2000, 208–9, A 2.
10	Pheneos: Philon (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> .	Late 4 th – early 3 rd	Piérart and Thalmann 1980, 259–61, no. 2 = <i>SEG</i> 30.356.
11	Tegea: [—]asiadas ¹⁷¹	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> (+descendants); <i>theōrodokos</i> for Zeus and Hera (+ descendants); <i>ateleia</i> and [<i>asylia</i>] and <i>asphaleia</i> in peace and war, on land and sea, for him and his fortune; <i>proedria</i> of the games; <i>empasis</i> of house.	3 rd	Perlman 2000, 233–4, A 26.
Messenia				
12	Messene: ? and Kaphisokles (+descendants)	[<i>proxenoí</i> and <i>energetai</i>]; <i>theōrodokoi</i> for Zeus and Hera; [<i>asphaleia</i> and <i>asylia</i> ?] on land and sea [in peace and war?].	3 rd ; c.240– 230? ¹⁷²	*ed. pr. Charneux 1953, 397–400, no.IV = <i>SEG</i> 13.243; Perlman 2000, 212–13, A 6.

To the above we add the *theōrodokoi* in four Arkadian *poleis* – Kleitor, Pheneos, Stymphalos, Alea.

We can view the majority of these decrees as a means of promoting these festivals and, through them, the prestige of Argos but we cannot say whether this was the predominant consideration of the Argives on every single occasion, all the more so since they rarely recorded the motivation for the honours. And when they did, their phraseology was usually abstract.

The decrees for the Corinthian Eukles and for Alexandros of Sikyon provide us with a reason for the honour – two out of three Argive decrees in which we find a motive recorded (the third and much more detailed is the decree concerning Pallantion). Eukles had provided his services (l. 4; to individuals? to the *polis*? to both?)¹⁷³ while Alexandros had provided his services and constantly shown his favourable disposition towards Argos (ll.4–7). Probably the reason for recording the motivation lies in the fact that these two were awarded the citizenship – the only Peloponnesian honorands to receive this award from the Argives. Alexandros was also awarded a bronze statue. Hence, in his case a justification of the honours may have been deemed essential while it would not have been considered necessary for less important honorands.

The right to acquire land and a house in Argos is recorded for Eukles but not for Alexandros. Probably, in this latter case, the proposers of the decree did not consider it necessary to spell it out in writing since it would have come as part and parcel of the citizenship rights. Only one more honorand, the Corinthian Agathonymos, was awarded the right to acquire land and house.

Dixon (2014, 97) accepting Vollgraff's (1915, 368–73) dating of the decree for Eukles to c.249–244, i.e. during the revolt of Alexandros, governor of Corinth, against Antigonos Gonatas (see Ch. 5, n.39), plausibly suggests that Eukles may have facilitated peace negotiations (recorded in *IG* II² 774) between Argos and Alexandros.¹⁷⁴ Such services would have surely justified the award of citizenship.

Very little can be said about the other Corinthian honorand, Agathonymos. Vollgraff (1915, 380–2 and 1916, 50) identifies the individuals recorded at the beginning of the decree as *stratēgoi* (ll. 1–8) and dates the decree to the late 3rd century on the basis of Livy (32.25.2) who refers to a board of at least 10 *stratēgoi* (*praetores*) in 198.¹⁷⁵ However, this does not exclude the possibility that this board of ten or more existed at a much earlier date: before, during or after the establishment of the tyranny in the late 270s.¹⁷⁶

The decree for Alexandros of Sikyon is exceptional in many ways, not least because of the prominence of an unknown number of *stratēgoi*. They are recorded in the preamble of the decree along with the *boulē*; they are responsible for registering Alexandros with a tribe, a phratry and a

pentekostys (ll. 2, 10–11). Suggested dates for the decree for Alexandros range from the early to the late 3rd century; the former view is advanced by Vollgraff and Moretti while the latter is proposed by Amandry.¹⁷⁷ At the most the period between c. 242 and 229 should probably be excluded since in this period the Sikyonian Aratos was trying to force Argos into the Achaian Confederacy and therefore there would be no room for awards of honours to a Sikyonian citizen. Buraselis (2013, 173–4 and nn. 17, 19), returning to Vollgraff's early date, argues that the absence of any hint at the Achaian Confederacy points to a date before Sikyon's incorporation in 251 but that it is unclear whether the decree precedes the establishment of the tyranny in Argos in the late 270s. The cautious identification by Vollgraff (1916, 66) of Alexandros, son of Alexandros, with a descendant of Polyperchon and his son Alexandros is intriguing but cannot be proved. On such a hypothesis, however, we would add another piece to the friendly relations of members of the Sikyonian elite with Polyperchon and his son in the late 4th century (see p.96).

In addition to the two decrees for Sikyonians recorded on the table above, Knoepfler (2001, 31–2) suggests that an Argive decree for a Thracian (ed. pr. Piérart and Thalmann 1980, 269–72, no.4 = *SEG* 30.357)¹⁷⁸ is recorded on a stone which had been used previously to record honours for a Sikyonian. In this case, Knoepfler argues, we are dealing with a deliberate hostile political action. We could very well place such an action in the years between 242 and 229, during the repeated attacks of Aratos against Argos. On the positive side, this erased decree constitutes evidence of liaisons between Argos and Sikyon.

Let us now turn to the Arkadian liaisons of Argos. Among the Peloponnesians honoured by Argos in the 3rd century, we find 7 Pallantieis, honoured in a single decree, 4 Mantineans, 1 Tegean, 1 Megalopolitan, 1 from Pheneos, 2 Corinthians, 1 Epidaurian, 2 Sikyonians, and finally 2 Messenians. In other words, 12 out of 19 honorands are Arkadians. Even if we count the 7 Pallantieis as one, the Arkadians still outnumber the other Peloponnesian recipients of honours: 6 decrees out of 12. And there are also the *theōrodoikoi* in Kleitor, Pheneos, Stymphalos and Alea. It appears then that in the late 4th and in the 3rd centuries the Argives were mainly interested in developing bonds with certain Arkadian *poleis* and, secondarily, with their immediate neighbours – Corinth, Sikyon and Epidaurus. The impression becomes stronger when we take into account the notable participation of Argives in the Arkadian or Megalopolitan Lykaia in the late 4th century (see pp.443–4). This cementing of bonds with citizens of Arkadian *poleis* is intriguing, given that at some point in the late 4th century the Argives had imposed a fine on an Arkadian *Koinon*.

At an uncertain date after 338, Argos inflicted considerable fines upon Stymphalos and an Arkadian *Koinon* for offences against the Nemean Games (*IG* IV 616).¹⁷⁹ The mere fact that the fines are imposed collectively, not individually, indicates collective action by the offenders. The fines imposed on the *Koinon* were extremely high, amounting to c.25,000 golden staters or 100 talents.¹⁸⁰ It is possible that there was an arrangement for the fines to be paid in instalments (Charneux 1983, 261). However, as Piérart pointed out (*pers. comm.*), for the date we have to look for a period in which the Argives were or felt powerful enough to impose such substantial fines. Elaborating on this point, we suggest that the imposition of fines does not automatically mean that they were paid. Or, it could even be that they were meant as a long-term exclusion. Furthermore, the Argives would have needed to back their demand with the threat of using force against each and every *polis* that refused to comply, which they were not in a position to do without external help. Thus, any time after Argos' aggrandisement by Macedon in 338, and possibly after the Nemean Games recommenced at Nemea, would be appropriate. The most compelling reason adduced by Piérart (1982, 130–1) for a date in or after the late 330s is the fact that the fines are imposed in golden staters, which points to a date after Alexander's victorious campaigns, since it was then that gold flowed into Greece in massive quantities.¹⁸¹ And it would have taken some time for the Greek *poleis* to become accustomed to this new coinage.

If we look for a period in which the Argives and a group of Arkadians were at odds, we come up with two possibilities. One suggestion is Agis III's war in 330 when all Arkadians except Megalopolis had fought on the side of the Spartans while the Argives did not participate in the war (Strasser 2007, 345). This does not necessarily make the Arkadians enemies of Argos but the hypothesis remains reasonable. Another possible context is the clash between Polyperchon and Kassandros in the Peloponnese. Piérart (1982, 136–8) argues that Argive relations with the Arkadians would have deteriorated when the Argives were captured by Kassandros in 316 and found themselves willy-nilly on his side whereas the Arkadians, with the exception of Megalopolis, sided with Polyperchon. In this context, the *Koinon* and the Stymphalians might have violated either the sanctuary or the *ekecheiria* for the Nemeia of 315. The fines might even have been imposed at the behest of Kassandros. The theory is attractive and I would add that in 316 the external backing for Argos, i.e. Kassandros' troops, was immediately at hand whereas in the 330s the Macedonian forces were too far away. Furthermore, Kassandros showed his interest in Argos and in the Nemean Games by presiding over them (Diod. Sic. 19.64.1).

Nevertheless, as Piérart himself admits there may have been other reasons for the hostility between certain Arkadians and the Argives. And in the end, a new inscription may come to light and cancel all arguments, as happened with the case of Kleonai's incorporation into Argos.

Given the present state of the evidence, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions on the date of the fines. But we can see the Nemean Games providing the cause for a rupture in the relations of Argos with certain Arkadians. We can also see the Argives firmly asserting themselves as organizers of the Nemeia.

Contrary to the hostility projected in the list of fines, we get a positive aspect of Argive relations with certain Arkadian *poleis*, as well as with other *poleis* from the Peloponnese, when we turn to the Argive decrees honouring citizens of Peloponnesian *poleis*. Unfortunately, not only are these decrees fragmentary but, with the sole exception of that for the Pallantieis, they actually say next to nothing about the background that led to the attribution of honours.¹⁸²

The inscriptions concerning Pallantion allow us to see the Argives assuming the role of protectors of a small Arkadian *polis*,¹⁸³ the Pallantieis seeking permanence in their friendly relations with the Argives and the latter responding positively to this request. More specifically, the copy from Pallantion records two decrees, by the same two proposers (Thiokritos and Nikodamos).¹⁸⁴

The Pallantieis had sent seven envoys to ask for a renewal of friendship with the Argives; the latter accepted and also resolved to record on stone that they had intervened with Polyperchon to release citizens of Pallantion who had been taken prisoner by Menemachos (presumably an official of Polyperchon; ll. 4–24). In the second decree the Argives record their decision to award the envoys *proxenia* and *theōrodokia* for the Nemeia and the Heraia (ll. 27–40).

Presumably, troops from Pallantion had fought on the side of Kassandros, perhaps following the lead of Megalopolis, perhaps acting independently. In any case, as Bielman comments (1994, 52), the release of captives following the intervention of a foreign *polis* is a unique phenomenon. That the Pallantieis resorted to a third party testifies to their fear of Polyperchon. On the other hand, the fact that they did not turn to their neighbours, the Tegeans, who had also sided with Polyperchon (Diod. Sic. 19.35.1) shows that they were perfectly capable of taking advantage of the advertised favourable disposition of Polyperchon towards Argos (see pp.90–1). Presumably, the Tegeans were not very attractive as mediators either because they were not as important as the Argives or because they were not on such good terms with Megalopolis and its followers as

Pallantion perhaps was. Both considerations could operate together but the former seems to carry more weight.¹⁸⁵

The Argive intervention dates to 318–316,¹⁸⁶ when Argos was on the side of Polyperchon, responding most favourably to his declaration of intent to restore the *poleis'* regimes as they had been under Philip II (Diod. Sic. 18.55.2, 56, 57.1, 69.3), and before Argos succumbed to Kassandros (Diod. Sic. 18.54.3–4). When the *stēlē* was actually set up is another matter.

The request for renewal of friendship indicates that a certain amount of time had elapsed after the services offered by Argos. It also suggests a change in the circumstances of Argos, i.e. that at the time of the request Argos was no longer on Polyperchon's side or that Polyperchon was now of secondary importance and the Pallantieis wished to confirm Argive good will. Thus, the period 318–316 should probably be excluded for the requested renewal of friendship.¹⁸⁷ This leaves us with two options: the period of Kassandros' rule between 315 and 303 or more narrowly between 309/8 and 303, when Kassandros and Polyperchon were allied, and the period after 303 when Argos was liberated by Demetrios Poliorketes (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1), which seems to be the most plausible context. The period of Poliorketes' rule is favoured by Guarducci (1941–43 [1948], 149–50). Her view is endorsed by Charneux (1991, 306–9, esp. 308, no.IV).¹⁸⁸ Indeed, it would not have been very wise on the part of the Argives to erect a constant reminder of their opposition to Kassandros, while he was in control of Argos. Such a public reminder of war against Kassandros fits much better the period of Demetrios Poliorketes who dissolved the former's control over the Peloponnese. If the *stēlē* was indeed set up during Poliorketes' rule, it would mean that the Argives sought to assert their role of protector and mediator, anew, under the new regime.

The Argive honorific decrees for Theainetos and Diatages of Mantinea (both otherwise unknown) fit into a pattern of friendly relations between the two states prior to the destruction of Mantinea in 223.¹⁸⁹ To these decrees we can add the arbitration (?) carried out by a Mantinean court between Argos and the Achaian Confederacy in 240. Aristippos II, tyrant of Argos, brought charges before a Mantinean court against the Achaian Confederacy and Aratos in particular for his expedition against Argos, in an attempt to force the city into the Confederacy (Plut. *Arat.* 25.5–6). The Mantinean court imposed a fine of 30 *mnai* (= half a talent) on the Confederacy – it was practically nominal but still the decision declared Aristippos and Argos to be in the right, the Confederacy and Aratos to be in the wrong (see pp.173–4). It was a matter of sovereignty for the Confederacy not to pay the fine.

The Megalopolitan [Ar]etakes was not appointed *theōrodokos*, perhaps because there was already one in Megalopolis. He could be the son or a

descendant of Aretis who had been one of Alexander's pages (Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.6).¹⁹⁰ However, the decree can be added to the evidence for cordial Argive-Megalopolitan relations as evidenced by the co-operation of the former tyrants, Aristomachos II of Argos and Lydiadas of Megalopolis, after they had enrolled their *poleis* into the Achaian Confederacy, as well as by Argive participation in the Arkadian/Megalopolitan Lykaia.

Argive-Arkadian relations via the Lykaia festival

Table 14: Peloponnesian *Lykaionikai*, late 4th century¹⁹¹

Origin	Victor	Text
Elis Argos Arkadia	Dameas, ¹⁹² ll. 3–4 Andromachos, ll.18–19 Philonikos, ll.7–8 Lysilochos, ll. 13–15 Aristomenes, ll.16–17 Agesistratos, ll.17–18 Eupolemos, ll.4–5 Chionidas, ll.6–7 Theoteles, ll.8–9 Nikias, ll.11–12 Aristippos, ll.12–13 Deinon, ll. 15–16 Pantichos, ll.19–20	<i>IG</i> V.2.549; * <i>Syll.</i> ³ 314.I, in the year of Eukampidas = 320? ¹⁹³
Argos Sparta Arkadia	Aristodamos, ll.26–7 Archedamos, l.27 Androbios, ll.28–9 Seleidas, ll.31–2 Pasikles, l.36 Aristippos, ll.24–5 Deinias, ll.25–6 Aisagenes, ll.30–1 Diyllos, ll.32–3 Dieuxes, ll.33–4 Euanor, ll.34–5 Amphainetos, ll.35	<i>Syll.</i> ³ 314.II, in the year of Archias, priest of Pan = 316?
Argos? ¹⁹⁴ Arkadia	?, ll.41–2 Pistagoras, ll.39–40	<i>Syll.</i> ³ 314.III, in the year of Xenostratos, priest of Zeus = 312?
Elis Argos	Damolytos, ¹⁹⁵ ll.9–10 Onomantos, ll.10–11 Ageus, ¹⁹⁶ l. 13	<i>IG</i> V.2.550; * <i>Syll.</i> ³ 314.V, in the year of Agesistratos, priest of Pan = 308?
Argos	Philistidas, l.19 Aristonymos, l.25 Aristodamos, l.23	<i>Syll.</i> ³ 314.VI, in the year of Aethlios = 304?

Arkadia	Tellias, l.16 Alexibios, l.18 Theoteles, l.21 Theogeiton, l. 22 Timodoros, l. 24 Thearidas, l. 28	
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Of the above-mentioned *Lykaionikai*, Ageus, Seleidas (or Seleadas) and Alexibios were also *Olympionikai*;¹⁹⁷ Andromachos was the brother of the Olympic victor Satyros.¹⁹⁸

In addition to the evidence listed on Table 14, we have:

a) from the mid-late 4th century, two or three more Argives: Kleainetos and Prateas and perhaps another recorded in an inscription from Hermione;¹⁹⁹

b) in the 3rd century: Kallistratos of Sikyon won three victories;

c) in the late 3rd century: Damatrios of Tegea – a *periodonikēs*, who achieved 4 victories in the Lykaia, and an unidentified Argive *periodonikēs* who was 4 times victorious in three Lykaia festivals.

The Megalopolitans, not having the privilege of hosting Panhellenic games, concentrated on the local festival of the Lykaia in honour of Zeus, celebrated every four years, possibly in April (Jost 1985, 268). Mt. Lykaion, in the Parrhasia, had become part of Megalopolis and thus the Lykaia festival passed under its control. In fact, most of the edifices in the sanctuary might date to the late 4th century.²⁰⁰ The lists of *Lykaionikai*, dating from the same period, show that the festival was primarily an ‘Arkadian affair’ – 28 victors – and, secondarily, an ‘Argive affair’ but it also attracted participants from places as remote as Macedon, Syracuse, Rhodes, Miletos and Egypt.²⁰¹

Among the Peloponnesians (apart from Arkadians), these lists record only Argives, Eleans and Lakedaimonians. Argive presence is the most impressive, covering all five Lykaia festivals, with 10–11 victories. Elean participation is very modest with only 3 victors. The victories of the Lakedaimonians Androbios, Pasikles and Seleidas are rather unexpected given the hostile relations between Sparta and Megalopolis (*Syll.*³ 314.III, ll. 28–9, 36). Are we entitled to think that certain members of the Spartan elite did not harbour hard feelings against Megalopolis and vice-versa?

The other notable feature of these lists is that the ethnic ‘Arkas’ is employed instead of city-ethnics; Megalopolitan origin is nowhere recorded. The employment of the ethnic sharply distinguishes the Arkadians from the foreigners, and the absence of city-ethnics has no parallel, inside or outside of Arkadia.²⁰² With only a couple of exceptions

we have no clue as to the origins of these Arkadians but it is not imperative that the same Arkadians participated in each festival. Alexibios could very well be the *Olympionikēs* from Heraia (*Syll.*³ 314.VI, l. 18; Moretti 1955, 188). The name 'Thearidas' (*Syll.*³ 314 VI, l. 28) does sound very Megalopolitan; he could very well be an ancestor of Polybios. Were the victors mostly Megalopolitans projecting their Arkadian identity? Were the Megalopolitans as well as citizens of other Arkadian *poleis*, perhaps within the Megalopolitan sphere of influence, stressing their Arkadian identity and advertising that Arkadian unity had been achieved or rather re-established?²⁰³ Or was the pool of Arkadians wider, irrespective of political affiliations? Jost (1985, 268) emphasizes that Zeus Lykaïos had a pan-Arkadian, pan-Hellenic function, reuniting and pacifying. Stavrianopoulou (2002, 134) plausibly suggests that the Arkadians may have formed a religious association. And if so, could we perhaps identify it with the Arkadian *Koinon* mentioned in *IG* IV 616?

Did the place of origin of the participants vary from one festival to the next? Our own hypothesis is that the Lykaia would have exercised a unifying effect on the Arkadians, but nevertheless certain Arkadians might have refrained from participating if at the time they were at serious odds with the Megalopolitans.

As they stand, the lists of *Lykaionikai* show that the festival of Lykaia provided a platform of unification for the Arkadians at a time when the Megalopolitans were standing apart politically, following a pro-Kassandros policy – in the last two decades of the 4th century. Until 330 the Megalopolitans had followed a separate political path but in the Lamian War all the Arkadians had refrained from involvement. Thus, it seems possible that, at least in 320, there was no major political difference preventing Arkadian *poleis* from participating in a pan-Arkadian festival organized in Megalopolitan territory. In 316 the Megalopolitans were the only (steadfast) followers of Kassandros, who had not yet won the day in the Peloponnese,²⁰⁴ while the other Arkadians had thrown in their lot with Polyperchon. Nevertheless, we do find Arkadian victors at the Lykaia of 316. We do not have any clue as to their *polis* of origin. Would the Tegeans or the Mantineans take part in a festival organized by a *polis* of the opposite camp? It is possible that common, pan-Arkadian cult outweighed political differences – but the opposite also is plausible. After 315, when Kassandros had reduced Polyperchon to insignificance, more Arkadian *poleis* could have been represented, willingly or not so willingly, possibly even at the behest of Kassandros. The last list of 304 most interestingly reports the victory of Boubalos from Kassandreia (*Syll.*³ 314 IV, l. 29), i.e. the *polis* founded by Kassandros after his *de facto* ascent to the Macedonian

throne. It is possible that Kassandros encouraged this participation, i.e. he had given his ‘blessing’ and encouragement to the festival.²⁰⁵

Intra-Peloponnesian relations of Arkadian *poleis*

Table 15: Arkadian *poleis* awarding honours
(in alphabetical order)

Giver	Origin / Honorand	Honours	Date	Text
1 Antigoneia/ Mantineia	Argos: Aphrodisios (+ descendants)	<i>Epainos</i> ; <i>proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> ; [as] <i>phaleia</i> and <i>asylia</i> in peace and war; all privileges accorded to other <i>proxenoi</i> . ²⁰⁶	after 222/1	<i>IG</i> V.2.263; <i>IPArk</i> 36h = ll. 19–24.
2 Kaphyai	Megalopolis: Lydiadas, son of Eudamos	Statue	2nd half of the 3 rd ; 228–26?	<i>IG</i> V.2.534; <i>Syll</i> . ³ 504.
3 Kleitor ²⁰⁷	Patrai: 2, ll. 60–1. Pellene: 21, ll. 91–113. Heraia: 2, ll. 143–5. Mantineia: 6, ll. 75–6 (1) + ll. 115–19 (5). ²⁰⁸ Antigoneia: 1, l. 169. Tegea: 8?, ll. 1–4 (4?) + ll. 71–4 (4). Messene: c.12, ll. 46–9 (3?) + ll. 83–91 (9). Elis: 6, ll. 55–8 (4) + ll. 136–7 (2). Phleious? 3?, ll. 138–42. Sikyon: 1, l. 170.	<i>Proxenoi</i>	2nd half of the 3 rd 209	<i>IG</i> V.2.368 + <i>add.</i> p.146; Rizakis 1995, no.682 (the Achaian <i>proxenoi</i>).

4 Lousoi	Kyparissia: Phillias, Erimanthos (+ descendants) ²¹⁰	<i>Proxenoí</i> and <i>energetai</i> ; <i>Theōrodokoi</i> .	Late 4 th – early 3 rd	<i>IG</i> V.2.390; *Perlman 2000, 241–2, L 3.
5 Lousoi	Pharai (Achaia): Andro[—] (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> ; <i>Theōrodokos</i> .	Late 4 th – mid-3 rd	<i>IG</i> V.2.392; *Perlman 2000, 242, L 4.
6 Lykosoura	Messene: Damophon	<i>proxenia</i> and <i>asylia</i> (+ descendants); crown; bronze statue in the sanctuary of Despoina; <i>energetēs</i> of the <i>polis</i> and the sanctuary; proclamation of the honours at the Nemeia, the Lykaia and the Messenian Ithomaia.	Late 3 rd – early 2 nd , before 190 ²¹¹	Themelis 1988 [1991], 79 = <i>SEG</i> 41.332; Themelis 1993, 102–3.
7 Orchomenos	Argos: Pannis (+descendants)	<i>proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> ; <i>asylia</i> in peace and war (+ for his property).	3 rd	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 467–8, no.10; Dubois 1988, II, 173–5; <i>IPArk</i> 36 l = ll. 3–7.
8 Orchomenos	Pellene: Neokles (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i>	3 rd , before 241? ²¹²	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 464–6, no.8; Dubois 1988, II, 171–2; Rizakis 1995, no. 647.
9 Orchomenos	Sparta: king Areus I	Statue	265	Plassart and Blum 1914, 447–9;

				<i>ISE</i> 54; Dubois 1988, II, 163–4.
10 Orchomenos	Alea: Agesima[ch]os	<i>proxenos</i> and <i>euergētēs</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ; <i>empasis</i> ; <i>asylia</i> and <i>epinomia</i> in war and peace – ‘as with the citizens’.	3 rd , after 234? ²¹³	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 466–7, no.9; *Dubois 1988 II, 172–3; <i>IPArk</i> 36k = ll. 3–8 (= Plassart and Blum).
11 Orchomenos	Arkadia: ²¹⁴ Lykiskos	<i>Euergetēs</i> ; <i>inpasis</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ; all the privileges accorded to <i>euergetai</i> .	3 rd	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 461, no.5.
12 Orchomenos	Kaphyai: Tyteas (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>euergētēs</i> ; <i>empasis</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ; <i>asylia</i> ; <i>epinomia</i> in peace and war; all privileges accorded to <i>proxenoi</i> .	3 rd	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 462–3, no.6; *Dubois 1988, II, 169–70; <i>IPArk</i> 36i = ll. 4–14 (= Plassart and Blum).
13 Orchomenos	Kaphyai: Kleophaes (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>euergētēs</i> ; all the privileges accorded to <i>proxenoi</i> .	3 rd	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 459–61, no.4; *Dubois 1988, II, 166–7.
14 Orchomenos	Lousoi: [Th]eoxis	<i>Theōrodokos</i> , ²¹⁵ <i>proxenos</i> .	c. 200	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 457–9, no.3; *Dubois 1988, II, 176–7.

15 Orchomenos	Megalopolis: Ainesan[dros? idas?] + descendants	[<i>proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i>]; <i>empasis</i> ; [<i>ateleia</i> ?]; <i>epino[mi]a</i> , <i>epiksy[lia]</i> , <i>asylia</i> ? in war and peace].	3 rd , after 235?	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 463–4, no.7; Dubois 1988, II, 170–1; <i>IPArk</i> 36j = ll. 2–8.
16 Orchomenos	Tegea: Larchippos	<i>proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> (+descendants); <i>inpasis</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> and <i>asylia</i> in war and peace.	3 rd	ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 468–71, no. 11; Dubois 1988, II, 175–6; <i>IPArk</i> 36m = ll. 8–17.
17 Psophis	Elis: Lamos and a son of Aristarchos	<i>Proxenoī</i> already; Statue.	240s– before 218? ²¹⁶	Paus. 6.16.7
18 Stymphalos	Megalopolis? ?	<i>Politēs</i> (+ descendants); crown of 1,000 drs.	331/0?	<i>IG</i> V.2.351; Latterman and Hiller von Gaertringen 1915, 87 (ll.1–10); Taeuber 1981, 190–1, ll. 6–9; *Dubois 1988, II, 191–3 (ll.1–12); Bielman 1994, no.64.
19 Stymphalos	Tegea: Kallias (+ descendants)	<i>proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> ; <i>asphaleia</i> and <i>asylia</i> in peace and war; all the other privileges accorded to <i>proxenoī</i> and <i>energetai</i> .	Late 4 th ? 3 rd ?	<i>IG</i> V.2.356; <i>IPArk</i> 36o = ll. 2–5.

20 Stymphalos	Lousoi, <i>polis</i>	<i>isopoliteia</i> ? ²¹⁷ (bilateral)	300–250	<i>IG</i> V.2.358; <i>SV</i> A III, 560.
21 Tegea	Orchomenos: Nikeas	<i>proxenos</i> (+ descendants) [<i>asylia</i>]; <i>ateleia</i> in peace and war.	Late 4 th	Mitsos 1936 [1937], 136–9, no.1 = <i>SEG</i> 11.1051; <i>IPArk</i> 36a = ll. 4–8.
22 Tegea	Argos: Aristomachos II	Panoply; <i>Isopoliteia</i> .	After 225	<i>IG</i> V.2.9; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 510; Dubois 1988, II, 84.
23 Tegea	Megalopolis: Timokles	citizenship ?	200–150?	<i>IG</i> V.2.19.
24 Tegea	Megalopolis: Philopoimen	Statue (epigram)	After 182 (posthu- mous)	Paus. 8.52.6.
25 Thisoa	Thelphousa: Thymon (+ descendants)	<i>proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i> ; <i>epinomia</i> ; all the privileges accorded to <i>proxenoi</i> and <i>energetai</i> .	Late 3 rd – early 2 nd	<i>IG</i> V.2.511.

Pretty much like Argos, Arkadian *poleis* produce inscriptions largely in the 3rd century. At most 5 out of 21 Arkadian decrees can be dated to the 2nd century (Table 15, nos. 1, 6, 14, 23, 25). In addition, there are three statue bases (nos. 2, 9 and 24, from Kaphyai, Orchomenos and Tegea respectively) and a long list of *proxenoi* from Kleitor (no.3).

Arkadian *poleis* present us with notable variations in their epigraphic mood and accordingly in the image of intra-Peloponnesian relations they project. First of all, a sense of solidarity among certain Arkadians is certainly evident. As Nielsen (2002, 503) has crucially observed, Arkadians tended to honour primarily citizens of large *poleis* but there was also a tendency to honour citizens of minor neighbouring *poleis* with whom the Arkadians probably had economic relations – as we shall below it is largely

Orchomenian decrees that afford evidence of economic relations. The award of proxenies (or perhaps their recording?) is a major development when we take into account that no proxenies between Arkadian communities are attested prior to 368.²¹⁸

With the exception of two cases from Argos and one from Elis,²¹⁹ Arkadian *poleis* appear to be the only Peloponnesian *poleis* offering citizenship to Peloponnesians; and this largely to fellow Arkadians. More specifically, there is the probable case of a bilateral grant of *politeia* (*isopoliteia*) exchanged between Lousoi and Stymphalos in the first half of the 3rd century (Table 15, no.20). Furthermore, Stymphalos rewarded a Megalopolitan (?) with *politeia*, at a disputed date (Table 15, no.18). Tegea granted *isopoliteia* to Aristomachos (II) of Argos (Table 15, no.22) and perhaps to the Megalopolitan Timokles as well (Table 15, no.23).²²⁰ In either the 3rd or the 2nd century Thisoa awarded *politeia* to a citizen of an unknown state but the fact that the decree records the right of *epiksyllia* (= to cut wood) suggests that he might have come from a neighbouring community (*IG* V.2.510; *IPArk* 36r = ll. 1–7; not included in Table 15).

Six Peloponnesians are on record as having been awarded a statue by an Arkadian *polis*: two otherwise unknown but probably eminent Eleans (Lamos and a son of a certain Aristarchos) by the Psophidians, Lydiadas of Megalopolis by Kaphyai, the Messenian sculptor Damophon by the Arkadian Lykosoura, king Areus of Sparta by Orchomenos, and Philopoimen by Tegea (Table 15, nos. 17, 2, 6, 9 and 24 respectively). Furthermore, Polybios (36.13.1) refers vaguely to statues, in the plural, for the Megalopolitan Lykortas (as for Kallikrates of Leontion), and we can legitimately suggest that Arkadian *poleis* must have bestowed honours upon him.

The honours for the Eleans by the Psophidians cannot be dated securely but they probably antedate 218, when Psophis was captured by Philip V and was offered to the Achaian Confederacy (see pp.295–6).²²¹ They can fit nicely in the period that Elis and Psophis were allied, between the 240s and 218 (see p.294). For Lydiadas, Areus and Philopoimen we have only the dedicatory inscriptions but Lykosoura provides us with one of the most detailed Peloponnesian honorific decrees, that for Damophon, dating to the early 2nd century.²²²

Being a widely famous sculptor, Damophon was also a very wealthy member of the Messenian elite, and this is how he was in a position to become a benefactor of Lykosoura. Lykosoura had commissioned a complex of colossal cult statues of Despoina/Kore, Demeter, Artemis and the Titan Anytos.²²³ Following the requests of the Council, of the priest of Despoina and of the citizens, Damophon agreed to postpone the collection

of a substantial debt of 3,846 silver tetradrachms and subtract the sum of 50 minas he had paid for the salaries of workmen; finally, he promised – and fulfilled his promise – to construct a statue of Artemis *Hēgemonē* (ll. 8–21).²²⁴ In return, he and his sons were awarded *proxenia* and *asylia*. He was awarded a crown, a bronze statue, a public eulogy and a proclamation of the honours at the Nemeia, the Lykaia and the Ithomaia of Messene.²²⁵ The fact that the honours were intended to be proclaimed at all these festivals shows not only Damophon's fame but also the friendly relations enjoyed by Lykosoura with the Argives and the Megalopolitans.

From **Kleitōr**, there has survived a long list of *proxenoi* recording an astonishing number of such individuals (Table 15, no.3). The very fact of the recording of this list shows that Kleitōr wished to emphasize its central place in a very dense network of liaisons.²²⁶ Kleitōr appears to maintain bonds with Achaian *poleis* – Patrai and Pellene. A notable feature of this list is the dense web of liaisons with Pellene: no less than 21 citizens of Pellene were *proxenoi* of Kleitōr. On the other hand, there is no trace of a *proxenos* of Kleitōr among its *immediate* Arkadian neighbours, such as Stymphalos, Pheneos, Lousoi or Thelphousa. This may very well be an indication that Kleitōr was not on the best of terms with its neighbours. Kleitōr, which had an exceptionally large territory, had been expanding steadily, through an unknown process, reaching the river Ladon to the south by 219 (Map 2; Polyb. 4.70.2).²²⁷ In other words, Kleitōr could very well have represented a threat to its immediate Arkadian neighbours. Among the more remote Arkadians, we find a considerable number of Tegean and Mantinean *proxenoi* but no Orchomenians or Megalopolitans. Would it be too much to suggest that relations between Kleitōr and Orchomenos had not improved much since the early 4th century (see pp.13–14)? And furthermore, that Kleitōr, as it expanded, was getting alarmingly near the territory of Megalopolis?

Megalopolis, which was a major player on the political scene, through its leading politicians in the late 3rd–early 2nd centuries, does not figure in the honorific record as a giver of honours to any other than its own citizens – the only exception, significantly, being a statue for Philip II of Macedon.²²⁸ On the other hand, honours for Megalopolitans from Peloponnesian *poleis* consist of probably 5 honorific decrees and 4 statues. The decrees come from Argos, Orchomenos, Stymphalos (?), Tegea and Messene (Table 13, no.8; Table 15, nos. 15, 18, 23; Table 16, no.16); the statues come from Kaphyai, Tegea, Epidauros and Sparta (Table 15, nos. 2, 24; Table 16, nos. 8, 12); one more statue comes from Lakedaimonian exiles (Table 16, no.13).²²⁹ Four of the Megalopolitan honorands were leading politicians of the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries: Lydiadas, Lykortas (honoured by two

poleis), Philopoimen and Thearidas. And this at a time when all parties involved were members of the Achaian Confederacy. To a certain extent, the picture in the best part of the 3rd century appears to conform with Megalopolis' earlier political isolation in the Peloponnese as demonstrated from literary sources. It is also rather curious that Megalopolis does not appear to take the initiative in cultivating relations with other Peloponnesian *poleis*, perhaps all the more curious after its joining the Achaian Confederacy.

Mantineia is also absent as a giver while two Mantinean citizens receive honours from Argos and six are recorded as *proxenoi* of Kleitor. Its destruction in 223 could very well account at least partly for this absence. After 223 and the change of the *polis*' name to Antigoneia (Plut. *Arat.* 45.6), the Antigoneis honoured an Argive citizen – Aphrodisios – and Antigonos III Doson. The decree for Aphrodisios (Table 15, no.1) is detailed, compared to most Peloponnesian decrees. We are not informed about the man's services but it is reported that Aphrodisios himself took the initiative and asked to be appointed *proxenos* of Antigoneia/Mantineia in Argos (ll. 1–5). There is no clue as to whether this move on Aphrodisios' part was encouraged by the Argive authorities but it does emerge that Mantineia, even as Antigoneia, retained its bonds with Argos. Furthermore, the very fact that Aphrodisios asked for honours shows that the practice and a certain procedure had been established in Antigoneia/Mantineia.

Tegea was more prolific than Mantineia when it came to honouring citizens of Peloponnesian *poleis*. Three Tegean decrees for Peloponnesians have survived – an Orchomenian, an Argive and a Megalopolitan (Table 15, nos. 21, 22, 23). On the other hand, Tegean citizens received honours from Argos (Table 13, no.11), Orchomenos, Stymphalos and Kleitor (Table 15, nos. 16, 19 and 3 respectively). The honours to and from Orchomenos, in particular, are ascribed to the context of steady amicable relations between the two *poleis*.

Having passed to the Spartan zone of influence after 229, the Tegeans chose to honour Aristomachos II of Argos, probably sometime after 225²³⁰ i.e. after the alliance between Argos and Sparta (Plut. *Kleom.* 18.1). The honours themselves are very interesting: a panoply and *isopoliteia*. The panoply was most probably intended to be dedicated by Aristomachos.²³¹ Its award signifies recognition or rather advertisement of his military prowess. By honouring Aristomachos II, the second most powerful man after Kleomenes III in the anti-Achaian front, the Tegeans obviously attempted to strengthen their position during a most critical period of the Kleomenic War.

The Tegean honorific decree for the Megalopolitan Timokles (Table 15,

no. 23) and above all the statue and the epigram for Philopoimen (Table 15, no. 24) can be seen to mark an important change in Tegean policy after the end of the Kleomenic War, from pro-Spartan to pro-Megalopolitan and anti-Spartan. All we know about the post-Kleomenes political history of Tegea is that it was attacked by the Spartan ruler Lykourgos in the Social War (Polyb. 5.17.1–2) and was briefly occupied by the Spartan Machanidas in the First Macedonian War (Polyb. 11.11.2, 18.8). A Tegean honorific decree (*IG* V.2.16 / *Syll.*³ 533) for the Tegean citizens Theokritos and Amphalkes probably alludes to the attack by the Spartan ruler Lykourgos and its repulse (Polyb. 5.17.1–2).²³² The two honorands are praised for fighting bravely for the freedom of the city (ll.3–4). The epigram for Philopoimen refers to two trophies from his victories over Spartan tyrants (τρόπαια τετυγμένα διςσὰ τυράννων Σπάρτας), presumably Machanidas and Nabis, and declares that Philopoimen procured ‘blameless freedom’ (ἀμωμήτου κράντορ’ ἐλευθερίας; Paus. 8.52.6).²³³

Apart from the long list of *proxenoi* from Kleitor, out of all the Arkadian *poleis* it is **Orchomenos** that figures most prominently as giver of honours to citizens of Peloponnesian *poleis* in the 3rd century (Plassart and Blum 1914, 458–9): it provides us with nine decrees plus one statue (for Areus I of Sparta). Seven of the beneficiaries are Arkadians (Osborne 1987, 119–21). Furthermore, Orchomenos is the only *polis* along with Argos that grants the right to acquire land and a house. On the basis of the surviving evidence, it appears that the emergence of the epigraphic ‘mood’ of Orchomenos in the 3rd century is associated with Spartan resurgence. The earliest attested grant of *proxenia* by Orchomenos (Nielsen 2004a, 524) belongs precisely to the preliminary stages of the Chremonidean War and it concerns three Athenian envoys who had been sent to the Peloponnese either to persuade the Peloponnesians to join the Athenian–Spartan alliance or to arrange details of their participation in the war.²³⁴ The statue for the Spartan king Areus also belongs to this context and – it has to be repeated – is part of the long history of amicable relations between Orchomenos and Sparta.

Inscriptions show us that the Arkadian allies of Sparta developed bonds between themselves as well, before or after the Chremonidean War. As mentioned, Orchomenos appears to have forged bonds with Tegea and Kaphyai, allies of Sparta in the Chremonidean War, by awarding proxenies. The relevant Orchomenian decrees could date either before or after the war but the picture remains. The Tegean decree for the Orchomenian Nikeas (Table 15, no.21), dating to the late 4th century, indicates that at least Tegea and Orchomenos had forged or maintained bonds after the War of Agis III and before they allied with Sparta again.

As Plassart and Blum have suggested (1914, 464), given the rather

unfriendly relations between Orchomenos and Megalopolis, the honours for the Megalopolitan Ainesan[dros?] (Table 15, no.15) should date after 235, i.e. after both had become members of the Achaian Confederacy. Our evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions on the motives: was it a sincere rapprochement or did the Orchomenians seek a way to keep the Megalopolitans happy out of fear?

Orchomenian decrees testify to economic relations with other Arkadian communities. The grants of *epinomia* (= right of pasture) by Orchomenos to Agesima[ch]os of Alea and Tyteas of Kaphyai (Table 15, nos.10, 12), the *epinomia* and *epiksyilia* (= the right to cut wood) awarded to Ainesan[dros?] of Megalopolis (Table 15, no.15), as well as the *proxenia* and *epinomia* offered by Thisoa to a citizen of neighbouring Thelphousa, are the only such grants that we know of awarded by Arkadian *poleis* to Peloponnesians, in the period extending from the 330s to the mid-2nd century.²³⁵ It is possible that such may have been included in two more Orchomenian decrees (Table 15, nos. 11 and 13) where we read that there are awarded all the other privileges accorded to *energetai* and to *proxenoi* respectively. The right of pasture and the right to acquire land are offered along with *ateleia*. Incidentally, Tegea is the only other Arkadian *polis* that offers *ateleia* to an honorand (Table 15, no. 21). It does not come as a surprise that 5 out of 8 decrees recording grants of *asyilia* belong to Orchomenos. Furthermore, Orchomenos is the only Arkadian *polis* that explicitly bestows upon a Peloponnesian *proxenos* the right to acquire land (*inpasis* = *enkētēsis*; Table 15, nos. 10, 11, 12, 15, 16; possibly also no.13).²³⁶ Taken together, all these privileges seem to have a practical value, especially in the case of neighbours such as Kaphyai and Alea.²³⁷

Pausanias (8.13.1) records only one festival celebrated at Orchomenos (shared with Mantinea), in honour of Artemis Hymnia.²³⁸ The date of this cult is unknown but Pausanias states that once upon a time it was celebrated by all the Arkadians. This is probably the festival for which the Orchomenians appointed [Th]eoxis of Lousoi as *theōrodokos*. Thus, Orchomenos, Mantinea and Lousoi appear to come together through this festival.

The small *polis* of **Lousoi** (in northern Arkadia), hosting the Hemerasia, a festival in honour of Artemis Hemera, provides another example of a festival's importance as a means of establishing bonds, even though it was not included among the great Arkadian cults.²³⁹ The development of the sanctuary may have been due to the fact that it marked the frontier with Achaia and served the needs of various neighbouring communities (Voyatzis 1999, 136). Lousoi distributed a series of honorific decrees, now severely mutilated (*IG* V.2.387 recording three decrees; *IG* V.2.388–394, 396), in the late 4th and in the 3rd century,²⁴⁰ when the cult

was at its most prosperous.²⁴¹ Five of the honorands were appointed *theōrodokoi*. Of these, two were citizens of Peloponnesian *poleis*: Phillias and Erimanthos of Kyparissia in Messenia and Andr[—] of Pharai, a neighbour of Lousoi.

The mutual grant of *politeia* between **Stymphalos** and Lousoi was perhaps more in the interest of Lousoi which was a minor *polis*²⁴² compared to Stymphalos. Nielsen (2002, 501) argues that since between the two lay the territory of Pheneos we should not see in the proxeny grant a sign of Stymphalian ‘empire building’. That at least the Stymphalians took advantage of the grant is attested by the fact that a Stymphalios (Anthesilaos) is recorded among the magistrates of Lousoi (*IG* V.2.389, l. 16; Nielsen 2002, 461–2).

Six Stymphalian decrees have come down to us, which, though inscribed on a single *stēlē*, belong to different, uncertain, dates (*IG* V.2.351–356; Bielman 1994, 222–3 with notes). Two of these decrees concern us here, one for a Tegean and another one, extremely problematic, possibly but by no means certainly for a Megalopolitan (Table 15, nos. 19 and 18 respectively). According to Taeuber (1981, 191), the honours for the Tegean could belong to the 3rd century, since the letter forms appear to postdate letter-forms of the other decrees. It cannot be established whether this decree ante- or post-dates the admission of either Tegea or Megalopolis into the Achaian Confederacy.

At an uncertain date the Stymphalians honoured an unidentified person with citizenship and a crown worth 1,000 *drachmai*. Hiller thought that the honorand was Megalopolitan,²⁴³ but this is uncertain, as in fact is almost everything about this decree. Prisoners of war are perhaps mentioned (ll. 7–8: Φαλόντ | [ο]ις) but they are recorded in the dative, and therefore cannot be the object of the verb ἐλύσατο = ‘ransomed’ in l. 7 (Bielman 1994, 223). Which is the *polis* that ‘ransomed’ (in l. 7)? Bielman (1994, 223) observes that it could be either Stymphalos or Megalopolis. There are further questions. Which war is meant, what is the meaning of the accusative Μεγάλαμ πόλι[ν, who is crowned with a crown worth 300 *drachmai* and by whom?

I IOIE | [. κ]αὶ ἰν τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις γεγένη[τ] | [α]ι καὶ ἰν τοῖς
c. 13 |σι παργεγε | νημίνος εὐρέ[θη] ἀγαθὸς ἑών, καὶ πολίταν θ | ἔσθαι
αὐτόν | τε καὶ ἐγόνος καὶ σ]τεφανῶσαι | [χ]ιλίαις δαρχμαῖς, καὶ τοῖς
|ίοις τοῖ |ς ἐλύσατο ἁ πόλις, [|ιμ πολέ]μοι Φαλόντ | [ο]ις Μεγάλαμ πόλι[ν
στεφανῶσαι τριακοσ | αις (Dubois 1988, p. 191, ll. 2–9).²⁴⁴

Taeuber (1981, 189–91) dates the decree to the late 4th century, on the basis of the digamma and the stoichedon style, and sets it in the context of Agis

III's War in 331, after the siege of Megalopolis had been lifted by the Macedonian regent Antipatros.²⁴⁵ In his view, Megalopolis would have played a major role in the liberation of Stymphalian captives. This is plausible although there is no evidence for Stymphalian captives. If we accept that the Megalopolitans were thus involved, then another problem concerns the reason for which they would have intervened to release the Stymphalians who belonged to the enemy camp – Aischines (*Against Ktesiphon* 165) emphatically states that of the Arkadians only Megalopolis did not join Agis. One answer to this could be that the Megalopolitans, being at odds with the Arkadians, would have seen the release of the captives as an opportunity to establish friendly relations with their neighbour, assuming the role of its protector.²⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Μεγάλα πόλις could simply denote location, and the captives might have simply been captured near Megalopolis.

The remaining awards of honours

Table 16 (clockwise by region, starting from Korinthia-Sikyonia; within the regions *poleis* are listed alphabetically)

Korinthia-Sikyonia				
1 Corinth	Sikyon: Aratos	Statue	after 243	Paus. 6.12.5.
2 Corinth	Aigion: Nikadas	<i>epainos</i>	c.150? second half of the 2 nd ?	<i>Corinth</i> VIII.1.2, no.2; Rizakis 1995, no. 623.
Argolid				
3 Hermione	Asine: envoys	Praise; <i>xenia</i>	c. 200 ²⁴⁷	<i>IG</i> IV 679; * <i>Syll.</i> ³ 1051; Curty 1995, no.2.
4 Hermione	<u>Troizen</u> : Dionysos[...] <u>Argos</u> : Damokle[s] <u>Phleious</u> : [...] <i>asilas</i> , ²⁴⁸ Olym[pi]adas <u>Corinth</u> : Nikostratos <u>Pellene</u> : Pe[i]sias <u>Aigion</u> : [...c. 5...] <i>kos</i>	<i>Theōrodokei</i> (in a list)	225–200 ²⁴⁹	<i>IG</i> IV 727A; *Perlman 2000, 244, H 1.

	[...ca 6...]os <u>Dyme</u> : ? <u>Thelphousa</u> : Olymp[...]			
5 Hermione	<u>Messene</u> : Chairemon (+descendants); <u>Tegea</u> : Aristoxenos.	<i>Theōrodokoi</i> (in a list)	c. 200?	<i>IG</i> IV 727B; Perlman 2000, 245, H 2.
6 Mykenai (<i>kōmē</i>):	Lakedaimon: Damokleidas	<i>Energetēs</i> ; <i>proedria</i> of the Dionysia.	c. 200–195?	ed. pr. Boethius 1921–23, 408–9 = <i>SEG</i> 3.312; Piérart 1992, ll. 11–15 = <i>SEG</i> 42.283.
7 Mykenai (<i>kōmē</i>)	Gortys (Arkadian?): Protimos	<i>Energetēs</i> ; <i>proedria</i> of the Dionysia.	early 2 nd , after 195	<i>IG</i> IV 497; * <i>Syll.</i> ³ 594; ²⁵⁰ Bielman 1994, no.44 [<i>IG</i> IV 497]. ²⁵¹
8 Epidauros	Megalopolis: Thearidas	Statue	182	<i>IG</i> IV ² .1. 623.
9 Epidauros	Aigion: Habrosynas	Statue	mid–2 nd	<i>IG</i> IV ² .1. 628; Rizakis 1995, no.622.
10 Epidauros	Argos: Philokles	Statue	2 nd	<i>IG</i> IV ² .1. 627.
11 Troizen	Sikyon: Aratos	Statue	after 243	<i>IG</i> IV 788; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 469.
Lakonia 12 Sparta ²⁵²	Megalopolis: Lykortas	Statue	182	<i>IG</i> IV ² .1.624; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 626.
13 Spartan exiles	Leontion: Kallikrates	Statue	179	<i>IvO</i> 300; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 634; Rizakis 1995, no. 626. ²⁵³
Messenia 14 Asine	Argos: Aristomachos II, Apia	Statues	c. 229–225	<i>IG</i> IV ² .1.621; <i>ISE</i> 45; <i>LAEpid</i> 268 = l.1.
15 Gerenia	Messene: Damophon	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i>	late 3 rd – early 2 nd , before 190	unpublished; Themelis 1988 [1991], 79.

16 Messene	Megalopolis: Satyros (+ descendants)	<i>Proxenos</i> and <i>energetēs</i>	late 4th	ed. pr. Themelis 2005 [2007], 50–1 = <i>SEG</i> 55.509.
17 Messene	Sparta: Damostratos	<i>Stēlē</i> with epigram	272–210 ²⁵⁴	Themelis 1997 [1999], 108–12; text by Matthaïou = <i>SEG</i> 47.390.
18 Messene	Phigaleia	<i>Isopoliteia</i> ; <i>epigamia</i> .	c.240	<i>IG</i> V.2.419 * <i>Syll.</i> ³ 472 <i>SV</i> A III, 495 <i>IP</i> Ark 28
Elis 19 Elis	Sparta: King Areus	Statue	260s	Paus. 6.12.5, 15.9.
20 Elis	Corinth, 13 Judges: Nikokles ? Nikatas Polyxenos ? ? Archemachidas Mnaseas ? Timosthenes Dikaiarchos ? Archemachos	[<i>epainos</i> and golden crown for the Corinthian <i>dēmos</i>]; <i>epainos</i> for the judges; <i>proxenoi</i> ; <i>energetai</i> ; <i>politeia</i> ; <i>ateleia</i> ; <i>asphaleia</i> [in war and peace]; all the other privileges accorded to <i>proxenoi</i> ; invitation to [<i>koi</i>] <i>nan hestian</i> ; [<i>xenia</i>]	after 191?	ed. pr. Robertson 1976 253–7 = <i>SEG</i> 26.392.
21 Elis	Messene: Damophon	Statue ?	c.183	Paus. 4.31.6–7.
Achaia 22 Pellene	Elis: Agathinos	Statue	Late 3 rd ? ²⁵⁵	Paus. 6.13.11.
Achaian Confederacy 23	Patrai: Chilon ²⁵⁶	Statue	330s or later (posthumously)	Paus. 6.4.6–7

24	Elis: Pantarkes	Statue	after 217? ²⁵⁷	Paus. 6.15.2. ²⁵⁸
25	Dyme: Aristainos ²⁵⁹	Statue	early 2 nd , after 196	<i>FD</i> III.3.122; Rizakis 1995, no.630. ²⁶⁰
26	Megalopolis: Philopoimen	Statue	182 (posthumously)	<i>FD</i> III.1.47; <i>Syll.</i> ³ 625; Plut. <i>Pbil.</i> 2.1, 10.8. ²⁶¹

As is clear from Table 16, the honorific record from *poleis* other than Argos and the Arkadian ones is poor: excluding the Epidaurian lists of *proxenoi* and *theōrodokoi*, we count 8 decrees, 15 statues and 1 *stēlē*, plus 2 lists of *theōrodokoi* from Hermione; on the Elean honours for Damophon (Table 16, no.21) we only have a vague piece of information by Pausanias (4.31.7: καὶ οἱ δεδομένοι τιμαὶ παρὰ Ἑλείων εἰσὶ) but it is probable that he was honoured with a statue (Auberger 2005, 213). The other notable feature of this record is that the statues by far outnumber the honorific decrees (always excluding the Epidaurian lists). To the table above we must add the information provided by Polybius (36.13.1–2; Walbank 1979, 672) on multiple statues for Kallikrates and Lykortas. Polybius does not record, however, where these statues had been erected, e.g. whether in their own *poleis* or in other *poleis* of the Achaian Confederacy. In any case, the record of Peloponnesian *poleis* other than Argos and the Arkadian ones shows a marked preference for statues over lesser honours.

Out of the 15 statues, 8 involve leading individuals of the Achaian Confederacy: 1 from Corinth for Aratos, 1 from Epidauros for Thearidas, 1 from Troizen for Aratos, 1 from Sparta for Lykortas, 1 from Lakedaemonian exiles for Kallikrates, 1 from Asine for Aristomachos of Argos and 2 from the Achaian Confederacy itself – for Aristainos and Philopoimen (Table 16, nos.1, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26). The Elean decree for judges probably had to do with delineation of boundaries after the incorporation of Elis into the Achaian Confederacy. Thus, on the basis of the surviving record, it appears that it was largely the Achaian Confederacy and the need of newcomers to forge amicable relations with its leaders, that gave rise to the honorific ‘mood’ of the above-mentioned Peloponnesian *poleis*.

The *poleis* of the Argolid provide us with 3 decrees and 4 statue bases – not including the Epidaurian lists of *proxenoi* and *theōrodokoi*. From **Hermione** there has survived only one honorific decree, but along with

two lists of *theōrodokoi* it affords evidence as to the importance of a festival in forging bonds between Peloponnesian communities. The decree renews the *syngeneia* with the Messenian *polis* of Asine and awards honours to envoys from Asine who, on behalf of their fellow citizens, asked and were granted permission to participate in the festival in honour of Demeter Chthonia,²⁶² the most important festival of Hermione, c.200; Agoraisos, son of Praxias (ll. 36–7), was the *theōrodokos* responsible for the reception of the *theōroi* sent from Asine.²⁶³ The two *poleis* were connected with bonds of *syngeneia* since they were both (or claimed to be) Dryopes (= ‘oakmen’) from central Greece (Paus. 4.8.3, 34.8–12). Asine had – independently – become a member of the Achaian Confederacy, perhaps during the First Macedonian War.²⁶⁴ In other words, by renewing the bonds with Hermione on the basis of *syngeneia*, the people of Asine were declaring that they had nothing to do with Messene. As Luraghi (2008, 40–3) has observed, it is probably not coincidental at all that during roughly the same period – in 196, after the Roman victory in the Second Macedonian War – Messene unsuccessfully claimed Asine (and Pylos; Polyb. 18.42.7). Sometime earlier, c. 229–225, the Asinaians had established bonds with Argos by honouring Aristomachos (II) and his niece (?) Apia (Table 16, no.14).²⁶⁵ These honours run counter to the Asinaian past, since according to Pausanias (4.34.9 and 2.36.4–5) it was the Argives who in the late 8th century had evicted the people of Asine from the Argolid, but from a political point of view this was a wise move, especially if the Asinaians were members of the Achaian Confederacy.

Two fragmentary lists of *theōrodokoi* (now lost) show that Hermione had forged connections throughout the Peloponnese, in the late 3rd–early 2nd centuries. The name of the festival is not recorded but it must be the one for Demeter Chthonia. Ten Peloponnesian *theōrodokoi* are recorded on the first list (out of a total of thirteen): from Troizen, Argos, Phleious (2), Corinth, Pellene, Aigion (2), Dyme and Thelphousa (the stone breaks off after Thelphousa).²⁶⁶ The names of two Peloponnesians, from Messene and Tegea, are preserved on the second list.

From the late 3rd–early 2nd century there is evidence of political activity at **Mykenai**, and this while it is a *kōmē* of Argos.²⁶⁷ Jameson (1990, 222) noted the unusual rights of Mykenai, especially its retaining an independent *ephēbeia* (also Alcock 1997, 24–5 and n.11). Thus, from the perspective of appropriation of legendary sites and privileges allowed on the part of Argos, the case of Mykenai can be assimilated to that of Kleonai.

Two honorific decrees have come down to us from Mykenai: for the Lakedaimonian Damokleidas and for Protimos of Gortys, either an Arkadian or a Cretan (Table 16, nos. 6, 7). Indeed, there had been more

honorific decrees, since both surviving inscriptions refer to other *energetai*. It is a festival organized by Mykenai that provides the community with the means of establishing connections with the outside world. Both Damokleidas and Protimos were awarded *proedria* of the Dionysia.²⁶⁸

The decrees belong roughly to the same period but the circumstances of their passing may have been quite different. The first one, for Damokleidas, could date anytime before, during or after Nabis' rule.²⁶⁹ It could even date to the Kleomenic War, when the Argives were briefly allied with the Spartans. As is so often the case with Peloponnesian decrees, this decree leaves us in the dark as to the honorand's services, but at least it shows a bond between Mykenai and a Spartan citizen. Moreover, whatever the date of the decree, the *kōmē* of Mykenai must have had at least the acquiescence if not the encouragement of Argive authorities in order to promulgate this decree (Piérart 1992, 384–5).²⁷⁰

If the decree for Damokleidas testifies to a rapprochement of Mykenai, and indirectly of Argos, with Sparta, the one for Protimos, son of Timarchos, bears evidence of worsening relations. Most probably, it was passed after Nabis' defeat by the joint forces of the Romans and the Achaian Confederacy and after the conclusion of peace.²⁷¹

As to whether the decree for Protimos affords positive evidence for relations of Mykenai with another Peloponnesian *polis*, we would need to be sure which Gortys Protimos came from – the Cretan or the Arkadian – and, moreover, in what capacity he worked for the rescue of the Mykenaian ephebes, i.e. whether he did so as a citizen of Gortys or whether he was acting in an unofficial capacity, that of a mercenary leader for instance. Unless further honours were recorded on the missing part of the stone, the modesty of those recorded points to a far from elevated social status but may also indicate that Mykenai did not have the means to award more luxurious honours. As to Protimos' origins, Fossey (1997, 57) states without explanation that Protimos came from Arkadia while Bielman (1994, 161) argues that he was a Cretan on the basis of the friendly relations between the Cretan Gortys and the Achaian Confederacy as well as the presence of Cretan mercenaries in the Peloponnese. This is an appealing view but there are two objections. If Protimos was a Cretan mercenary, then he might not have been the best choice to negotiate the liberation of the hostages,²⁷² given the hostile relations between the Cretan Gortys and Nabis.²⁷³ Additionally, if the honorand was a Cretan, then it would perhaps have made sense for the Mykenaians to specify on the stone that Gortys was the Cretan one, since the Arkadian would more naturally come first to the mind of a Mykenaian.

Large *poleis* also present us with a very modest or practically non-existent

epigraphic or honorific record. From **Sparta** we have two statue bases for leaders of the Achaian Confederacy in the early 2nd century, one set up by Sparta (*polis Lakedaimoniōn*) and the other by a group of certain exiles, for Lykortas and Kallikrates respectively. These are hardly the product of unanimous warm feelings towards the honorands. On the contrary, they bear testimony to severe rupture in Spartan society and politics (see pp.350–8). Lykortas was probably honoured following his proposal to re-incorporate Sparta into the Achaian Confederacy in 182 (Polyb. 23.17.5–11; Walbank 1979, 250–1) while Kallikrates was honoured after the restoration of the (remaining) Spartan exiles (Polyb. 24.10.5): both issues had been deeply divisive and the cause of a protracted clash both within Spartan society and between Sparta and the Achaian Confederacy. However, these statues were set up in Epidauros and in Olympia respectively; in other words, different Spartan groups proclaimed to a Panhellenic audience their gratitude and their success.²⁷⁴ Former perioikic communities emerge in the epigraphic record in the second half of the 2nd century, after having been removed from Spartan control in 195.²⁷⁵ Notably, however, seven out of twelve proxeny decrees concern Spartans, thus indicating the perseverance of bonds with Sparta (Kennell 1999, 194, 198).

On the basis of the epigraphic record, **Elis** and **Corinth** do not appear to have forged bonds with other Peloponnesians via the grant of honours. However, we should bear in mind that inscribed decisions do not correspond to the number of decisions taken. For the Eleans, in particular, we must take account of their preference for perishable material (see Introduction). In their decree for Corinthian judges (see below) reference is made to other *proxenoi* and benefactors. For Corinth, there is no way of knowing how great the actual Corinthian epigraphic output had been since the city was destroyed by Mummius in 146. That both *poleis* were capable of passing decrees is indicated by the fact that in 242 Elis acknowledged *asylia* for the Asklepieia at Kos while at the end of the 3rd century Corinth acknowledged *asylia* for Magnesia on the Maiander and isopythic status for the Leukophryena festival. We are only informed of this activity because it was important enough for the Koans and the Magnesians to record them on stone.²⁷⁶

On the basis of inscriptions, Nikadas of Aigion appears to have been the only Peloponnesian honoured by Corinth, in c.mid-2nd century, when Corinth was a member of the Achaian Confederacy. The report of Pausanias (6.12.5) on the statue erected by the Corinthians in honour of Aratos at Olympia is also an indication of activity of the civic body. Shipley (2005, 327) associates the dearth of inscriptions from Corinth with a restricted oligarchy. The argument is plausible, given Corinth's strong

oligarchic tradition, and we would also add that the constant presence of a Macedonian garrison at Akrokorinthos would have forestalled activity of the assembly, at least on decisions concerning foreign policy.

The case of Elis is different from that of Corinth. It did not have a foreign garrison but there is not much trace of a consistently active Elean assembly from the 4th century to the 2nd AD, which indicates that it may have had a very limited scope of activities (Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 95). One result of such activity must have been the statue awarded to the Spartan king Areus, probably during or after the Chremonidean war (Paus. 6.12.5; see p.120). Damophon (Table 16, no.21), the famous sculptor, had also been honoured by the Eleans, perhaps with a statue, for having repaired the cracks in the ivory of the 5th century statue of Zeus at Olympia c.183, following an earthquake (Themelis 1994, 4, 29).

Notably, however, these two seemingly 'isolated' *poleis*, Elis and Corinth, forged some kind of relationship between themselves. An inscription found at Corinth records the only surviving Elean decree awarding honours to citizens of a Peloponnesian *polis*, dates to the early 2nd century and concerns thirteen Corinthian judges. It confers upon them both the *proxenia* and the *politeia*, a practice found in Aitolian decrees but not in Peloponnesian ones – in other words we could see here Aitolian influence on Elean practice. A suitable context could be the aftermath of the admission of Elis into the Achaian Confederacy in 191, since prior to this date the two *poleis* belonged to opposite camps.²⁷⁷ As for the issue involved, it could either be an internal matter or regulation of boundaries with a neighbour. The latter is more likely the case, given the general stability in Elis. There may very well have been a need for Elis to regulate its boundaries with Alipheira or Triphylian communities (Polyb. 4.73.7–8; Robertson 1976, 265–6).

On the other hand, it is only **Kleitōr** that appears to have been interested in forging bonds with Elis via attribution of honours: 7 Elean *proxenoi* are recorded in *IG* V.2.368, ll. 55–8, 132–4. But Kleitōr had a very wide target group anyway.

Sikyon is also absent from the record of givers of honours.²⁷⁸ Sikyonians are also largely absent as recipients. Only a certain Alexandros and Aratos were honoured, the former by Argos. In addition to the Corinthians Aratos was honoured by the Troizenians with a statue, after 243 (Table 16, no.11). Thus, epigraphic evidence appears to indicate that Sikyon remained isolated in the Peloponnese, even after its incorporation in the Achaian Confederacy. As with Megalopolis, the eminent position of Sikyonian politicians such as Aratos and even Apollonidas, does not appear to have become a platform of interstate relations.

Pretty much the same picture of distance from fellow Peloponnesians emerges when we examine the output of **Messene** until the mid-2nd century. The bilateral agreement of *isopoliteia* and *epigamia* between the Messenians and the Phigaleians discussed above (pp.279–80) was more the product of Aitolian intervention and interests rather than the result of a genuine wish between the two communities to promote friendly relations. As to individuals, only the Spartan Damostratos and the Megalopolitan Satyros appear to have been honoured by the *dēmos* of Messene, in the 3rd and the late 4th century respectively. It is striking and ironic that one of the only two Peloponnesians honoured by Messene (that we know of) was a citizen of Messene's traditional enemy. With the exception of the c. 12 Messenian *proxenoi* of Kleitor (*IG* V.2.368, ll.47–9, 83–91), Messenians are rarely honoured by Peloponnesian *poleis*. One decree from Argos for two Messenians, dating to the 3rd century, has survived (Table 13, no.12) as have two decrees from the late 3rd–early 2nd century for the famous sculptor Damophon – one from the Arkadian Lykosoura (Table 15, no.6) and one from the Messenian Gerenia (Table 16, no.15).²⁷⁹

The *poleis* of **Achaia** proper do not figure as givers of honours to non-Achaian Peloponnesians, with the exception of Pellene for Agathinos of Elis. Correspondingly, citizens of Achaian *poleis* receive honours from Peloponnesian *poleis* rather infrequently, with the exception of the proxenies awarded by Kleitor in the 3rd century: 21 *proxenoi* at Pellene, 2 at Patrai, perhaps 5 at Tritaia (*IG* V.2.368, ll. 91–113, 60–1, 76–81 respectively).²⁸⁰ As to Aigion, the capital of the Achaian Confederacy, Habrosynas was honoured by Epidauros with a statue in c.mid-2nd century; Nikadas was honoured by Corinth in the same period. Of Pharai, a single citizen was honoured by Lousoi (Table 15, no.5). Of Dyme, only Aristainos, most probably the well-known *stratēgos* (see this chapter, n.259), was honoured by the Achaian Confederacy with an equestrian statue, at Delphi (Table 16, no.25).

The **Achaian Confederacy** was surely interested in advertising the glory of its major politicians beyond the boundaries of the Peloponnese. Two statue bases for major politicians have come down to us, for Aristainos and Philopoimen. Both statues were set up in the Panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi. Philopoimen's statue was erected along the right side of the Sacred Way, perhaps near the monument dedicated by the Arkadian Confederacy commemorating the victory over the Spartans during the invasion of Lakonia in 370/69 (*FD* III.1.3; Paus. 10.9.5; see pp.14–15).²⁸¹

About a dozen inscriptions have come down to us from the Achaian Confederacy as a body, only a couple of them honorific, in marked contrast with its rival, the Aitolian Confederacy,²⁸² which developed an extensive

network of honorands, especially during its period of expansion, after the Gallic invasion of 279 (Fossey 1996, 158–65). By comparison, the record of the Achaian Confederacy is so poor that it probably denotes a markedly different perception of forging bonds and expansion.²⁸³ Compared to the Aitolian Confederacy, the Achaian had a much more restricted character, that of an intra-Peloponnesian alliance. For this, we should take account of the fact that the Achaian Confederacy expanded in a much shorter period of time, i.e. it did not have the time to develop more elaborate ways of expansion or of forging bonds, other than sheer incorporation.

* * *

To sum up: in this chapter, we have examined patterns of friendly Peloponnesian interstate relations after 371 up until 146, as they emerge from participation in festivals, honorific decrees, *proxenoi* lists and statue bases for leading Peloponnesians. Evidence for the Isthmia is such that it does not allow us to draw any conclusions as to the popularity of those games among the Peloponnesians but on the basis of epigraphic evidence as a whole it seems that Corinth stood apart from the rest of the Peloponnese. And so did Elis. Evidence for participation in the Olympic Games shows that they did not play a unifying role in the Peloponnese. The Peloponnesians appear to have kept their distance from the Olympics. On the other hand, evidence for participation in the Epidaurian Asklepieia shows that while the Epidaurians progressively cultivated relations with increasing numbers of Peloponnesian *poleis*, the Asklepieia did not provide a vehicle for relations with their neighbours in the Argolid except for Argos and Phleious. To the Argives, the Nemeia and the Heraia provided the means of self-assertion. The number of Argive honorific decrees awarding the *theōrodokia* to Peloponnesians as compared to that for non-Peloponnesians gives the impression that the Argives were more interested in cultivating relations with the world outside the Peloponnese. But very little has survived from the list recording *theōrodokoi* in Peloponnesian *poleis*, and the impression could thus be deceptive. However, the existing record of honours from Argos shows that within the Peloponnese liaisons with Arkadian *poleis* hold prominence. As for the Nemeia, far from providing a platform for amicable relations, they became a bone of contention between Argos and the Achaian Confederacy with the former being the ultimate winner after 225.

Our rather limited epigraphic evidence shows that of all the regions in the Peloponnese it is in Arkadia that we observe strong bonds among *poleis*: it is largely Arkadian *poleis* that bestow citizenship, and this to fellow

Arkadians. The picture largely agrees with what we know of political history from literary sources. The rest of the Peloponnesian *poleis* on record seem to be more interested in awarding statues to eminent politicians or rulers rather than bestowing other, lesser privileges.

Notes

¹ See Perlman 2000, 13–14; 18–29, for the beginnings and the development of the institution in the 4th century (first established to promote the Olympic Games in the 360s); at pp. 22–6 see the very useful tables of the epigraphic evidence for the *theōrodoxia* (until the first half of the 2nd century).

See Charneux 1966, 167–8 and Perlman 2000, 45–62, for the duties of the *theōrodoxoi*. Charneux (1966, 161–2) and Perlman (2000, 28) distinguish between the duties of the *theōrodoxoi* and the duties of the *proxenoi*: the former served the god(s) and thus their duties were restricted while the latter served the *polis* and their duties were much broader. Contrary to what Charneux asserts, Perlman (2000, 38) emphasizes (rightly in our view) that citizenship was important in the appointment.

² There are only two decrees, one issued by Pisa in 365–363 (*IvO* 36 / *Syll.*³ 171), during its brief control of the games, and another (*IvO* 39) of the late 3rd–early 2nd century; Perlman 2000, 64–6.

³ Gauthier 1985, 4–13, 17–21; Rigsby 1996, 24; Hansen 2004, 100; Billows 2007, 312.

⁴ More than 98 in all: Mack 2015, 165.

⁵ Some thirty inscriptions in total have been found recently in the Arkadian Phigaleia (in the temple of Athena) of which six are lists (of *proxenoi*?) while eleven are parts of proxeny decrees; one of the honorands is a *proxenos* of the Lakedaimonian *Koinon* possibly dating to the 1st century; see Arapoyianni 2001, 303–4 (= *SEG* 51.512). My warmest thanks go to Elena Zavvou of the Epigraphical Museum in Athens who very generously showed me transcripts of the inscriptions and shared with me her thoughts on their nature and date.

⁶ Table 13, no.4; Table 15, nos. 6, 17.

⁷ Mack 2015, 51–73, on the activities, services and status of the *proxenoi*.

⁸ Rubinstein (2009, 120) notes that more than 600 grants of *proxenia* all over the Greek world are accompanied by a grant of *ateleia*.

⁹ Gauthier (1972, 230–3) comments on the most frequent association of the *proxenia* with the *asylia*. See also Mack 2015, 128.

¹⁰ Mack (2015, 125) underlines that the *proedria* was a privilege ‘shared with members of the civic elite’.

¹¹ Gauthier 1972, 23–5, 57–61; *id.* 1985, 131–49; Gschnitzer 1973, cols. 643–63; Marek 1984, 333–57; Hansen 2004, 100–1. See Mack 2015, 4–8, for a review of the scholarship on the significance of the *proxenia*.

¹² Marek 1984, 72–3 on the honorary value of the *ateleia*. Rubinstein (2009, 115–16) distinguishes between three types of *ateleia*: the purely honorary, the one aimed at facilitating economic activities and, thirdly, block grants (often in a very restricted form) upon groups of citizens or entire citizen bodies.

¹³ Smith (2008, 128) underlines that it is dangerous to grant the right to acquire land to non-citizens.

¹⁴ See Gawantka (1975, 11–46, 113–52 [esp.124], 206–24) laying emphasis on the reinforcement of bonds between communities; Gauthier (1984, 104–6 and 1985, 152–4) places equal emphasis on facilitating the incorporation of new citizens; see Gauthier 1972, 365, on the *isopoliteia* between neighbouring *poleis*; see also Rousset 2012 on the *isopoliteia* in general.

¹⁵ Additionally, a decree from Dyme, dating to the 3rd century, regulates the sale of citizenship to *epoikoi*: *Syll.*³ 531 / Bingen 1954a, 86–7, no. 4 (ll. 1–6) / Rizakis 1990, 110–23, no.I = *SEG* 40.394 / **id.* 2008a, 44–9, no.3; Mackil 2013, 455–8, no.35 (text of Rizakis 2008a, and translation). Another decree from Dyme (now lost), dating to 219/8, confers citizenship upon a group of foreigners (associated with the defence of Dyme), of whom very few might have been Peloponnesians: *Syll.*³ 529 / Rizakis 1990, 123–9, no.II / **id.* 2008a, 49–54, no.4 (esp. pp.53–4); see also Ch. 7, n.20. A decree from the Achaian Tritaia, dating to the 3rd century, concerns sale of citizenship and, like the aforementioned decree of Dyme, probably represents an attempt to replenish the citizen body after the population losses during the Social War: Rizakis 2008a, 28–9 and 134–7, no.94 (= *SEG* 40.400).

¹⁶ In roughly the same period, Tegea awarded the *isopoliteia* to the Thessalian Hagesandros (*IG* V.2.11 / *Syll.*³ 501 / *IPArk* 36c = ll. 5–12), and to an unknown person (*IG* V.2.13 / *IPArk* 36e = ll. 1–8).

¹⁷ *IG* V.2.3 / Dubois II, 1988, 20–34 / *IPArk* 2. *IG* V.2.6 / Dubois II, 1988, 39–61.

¹⁸ Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 492: among Achaian decrees, only the sacred law of Epidauros drawn up by the *nomographoi* (*IG* IV².1. 73) names a proposer; no proposer's name is known from (the very few) Elean or the Arkadian decrees. The same principle applies to Lakonia (where we do find a *pothodos* ['approach'] by an individual not entitled, however, to submit a formal proposal) while from Messene there is only one decree where the proposer's name is recorded.

¹⁹ From Argos there is evidence for statues of the 3rd-century tyrants (Plut. *Arat.* 13.1) – admittedly, it is possible that these statues were not the result of the people's decision.

²⁰ Taeuber 1986 (= *SEG* 36.379), publishes a dedicatory inscription (on a base for an equestrian statue) for Aristopamon; he dates it between c.227, the date of his father's death, and the end of the 3rd century. To these we add the statue base for Nikeratos (son of Arkesilas), dating to c.220, and the statue base for the athlete Antiochos (son of Nikasippos), dating to c.150 (Lauter and Spyropoulos 1998, 449, no.3, ph., and no.4 = *SEG* 48.522 and 525 respectively).

²¹ Lauter and Spyropoulos 1998, 449–51 (ph., no text; text in *SEG* 48.524) / *Stavrianopoulou 2002, 152–3.

²² See Ma 2013, 93; also Taeuber 1986, 226 and Errington 1969, 193–4.

²³ Polybios (36.13.1–2) records that another illustrious Megalopolitan, his own father Lykortas, and Kallikrates from Leontion in Achaia were awarded statues; see Walbank 1979, 672.

²⁴ Precise dating cannot be established in many cases but this does not affect the general picture.

²⁵ The Olympic Games of 364 (=164th Olympiad) were organized by Pisa. Therefore, the Eleans considered them as an ἀνολυμπιάς ('non-Olympiad'): Moretti 1953, 63. On Sostratos' athletic career see Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 200.

²⁶ Aratos' victory falls between 243 (the capture of Akrokorinthos by Aratos) and 224 (its restoration to Macedon).

²⁷ Correction of l. 5: Πύθια, ἑξάκι δ' ἰθμῶν; acknowledged by Charneux 1987, 414–15, no.612.

²⁸ Moretti (1957, 142–3) argues that the Olympic victories from 208 to 196 belong to the same man, the celebrated athlete recorded in Mitsos 1940, 47 (= *SEG* 11.338). In this inscription the victor is called πρῶτος Ἀχαιῶν and is identified by Mitsos with a citizen of Argos (a view accepted by Moretti 1953, 119). The basis of this argument (at pp.48–9) is that the inscription was found in the vicinity of Argos, and that two victories in the Nemeia are recorded and one in the Heraia with the latter appearing first; as to the appellation πρῶτος Ἀχαιῶν, we do find Argives identifying themselves as ‘Achaians of Argos’ (in the Panathenaia), after their joining the Achaian Confederacy in 229/8; in the present inscription it means that he was the first Achaian to win in the Eleutheria of Plataia (Moretti 1953, 118–19). Mitsos (at p.48) argues that the athlete’s victories are no later than the late 220s, mainly on the basis of letter forms. On the other hand, Moretti (1953, 120–1) argues that the Soteria should be identified with those of Sikyon and thus the athlete’s victory there should postdate 213, the date of the establishment of the Sikyonian Soteria (ll. 8–9); and since he was victorious as a *pais*, his victories in other events, as an adult, should postdate 213; *contra* Mitsos (1940, 54) who thinks that the Delphic Soteria would be the first to come to mind without further qualification. Still, this would not be necessarily the case in a Peloponnesian’s mind: in *LAEpid* 210 the Soteria are qualified as τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς. See also the criticism of Robert, J. & L. 1941, 246–7, no.56.

²⁹ For Damatrios’ victories, see also Amandry 1980, 223.

³⁰ In 1957 Moretti had tentatively dated Xenon’s victory in 360 but the downdating of Asamon’s victory (no.452) by at least a century downdates Xenon’s as well, since both his and Asamon’s statue were made by Pyrilampes of Messene; on the problem of dating see also Jacquemin 2002, 204–5; also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 283, 296.

³¹ See also Jacquemin 2002, 218.

³² Ebert (1982, 199, 201) restores [τὸ τριτόν] in l.15 of *I.Magnesia* 16, which records a victory of Hagesidamos in the pankration and argues that he won 3 times in Olympia (in 228, 224 and 220); Moretti 1987 and 1992 takes account of Ebert’s view.

³³ See Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 201–2.

³⁴ The references to Zoumbaki 2005 concern an athlete’s entire career, not just one victory.

³⁵ For the dates of Nikandros’ victories see also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 295; Jacquemin 2002, 216.

³⁶ See also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 272.

³⁷ See also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 215–16.

³⁸ Zoumbaki (2005, 164–5, with bibliography) discusses the probable identification of Euanoridas with one of the prominent Eleans captured by Philip V during the Social War (Polyb. 5.94.6).

³⁹ In 1957 Moretti tentatively dated Asamon’s victory in 340 but in 1987 (and in 1992) he lowered the date of his victory by at least a century; for a date in the late 3rd century see Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 296 with bibliography; see also this chapter, n.30.

⁴⁰ See also Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 290, 299.

⁴¹ On Timon’s military career see also Jacquemin 2002, 212; Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 296.

⁴² The number of Elean victors could rise to 33, if we include Theodoros, Neolaidas, Klearetos and Kriannios (Paus. 6.16.8, 9; 17.1); the victories of the first three are dated by Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino in the 4th or the 3rd century while that of Kriannios before the conquest of Macedon by Rome. See also Zoumbaki 2005, 183–4, Θ9; 219, K 30; 228, K 51; 263, N 2.

⁴³ Crowther 1988, 301: 115 victories = 12%.

⁴⁴ This is the general picture that emerges from Crowther's 'Table I: Overall Top Fifteen Successful Cities / States at Olympia' (1988, 301).

⁴⁵ Moretti 1957, supplemented by Moretti 1970, 297, 298 and 1987, 84–7; additionally, an Amphipolitan was victorious at an uncertain date in the Hellenistic period (Moretti 1987, 85). I do not include those victors whose origin is unknown.

⁴⁶ See Hodkinson 2000, 307–8, for a slight modification of Moretti's list for the mid-6th century to 368 (table at p.308).

⁴⁷ Crowther (1988, 309) notes that there are no known Elean victors at Delphi and Nemea who did not also win at Olympia.

⁴⁸ See Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 184, on the rather surprising age of Damiskos.

⁴⁹ On Pellene's outstanding Olympic record starting from the mid-6th century see Morgan and Hall 2004, 485.

⁵⁰ In *IG IV*².1.618 Epidauros honours the Argive Drymos, son of Theodoros, for having travelled from Olympia to Epidauros in a single day to announce the Olympic victors. The inscription is vaguely dated in the 4th century but Mitsos (1976 [1977], 83–6) suggests that he could have been a cousin of Drymos son of Epikrates, *theōrodokos* for the Epidaurian Asklepieia in c.350.

⁵¹ For the dates of the Isthmian victories see Farrington 2012, 120, n.284 (the presumed career length of an athlete is 15 years). The lower date for Chilon depends on Pausanias' information (6.4.6–7) that according to the epigram on the statue in his honour (at Olympia; Jacquemin 2002, 117) he died in battle, which in Pausanias' view could be either Chaironeia or Lamia; in the latter case, Pausanias goes on, Chilon would have been the only Achaian to fight against Antipatros. This was actually the view of the local *exēgetēs* (a local guide? See Lafond 2000, 130) in Patrai (Paus. 7.6.5–6). For its unreliability see Merker (1991, 45, 47) who also suggests that the battle in which Chilon lost his life could be any of the battles in which the Achaians participated from c.370 to the end of the 3rd century, since Lysippos, the sculptor of Chilon's statue, had a very long career. Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino (1999, 203) argue plausibly that Chilon may have died at the battle of Megalopolis in 331, when the Achaians were allied with the Spartans against Antipatros; for Pausanias, with his negative attitude towards Sparta, this battle would not have accounted for much. On the other hand, Dixon (2014, 30–1) offers a more complicated theory according to which Chilon, far from being Macedon's enemy, may have actually given a pro-Macedonian turn to the policy of Patrai; the Patraians of the 2nd century AD, having a Roman colony in their city, would have had every reason to construct an anti-Macedonian profile for Chilon.

⁵² Moretti (1953, 63) dates Sostratos' career between c.376 and c.356; Farrington (2012, 122–3, n.289) argues that if Sostratos was an adult in his first Olympic victory in 364, then his victories fall between c.369 and c.354; the date on the table is the one given by Farrington in his list at p.49.

⁵³ Kallistratos was also victorious at the Asklepieia in Epidauros, the Basileia in Lebadea, the Naia in Dodone and the Rhieia in Ozolian Lokris.

⁵⁴ The date is suggested by Farrington 2012, 128, n.326, on the basis of the career of Thoinias, sculptor of Kallistratos' statue, who was active between c.260 and c.220.

⁵⁵ On the number of Kleainetos' Isthmian victories see this chapter, p.405 and n.27.

⁵⁶ See Charneux 1985, 363–4, for the identification of θηροτρόφος in l. 6 of the epigram for Kleainetos with Nemea.

⁵⁷ The *terminus post quem* is set by his victory at the Delphic Sotēria; this victory is dated by Nachtergaele 1977, 362–8, 486–7, no.72, to or after 246.

⁵⁸ Nachtergaele (1977, 316–23, 429–30, no.15bis) dates the Pythian victories of [Pytho]kles between 265–255.

⁵⁹ *IG V.2.142a* lists 3 Isthmian victories (ll. 11, 16, 24) whereas frg. b records ἰσθμια ἄνδρας δόλιχον δίς (in l. 36). Since frg. b appears to summarize Damatrios' career, and victories in frg. b are identical with those in frg. a, I think that the engraver simply made a mistake writing δίς instead of τρίς.

⁶⁰ Date suggested by Farrington 2012, 130, n.339.

⁶¹ Miller (1979, 100) suggests that the Olympic victor Telestas could be identified with the Τ[Ε]ΛΕΣΤΑΣ in a graffito in the tunnel of the Nemea stadion; this does not necessarily mean that he won, only that he competed, perhaps as a man, following his Olympic victory in boys' boxing.

⁶² See Farrington 2012, 31–5, on the geographical origins of the *Isthmionikai* (down to the Imperial period).

⁶³ Charneux (1985, 357, 361) argues that Kleainetos of Argos was probably a *periodonikēs*. Nachtergaele (1977, 320) and Farrington (2012, 127, n.324) argue against the possibility that [Pytho]kles was also an *Olympionikēs*.

⁶⁴ There was perhaps one Elean *Isthmionikēs* in the early-mid 5th century: see Farrington 2012, 31–2.

⁶⁵ *Scholia* on Pindar, *Nem.* 3, 147; Sève 1993, 320 (and n.77) –322; Perlman 2000, 91 and n.100; 95. See Sève 1993, 322–4, on the programme of the Asklepieia.

⁶⁶ See Sève 1993, 305 and Perlman 2000, 82 on Apollo (the father of Asklepios) becoming a patron-deity of the Asklepieia in the mid-3rd century or slightly earlier; Perlman 2000, 92–3 and Sève 1993, 322, on the possibility of the existence of two festivals; Perlman also suggests that honorific decrees may have been passed precisely at the time of these celebrations.

⁶⁷ Perlman 2000, 96 and n.124, 125; *ibid.* 200, 201, 202.

⁶⁸ For the date see Rigsby 2007, 111–12, who prefers 363 (a year before the Asklepieia), instead of the traditional date to 360/59. The first dispatch of *theōroi* and the appointment of *theōrodokoi* have been associated with a decision of the Epidaurians to 'establish the festival and the games of Asklepios on a grander scale', sometime after the completion of the Asklepieion: see Sève 1993, 307–8 and Perlman 2000, 68–4, 79–81; the *addenda* in the first Epidaurian list date *post* c.316 while those in the second start in the late 340s – early 330s.

⁶⁹ The first list records *theōrodokoi* at Megara, Athens, Boiotian *poleis*, Thessaly, Macedon, Chalkidike and Thrace.

⁷⁰ Perlman 2000, 84–5, 87–8. For the assignment of the decrees to years see her table at p. 83; the change in years is indicated by the name of the *katalogos boulas*.

⁷¹ Peek: Ἰ[ῆραι]έα.

⁷² Restoration of the honorands' name by Perlman noting that ἀχον is legible on the

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stone. In his *editio princeps* Mitsos restored [ων...3–4.μ]αχον; [Φίλ]αινον was restored by Peek.

⁷³ Restored by Perlman in l. 9.

⁷⁴ [Κο]ρίνθιον in both Peek and Perlman.

⁷⁵ Perlman: Κ[ορί]νθιο[ς].

⁷⁶ Just a few letters are preserved on the first part of the stone recording the *theōrodokoi*.

⁷⁷ Perlman: Κ[.....]ιο[—]; Peek: Κ[ορί]νθιο[ς].

⁷⁸ Peek: [Φ]λειά[σιος]; Perlman: [Φλ]ειάσ[ιος]. Peek also restores Φ[λειάσιος] in l.22 and [Φλει]ά[σι] ο[ς] in l. 23.

⁷⁹ Peek: Ἀρ[ιστά]νδρου [Ὶ]Ἡρα[ιεύς]; Perlman: Ἀριστάνδρου ῚΗραιεύς.

⁸⁰ Perlman: Κο[ρί]νθιος, noting that the [νθι] is one letter too long; Peek: Αἴνιος.

⁸¹ For the date see Perlman 2000, 87–8, 91; the *terminus ante quem* is established by the death of Androkles, *theōrodokos* at Phalasarna, in 220/19. Assuming that Androkles must have been at least thirty years old when he was appointed *theōrodokos* in year 2 of the list, the *terminus post quem* should be set at c.260. Thus, year 14 of the list should be 248 at the earliest, which fits the age of Kassandros, son of Arrhabaios, *proxenos* of Epidauros in Macedon in that year.

⁸² See also Mack 2015, 311, Table 6, 1; Rizakis 1995, nos. 685, 686 (the Achaian *proxenoi*).

⁸³ The Spartan honorands are regularly called Lakedaimonioi.

⁸⁴ See Perlman 2000, 263, on the prominence of Theon's family in the 2nd century.

⁸⁵ I do not count Agasippos since he is the same person as in no.4 of the table. Mack (2015, 311, n.38) suggests that this repetition might be an error of the stonecutter.

⁸⁶ Nikasippos was the son of Eudamos. O'Neil (1986, 35), based on an earlier date for *IG IV*².1.96, thinks that Eudamos could be either a grandfather or a great uncle of Lydiadas, the tyrant of the mid-3rd century and later *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy.

⁸⁷ L. 46 reads Λυσίβιον Θευδώρου Ἀλεῖον. Perlman (2000, 187) lists Lysibios as an Elean. On Alea as his place of origin see Dubois 1988, II, 186 who argues that the ambiguity is caused by the insertion of the iota between the epsilon and the omicron; also that the listing of Lysibios on the same line with the *proxenos* from Kleitor indicates that he was an Arkadian. Additionally, Zoumbaki (2005, 32) points out that the use of the upsilon in the patronymic Θευδώρου instead of the omicron is a feature of the Arkadian dialect. See *ead.*, 30–3 on the problem of the confusion between the *ethnika* of Elis and Alea.

⁸⁸ Peek: Παν[οανίαν] Ἀνδρίωνος. Both Peek's and Perlman's reading are based on the repetition of the name in decree XVII, l. 64.

⁸⁹ Perlman: Ἀντιπ[άτρου] Ἀργεῖον; Peek: Ἀγπ[άτρου] Ἀργεῖον.

⁹⁰ Peek: Φαντίαν.

⁹¹ On Deraí – probably a district – see Shipley 2004a, 551. The name of Aristarchidas is repeated in ll. 64–5; see Mack 2015, 311, n.39, on these rather inexplicable repetitions.

⁹² Perlman (2000, 275, no.255) suggests that Polyphantos could be identified with Polyphontas who in 220 escaped to the court of Philip V as a consequence of the conflict between the pro-Macedonian and the pro-Aitolian factions in Sparta (Polyb. 4.22.8–12).

⁹³ Same person as in no. 23 of the table.

⁹⁴ Philon and Pausanias are the same honorands as in nos. 23 & 22 respectively. See Perlman 2000, 84–5, on the problems of Year 13 to which she assigns Decrees XVI, XVII, XIX. Perlman believes that decree XVII is an amendment to XVI while XIX is an addition. Cf. Peek, *LAEpid*, pp. 37–8, who thinks that XVI and XVII were either passed during the same assembly meeting or in different years but on the same day (the 4th) of the month Apellaios.

⁹⁵ Including part of the patronymic.

⁹⁶ See Perlman 2000, 89, on the date; she points out the similarity in language and arrangement with E 5 and argues that it could either postdate or antedate it; since the stone is broken across the top and the bottom, we cannot know how many years it covered.

⁹⁷ See also Mack 2015, 312, Table 6, 2.

⁹⁸ Mitsos: [Πασι]τελίδας; Peek: [Καλ]λιτελίδας.

⁹⁹ SEG 11.413: [Δα]μ[αρ]μενίδαν; Mitsos: .μ., Μενίδαν.

¹⁰⁰ See also Mack 2015, 312, Table 6, 3.

¹⁰¹ SEG 11.414: Ἀν[υ]σί[στ]ρ[α]τος; Mitsos: Ἀν.ΣΙ..Ρ.ΤΟΣ.

¹⁰² Perlman: Κορίνθιος; Peek: [Κορίν]θιος.

¹⁰³ Peek restores the name of yet another Messenian in ll. 15–16: [Φ]ερεκράτης [Κράτω]νο[ς] Μεσσ[ά]νιος.

¹⁰⁴ Mitsos: Δέξιππος.

¹⁰⁵ SEG 11.414: [Ἀν]τιφών.

¹⁰⁶ Perlman (2000, 283) suggests that the father of the honorand, Ischemachos, could be identified with the *strategos* in IG V.2.12.

¹⁰⁷ Mitsos: Ἰάρων; Peek: Ἰων.

¹⁰⁸ See Perlman 2000, 273, on the possibility that Patrokleidas could be a descendant of a 4th century *damiourgos* and *prytanis*.

¹⁰⁹ Sineux 1997, 6–7, 10–12; Luraghi 2008, 233–5, 271–2.

¹¹⁰ In the first case, the Asklepion belongs to the period that Messene was not a member of the Achaian Confederacy. Themelis (1994, 4–9) notes the political character of the complex as well as that it only became known as the Asklepion in the time of the emperor Tiberius; Themelis (1994, 24, 30) prefers a date between the late 3rd and the early 2nd century (between 215 and 182); on the other hand, Luraghi (2008, 283–5 with bibliography) excludes the troubled period between 191 and 182 and argues that the complex could belong to the period when Messene was a member of the Achaian Confederacy, after 182 and before the Achaian War. Sineux (1997, 18) associates the Asklepion with a wish of the Messenians to assert their identity vis-à-vis the Achaian Confederacy.

¹¹¹ Melfi 2007, 247, 250–8 with bibliography; Luraghi 2008, 277–85.

¹¹² Kleitor: Paus. 8.21.3 and Jost 1985, 39–40; Mantinea: Paus. 8.9.1, IG V.2.269, and Jost 1985, 124–5; Tegea: Paus. 8.47.1, 54.5; Gortys and Megalopolis: Paus. 8.28.1, 32.4–5, IG V.2.449, and Jost 1985, 203–10, 232–3. See Edelstein and Edelstein 1998, vol. I, 380–96, T. 735–785 and vol. II, 242–5, for the testimonies for sanctuaries of Asklepios in the Peloponnese; Jost 1985, 493–4, for a comprehensive table of the cults of Asklepios in Arkadia; Thelphousa, Alipheira, Phigaleia also had a cult of Asklepios; *ibid.* 500–1 and Melfi 2007, 243–5, for the Epidaurian influence on the introduction of the cult at Mantinea at the end of the 5th century; also on the

association of Asklepios with Hygieia in the sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea, in the mid-4th century, right at the time of the diffusion of Asklepios' cult in the Peloponnese. See also Melfi 2007, 209–25, on the Asklepieia of Gortys; *ibid.* 235–43, on Pheneos.

¹¹³ Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 598 and n.2) suggest that the text might concern division of the territory of Halieis between Hermione and Epidauros (the territory of Halieis was abandoned in c.280); Dixon (2000, 125–32) provides a new text of *IG IV*².1.74 and remains sceptical as to the identity of Hermione's rival although Epidauros 'is the most logical candidate' (at p.132).

¹¹⁴ Wilhelm 1948, 69–70; Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 74–5.

¹¹⁵ At the time of the arbitration Hermione had expanded its territory both to the north, acquiring access to the sea, and to the south (Magnetto 1997, 412–13).

¹¹⁶ On the number of the Rhodian judges, Dixon (2000, 156–7) rightly estimates that they were more than six: in ll. 24–8 of the Epidaurian copy there is space for at least two names with patronymic in each line.

¹¹⁷ The two boards of arbiters gave identical decisions. Two *stēlai* have survived, one from Epidauros (in seven non-joining fragments) and one from Hermione; both start with the decision of the Milesian judges; from the Hermione one there survives this decision and only the beginning of the Rhodian decision.

Copy from Epidauros: *IG IV*².1.75 (frgs a–e) / Hondius in *SEG* 11.405: restoration based on the Hermione copy) / *LAEpid* 30 (= ll.1–15; frg f) + Mitsos 1979 [1981], 215–17, no.2 (= *SEG* 31.328; frg g: omitted line between ll.6 & 7 in *LAEpid* 30) / Magnetto 1997, no.69.II (= frgs a–g, noting frg f as A1 and frg 'g' as 'frg 'f'; see Dixon 2000, 134, n.10).

Copy from Hermione: ed. pr. Peek 1934, 47–52, no.9 / Wilhelm 1948, pp. 67–8 (= *SEG* 11.377) / *ISE* 43 (= *SEG* 25.375) / Daverio Rocchi 1988, 157–9, no.15.2 (ll. 10–19); Magnetto 1997, no. 69.I / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.10 (ll.1–23) / Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, Appendix F, 596–606; translation and commentary). Ager 1996, no.63 attempts a combination of the two copies starting with the Hermione copy (based on Peek 1934 for ll.1–25 and including Mitsos 1979 [1981]).

Text and commentary for both copies in Dixon 2000, 132–67.

As to the date of the arbitration, it has commonly been dated to the very beginning of the 2nd century: Jameson (1953, 160–7, no.15, at p.160); Jameson, Runnels and van Andel (1994, 598) think that the dispute might have 'aggravated' during Nabis' control of the Argolid and date the arbitration shortly after 195, when the cities of the Akte returned to the Achaian Confederacy; Magnetto 1997, 413, n.2: late 3rd–early 2nd century; Moretti (*ISE* 43): first half of the 2nd century; Ager (1991, 22) opts for 201/0 viewing the arbitration as an attempt of Rhodes and Miletos to strengthen bonds with the Achaian Confederacy, ally of their enemy Philip V; also Magnetto 1997, 410–11. On the other hand, Dixon (2000, 148–154; 2001 = *SEG* 51.426) restores (in the nominative) Διοπαίθηζ and Σωσγέ[νης] as the names of two of the Rhodian judges in ll. 25 and 27 of the Epidaurian copy (providing a very good photo). He identifies them with the Rhodian judges who, some years before 170, had arbitrated between the Achaian Confederacy and Eumenes II and had ruled that the honours for the latter should be cancelled (Polyb. 28.7.9). Thus Dixon argues that the arbitration between Epidauros and Hermione took place between c.175 and 172. I was able to confirm his readings during a visit to the Museum of Epidauros, and his hypothesis for the date appears attractive.

¹¹⁸ Mitsos observes that it is easier to explain the absence of this event from sources largely interested in Macedon than its absence from Xenophon.

¹¹⁹ See Lykourgos, *Against Leokrates* 42 and Burford 1969, 29, n.7.

¹²⁰ See the new edition of the text also in Piérart 2014, 233–6; see also *id.* 2004a, 604, 607.

¹²¹ I am most grateful to M. Piérart for sharing with me his thoughts on the problem of Epidauros' relations with Argos.

¹²² Mitsos 1937, 713–14, n.2; Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 18.

¹²³ See Ch.4, p.119 and n.14.

¹²⁴ See Mack 2015, 171, for the sharp increase in grants between 220 and 200; at p.175 Mack underlines that of the 136 *proxenoi* of Epidauros whose ethnics are known only 10% originated from outside the Peloponnese and central Greece.

¹²⁵ Epidauros commanded a very good harbour in the Saronic Gulf, next to the Gulf of Argos: Piérart 2004a, 606.

¹²⁶ Charneux 1985, 751; Perlman 2000, 258.

¹²⁷ Sève 1993, 309 and 327–8 on the victors; at p.313 Sève draws attention to the fact that the Asklepieia often referred to in texts could very well be those of Kos, acknowledged by the Greek world in 242. On Kleainetos see this chapter, pp.415, 417 and n.63; Moretti 1953, 114–15, no.43, on Akestoridas.

¹²⁸ The name 'Hekatomboia' disappears before the end of the 3rd century while the name Heraia appears at about the same time: Amandry 1980, 226–9; 245–6 for the lists; see also Piérart 2004b, 23–4.

¹²⁹ According to Diodorus (11.65.2–5) Mykenai kept claiming both the sanctuary of Hera and control of the Nemean Games, and in general contested Argive superiority in the Argolid; subsequently Mykenai was razed to the ground by the Argives. Lewis (1981, 74–5) suggests that there may have been dissension at Mykenai and also that it may have acted at the instigation of the Corinthians; cf. Perlman 2000, 140–1 and n.178, 182. The date of Mykenai's destruction is set at c. 465 (see Perlman 2000, 139–40 and n.175 for bibliography). According to Strabo (8.6.19) Kleonai fought on the side of Argos and after the destruction of Mykenai received part of the population. See also Ch. 1 and n.35.

¹³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1–5; Paus. 3.10.1; Mitsos 1945, 22–3; Salmon (1984, 358–9) rejects the idea that the Argives eventually took over Corinth violently and prefers to see this as a joint celebration on the strength of Argive tenure of Corinthian citizenship; see Ch. 1, p.6 and n.27.

¹³¹ See Pindar, *Nem.* 4.17 and *Nem.* 10.79; and Perlman 2000, 131 and n.138; at pp.139–41, Perlman argues that Kleonai was an independent ally of Argos in the 5th century.

¹³² Lewis 1981, 74, based on Diod. Sic. 11.65.2–3. Diodorus reports that the Argives went to war against Mykenai (in the 460s) because the latter challenged their authority in the Argolid and Mykenai also claimed the right to administer the Nemeia. Strabo 8.6.19 reports that Kleonai sent troops to help Argos. Lewis argues persuasively that Argos would not have gone to war against Mykenai if it did not control the Nemeia. *Contra* Perlman 2000, 140, who suggests that control of the Argolid was the overriding issue, in which case it would make more sense if Kleonai was already allied to Argos. In our view, control of the Argolid does seem to be the main Argive problem but control of the Nemeia was certainly the second.

¹³³ Miller (1982, 106–7) argues that the Nemeia had been transferred to Argos already before 388, on the basis of Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.2–3, where the oracle at Olympia and Delphi declare the sacred truce proclaimed by the Argives unjust – the truce is taken by Miller to be the *ekecheiria* preceding the Nemeia. Knapp (2005, 16 with notes 38 & 39; 22) also argues for transfer to Argos but notes that the site of the games is not explicitly mentioned by Xenophon. Perlman (2000, 134–5) believes that Xenophon’s passage is inconclusive since the truce is not securely identified (I am inclined, though, to accept Miller’s interpretation that the *ekecheiria* referred to in the passage concerns the Nemeia). Perlman (at pp.136–8) observes that Demosthenes’ *Against Meidias* 115 (τῷ Δὲ τῷ Νεμείῳ), Plato’s *Laws* 950e (*theōroi* travelling εἰς Νεμέαν) and the Epidaurian building inscriptions of c. 370 (*IG* IV².1.102 IIA, ll. 114–15; funds given to the κάρυκι (ἔς) Νεμέαν), in contrast to archaeological remains, show that the Nemeia were celebrated at Nemea in the first half of the 4th century. Strasser (2007, 331–2 and nn.13, 14) suggests that Kleonai presided over the games perhaps until its incorporation by Argos and further wonders whether they were celebrated at Kleonai itself.

¹³⁴ Miller 2004, 32, 53–7, 153–4, 191–208; Knapp 2005, 14–15; Walbank, M. B. (1981, 174, n.14) believes that the new temple of Zeus may have been dedicated at the Nemeia of 324/3. Strasser (2007, 346), quite reasonably, points out that the programme would have taken some years to be completed, perhaps until the Nemeia of 323.

¹³⁵ Charneux 1987, 403–4, 410–11, nos. 603, 605; Strasser 2007, 341–7. In ps.Skylax 49 (in the edition of Shipley 2011) – which is our earliest literary testimony on the incorporation – Kleonai appears under the entry ‘Argos’ along with two *kōmai* (Mykenai and Tiryns). The date of his text remains uncertain, but the part of the work dedicated to mainland Greece is usually dated between 338 and 335. See Perlman 2000, 143–4 urging caution; Strasser 2007, 341 and nn. 78–82, relying more on ps.Skylax. Shipley (2011, 7–8) suggests a date shortly after Chaironeia but before Philip II had the coastal towns of southern Messenia detached from Sparta – the latter are included in Lakadaimon by ps.Skylax 46.1.

¹³⁶ Piérart and Thalmann 1980, 266–8; Piérart 1982; Piérart and Touchais 1996, 62; Miller 1982, 108; Perlman 2000, 148–9. For Piérart and Thalmann a date c. 318–316 as the *terminus ante quem* can be provided by the Argive decree for envoys from Pallantion (*SEG* 11.1084 / *ISE* 52), which contains the earliest securely dated reference to the award of *theōrodokia* for the Nemeia to *proxenoi* of Argos. Miller (1982, 108) wonders whether Kleonai was assigned to Argos in c. 318 or slightly later, by Polyperchon, as a punitive measure for its friendly disposition towards Antipatros during the Lamian War. Perlman (2000, 148–9) dates the incorporation of Kleonai between 315–313, when Kleonai was caught between Polyperchon, who held Corinth, and Kassandros who held Argos; in her view this could have perhaps drawn Kleonai into the arms of the Argives for protection. The lower limit is based on Errington’s (1977, 496–500) low dating of the early *Diadochoi* Wars and of Kassandros’ campaigns, but see the plausible arguments for a high dating in Wheatley 1998, 257–66, 280.

¹³⁷ See Kritzas 2006, 407–9, on the palaeographic features of the tablets; publication of one tablet at p.434. In the first quarter of the 4th century the Athenians appointed Echembrotos Kleonaos as *proxenos* (*IG* II² 63); therefore the lead tablets postdate this inscription. In view of the new evidence Piérart now (2014, 222–5) endorses the new

date suggested for the incorporation of Kleonai and argues further that the *sympoliteia* between Argos and Corinth served as precedent.

¹³⁸ For the long tradition of co-operation between Kleonai and Argos see Piérart and Thalmann 1980, 265–6; Miller 1982, 105 and n.39; Perlman 2000, 139–41.

¹³⁹ Knapp (2005, 15–17, 51, 53, 58–60) dates the issues to c. 320 (the coins were found in the stadion and the heroon where other coins of the second half of the 4th century were also found). For Strasser (2007, 339), who dates the incorporation between 338 and 323, the late 320s can only indicate the *terminus ante quem*.

¹⁴⁰ The Kleonaiaans occupied a privileged area of the Nemea Stadion, across the tunnel from which the athletes emerged, as evidenced by thirty-one coins of the ΚΛΕΩ type found in that area (on the hypothesis of ‘town seating’): Knapp 2005, 53.

¹⁴¹ See Ch. 2, pp.63–4 and nn.67–9.

¹⁴² Perlman (2000, 143 and n.191) and Strasser (2007, 341, n.71) think that Kleonai would not have continued minting its own coinage after the loss of its independence.

¹⁴³ See Martin 1995, 272–3, on the Eleusinian coinage; see Psoma (2008, 229, 237–8, 240, 246), on the ‘profit-yielding’ activities during festivals and on the Eleusinian coinages as the forerunner of the Hellenistic (rare) bronze festival coinages. I owe special thanks to K. Liampi and S. Psoma for sharing with me their expert knowledge on coinage.

¹⁴⁴ Perlman (2000, 142) assumes association between political independence and administration of the Nemeia.

¹⁴⁵ Miller (2001, 93 and n.213) argues that Pyrrhos’ assault on Argos might have occasioned the change of location, on the assumption that the Argives would not wish to administer the games at a distance from their city. Buraselis (2013, 174–5) dates the transfer of the games to Argos after 270 but dissociates it from Pyrrhos’ invasion and views it as the result of a conscious policy on the part of the Argive tyrants in order to secure sacred immunity for their city, even if temporarily.

¹⁴⁶ Miller (2001, 99) wonders whether ‘there were any competitors physically present at Aratos’ Nemean Games’. Urban (1979, 66–71) argues that the cause of Aratos’ anger was that the Kleonian/Achaian Nemeia were not acknowledged by the Greek world.

¹⁴⁷ Plut. *Kleom.* 17.2–4. In 225 Kleomenes III of Sparta occupied the Aspis area overlooking the theatre during the celebration of the Nemean Games.

¹⁴⁸ Miller 2001, 99–100 with notes; Knapp 2005, 16–17; Amandry 1980, 246.

¹⁴⁹ See also Ager 1996, no. 44 / Magnetto 1997, no.41 / Harter-Uibopuu 1998, no.4. Bradeen (1966, 323) notes that the fragments were found in 1926 but by 1966 only three existed; ten had been transcribed and photographed by Caskey.

¹⁵⁰ Both Ager (1996, 133) and Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 25–7) believe that the agreement was carried under the auspices of the Achaian Confederacy. Harter-Uibopuu (at p.29) draws attention to the ἄλλος in l. 8, standing in contrast with the Kleonaiaans and the Argives in l. 7, which might allude to a third party judging the case. On the other hand, Magnetto (1997, 255) suggests that Argos and Kleonai might have reached their agreement without resorting to the services of a third party.

Evidence for possible involvement of the Achaian Confederacy is indirect. In l. 20 Bradeen (1966, 325–6) identifies Timokleidas Soter (l.20: τοῦ σωτήρος Τιμοκλείδα) with an associate of Kleinias (Aratos’ father), who died before 264 (Plut. *Arat.* 2). According to Bradeen, this reference might allude to a statue and suggests the

involvement of Aratos in the settlement of the dispute between Argos and Kleonai; in turn, this also suggests a date after the incorporation of Argos in 229/8. We can only speculate as to the reason for this reference. For instance, there might have been a reference here to a *stēlē* (to be?) set up near the statue or to a meeting somewhere near it. Bradeen also restores [Ἀγί]ας Ἀρ[ιστ]ομάχου (in l. 25) whom he identifies with Agias, son of Aristomachos I, who helped Aristomachos II assume the tyranny in Argos in 235 (after the death of the tyrant Aristippos II; Plut. *Arat.* 29.4). All we can say is that the []ας Ἀρ[ιστ]ομάχου is part of a list of names with patronymics (ll. 25–9). If he was indeed an Argive, then these names could belong to representatives of the disputing parties.

¹⁵¹ Harter-Uibopuu (1998, 31) raises the possibility that the court could have come from Pharai – on the basis of ΦΑΡΑΕΙ in l. 23. It was restored by Bradeen (1966) in the text, who, nonetheless, expresses his doubts at p.325.

¹⁵² See Perlman 2000, 147 and n.220.

¹⁵³ The *terminus post quem* (331/0) is provided by the appearance of Kleopatra, widow of Alexandros the Molossian, as *theōrodokos* for the Epeirotes. It is possible that Kleopatra ruled Epeiros until 324; see Perlman 2000, 102–4 with references; Charneux (1966, 177–83) suggested that the list concerned the Nemeia of either 329 or 327. Miller (1988, 161–2) argued that the return of the games to Nemea would have occasioned the publication of the list set up at Argos.

¹⁵⁴ See Perlman (2000, 149, 155), based, however, on the hypothesis that Argos incorporated Kleonai and acquired presidency of the Nemeia c. 315–313.

¹⁵⁵ The Nemean list is viewed by Miller 1988, 161–2, as a re-edition of the Argive list, necessitated by the return of exiles according to Alexander's *diagramma*; he dates it before Alexander's death and connects it to the festival of 323/2. Miller (at p.162 and n.72) argues that Nikokreon of Salamis, an ally of Ptolemy I, would not have been appointed *theōrodokos* at a time when it was not clear who the winner would be; he does concede that 315 could be another context, when Argos was in Kassandros' hands and the latter was allied with Ptolemy; on this context see also Perlman 2000, 113–14. Perlman (2000, 105–12 and 149–50) dates the original text of the Nemean list after the incorporation of Kleonai which she places between 315 and 313. In any case, the *terminus ante quem* for the original text can be determined by the presence of Aristonous, tentatively identified by Miller 1988, 158–9, with Alexander's bodyguard who died in 316; the identification is not accepted by Perlman 2000, 129–30 and esp. 251–2, but is re-instated more vigorously by Strasser 2007, 342–3; see also Hatzopoulos 1996, 474 and n.7, 475. Alternatively, the *terminus ante quem* could be lowered to 313, depending upon the presence of the Akarnanian *polis* Oiniadai which was abandoned in 313: see Miller 1988, 160–1 and Perlman 2000, 107–9.

Two more 'hands' are identified by Perlman, the one going down to 280 and the other down to c. 270. At pp.112–131 and esp. at pp.149–52 Perlman argues at length that the Nemea list served as an addendum to the Argive list.

¹⁵⁶ Charneux 1966, 239–40; Strasser 2007, 343.

¹⁵⁷ Argive prestige outside the Peloponnese is first evidenced by the fact that the League of Corinth, under the leadership of Philip II, stipulated that the dispute between Melos and Kimolos should be adjudicated by Argos. In other words, Argos was briefly turned into a regulator of another *polis*' affairs, only outside the

Peloponneses (*IG* XII.3.1259 / Tod 1948, no.179 / Ager 1996, no.3 / Magnetto 1997, no.1 / Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 403–5, no. 82).

¹⁵⁸ For the Rhodians (first half of the 3rd century?): ed. pr. Vollgraff 1916, 219–38, no.IV (= *SEG* 19.317) / Maier 1959, I, no. 33 / *ISE* 40 / Migeotte 1984, no.19 / L'Institut Fernand-Courby 2005, no.8; the Rhodians are called *syngenees* in l. 5. For the Aspendians: Stroud 1984 (= *SEG* 34.282). They are actually called *apoikoi* in l. 5. In an epigram in honour of king Nikokreon of Salamis it is claimed that Argos was the *metropolis* of Salamis (*IG* IV 583 / Tod 1948, no.194 / *ISE* 38/ Kotsidu 2000, no.53).

¹⁵⁹ Perlman (2000, 101, 153 and n.237, 238) points out that another decree for an individual (for the Athenian Pamphilos: ed. pr. Piérart and Thalmann 1980, 261–9, no.3 = *SEG* 30.355) and two for *poleis* (Rhodes and Aspendos; see this chapter, n.158) do not include the *theōrodokia* in the honours; another six are too fragmentary. See Charneux 1966, 235–6, on the combination of the *proxenia* with the *theōrodokia*, and on the just two Argive decrees awarding solely the *theōrodokia* (for Alexandros of Sikyon and Kassandros of Alexandria in Troas).

¹⁶⁰ Reported by Charneux 1990, 397 (= *SEG* 40.324).

¹⁶¹ Perlman (2000, 153) underlines that Argive decrees are largely dated on the basis of letter forms, which, as she sensibly acknowledges, is far from a safe criterion. Piérart (1985, 351–2) offers a list of nine Argive decrees that can be dated with relative certainty.

¹⁶² In l. 5 Vollgraff restores πρόξε[νον ἡμεν καὶ εὐεργέταν καὶ πολίταν τᾶς πόλιος]. The restoration appears almost certain since in l. 9 the decree records [τοῖς] ἄλλοις πολίταις.

¹⁶³ Vollgraff, ll. 15–18: [ργείας], ἡμεν δὲ αὐτῷ [ἀτέλειαν καὶ ἔμπα] | [ἰν γὰς κ]αὶ οἰκίας καὶ [αὐτῷ καὶ γένει καὶ] | [ἀσυλίαν] καὶ ἀ[σφ]ά[λειαν καὶ πολέμου καὶ] | [ἰράνας κ]αὶ κα[τ]ὰ γῆαν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν].

¹⁶⁴ Charneux, ll. 1–6: [ἡμεν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ χρήμασι ἀτέλειαν] | [καὶ ἀσυλίαν καὶ κατὰ γᾶν κ]αὶ κατὰ [θά] | [λασσαν καὶ ἐμ πολέμω]ι καὶ ἐν ἰρ[ά] | [να]· ἡμεν δὲ καὶ θεαροδ[ό]κον τοῦ Διὸς | [τοῦ Νεμέαι καὶ τᾶς Ἥρας τᾶς Ἀργείας | καὶ προεδρίαν ἐν τοῖς] ἀγῶνσι οἷς ἂ πό | .

¹⁶⁵ Minor differences from Vollgraff's text in ll. 24 and 25.

¹⁶⁶ Perlman's text gives a better idea of how much is missing from ll. 21–8.

¹⁶⁷ Table 13, nos. 5, 11, 12 on this table are dated after 315 by Perlman on the hypothesis that Argos acquired presidency over the Nemeia in c.315–313.

Vollgraff dates the decree for Kleandros before 243, on the assumption that after the incorporation of Epidauros in the Achaian Confederacy the name of the Achaian *stratēgos* should have been recorded in the preamble. This is a conclusion unwarranted by our evidence, at least in its present state. The Achaian *stratēgos* appears in preambles of inscriptions dealing with settlements of disputes under the aegis of the Achaian Confederacy (see p.165).

¹⁶⁸ The *terminus ante quem* is determined by Mantinea's destruction in 223.

¹⁶⁹ The *terminus post quem* is determined by the presence of a secretary from Zarax which in the 270s appears to have been Lakonian; see Ch. 2, n.69.

¹⁷⁰ *ISE* 52 incorporates Mitsos' corrections. Bielman and Perlman restore Ἐν[ε]ν.Ἰνα in ll. 36–7 on the basis of the Argive copy, l.12.

¹⁷¹ Charneux (1983, 252, n.7) offers two possibilities: Agasiadas or Mnasiadas; Perlman prefers the latter.

¹⁷² The suggested chronology is based on the possible recording of the patronymic

of the president of the *boulē*: see the tabulation of the evolution of the *nomenclatio civium* by Piérart 1985, 352.

¹⁷³ This is the opinion of Charneux 1991, 298–9: πολλὰ καὶ εὐχρηστα [ποιεῖ τὰ πόλι καὶ ἰδία τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις] | ἐξ Ἀργεος.

¹⁷⁴ Vollgraff (1915, 367–73) believes that this decree (and others) come from a building associated with the Ptolemies, and dates them between 249 and 244, when the Argives had friendly relations with Egypt. Launey (1949, I, 106 and II, 1116) suggests that Eukles was a Ptolemaic official. Vollgraff's date is endorsed by Dixon (2014, 95–7, and n.142 at p.107) who plausibly adduces the evidence afforded by *AB* 79 (an epigram of Poseidippos of Pella for the victory of Berenike II, later wife of Ptolemy III Euergetes, in the Nemeia of 249) as testifying to friendly relations between Argos and Egypt. Perlman (2000, 229) prefers to date it more vaguely in the 3rd century.

¹⁷⁵ Moretti (*ISE*, I, p. 97, n. 9) draws attention to the Argive honorific decree for Cn. Octavius (*ISE* 42), dating to 170, which records that the *stratēgoi* are responsible for setting up the *stēlē*.

¹⁷⁶ In the Classical era the board consisted of five *stratēgoi* (Thuc. 5.59.5; Tomlinson 1972, 197).

¹⁷⁷ Vollgraff (1916, 65–6) dates the decree before 251 because there is no mention of the Achaian *stratēgos* in the preamble and because of the stoichedon style, but Amandry (1980, 229, n.30) points out that this style exists after 200 and that Vollgraff himself dates the decree for Agathonymos, also written in stoichedon style, to the late 3rd century. Vollgraff is followed by Moretti (*ISE*, I, pp.96–7) who thinks that Alexandros might have held tyrannical rule, and that the prominence of the *stratēgoi* might indicate that Argos was under some kind of dictatorship. Mitsos (1945, 70) believes that it should be dated before c.275, the date he thinks tyranny was established at Argos. Like Vollgraff he assumes that there was no assembly activity during the tyranny, which is too rigid an assumption. Amandry (1980, 226, 229 and n.30) tentatively dates the decree to 225–215, i.e. between the re-incorporation of Argos in the Achaian Confederacy and the first years of the reign of Philip V. His view is based on the information of Livy (32.25.2) that a board of at least 10 *stratēgoi* existed in 198. Thus, he views 198 as a *terminus ante quem* for the establishment of the board. Tomlinson (1972, 197) argues that the *stratēgoi* act in an administrative capacity. But as Amandry has pointed out, although Eukles also had to be registered there is no trace of the *stratēgoi* in his case.

¹⁷⁸ Also in Perlman 2000, 215–16, A 9.

¹⁷⁹ The games are not mentioned by name, but see Piérart 1982, 123, for the identification with the Nemeia.

¹⁸⁰ Piérart 1982, 136–7; Piérart and Touchais 1996, 64.

¹⁸¹ For Piérart, in 1982, the *terminus post quem* for the inscription depended, among other things, on the date of Kleonai's incorporation by Argos which he placed after 323/2. This *terminus* is no longer valid since Kleonai had been annexed early in the 4th century: see Ch. 2, n.73 and this chapter n.137.

¹⁸² Bielman (1994, 51, n.4) observes that this decree is the only testimony for the history of Pallantion until 228.

¹⁸³ Forsén 2000, 50: Pallantion may have comprised only c.1,500–2,000 inhabitants.

¹⁸⁴ The proposers of the Argive honorific decree for the Rhodians were also two (see this chapter, n.158): Charneux 1983, 253 and n.11.

¹⁸⁵ Bearzot (1997, 269) argues plausibly that on the part of Polyperchon the release of the captives would have been a means of isolating Megalopolis.

¹⁸⁶ Guarducci (1941–43 [1948], 149) thinks that the Argives intervened precisely during the siege of Megalopolis by Polyperchon; the idea is attractive to Charneux 1991, 306, n.57.

¹⁸⁷ De Sanctis (1949, 309) dates the decree in 318–316, arguing that at the time of the inscription Argos and Polyperchon seem to be still on amicable terms or at least Polyperchon had not become menacing; Moretti (*ISE*, I, p.134), also dates the decree to c. 318–16, arguing that the ‘obsequious’ attention to Polyperchon indicates that he still exercises influence on Argos. I think that attention is focused on the Argive deed and, in order to make it clear to everyone, the authors offer details about the persons involved. Such a report would have made even more sense if more than a decade had elapsed. L’Institut Fernand-Courby 2005, 66, no.9, also date the decree between 318–16, arguing that the way of referring to Polyperchon indicates that he was still alive.

¹⁸⁸ Charneux also observes that the intervention is not recorded in a prominent place on the stone (followed by Bielman 1994, 52 and Strasser 2007, 344). Elaborating on this point, I would say that the decision of the Argives to record their intervention with Polyperchon on stone seems to have been only an afterthought on the part of the proposers, following the request of the Pallanties.

¹⁸⁹ Charneux (1958, 12 and n.2) sets the decrees against the background of good relations between Argos and Mantinea in the late 5th and early 4th centuries, also noting the rupture in the 360s.

¹⁹⁰ Charneux 1958, 3–4; he also suggests that Aretis could be identified with Aretes, one of Alexander’s cavalry commanders (*Arr. Anab.* 3.12.3, 14.1, 3).

¹⁹¹ See the list compiled by Nielsen 2002, Appendix I, 529–30.

¹⁹² Zoumbaki 2005, 137, Δ 10.

¹⁹³ I follow here the chronology in *Syll.*³ 314. Moretti 1953 and 1957 follows Klee (1918, 67) who thinks that the festival took place every two years and assigns the Lykaia lists I, II and III to odd years – in 311, 309 and 307; he assigns list VI to 313. Moretti assigns the victory of the Spartan Seleidas/Seleadas to 307, and that of the Arkadian Alexibios to c.313 (1957, nos. 487 and 483 respectively; he accepts 304 as a possibility for Seleadas’ Lykaia victory in 1955, 188); *Syll.*³ 314, List IV is assigned by Moretti (1953, 81) to c. 300.

¹⁹⁴ The [Ἀργεῖος] is in brackets.

¹⁹⁵ Zoumbaki 2005, 138, Δ 14.

¹⁹⁶ The ethnic of Ageus, son of Aristokles, is not recorded but he could be identified with the Argive Olympic victor (*Syll.*³ 314, n.16 [Hiller]; Moretti 1957, no. 464, dating his victory in the Lykaia c. 315). If his victory in the Lykaia does belong to 308, then, admittedly, he must have had an unusually long career.

¹⁹⁷ On Seleidas/Seleadas see Table 6 in this chapter and Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 296.

¹⁹⁸ Crowther 1988, 309; Zoumbaki 2005, 320.

¹⁹⁹ *IG* IV 673 with the restorations by Robert 1930, 36 and Charneux 1985, 366 and n.51, for the Lykaia.

²⁰⁰ See Jost 1985, 183–5, on the history of the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios and the games in his honour; *ibid.* 258–67 on the rituals involved in the Lykaia and 267–8 on

the organization of the games which consisted of races for *paides* and men, pentathlon, pankration and horse races. See Charneux 1985, 364–8, on the prize awarded at the Lykaia. See Roy 2011, 77–9 with bibliography, on reports of human sacrifice in the festival.

²⁰¹ Lagos, presumably a son of Ptolemy I, was victorious in 308: *Syll.*³ 314 V, ll. 8–9; he is actually recorded as Macedonian.

²⁰² Pretzler 2009, 93; Nielsen 2013, 238.

²⁰³ On the Lykaia as a national festival see Jost 1985, 179–84; Pretzler 2009, 93.

²⁰⁴ See p.92; Piérart 1982, 134–5.

²⁰⁵ Boubalos could be identified with Boubalos son of Leukon who appears as a donor for the rebuilding of Thebes in a new fragment of *IG* VII 2419 (*Syll.*³ 337), published by Buraselis 2014, 159 (l.15) and 168. In the same period Aristoboulos son of Euboulides from Kassandreia participated in the Panathenaia (Tiverios 2000, 11–12 = *SEG* 50.558) – he could also be a donor in the aforementioned fragment (Buraselis 2014, 167–8).

²⁰⁶ This formulation indicates either a law or ‘that a conventional set of honours had arisen in practice’: Mack 2015, 123.

²⁰⁷ See Mack 2015, 324–6, no.11, Table 10 and map 11, for a synoptic presentation of the *proxenoi* of Kleitor.

²⁰⁸ Marek (1984, 21) gives c.18 *proxenoi* at Mantinea, which is mistaken. A Mantinean is recorded in l. 76 and there follow names under another heading until l. 81. The names recorded in ll. 77–81 could belong to either ΤΙΤΑΙΕΙΣ (restored by Hiller von Gaertringen in his commentary) or ΠΙΤΑΙΕΙΣ, as seems preferable to Rizakis 1995, 369–70. In ll. 115–19 only 5 names of Mantineans are recorded.

Hiller restores [Τεγεᾶται] in l. 1 on the basis of the identification of Νεοκλῆς Νέωνος (l.3) with the Νεοκλῆς in the Tegean dedication *IG* V.2.106: see *IG* V.2, *add.* p.146.

On the Elean *proxenoi* of Kleitor see Zoumbaki 2005, 76, Α 50 Ἀλκείας; 184, Θ 11 Θεόδωρος; 194, Θ 28 Θράσων; 239–40, Λ 15 Λεάγρος; 263, Ν 1 Νεοκλῆς; 357, Φ 20 Φιλιστέας. Neokles and Leagros are Pisatans from Opous: see Roy 1999a, 165, n.80.

[ΦΛΕΙΑ]ΣΙΟΙ is restored by Hiller in l. 138.

²⁰⁹ For the multiple phases of the inscription see Mack 2015, 325; see Habicht 1998b, 490, on the *termini* established by the inscription: Mantinea is recorded in ll. 75 and 114, which shows that at least this part of the list is older than Mantinea’s renaming as Antigoneia; the upper limit is set by the Elean Thrason, son of Tereus in l. 55; Thrason must be the father of Tereus who was *theōrodochos* for Delphi between 230 and 210. See also Zoumbaki 2005, 194, Θ28, arguing for the Elean identity of Thrason.

²¹⁰ Rizakis 1995, no.712 (*IG*.V.1.1387), notes that possibly a citizen of Aigion was victorious at the Hemerasia. This athlete was a specialist in Peloponnesian games; he was also victorious at the Poseidaia of Antigoneia/Mantinea and the Aleaia of Tegea: see Robert 1930, 36, on ll. 3–4.

²¹¹ On the date see Themelis 1994, 27–8. Sève (2008, 123) suggests that the decree could postdate by several years the agreement between Damophon and Lykosoura. Grandjean and Nicolet-Pierre (2008, esp. 132–3) suggest a date for the decree between 210 and 180 while tetradrachms of Athenian standard were still in circulation (a debt to Damophon is calculated in silver tetradrachms).

²¹² The date is suggested by Rizakis 1995, 358.

²¹³ The decrees for Lykiskos and Kleophaes (Table 15, nos. 11, 13) record a προστάτας ἁλιαίας; a προστάτας βουλᾶς appears in the decrees for Pannis and Agesimachos (nos. 7, 10). This probably indicates some administrative change (Sherk 1990, 264). The *epōnymos* official in Table 15, no.10 is now a *damiorgos* who has replaced the *theoros*, a change that can be associated with influence of the Achaian Confederacy (Veligianni-Terzi 1977, 65–7).

In the decrees for Tyteas, Ainesan[dros] and Larchippos (Table 15, nos. 12, 15, 16) the *boulē* appears in the preamble, along with the *polis* of the Orchomenians, as a decision-making body. See Plassart and Blum 1914, 472, who associate the *boulē* with Spartan influence.

²¹⁴ Plassart and Blum (1914, 459) argue that Lykiskos is an Arkadian on the basis of the dialect form of the patronymic (in the genitive).

²¹⁵ Theoxis belongs to a rare type of *theōrodokos*, that of someone appointed to entertain *theōroi* sent to participate in a festival (not to announce one): Perlman 2000, 13, 17 and n.24.

²¹⁶ On the date see Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino 1999, 296–7.

²¹⁷ The inscription is very fragmentary; an argument in favour of a bilateral grant of citizenship is found in *IG* V.2. 389, ll.15–16, where an Anthesilaos Stymphalios is recorded as holding the office of *oikonomos*: see Schmitt, *SV* A III, pp. 347–8; also Nielsen 2002, 461–2, 502.

²¹⁸ See Nielsen 2002, 502, who also warns that this absence might have been accidental.

²¹⁹ See Table 13, nos. 1, 4, and Table 16 no.20.

²²⁰ Only the beginning of the decree has survived; Timokles Ἀπολλωνίου Μεγαλοπολίτας παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐνπολιτεύσας [‘enjoyed citizen rights’] ἔτη καὶ πλείω τὰν [τ]ε ἀναστροφὰν ἐποιήσατο (ll. 3–4).

²²¹ For the *terminus ante quem* and the lacuna in Pausanias’ text see Jacquemin 2002, 217; also Zoumbaki 2005, 238, Λ 9 Λάμπρος.

²²² Six more honorific decrees for Damophon are preserved on the same *stēlē*, from mainland and island *poleis*; on Damophon’s career see Themelis 1994 and for a synopsis Schultz 2012. Sève (2008, 125–8) assembles the epigraphic evidence for Damophon.

²²³ On the Lykosoura group see Paus. 8.37.4–5; Themelis 1994, 23–4; Jost 1998, 249–52.

²²⁴ Themelis 1993, 102–3 and 1994, 26–7; Sève 2008, 121 and n.32.

²²⁵ *IG* V.2.539 and 540 are dedications of Damophon and his son Xenophilos at Lykosoura; Themelis 1993, 103; 1994, 23. Damophon had also been active at Megalopolis: see *IG* V.2.454 (dedication of Damophon to Poseidon) and Paus. 8.31.6 reporting a cult group representing Demeter and Kore Soteira in Megalopolis, probably as part of a rebuilding programme after the sack of Megalopolis by Kleomenes III in 223; see Themelis 1994, 23.

²²⁶ See Mack 2015, 152–6, on the significance and purposes of proxeny lists.

²²⁷ On Kleitor’s territory see Paus. 8.21.1; Jost 1985, 38–9; Kleitor was fortified by a fine stone wall of 2.5km and enclosing c. 58ha, built in c.300: Nielsen 2004a, 515 with references. On Kleitor’s defence network see Pikoulas 1999b, 145–54.

²²⁸ See Introduction, n.11.

²²⁹ On one more occasion the awarding *polis* is unknown: *IG* V.2.436.

²³⁰ See Paschidis 2008a, 221, n.5 with earlier bibliography.

²³¹ See Dubois 1988, II, 84 citing other examples.

²³² See Ch. 7, p.271, Table 2. The association is made by Bérard 1892, 543–7, no.4 (ed. princeps), who also notes the modesty of the honours, according to the law (l. 7): simply a proclamation and a decree.

²³³ Jost (1998, 287) raises the possibility that the trophies might be meant metaphorically.

²³⁴ See Ch. 4, p.130 and n.58.

²³⁵ See Baladié 1980, 190–1, on Arkadia as a region well known for pasture. Chandezon (2008, 109) notes that the Peloponnese – mainly Lakonia and eastern Arkadia, as well as Methana – offers us 30 decrees awarding the *epinomia* while only Thessaly offers more. Lousoi awarded *epinomia* to Olympichos of Charadros (for its possible location see Perlman 2000, 240, n.4 with bibliography): *IG V.2.389* / Perlman 2000, 240, L 1 / *IPArk* 36q = ll. 4–12. Tegea offered *epinomia* to the Aitolian Damatrios (*IG V.2.10* / *IPArk* 36b = ll. 3–7), to the Thessalian Hagesandros (*IG V.2.11* / *Syll.*³ 501 / *IPArk* 36c = ll. 5–12), and to another three of unknown origin (*IG V.2.13* / *IPArk* 36e = ll.1–8. Also *IG V.2.17* / *IPArk* 36g = ll. 1–7 and *IG V.2.18*). Orchomenos also offered *epinomia* to the eminent Athenian envoys on the eve of the Chremonidean War (ed. pr. Plassart and Blum 1914, 451–4, no.1 / *ISE* 53 = *SEG* 25.443 / Dubois 1988, II, 164–6) – at least *prima facie* this had no practical value. There is another Orchomenian decree granting *epinomia* and *epiksyllia* to the Lakedaimonian Kleoxenos (along with a golden crown and a bronze statue) but this probably dates after 146 (Woodward, A. M. and Robert, L. 1927–28, 57–62, no.84 = *SEG* 11.470; see Guarducci 1932, 84–5, for the date, based on the appearance of *synedroi* instead of *bouleutai*).

²³⁶ These rights had been awarded to a limited number of non-Peloponnesians as well; see Nielsen 2002, 472 and nn.231–5, on the privileges recorded in decrees of Arkadian *poleis*. They may have been awarded by Styμφalos and Thisoa as well (Table 15, nos. 19, 25).

²³⁷ Osborne 1987, 121; Chandezon 2008, 115.

²³⁸ Jost (1985, 119) suggests that the sanctuary for this cult could be identified with the sanctuary of Anchisia, which was located right on the border between Mantinea and Orchomenos; see also Perlman 2000, 17, n.24.

²³⁹ Jost 1985, 47–51; Rigsby 1996, 92; Nielsen 2004a, 516–17; Voyatzis 1999, 135–6, 148.

²⁴⁰ There is a list of *proxenoi* (*IG V.2.387* / Dubois 1988, II, 215–17/ Mack 2015, 326–7, no.12) from Lousoi dating to the second half of the 5th century, which shows that there may have been even more awards of *proxenia* before the 3rd century, and therefore we should be very cautious when faced with absence of evidence, whether from Lousoi or elsewhere.

²⁴¹ The temple of Artemis was raided by the Aitolians in the 240s and threatened by them once more in 220, but the Lousiatans averted the danger by giving the Aitolians some furnishings of the goddess (Polyb. 9.34.8–10 and 4.18.9–12). See Rigsby 1996, 91; Scholten 2000, 118–19; Perlman 2000, 160, on the archaeological evidence for the development of the sanctuary. The games are attested down to the 2nd and the 1st centuries; *IG V.1.1387* records victories of an unknown individual at the Hemerasia and the Poseidaia of Thouria.

²⁴² 1,000 inhabitants maximum; see Nielsen 2004a, 516 with references.

²⁴³ Hiller (in Lattermann and Hiller von Gaertringen 1915, 83–9) dated the decree to 218, associating it with a battle near Stymphalos in which Philip V defeated an army of Eleans and Aitolians and captured 1,200 men (Polyb. 4.68–9). In their view, the Stymphalians thank various Greeks for the liberation of captives – in this and another five decrees of the *stēlē*. Bielman (1994, 222–3) observes that there are two serious problems with this view: 1) commonly, it is the *polis* from which the captives originate that honours the liberators; if we accept Hiller’s view, we must accept that Stymphalos honoured a Megalopolitan for the liberation of Elean captives; 2) the liberators come from the enemy’s camp.

²⁴⁴ *IG* V.2.351, ll. 3–4: [α]ι καὶ ἐν τοῖς νῦν περιεστακό[σ]ι παργεγε | νημίνος εὐρέ[θη] πᾶσι, δεδόχθαι πολίταν θ |; Hiller von Gaertringen, in Lattermann and Hiller von Gaertringen 1915, p.87, ll. 3–4: [α]ι καὶ ἐν τοῖς νῦν σὺν Μακεδόν[σ]ι παργεγε | νημίνος εὐρέ[θη] ἀγαθὸς ἐών, καὶ πολίταν θ |.

²⁴⁵ Dubois (1988, II, 192) agrees with Taeuber on the significance of the digamma but disagrees with him on the *stoichedon* style as an indication of date since, as he rightly points out, the style is found even in the late 3rd century (in Phigaleia). Thus, cautiously, he prefers to date the inscription to c. 300.

²⁴⁶ Taeuber also believes that a second decree, by the Arkadian Alea, is inserted in ll. 6–8, and restores Ἀλεαίοις in l. 6. It is Alea then, in Taeuber’s view, that honours Megalopolis with a crown worth 300 *drachmai*. One problem is, as Dubois (1988, II, 192) has pointed out, that the ethnic Ἀλεαῖος is first attested much later, in Stephanos Byzantios. Another is the reason for which the Stymphalians would have inserted a decree by another *polis*.

²⁴⁷ On the date see Perlman 2000, 163.

²⁴⁸ [Δαμ]ασίλας in *IG* IV 727 A.

²⁴⁹ The date of the list is determined by the *theōrodochos* in Pellene: Peisias, son of Memnon, most probably the father of the *damiorgos* who refused to put to the vote the matter of the alliance with Rome in 198 but changed his mind after the intervention of his father: Livy 32.22.5–8 and Perlman 2000, 162.

²⁵⁰ The only difference between *IG* IV 497 and *Syll.*³ 594 is in l. 14: Πρότιμον [Τιμάρχου αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκγόν] in the former, Πρότιμον [καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκγόν] in the latter.

²⁵¹ See also the commentary by Charneux 1991, 302–6, no.III.

²⁵² Sparta is being referred to as *polis Lakedaimoniōn*. For this expression in Classical literature see Ducat 2008, 72–3 and 2010, 191–4.

²⁵³ See also Siedentopf 1968, 25 and 100, no.44; at p.25 he notes that the monument carried two more equestrian statues, in his view those of his fellow envoys in the embassy to Rome in 180 (see pp.349, 358).

²⁵⁴ See Ch. 4, pp.125–6 and nn. 42–3, on the date of the monument for Damostratos.

²⁵⁵ Maddoli, Nafissi and Saladino (1999, 179–80, 272) suggest that Agathinos’ father Thrasyboulos may be identified with the seer Thrasyboulos (Paus. 6.2.4), supporter of Pyrrhos and instigator of the assassination of the Elean tyrant Aristotimos (see Ch. 4, n.48); on this possibility see also Jacquemin 2002, 194–5 who suggests that Agathinos may also have been a seer and part of the anti-Spartan group in Pellene, in which case he may have offered his services in the period between 225 and 222. See also Zoumbaki 2005, 47, A 5. There are far too many ‘ifs’ in this theory; above all it ultimately relies on Pausanias’ (8.10.5–8) unreliable information that Thrasyboulos

played a part in a joint Achaian-Arkadian battle against Sparta in the 240s: see Ch. 4, n.93.

²⁵⁶ On Chilon's death see this chapter, p.414 and n.51.

²⁵⁷ See Ch. 7, p.291 and n.89.

²⁵⁸ Pausanias writes 'Ἀχαιῶν ἀνάθημα'; therefore we should not exclude the possibility that it was the Achaian *poleis* that honoured Pantarkes.

²⁵⁹ It is not certain whether Aristainos should be identified with the well-known *stratēgos*. Plutarch calls Aristainos, the *stratēgos*, a Megalopolitan, in *Phil.* 17.3. Pausanias (8.51.4) also calls him a Megalopolitan. Polybius does not record the *stratēgos*' place of origin, while in 11.11.7 he records that Aristainetos Dymaios was the *hipparchos* in the battle of Mantinea in 207 – most probably the 'Aristainetos' is a mistake of the manuscripts (Errington 1969, 277). As to epigraphic evidence, *FD* III.3.122 (Table 16, no.25) records that Aristainos, son of Timokades, Dymaios, was honoured by the *Koinon* of the Achaians for his *eunoia* towards the *ethnos*, the allies and the other Greeks. The Cretan city of Aptera conferred proxeny upon Aristainos, Achaian, son of Damokades (*Inscr. Cret.* II.3.6F / Rizakis 1995, no.684); the 'Δαμοκάδης' is almost certainly an error: see Niccolini 1913 (*non vidi*) and Rizakis 1995, 353 with bibliography. Finally, Aristainos dedicated a statue in honour of Flamininus at Corinth, probably between 196 and 194 (*Corinth* VIII.1.72 / Bousquet 1964, 607–9, restoring Ἀρίσταινος Τιμοκάδης Δυμαῖος] in l.2 / *ISE* 37 / Rizakis 1995, no.629). Niccolini (1913), Aymard (1938b, 68, n.93), Moretti (*ISE* 37, at p.86), Walbank (1967, 287 and 1979, 187), Errington (1969, Appendix 4, 276–9) and Rizakis (1995, no.630, at p.353) believe that Aristainos of Dyme should be identified with the well-known *stratēgos*. On the other hand, Deininger (1966) argues that the *stratēgos* was Megalopolitan and distinguishes him from the Dymaian Aristainos, arguing for the credibility of the information provided by the above-mentioned literary sources as well as by Plut. *Phil.* 13.4; he is followed by O'Neil (1986–87, 36) who, however, correctly points out that this passage does not record that Aristainos was Megalopolitan. Baronowski (2013, 52–3 and n.40 at pp.192–3) also believes that Deininger's view is attractive, suggesting that the Delphic statue might have honoured Aristainos for his performance at the battle of Mantinea; he also suggests that l.2 in the dedication for Flamininus could be restored as Ἀρίσταινος στραταγὸς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν].

However, it is easier to believe that Plutarch and Pausanias (following Plutarch) have made an error than that there were two contemporary politicians extremely important for the Achaian Confederacy, bearing the same rare name.

²⁶⁰ Siedentopf 1968, 24–5 and 114, no. 76; Jacquemin 1999, 308, no. 004.

²⁶¹ Siedentopf 1968, 25 and 108–9, no. 65; Jacquemin 1999, 200, 308, no. 005.

²⁶² On the festival of Demeter Chthonia see Paus. 2.35.4–8; Perlman 2000, 162–6.

²⁶³ Perlman 2000, 13–14, 17: Agoraisos is only one of seven *theōrodochoi* who act as hosts of 'festival-goers', i.e. not of *theōroi* sent to announce celebration of a festival; adoption of this title by the former is not attested before the late 3rd century.

²⁶⁴ See also Makres (2009, 188–94) on the history of Asine and the use of Apollo Maleatas as a symbol of the Dryopian identity of the Asinaians, probably in the late 2nd century; Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994, 63–5.

²⁶⁵ Paschidis 2008a, 221, n.5, on the date; Mandel 1979, 301; Apega in Polyb. 13.7.6.

²⁶⁶ Perlman 2000, 161, n.22: the name of another Peloponnesian *theōrodochos* could have been recorded between the names of those from Aigion and Thelphousa.

²⁶⁷ Mykenai has its own assembly and officials (the *damiorgoi*, an *agōnothetēs*, a *tamias* and a *grophheus*: Fossey 1997, 56). On the other hand, all the institutions that we read about in these decrees imitate those of Argos: Piérart 1997, 339–40.

²⁶⁸ In the editio princeps of the decree for Damokleidas, Boethius (1921–23, 408–9) restored ll.10–15 as follows: [ν]ονς αὐτοῦ καλίσθα[ι ἐς προ] | ἐδρίαν τοῖς Διονυσί[οις καθά] | καὶ τὸν ἄ[λλων] εὐεργέ[ταν καὶ ἅ] | [ν]ανεώ[ίσθαι τοῖς Λακεδαίμονι] | [οἰς τ]ἄν κοινανίαν ἀγ[ώνων, ὧν] | ἡ κώμα τίθητι · ἀγγράψ[αι δὲ το δό] |.

Against this view, which has Mykenai renewing the right of the Spartans to participate in the Dionysia, i.e. conducting foreign relations with Sparta, Piérart (1992, 383–5) rightly points out that Mykenai, being a *kōmē* of Argos (see Ch. 1, n.35 and this chapter, nn.129, 132), was in no such position; instead it could only bestow local privileges. Thus, Piérart plausibly restores ll. 11–15, on the basis of *Jyll.*³ 594: καθάπερ] | καὶ τὸν<ς> ἄ[λλων] εὐεργέ[ταν τῶν Μυ] | [κ]ανέω[ν· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι (vel αὐτοῖς] | [καὶ τ]ἄν κοινανίαν ἀγ[ώνων οὖς] | [ἡ] κώμα τίθητι.

²⁶⁹ Boethius (1921–23, 425), assuming that the Argives were continuously and wholeheartedly hostile to Nabis, suggests that the decree could date shortly after the peace of 195, in the spring of 194, ‘and be a consequence of the pacific Roman policy of the years 195 and 194’.

²⁷⁰ Fossey (1997, 57–8), taking into account Argive oppressive policy towards its neighbours in the Argolid in the 5th century, views Nabis’ policy as exploitation of internal rivalry between Argos and Mykenai due to the expansionist policy of the former and the consequent (in his view) pro-Spartan stance of the latter. However, he does not take into account the fact that Mykenai was inhabited by Argives.

²⁷¹ Boethius 1921–23, 425; Errington 1969, 37 and n.1; Bielman 1994, 162.

²⁷² The decree records that Protimos made every effort (τὰν ἡπανσαν σπουδὰν ἔθετο; ll. 9–10) to save the ephebes; there is no reference to Protimos contributing his own money.

²⁷³ Errington 1969, 34–48 (he assumes that Protimos was a Cretan); Brulé 1978, 46–50.

²⁷⁴ Ma 2013, 97–8; Cartledge 2002b, 84.

²⁷⁵ See Ch. 8, p.342 and n.119.

²⁷⁶ Signs of Corinthian activity in the second half of the 3rd century: the proxeny decree possibly for the Kalydonian Pantaleon (*Corinth* VIII.3.37 as restored by Bousquet 1967, 298–9 = *SEG* 25.325); another for a certain Chairesilaos (*Corinth* VIII.1.3); *asylia* for Magnesia and isopythic status for the Leukophryena (*I.Magnesia* 42 / Rigsby 1996, no.92). Elis for the Asklepieia of Kos in 242: Rigsby 1996, no.17; reference to Elean recognition of the Leukophryena is appended to a decree of the Achaian Confederacy: *I. Magnesia* 39 / Rigsby 1996, no.89, ll. 48–9.

²⁷⁷ Robertson 1976, 264; Harter-Uibopuu 1998, 111, no.13c. For the judges see Zoumbaki 2005, 116–17, A *125 Ἀρχεμαχίδας; 117, A *126 Ἀρχέμαχος; 145, Δ *30 Δικαίαρχος; 257, M *17 Μνασέας; 266, N *9 Νικάτα[ς]; 269, N *19 Νικοκλῆς; 299–300, Π *26 Πολύξενος; 340, T *26 Τιμοσθένης; 382–3, nos. *4, 7, 10 names unknown; the asterisk denotes conferred Elean citizenship: Zoumbaki 2005, 38.

²⁷⁸ The only decree of Sikyon extant is the one acknowledging *asylia* for Magnesia on the Maiaander: *I.Magnesia* 41 / Rizakis 1995, no.690A / Rigsby 1996, no.91.

²⁷⁹ On Gerenia (or Gerena), which may have belonged to Messenia after 338/7, see

Chapter 9

Paus. 3.26.8 and Shipley 2004a, 556. P. Themelis kindly invited me to check Messenian inscriptions and Voula Bardani very generously shared with me information on Messenian decrees as well as decrees for Messenians, especially judges. Generally speaking, the Messenians appear to be very active after the mid-2nd century, offering their services as judges to states outside the Peloponnese.

²⁸⁰ See this chapter, p.446 and nn.207–8.

²⁸¹ Daux 1966, 288–91 on the nature and location of the statue.

²⁸² Roy 2003a, 81.

²⁸³ As with Elis and Corinth, there is also an Achaian decree recorded by Magnesia on the Maiander: Rigsby 1996, no.89.

CONCLUSIONS

When I first started this book I was hoping that I would not have to deal with Sparta at almost every step of the way. My hopes were to a certain extent belied. The Spartans were present even when they were absent from the scene of political-military events, in the sense that their leadership came to be greatly missed. Both their presence and their absence shaped Peloponnesian politics. To a degree this reflects the nature of the literary sources and their interests. But essentially it was the fact that the Spartans themselves after the battle of Leuktra kept coming back, sooner or later. Commonly, emphasis is laid on Sparta's weakness in Hellenistic times, as compared to its power in the Classical era. Certainly, this theme is valid. Sparta never became again what it had been – with perhaps the exception of the few years of Kleomenes III's rule. On the other hand, Spartan vitality after almost every military blow suffered is remarkable and, literally, incomparable.

The geo-political map of the Peloponnese changed after Leuktra. Of course the Spartan state was heavily reduced after the creation of the Messenian state by the Thebans. But more cuts followed: after the battle of Chaironeia in 338, in the late 3rd and the early 2nd centuries. Yet, Sparta remained a large state in terms of extent and population. The size of Lakonia and its human resources was Sparta's ultimate strength, combined with the innovative spirit of its rulers in the second half of the 3rd and the early 2nd centuries, who revolutionized Spartan society in order to create formidable armies.

The vacuum of leadership created in the Peloponnese after 371 was not filled by any other Peloponnesian power until the mid-3rd century when the Achaian Confederacy emerged. In the meantime, non-Peloponnesian powers became regulators of the geo-political map of the Peloponnese. First it was the Thebans under the leadership of Epameinondas who created the Messenian state at the expense of Sparta. Then, in the 340s, the power vacuum allowed Philip II of Macedon unrestrained infiltration into Peloponnesian politics. From 338 and until the early 2nd century, the kings of Macedon had control of a large part of the Peloponnese, though not continuously and only in varying degrees. With Philip II there emerged the practice of treating Peloponnesian territories as gifts – in fact it was largely Arkadian territories that were treated in this manner. Philip II sliced off Lakedaimonian territory to the benefit of Sparta's rivals: Argos, Messene and Megalopolis; Tegea also received a share. Along with Elis,

both Argos and Megalopolis emerged now as the great Peloponnesian powers in terms of size and population but Lakonia still was larger than each one of them. Increased territory was not translated into military and political superiority, evidently because these cities lacked experience – and confidence – in military and political leadership. The Argives and the Megalopolitans became major Peloponnesian powers, in terms of territory, without showing any signs of military excellence. Only in the last decades of the 3rd century did Argos and especially Megalopolis achieve the status of active agents in Peloponnesian politics, and this as members of the Achaian Confederacy.

The military weakness of the Achaian Confederacy in its confrontation with the Spartan Kleomenes III made the Macedonian kings once again the regulators of interstate Peloponnesian relations. In 222, after his victory over Kleomenes, Antigonos III Doson followed Philip II's practice towards Sparta: territories taken away by Kleomenes were now restored or reconfirmed to Megalopolis, Messenia and Argos. Doson's successor, Philip V, also re-arranged the map of the Peloponnese during the Social War (220–17), by stripping the Eleans of their extensive sphere of control and by treating most of his newly-won Arkadian territories as gifts to the Achaian Confederacy. In 199/8 Philip V restored the remaining Arkadian territories in his possession to the Achaian Confederacy. Shortly afterwards it was the turn of the Romans to regulate intra-Peloponnesian relations by treating Corinth, Argos and Messene as gifts to the Achaian Confederacy.

* * *

The 4th century cast a very long shadow over Peloponnesian politics in the Hellenistic period. The main features of interstate Peloponnesian relations were in fact shaped during the forty years after 371, and especially by the years after 362.

Two new states were created c. 370/369 as a bulwark against Sparta: that of Messenia, headed by Messene, and the Arkadian Megalopolis. Both Megalopolis and Messenia were artificial and therefore unstable units. This feature led to the dismemberment of the Messenian state in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries. Megalopolitan communities were also detached from Megalopolis in the early 2nd century. Both had acquired large territories thanks to external powers, and not to any military skills of their own. Accustomed to receiving territories as gifts, Messene claimed, unsuccessfully, from the Romans the restoration of communities that had become independent members of the Achaian Confederacy.

Messenia was a militarily weak state from the start and this weakness

coupled with its long history of subjugation to Sparta and detachment from Peloponnesian politics led the Messenians to seek powerful protectors outside the Peloponnese from the mid-4th century onwards: first Macedon, then Aitolia, and finally Rome. Megalopolis was also militarily feeble, despite its size and population, but acquired power through its membership in the Achaian Confederacy from 235. Both states owed their existence to the fear of Sparta, but Megalopolis itself came to be the enemy of the two others in the early 2nd century. Through the actions of Megalopolitan *stratēgoi* and the Romans, Messene was coerced into becoming part of the Achaian Confederacy in 191 and, following its unsuccessful revolt, again in 182. Controversy continued in the form of a series of arbitrations over territory, and in this case the Messenians were able to prevail upon the Megalopolitans.

Both Messene and Megalopolis remained enemies of Sparta but their hostility was expressed in different ways. The enmity between the Spartans and the Messenians rarely took the form of armed conflict. There is evidence for Spartan attacks in the mid-4th century and after that in the late 280s – early 270s. In the late 3rd century Spartan rulers made only a few half-hearted and unsuccessful attacks on Messenia. On the other hand, there is evidence for co-operation between the two states in the late 270s against Pyrrhos of Epeiros. A long period of peace followed. Most importantly, Kleomenes III, the Spartan king who made the most serious attempt to restore Spartan hegemony, chose not to attack Messenia. However, some hostility between Sparta and Messenia persisted. It was characteristically expressed in the form of non-cooperation against their common enemy, the Achaian Confederacy, in the early 2nd century. Hostility between Sparta and Messenia went on after the Roman conquest in 146 down to at least the time of Tiberius (AD 25), in the form of a series of arbitrations over the Dentheliatis.

By contrast, hostility between Sparta and Megalopolis came to be extremely violent. In the late 350s the Megalopolitans were incapable of facing Spartan attacks on their own. In the early 270s they were faced with the threat of a Spartan attack and c. 262 they had their first and, for a long time, last success against the Spartans. Kleomenes III thoroughly sacked Megalopolis in 223. The scales were tipped in favour of the Megalopolitans in the late 3rd and the early 2nd century. Through Philopoimen, the Megalopolitan *stratēgos* of the Achaian Confederacy, Megalopolis outdid Sparta militarily and twice forced it to become a member of the Confederacy. Like the Messenians, the Spartans claimed restoration of their ancestral territories from the Megalopolitans. Unlike the Messenians, the Spartans failed.

* * *

The aftermath of Leuktra showed the demoralizing effect Sparta had exercised on its enemies, the Argives, the Eleans and the Arkadians. All depended on Theban leadership to attack their old enemy. The Argives, the only rivals of Sparta for supremacy in the Peloponnese in the remote past, had suffered from the Spartans in the past and thus had every reason to be afraid of them. As mentioned, the Argives remained largely content with the territorial gift by Philip II and at no time did they attempt to translate their territorial superiority into political control over the Peloponnese. Throughout the 4th and the 3rd centuries, with a few exceptions, the Argives showed a marked preference for avoidance of warfare, partly due to severe civic strife. Instead, from the late 4th onwards the Argives chose to assert themselves in the Argolid and in the wider Greek world through the organization of the festivals of the Nemeia and the Hekatomboia/Heraia. As to the Eleans, they had always been militarily inferior to the Spartans, although they had fared better than the Argives.

The Arkadians alone attempted to form a new power unit by establishing a Confederacy c.370. It was an abortive attempt for various reasons. No Arkadian *polis* had any experience in leadership on a grand scale, although the most important of them had established control over their neighbours. Not all Arkadians shared anti-Spartan feelings or maintained constantly a single attitude towards the Thebans. The old rivalry between Tegea and Mantinea persisted and a new conflict arose over relations with the Eleans. Thus, by 362, the Confederacy was split into two groups and crossed swords at the battle of Mantinea – one group was headed by Sparta, the other by Thebes. The Confederacy was never restored in its *original* form but there are signs of revival in a *loose* form.

Apart from the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis, the most important developments in Peloponnesian interstate relations are first observable within the period from 371 and 330, in the attitudes of Elis and the Arkadian *poleis* towards Sparta, as well as in intra-Arkadian relations. These changes essentially form the mould for future relations.

In the absence of Sparta's firm grip over Peloponnesian affairs, in 365 the Arkadians tried to expand to territory that had belonged to Elis until the late 5th century – Triphylia and Lasion, which claimed to be Arkadian – and even to acquire control over Olympia. The Eleans regained Olympia but lost Triphylia. Due to their conflict with the Arkadians the Eleans switched from being anti- to pro-Spartan. This shift of allegiance proved to be long-lasting – down to the end of the 3rd century. On two occasions, the Eleans allied with the Spartans against Macedon: in 331/0 with Agis III and in the 260s with Areus. In the 220s they were also on the side of Kleomenes III against the Achaian Confederacy, though probably not

actively. In the Social War, the Eleans and the Spartans were in the same camp against Macedon and the Achaian Confederacy. Indeed, relations with the Spartans were the only steady intra-Peloponnese political relations the Eleans had from 365 onwards. Like the Messenians, in the 3rd century they preferred to be allied with the same *external* power, i.e. the Aitolians, their alleged kinsmen. Like the Messenians, the Eleans joined the Achaian Confederacy in 191, when they were deprived of Aitolian support.

The Eleans lacked military leadership and perhaps military competence in general but they did entertain micro-imperialistic ambitions over Arkadian territories. Having failed militarily in the 360s, they achieved expansion via gifts. They never renounced their claim to Triphylia and in the mid-3rd century regained it, perhaps as a gift from the Aitolians. In the same period they acquired Alipheira as a gift from the Megalopolitan tyrant Lydiadas. The most symbolically significant gift came from Kleomenes III: reversing the Spartan policy of c.400 he offered Lasion to Elis. In the course of the Social War (220–217), the old feud with the Arkadians over Triphylia and Lasion was transformed into a feud with the Achaian Confederacy, and the Eleans time and again invaded the territory of Achaia proper (under Aitolian leadership). However, the Macedonian king Philip V curtailed Elean ambitions.

Important changes are observed in intra-Arkadian relations from the late 360s onwards. Due to their rivalry with Tegea and the Thebans, the Mantineans allied with Sparta in 362, fighting against Megalopolis and Tegea. As in the case of Elis, this shift towards the Spartans proved to be long-lasting, down to the depopulation of Mantinea by the Macedonians and the Achaian Confederacy in 223. After 362, the Arkadians seem to be politically divided into two units, one headed by Mantinea and the other by Megalopolis – nothing unusual in this intra-Arkadian competition, and very much in line with previous intra-Arkadian relations. By 342 the Megalopolitans appear to be on their own, thus foreshadowing their political detachment from the rest of the Arkadians in the 330s and afterwards.

Macedonian rulers reshaped intra-Arkadian relations. As mentioned, after the battle of Chaironeia, Philip II reduced severely Spartan territory, to the benefit of Argos, Messene, Tegea and Megalopolis. Megalopolis' size now must have appeared quite menacing to its Arkadian neighbours. Furthermore, Philip's gift created long-lasting bonds between Megalopolis and the Macedonian kings, which detached, politically, the Megalopolitans from their fellow Arkadians. In the spring of 331, Agis III called the Peloponnesians to arms against Macedon. The Arkadian *poleis* demonstrated a markedly pro-Spartan attitude: all accepted – except for Megalopolis.

Former rivals, Orchomenos and Mantinea, and especially Mantinea and Tegea, were brought together because of a common enemy. This 'coming together' of Mantinea and Tegea outlived the war. In 324, Alexander ordered the restoration of exiles, and the Tegeans delegated the resolution of disputes arising from their return to a Mantinean court.

Agis' War is the first instance of Spartans in the role of champions of freedom from Macedon. The Spartans assumed the role again in the 3rd century. It is the last occasion, until the battle of Sellasia in 222, that we hear of Peloponnesians participating in war in impressive numbers – apart from the Arkadians, the Eleans and the Achaians (except for Pellene) also took part.

Between 330 and 280 the Peloponnesian *poleis*, with the exception of Sparta, were caught first in the struggle between Macedonians, the regent Polyperchon and Kassandros, and later between Kassandros and the Antigonids. The *Diadochoi*'s struggle had a curiously positive impact, generating unanimity among the majority of the Arkadians. Most Arkadians (and most Peloponnesians) took sides with the regent while the Megalopolitans demonstrated their difference again by choosing Kassandros. There is even the possibility that Polyperchon revived temporarily the Arkadian Confederacy. On the other hand, the involvement in the *Diadochoi*'s struggle for power essentially dissolved the Achaian Confederacy. Kassandros' intervention in Messenia caused rupture between Messene and the other *poleis* of Messenia.

In the 3rd century, the Spartans in the role of champion of freedom from Macedonian rulers lured Peloponnesian *poleis* to their side. The Megalopolitans again distanced themselves from other Arkadians by not participating in the so-called Chremonidean War against Antigonos II Gonatas of Macedon in the 260s.

The preference of the Arkadians for the Spartans in general, and in particular for the Spartans over the Macedonians, became even more manifest in the 220s. Between the Achaian Confederacy on the one hand, and Kleomenes III of Sparta on the other, the eastern Arkadian *poleis* chose Sparta; when the Achaian Confederacy forged an alliance with Macedon in 224, their choice was again Sparta.

The picture of Arkadian solidarity is corroborated by epigraphic evidence. Among the Peloponnesian states, it is largely Arkadian *poleis* that bestow citizenship, and this to fellow Arkadians. In those turbulent times, small cities had to reduce the chance of war by their own initiative. The other main liaison of Arkadian *poleis* was with Argos, as evidenced by Argive decrees awarding citizens of Arkadian *poleis* the *proxenia* and the *theōrodokia* (in order to promote their festivals).

Perhaps the most intriguing manifestation of Spartan allure is offered by Argos. In the Classical period Sparta had always been Argos' enemy par excellence. In the 3rd and the 2nd centuries there are three instances of departure from hostility. First, the Argives helped the Spartans against Pyrrhos of Epeiros, though probably not so much out of sympathy for Sparta as out of allegiance to the Macedonian king Antigonos Gonatas, Pyrrhos' rival. In the war of Kleomenes the Argives seceded from the Achaian Confederacy and allied (briefly) with Sparta. Kleomenes either had from the beginning, or subsequently acquired, supporters in Argos although their number and identity is problematic. In 197 Argos came under the control of the Spartan Nabis. In this case, the support for Nabis must have been significant. In both cases Spartan attractiveness was the result of the unattractiveness of the Achaian Confederacy of which the Argives had been unenthusiastic members.

In the mid-3rd century, the renascent Achaian Confederacy stepped up to fill the vacuum of leadership in the Peloponnese. Its hegemony succeeded Sparta in its role of champion of freedom from Macedon. In fact it was more successful since its *stratēgos* Aratos of Sikyon liberated Akrokorinthos and Corinth from the Macedonian garrison (a Macedonian garrison had been there since 338/7). Thereafter the Confederacy expanded steadily: first to the north-eastern and then to the central Peloponnese, depriving Macedon of its control over the Peloponnese. The appeal of the new political formation varied and was neither universal nor steady.

The Achaian Confederacy outdid Sparta in terms of territory and population but it did not really achieve supremacy in the Peloponnese. Very much unlike Classical Sparta it needed external backing to maintain its hegemony, from the start: first Ptolemy III of Egypt and, in 224, when it was losing the war against Kleomenes III of Sparta, the Confederacy proclaimed as *hēgemōn* the very much present (albeit briefly) Antigonos III Doson of Macedon and, following his death, his successor Philip V. To be fair, in a world dominated by kings with large armies and substantial resources, neither would the Spartans have been able to achieve supremacy on their own.

Achaian expansion was too rapid. There had been insufficient time to develop mechanisms of expansion and hegemony, other than straightforward incorporation. None of the Confederacy's constituent states had been accustomed to lead, no military apparatus had evolved. Thus, it was shaken to its core when it faced the challenge of Kleomenes III. It proved then unable either to lead or to protect its members. The Confederacy was saved only thanks to an alliance with Macedon. In the Social War, the performance of Achaian troops was again poor.

Conclusions

In the late 3rd and the early 2nd century, the Confederacy had a formidable leader, Philopoimen, who re-organized its army and thus managed to outdo Sparta on the battlefield. The Confederacy came to unite the whole of the Peloponnese under its authority but Roman support was essential. In the end, its ongoing dispute with Sparta led to its undoing.

* * *

Modern historians in their hindsight, knowing that Sparta would never recover its Classical greatness, concentrate on the succession of foreign reductions of Spartan territory. However, each reduction, from the loss of Messenia in 370 to the erosion of Lakonia by the Romans, marks a fear that Sparta would indeed continue to threaten. The fact that Rome, when it eventually put an end even to the ‘battles of mice’ between Peloponnesian states, privileged and rewarded Sparta, is a continuation – albeit distorted – of the exceptionalism which had always clung to Sparta.

We see continuities as regards Sparta in the foreign policy of Elis, most of Arkadia, Messenia, the Achaian Confederacy: these definite patterns shaped Peloponnesian history far beyond the narrow relation of each community to Sparta. They also conditioned the relation of most major Peloponnesian powers to each other.

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